Daily Current Affairs

U.S. Announces Permanent Tariffs; India Remains at 10%

By T.C.A. Sharad Raghavan
Washington, July 25, 2026

Even as the U.S.’s temporary 10% tariffs come to an end, it has announced permanent tariffs related to its investigation into forced labour on 60 of its trading partners, including India. India’s tariff rate, however, remains at 10% instead of the proposed 12.5% after it banned the import of forced labour goods earlier this month [citation:original text].

The U.S. had in February imposed a temporary 150-day 10% tariff on all of its trade partners, which expired on Friday. In March, the office of the U.S. Trade Representative had also launched two separate investigations under Section 301 of the Trade Act, 1974 .

The new tariffs announced late Thursday night (India time) are a result of the findings of one of these investigations — the one on whether the U.S.’s trade partners were doing enough to prevent the import of goods made using forced labour .

The second investigation, into whether other economies were using excess manufacturing capacity to export to the U.S. in a manner that was hurting the U.S. economy, is still pending and could result in further tariffs .

The Legal Shift: From Section 122 to Section 301

The new tariffs represent a significant legal shift in the U.S. trade policy apparatus. The temporary 10% tariff was imposed under Section 122 of the Trade Act of 1974, a rarely used balance-of-payments tool that caps emergency tariffs at 15% for a maximum of 150 days unless Congress agrees to an extension . As that period lapsed on July 24, the administration needed a new legal vehicle to maintain its tariff wall.

Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974 provides that legal vehicle . Unlike Section 122, Section 301 allows the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) to impose tariffs or other restrictions whenever foreign government practices are found “unreasonable” and burdensome for U.S. commerce . Importantly, these duties can remain in effect indefinitely until actively modified or withdrawn by the administration .

The move is also a direct response to a February 2026 U.S. Supreme Court ruling that struck down President Trump’s previous global tariffs imposed under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) . The administration has since been seeking alternative legal authorities to maintain its tariff policy, and Section 301, which has survived prior court challenges, offers a more durable foundation .

The Forced Labour Investigation: India’s 10% Rate

In its July 23 notice, the USTR concluded that the failure of 60 economies to ban imports of goods made with forced labour constituted an “unreasonable” practice under Section 301 . The investigation covered over 99% of U.S. imports .

In June, the USTR had proposed a 12.5% tariff on 54 countries, including India, as they had “failed to impose and effectively enforce” prohibitions on the import of goods produced using forced labour . However, India’s swift action on this front altered its final tariff rate.

On July 13, 2026, the Directorate General of Foreign Trade (DGFT) issued Notification No. 23/2026-27, amending the Foreign Trade Policy to prohibit the import of goods produced, wholly or partly, using forced labour . The notification adopts the International Labour Organisation’s definition of forced labour and empowers the government to prohibit identified goods through future notifications following investigations .

This move by India was acknowledged by USTR Jamieson Greer, who stated, “I am encouraged by the trading partners who have moved quickly to adopt forced labour import prohibitions, and look forward to ensuring their effective enforcement” .

As a result of India’s action, it has now been included among the countries that will face a 10% tariff instead of 12.5%. These 10% tariffs will apply to countries that impose a forced labour import prohibition, have committed to impose and enforce such a prohibition through a trade agreement with the U.S., or have imposed a partial regime with the effect of preventing the import of certain forced labour goods .

Coverage and Exemptions: What It Means for Indian Exporters

The tariff structure is not uniform across all products. The USTR has exempted certain items, including raw materials that would become unavailable or cause economy-wide disruptions, and products that cannot be grown or produced in sufficient quantities or at reasonable prices in the U.S. .

For India, the impact will be sector-specific . About 70% of India’s exports to the U.S.—including engineering goods, textiles and garments, chemicals, machinery, plastics, leather products, gems and jewellery, and furniture—will now face their normal most-favoured-nation (MFN) duty plus a 10% Section 301 charge .

Products already covered by Section 232 of the U.S. Trade Expansion Act, such as steel, aluminium, copper, auto components and certain derivative products, will continue to face 25-50% tariffs in addition to the normal U.S. MFN duties. These account for about 8% of India’s exports .

A notable absence from India’s tariff treatment is the tariff-rate quota (TRQ) exemption that was granted to some other countries. Bangladesh, Cambodia, Indonesia, and Malaysia received TRQ exemptions for specified volumes of textile and apparel exports that use U.S.-origin cotton and fibre . India did not receive such an exemption, leaving some exporters concerned about their competitive position .

The Looming Overcapacity Probe

The most significant source of uncertainty for Indian exporters is the pending second Section 301 investigation—the one on structural excess capacity in manufacturing sectors, which covers 16 economies, including India .

USTR describes “structural excess capacity” as underutilised industrial production capacity that is sustained through governmental interventions or policies, contending that such excess causes other countries to have large or persistent goods trade surpluses that displace U.S. production .

While the forced labour tariffs replace an existing levy, the excess capacity investigation could result in entirely new duties on additional sectors, potentially including manufactured goods where India has a strong export presence. The investigation is ongoing, and its outcome is still uncertain.

The Broader Context: A New Trade Architecture

The new tariff regime is part of a broader restructuring of U.S. trade policy under the Trump administration. USTR Jamieson Greer, testifying before the Senate Finance Committee, characterized the U.S. trade deficit of $1.2 trillion in 2025 as a “national emergency” and committed the administration to continuing the use of tariffs as a tool of economic policy . He noted that while “the specific authorities this administration is using have changed, the trade strategy has not” .

The administration is reportedly using these tariffs as a starting point for negotiations on reciprocal trade agreements. The forced labour tariffs, along with the pending excess capacity probe, create leverage for the U.S. to extract concessions from its trading partners, including India, as it seeks to reshape its trade relationships .

Q&A Section

1. Why did India receive a lower 10% tariff instead of the proposed 12.5%?
India’s tariff rate was reduced from the proposed 12.5% to 10% because India banned the import of goods made using forced labour earlier in July 2026 [citation:original text]. The USTR acknowledged this action, placing India in a group of 17 economies that will face a 10% tariff for having adopted a forced labour import prohibition .

2. What is the legal basis for the new U.S. tariffs, and why is it significant?
The new tariffs are imposed under Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974, which allows the U.S. Trade Representative to impose tariffs on foreign practices that are “unreasonable” and burden U.S. commerce . This is significant because it replaces the temporary Section 122 tariff, which had a 150-day time limit, with a permanent legal authority that can remain in effect indefinitely .

3. What Indian exports are affected by the new 10% Section 301 tariffs?
Approximately 70% of India’s exports to the U.S. will be affected, including engineering goods, textiles and garments, chemicals, machinery, plastics, leather products, gems and jewellery, and furniture. These products will now face MFN tariffs plus an additional 10% Section 301 duty . Products covered under Section 232 (steel, aluminium, auto components) will continue to face 25-50% tariffs .

4. Are there any exemptions from the new tariffs?
Yes, the USTR has exempted certain products, including raw materials that would cause economy-wide disruptions if unavailable, and products that cannot be grown or produced in sufficient quantities or at reasonable prices in the U.S. . However, India did not receive tariff-rate quota exemptions for textiles that were granted to some other countries like Bangladesh, Cambodia, Indonesia, and Malaysia .

5. What is the status of the second Section 301 investigation on “excess capacity”?
The second investigation is still pending and could result in further tariffs on additional sectors. It covers 16 economies, including India, and examines whether their structural excess manufacturing capacity is burdening U.S. commerce . Its outcome is uncertain and could impose additional duties beyond the current 10% forced labour tariffs .

Fast-Track Special Courts: A Promise of Speed, a Reality of Backlog

By Ishita Mishra
New Delhi, July 25, 2026

A day after Prime Minister Narendra Modi called for establishing fast-track courts to ensure speedy trials in paper leak cases, data tabled by the Union Law Ministry in Parliament on Friday showed that the country’s existing Fast Track Special Courts (FTSCs) are burdened with a backlog of 2.45 lakh pending cases [citation:original text].

The Law Ministry’s response came on a question raised by BJP MPs from Uttar Pradesh and Madhya Pradesh. The two had asked about the number of FTSCs, including exclusive POCSO courts, in the country and the number of cases instituted, disposed of and pending before these courts in the past three years [citation:original text]. The MPs also sought details of funds released and measures taken to improve disposal rates and address vacancies and infrastructure gaps [citation:original text].

Responding to the queries through a written reply, Law and Justice Minister Arjun Ram Meghwal informed the Lok Sabha that 775 FTSCs, including 398 exclusive POCSO courts, were functional across 29 States and Union Territories as of April 30 [citation:original text]. These courts were established for the expeditious disposal of rape and POCSO cases [citation:original text]. He said that the courts had 2,45,579 pending cases as of December 31, 2025. According to the data shared by the Minister, FTSCs registered 1,43,936 new cases in 2025 but disposed of only 66,500 [citation:original text].

A Growing Crisis: The Numbers Behind the Promise

The data reveals a troubling trend that goes beyond a single year’s performance. Annual disposals by FTSCs dropped to 66,500 cases in 2025, down from a record 85,595 in 2024—a decline of more than 22% . At the same time, pending cases rose from a little more than 2 lakh at the end of 2024 to nearly 2.5 lakh by the close of 2025 .

The trend suggests that despite expanding judicial capacity, fresh cases continue to outnumber disposals. Since 2021, pendency has increased by nearly one-third, from around 1.8 lakh to nearly 2.5 lakh, even as annual disposals almost doubled between 2021 and 2024 before falling last year . The figures point to a structural challenge rather than a temporary slowdown. Fast-track courts were conceived to shorten the time victims wait for justice, but rising case inflows, judicial vacancies, infrastructure constraints and limited courtroom capacity have continued to push pendency upwards . The result is that courts designed to accelerate trials are themselves carrying growing backlogs .

The State-Wise Disparity: 218 Courts in UP, Only 4 in J&K

The effectiveness of the scheme varies widely across States. Uttar Pradesh has the highest number of functional FTSCs at 218, followed by Madhya Pradesh (67), Kerala (55), Bihar (54) and Rajasthan (45) . In contrast, Jammu and Kashmir has only 4 operational FTSCs, making it one of the states with the lowest number of such courts in India . Since the inception of the FTSC scheme in J&K, 808 cases have been instituted and only 311 cases have been disposed of as of June 30, 2025—a disposal rate of less than 40% . The average trial time in J&K for rape cases is 1,095 days (roughly 3 years) and 730 days for POCSO cases (2 years)—among the higher ranges in the country .

Some States have managed comparatively low pendency per court, while others operate under far heavier workloads, indicating that the effectiveness of the scheme depends not only on the number of courts but also on staffing, infrastructure and the volume of new cases entering the system .

The Funding and Operational Challenges

The Centrally Sponsored Scheme for setting up FTSCs was launched in October 2019, following the enactment of the Criminal Law (Amendment) Act, 2018 and a Supreme Court directive . The scheme has been extended twice, with the last extension valid up to March 31, 2026, for the establishment of 790 FTSCs, and has now been temporarily extended up to September 30, 2026 . The financial outlay under the scheme is ₹1,952.23 crore, with ₹1,207.24 crore as the central share from the Nirbhaya Fund . Since its inception, the Centre has released ₹1,259.51 crore to States and UTs to ensure the smooth functioning of these courts . The assistance covers the salaries of one Judicial Officer and seven support staff per FTSC, along with a flexi grant for day-to-day expenses .

However, despite the funding, the challenge of vacancies and infrastructure remains. Law Minister Meghwal informed Parliament that it is the responsibility of states and High Courts to recruit judges and fill vacant positions of judicial officers in district and subordinate courts, including fast-track ones . Adding to concerns, Jharkhand exited the FTSC scheme entirely on July 7, 2025, leaving child sexual abuse cases in the state without dedicated judicial infrastructure .

The Promise of Fast-Track Courts for Paper Leak Cases

The announcement by Prime Minister Modi to set up fast-track courts for paper leak cases comes against this backdrop of the FTSCs struggling under their own backlogs. The government has directed the establishment of fast-track courts in four states (Bombay, Calcutta, Delhi, and Madhya Pradesh High Court jurisdictions) on a priority basis to hear cases under the Public Examinations (Prevention of Unfair Means) Act, 2024 [citation:original text]. These courts will hear cases on a day-to-day basis [citation:original text]. However, the data from the FTSCs raises a critical question: if existing fast-track courts for rape and POCSO cases are burdened with a backlog of 2.45 lakh cases, how will new fast-track courts for paper leak cases avoid the same fate?

Q&A Section

1. How many Fast Track Special Courts (FTSCs) are operational in India, and what is the current case backlog?
As of April 30, 2026, 775 FTSCs, including 398 exclusive POCSO courts, are functional across 29 States and Union Territories [citation:original text]. The courts had 2,45,579 pending cases as of December 31, 2025 [citation:original text]. In 2025, these courts registered 1,43,936 new cases but disposed of only 66,500 .

2. Why has the disposal rate of FTSCs declined in 2025?
Annual disposals dropped to 66,500 cases in 2025, down from a record 85,595 in 2024—a decline of more than 22% . This decline is attributed to a structural challenge of rising case inflows, judicial vacancies, infrastructure constraints and limited courtroom capacity, which have continued to push pendency upwards despite expanding judicial capacity .

3. Which states have the highest and lowest number of FTSCs?
Uttar Pradesh has the highest number at 218, followed by Madhya Pradesh (67), Kerala (55), Bihar (54) and Rajasthan (45) . Jammu and Kashmir has only 4 operational FTSCs, making it one of the states with the lowest number . Jharkhand exited the scheme entirely on July 7, 2025 .

4. What is the average trial time for POCSO and rape cases in different states?
The average trial time varies widely across states. Delhi records the slowest disposal rate at 4.5 years, while Tripura (4 years) and Manipur (3.7 years) also exceed 3 years. In contrast, Puducherry concludes trials in just six months, followed by Andhra Pradesh (257 days) and Chhattisgarh (332.5 days) . J&K averages 3 years for rape cases and 2 years for POCSO cases .

5. What is the funding status of the FTSC scheme, and why has it been extended?
The Centrally Sponsored Scheme was launched in October 2019 with a financial outlay of ₹1,952.23 crore, with ₹1,207.24 crore as the central share from the Nirbhaya Fund . Since its inception, ₹1,259.51 crore has been released to States and UTs . The scheme has been extended twice, with the latest extension up to September 30, 2026, to allow for the establishment of 790 FTSCs . However, Jharkhand’s exit from the scheme highlights the challenges in ensuring nationwide coverage .

Amid Ruckus, Bill to Punish Insult to National Song Introduced in Rajya Sabha

By The Hindu Bureau
New Delhi, July 25, 2026

Amid disruptions over the police action on student protesters, the Home Ministry introduced the Prevention of Insults to National Honour (Amendment) Bill, 2026, in the Rajya Sabha on Friday, to punish any insult to National Song Vande Mataram . The objections raised by Left MPs against the introduction of the Bill were defeated by a voice vote .

The Bill, which proposes to amend the Prevention of Insults to National Honour Act, 1971, extends the punishment for acts of disrespect towards national symbols such as the National Flag, the Constitution, and the National Anthem, to the National Song too .

A Legislative Gap and the Government’s Rationale

Union Minister of State for Home Nityananda Rai introduced the Bill. The government’s justification for the legislation is that it fills a long-standing legislative gap. The Prevention of Insults to National Honour Act, 1971, currently provides penal protection against disrespect to the National Anthem (Jana Gana Mana), the National Flag, and the Constitution. However, it does not specifically extend the same protection to Vande Mataram, which holds the status of the National Song .

According to the Statement of Objects and Reasons accompanying the Bill, “Presently, there is no specific legal provision to prevent insults to the singing of Vande Mataram, which is honoured as the National Song.” The government argues that the proposed amendment gives statutory effect to the declaration made by Constituent Assembly President Dr. Rajendra Prasad on January 24, 1950, that Vande Mataram “shall be honoured equally with Jana Gana Mana and shall have equal status with it” .

If enacted, the amendment would replace Section 3 of the 1971 Act to include the National Song in its ambit. It would stipulate that anyone who intentionally prevents the singing of the National Song or causes a disturbance to an assembly engaged in such singing would be liable to imprisonment for up to three years, a fine, or both .

The Opposition’s Constitutional Challenge

The introduction of the Bill, however, was met with strong opposition, particularly from Left parties, who argued that the legislation raises serious constitutional concerns and represents an attempt to manufacture patriotism through punitive measures.

Deputy Chairman Harivansh, who was on the chair, invited CPI(M) MP John Brittas and CPI MP Sandosh Kumar P. to speak for one minute as they had given notices to oppose the Bill on the grounds of legislative competence or its constitutionality .

Mr. Brittas contended that Parliament cannot rewrite a constitutional settlement through an ordinary legislation. He argued that the Bill relies entirely on the first President Rajendra Prasad’s statement that the National Song must get a similar stature to the National Anthem. “But it suppresses the crucial constitutional context in which the statement was made… Parliament cannot elevate a presidential statement in the constitutional text, 76 years later,” he said, adding that the Bill is a dishonour to the decision of the Constituent Assembly and framers of the Constitution .

He asserted, “The Constituent Assembly, after nearly three years of exhaustive deliberation, consciously refrained from placing the National Song and the National Anthem on the same constitutional footing. Had the framers of both intended to enjoy identical legal consequences, they would have expressed and so provided,” and that the government cannot manufacture patriotism and nationalism through a piece of legislation .

Mr. Kumar’s reference to the ruling establishment’s role in freedom struggle was deleted by the Chair. He said the core point is that Vande Mataram should unite Indians, not divide them. “The leaders of India’s freedom movement, including Rabindranath Tagore, had understood this. That is why it was confined to two stanzas only,” he said and added that the government is purposefully manufacturing a division between Rabindranath Tagore and Bankim Chandra Chatterjee, the author of the National Song . He also alleged that the Bill was introduced to distract public attention from the ongoing student movement against the NEET examination paper leak .

The Government’s Defense and the Political Context

Countering the statements, Mr. Rai said the Left MPs were trying to mislead the House. He reiterated that on January 24, 1950, Rajendra Prasad had said that both National Song and National Anthem should have equal status and the government respects it .

The introduction of the Bill also takes place against a backdrop of a broader political and ideological debate over national symbols. As reported by The Telegraph, BJP President and Leader of the House in the Rajya Sabha, J.P. Nadda, had previously accused the Congress of not giving due respect to Vande Mataram, citing Jawaharlal Nehru’s reservations about the song . In a December 2025 debate, Nadda had said, “Jawaharlal Nehru was entirely responsible for what happened during the selection of India’s national anthem in the Constituent Assembly,” arguing that Nehru did not regard Vande Mataram as a suitable choice for the national anthem .

The Bill was put to vote amid slogans by the Opposition and Mr. Harivansh announced that the Bill was introduced. He then adjourned the House for the day . The Bill is expected to come up for further parliamentary scrutiny, with the government likely to defend it as a measure to safeguard national honour, while Opposition parties are expected to seek safeguards against possible misuse and greater clarity on its constitutional implications .

Q&A Section

1. What is the Prevention of Insults to National Honour (Amendment) Bill, 2026?

The Bill seeks to amend the Prevention of Insults to National Honour Act, 1971, to include the National Song, Vande Mataram, under its penal provisions. The existing law criminalises disrespect towards the National Flag, the Constitution, and the National Anthem with imprisonment of up to three years. The Bill aims to provide the same statutory protection to Vande Mataram .

2. Why has the government introduced this Bill?

The government argues that the Bill fills a legislative gap, as there is currently no specific legal provision to prevent insults to Vande Mataram, despite its status as the National Song. It cites the January 24, 1950 declaration by Constituent Assembly President Dr. Rajendra Prasad that Vande Mataram should have equal status with the National Anthem .

3. What is the Opposition’s primary objection to the Bill?

Opposition members, particularly from Left parties, have objected on constitutional and democratic grounds. They argue that Parliament cannot manufacture patriotism through legislation, that the Bill infringes on fundamental rights, and that it seeks to rewrite a constitutional settlement by elevating a presidential statement to a law after 76 years. They contend that it will polarise society rather than unite it .

4. What was the political context surrounding the introduction of the Bill?

The Bill was introduced amidst a broader debate over national symbols and historical legacy. BJP leaders have previously blamed Jawaharlal Nehru for Vande Mataram not being chosen as the National Anthem, citing his reservations about its suitability. The introduction of the Bill also came amid disruptions over the police action on student protesters demanding the resignation of the Education Minister over the NEET paper leak .

5. What is the proposed punishment for obstructing or insulting Vande Mataram?

If enacted, the Bill proposes that anyone who intentionally prevents the singing of Vande Mataram or causes a disturbance to an assembly engaged in such singing would be liable to imprisonment for up to three years, a fine, or both .

SC Seeks Centre’s Response on NEET Reforms: A Push for Institutionalisation Over Ad-Hocism

By The Hindu Bureau
New Delhi, July 25, 2026

The Supreme Court on Friday indicated that it would closely monitor the Centre’s proposed overhaul of the National Eligibility-cum-Entrance Test (NEET) and directed the Union government to file a detailed response on whether it intends to shift the NEET-UG examination to a computer-based test (CBT) and the safeguards it proposes to put in place to protect examination data [citation:original text].

A Bench of Justices P.S. Narasimha and Alok Aradhe observed that extraordinary measures, such as deploying the Indian Air Force to transport question papers during this year’s re-NEET examination, could only serve as temporary fixes [citation:original text]. “We cannot let such a situation go on like this. We have to focus on institutionalisation… Here, because of what had happened, you deployed the Air Force, but that is only an ad hoc arrangement, not a permanent one,” the Bench orally observed [citation:original text].

The hearing came a day after Prime Minister Narendra Modi addressed the alleged NEET paper leak controversy for the first time, announcing the creation of fast-track courts to ensure the expeditious trial of such cases amid the ongoing protests led by the Cockroach Janta Party [citation:original text].

The Need for Institutional Reform

The observations were made while the court was hearing a batch of petitions filed by the Federation of All India Medical Association (FAIMA), the United Doctors Front (UDF) and others seeking to replace the National Testing Agency (NTA) with an independent statutory body [citation:original text]. The court has been vocal about the need to move beyond “ad-hocism” and institutionalise the examination process . “We need to get out of the cycle of committing errors,” the Bench remarked .

Justice Narasimha expressed concern over the security of data to prevent further incidents of paper leaks [citation:original text]. “Please reflect on that also and tell us… How is data transferred? How does data protection occur? That’s very important because when you shift to this, leaks could occur, making data unsafe. And the entire thing breaks down,” he said [citation:original text].

The Radhakrishnan Committee Recommendations

The Bench then turned to the reforms proposed by the seven-member High Level Committee of Experts, constituted by the Ministry of Education in 2024 under former ISRO chairman K. Radhakrishnan to review the functioning of the NEET examination system [citation:original text]. The committee recommended a series of structural reforms, including a transition to a computer-based examination [citation:original text].

The court referred to the NTA’s affidavit outlining the progress made in implementing the recommendations [citation:original text]. The committee’s mandate included proposing measures to improve exam security, streamline processes and address persistent issues . The major recommendations include:

• Online Testing and Hybrid Model: A phased shift to online testing to minimise risks associated with paper-based exams. For cases where full online testing isn’t feasible, a hybrid model where question papers are transmitted digitally to exam centres and students record answers on paper .

• Multi-stage Examination: A two-tiered system similar to JEE (Main and Advanced), with the first stage serving as a screening exam and the second offering deeper assessment .

• Enhanced Staffing: Increasing permanent staffing within the NTA to build a stable, dedicated workforce capable of consistent management of examination processes and data security .

• Greater Government Control: Establishing more NTA-owned examination centres to reduce dependency on third-party service providers .

• Enhanced Data Security: Digitally transmitting question papers as close to the exam start time as possible to minimise the chance of unauthorised access .

• Capping NEET Attempts: Introducing a limit on the number of attempts allowed for NEET to level the playing field .

The Government’s Response

Appearing for the Centre, Solicitor General Tushar Mehta submitted that the government was going “ten extra miles” to address students’ concerns and that the entire exercise was being supervised at the highest executive level . “For children there cannot be any adversarial response. The Radhakrishnan Committee has been fully accepted,” Mehta said .

The government is also working on a comprehensive draft Bill to introduce stricter provisions and stringent punishments for paper leak cases, which is expected to be discussed by the Union Cabinet and introduced in Parliament next week . The proposed legislation envisages harsher penalties, fast-track special courts for time-bound trials and stronger institutional accountability .

The Path Forward

The Bench directed the Centre to file a further affidavit setting out its roadmap for implementing the reforms, including the proposed cybersecurity framework and safeguards to prevent data breaches [citation:original text]. The court also sought the Centre’s response on implementing a computer-based test for medical entrance on the lines of the IIT-JEE .

The Supreme Court has made it clear that it will keep monitoring the process till the system is institutionalised . “We will very closely monitor this. We will follow it up throughout the year. We will see that complete and total institutionalisation takes place. We can’t let this continue,” the Bench observed . The matter has been listed for further hearing on August 3, when the Centre is expected to file its detailed affidavit .

Q&A Section

1. What is the Supreme Court’s key concern regarding NEET reforms?

The Supreme Court is concerned that the examination system has relied on ad-hoc measures rather than permanent institutional reforms. The Bench observed that deploying the Indian Air Force to transport question papers, while necessary as a temporary fix, cannot be a permanent solution. The court is focused on “institutionalisation” of the examination process to break the cycle of recurring errors [citation:original text].

2. What are the key recommendations of the Radhakrishnan Committee?

The Radhakrishnan Committee, formed after the NEET-UG 2024 paper leak, recommended a phased shift to computer-based testing, a hybrid model for digital question paper transmission, a multi-stage examination format similar to JEE, enhanced permanent staffing within the NTA, greater government control over exam centres, improved data security, and a cap on the number of NEET attempts .

3. What is the government’s position on the proposed reforms?

Solicitor General Tushar Mehta assured the court that the government has “fully accepted” the Radhakrishnan Committee’s recommendations and is going “ten extra miles” to address students’ concerns. The government is also preparing a comprehensive Bill with stricter punishments and fast-track courts for paper leak cases .

4. Why is the transition to computer-based testing significant?

The shift to CBT is significant because it would reduce the risks associated with paper-based exams, including physical transportation and storage of question papers. However, the court has flagged data security concerns, asking the government to explain how data will be transferred, protected, and how cybersecurity will be handled [citation:original text].

5. What is the timeline for the next hearing?

The Supreme Court has listed the matter for further hearing on August 3, 2026, and directed the Centre to file a comprehensive affidavit setting out its roadmap for implementing the Radhakrishnan Committee’s recommendations. The court has made it clear that it will “very closely monitor” the reforms throughout the year .

In a Major Overhaul, NTA Begins Senior-Level Recruitment Drive

By Maitri Porecha
New Delhi, July 25, 2026

In a bid to rebuild its structure following the recommendations of the K. Radhakrishnan-led High-Level Committee of Experts, the National Testing Agency (NTA) is looking to recruit senior-level officials to overhaul its academic, operational, cyber security, and investigative capabilities [citation:original text].

On Friday, NTA, an autonomous body, advertised for vacancies in top-tier senior leadership roles and opened recruitment for young professionals via the UPSC Pratibha Setu portal [citation:original text]. The hiring reforms come amid massive student protests across the country against the NEET paper leak that has put the functioning of NTA under scanner. Sources said the testing agency fired 47 officials from services, some of whom are set to face legal and criminal action [citation:original text].

The Restructuring Blueprint

The recruitment drive is the first tangible step in implementing the recommendations of the High-Level Committee of Experts, which was constituted by the Ministry of Education in 2024 under former ISRO chairman K. Radhakrishnan . The committee’s mandate was to review the functioning of the NTA and propose measures to improve exam security, streamline processes, and address persistent issues . The committee had submitted its report to the Education Ministry in January 2025 . The Supreme Court, during a hearing on July 24, 2026, indicated that it would closely monitor the Centre’s proposed overhaul of the NEET and directed the Union government to file a detailed response on the implementation of these reforms .

Key Hiring Initiatives

NTA has opened hiring for four General Manager positions on a three-year contract basis. These include experts in assessment research, development, and psychometrics who can build item banks, refine normalisation methodologies, manage equating procedures, and spearhead pilots for Computer-Adaptive Testing and AI-assisted assessments [citation:original text].

NTA wants to hire officials who can focus on empanelment standards, capacity planning, exam-day logistics, accessibility for candidates with benchmark disabilities, and multi-agency coordination [citation:original text]. Another area where the NTA wants to focus on is the cyber-security ecosystem protecting NTA systems, networks, applications, and candidate data. It is trying to recruit senior officials to oversee internal vigilance, digital forensics, and anti-malpractice operations [citation:original text].

A separate Expression of Interest for fresh empanelment of subject matter experts and translators has also been floated [citation:original text]. “This hiring drive is the first stage of a broader restructuring process. Further recruitments across the 10 functional verticals recommended by the High-Level Committee are expected to roll out in the coming weeks,” an official said [citation:original text].

The Background: The NEET Crisis and NTA’s Failures

The recruitment drive comes after the NTA faced intense scrutiny following the NEET-UG 2026 paper leak, which led to the cancellation of the examination and widespread protests . The NTA had also faced controversies in 2024 over grace marks and alleged paper leaks . The Ministry of Education had constituted the Radhakrishnan Committee after the 2024 NEET-UG paper leak to review the functioning of the NTA . The Supreme Court has been monitoring the situation, with the Bench observing that the NTA must adopt “institutionalisation” rather than ad-hoc measures to prevent future failures .

The government has also taken action by terminating the services of 47 NTA officials [citation:original text]. This is part of a complete overhaul of the NTA, which has been in controversy over paper leaks . Legal and criminal actions will also be taken against some of these officials, with more reformative actions to follow . The proposed amendments to the Public Examinations (Prevention of Unfair Means) Act, 2024, include steeper jail sentences (5 to 10 years), higher financial penalties (up to ₹10 crore), and the setting up of fast-track courts for speedy trials within three months .

The Radhakrishnan Committee’s Recommendations

The Radhakrishnan Committee recommended a series of structural reforms, including a transition to a computer-based examination, enhanced staffing to build a stable and dedicated workforce, and improved data security by digitally transmitting question papers as close to the exam start time as possible . The NTA’s recruitment drive is directly aligned with these recommendations, focusing on building expertise in psychometrics, cyber security, and operational logistics.

The government has accepted the committee’s recommendations and is now implementing them in a phased manner . The current recruitment drive is expected to be followed by further recruitments across the 10 functional verticals recommended by the committee . This marks a significant shift in the NTA’s approach, moving from a reliance on ad-hoc measures to building a permanent, specialised workforce capable of managing high-stakes examinations securely and efficiently.

Q&A Section

1. What is the NTA’s recruitment drive and why is it significant?

The NTA has launched a recruitment drive to hire senior-level officials, including General Managers in areas like psychometrics, exam logistics, and cybersecurity. This is the first stage of a broader restructuring process following the recommendations of the K. Radhakrishnan-led High-Level Committee of Experts . The drive is significant because it marks a shift from ad-hoc measures to institutionalising the examination process .

2. What are the key positions NTA is looking to fill?

NTA is hiring for four General Manager positions on a three-year contract basis, focusing on: (1) assessment research, development, and psychometrics; (2) empanelment standards, capacity planning, and exam-day logistics; (3) cybersecurity and data protection; and (4) internal vigilance, digital forensics, and anti-malpractice operations [citation:original text].

3. How many NTA officials have been terminated and why?

The NTA has terminated 47 officials from their services, with legal and criminal actions also to be taken against some of them. This is part of a complete overhaul of the NTA, which has been in controversy over paper leaks [citation:original text].

4. What are the key recommendations of the Radhakrishnan Committee?

The committee recommended a phased shift to computer-based testing, enhanced permanent staffing within the NTA, improved data security through digital transmission of question papers, a multi-stage examination format similar to JEE, and a cap on the number of NEET attempts . The NTA’s recruitment drive is directly aligned with these recommendations .

5. What is the timeline for the implementation of the reforms?

The current recruitment drive is the first stage, and further recruitments across the 10 functional verticals recommended by the High-Level Committee are expected to roll out in the coming weeks . The Supreme Court has directed the Centre to file a detailed affidavit setting out its roadmap for implementing the reforms by August 3, 2026 [citation:original text].

CBI, SIT Told to Expedite Probe into Manipur Riots: Supreme Court Proposes Special Courts for Day-to-Day Trials

By Aaratrika Bhaumik
New Delhi, July 25, 2026

The Supreme Court on Friday asked probe agencies to conclude pending investigations into the Manipur violence expeditiously and file the remaining chargesheets. It further directed the Manipur Chief Secretary and the Director General of Police to extend full cooperation to the investigating agencies and ensure effective coordination to facilitate the completion of the probes [citation:original text].

A Bench comprising Chief Justice of India Surya Kant and Justices Joymalya Bagchi and V. Mohana was hearing a batch of petitions relating to the ethnic violence in the State [citation:original text]. Taking on record the latest status report filed by the CBI, the Bench noted that chargesheets had been filed in 21 cases, while closure reports had been submitted in six cases, three of which had been accepted [citation:original text].

The Scale of the Crisis: 3,020 Cases and Counting

The court was informed that the SITs are probing 3,020 cases related to the Manipur violence across eight districts. Of these, chargesheets have been filed in only 301 cases, charges have been framed in 41 matters, and trial has begun in only 10 cases [citation:original text]. The prosecution proposes to examine 2,924 witnesses across these cases [citation:original text].

The CBI, which was directed to take over investigation of heinous cases in August 2023, informed the court that it has filed chargesheets in 21 of the 31 cases transferred to it. Supplementary investigations are underway in 11 cases, while closure reports have been filed in six matters, three of which have been accepted by the competent court. Four cases continue to remain under investigation [citation:original text].

The Challenges of Investigation: Displaced Witnesses and Internet Shutdowns

The CBI also apprised the court of the practical difficulties affecting the investigations, citing the fragile law and order situation in the state. It submitted that recording statements and examining witnesses had been particularly challenging as a large number of them had been displaced due to the violence [citation:original text]. Lawyers also informed the bench that prolonged internet shutdowns had adversely affected the collection of digital evidence, while restrictions on movement had impeded field investigations in violence-hit areas [citation:original text].

The Bench observed that the prevailing law and order situation had made the examination of witnesses difficult, with many having been displaced or relocated [citation:original text]. The court also pointed out that the prolonged suspension of Internet services had impeded the collection of digital evidence, while restrictions on the movement of investigating officers had hampered field investigations, contributing to delays in the probe [citation:original text].

The Proposal: Special Courts for Day-to-Day Trials

To address the inordinate delay, the Bench proposed the establishment of special courts to conduct day-to-day trials in cases arising out of the 2023 Manipur violence [citation:original text]. “We tentatively propose to constitute special courts, with the concurrence of the State of Manipur and the High Courts of Manipur and Gauhati, for trials to be taken up on a day-to-day basis, especially in light of the inordinate delay that has already taken place in the ongoing investigation,” the Bench said [citation:original text].

To facilitate the establishment of the proposed special courts, the Bench directed Additional Solicitor General Aishwarya Bhati, appearing for the State government, the SIT and the CBI, to collate details of cases in which investigations have been completed and chargesheets filed, as well as those in which the probe is still under way [citation:original text]. “This information is eminently required for the purpose of determining the strength of the special courts which we propose to establish,” the Bench said [citation:original text].

Ensuring Victim Access to Justice

The court also addressed the grievance that many victims and their families remained in the dark about the progress of the investigations and were yet to receive copies of the chargesheets filed by the CBI and the SIT, despite the court’s earlier directions [citation:original text]. Senior advocate Vrinda Grover, appearing for the victims in two cases of sexual violence during the ethnic violence, informed the court of this lapse [citation:original text].

Taking note of the grievance, the Bench directed the legal aid counsel representing the victims to approach the offices of the Chief Justices of the Gauhati and Manipur High Courts to obtain copies of the chargesheets [citation:original text]. The Bench ordered that the authorities will ensure the supply of the chargesheets as early as possible, and no later than one week from the date the legal aid counsel contacts them [citation:original text].

The Bench also directed the Manipur High Court to look into cases relating to the 30 persons who have remained missing since the outbreak of the ethnic violence [citation:original text]. It further directed the investigating agencies to file fresh status reports before the next date of hearing, which has been posted for August 3 [citation:original text].

Q&A Section

1. What did the Supreme Court propose to expedite trials in Manipur violence cases?

The Supreme Court proposed the establishment of special courts to conduct day-to-day trials in criminal cases arising out of the 2023 Manipur ethnic violence. The court said it would constitute these courts with the concurrence of the State of Manipur and the High Courts of Manipur and Gauhati [citation:original text].

2. What is the current status of investigations into the Manipur violence?

The SITs are probing 3,020 cases across eight districts, with chargesheets filed in only 301 cases and trials commenced in just 10. The CBI has filed chargesheets in 21 of the 31 cases transferred to it, with supplementary investigations underway in 11 cases, closure reports in six, and four cases still under investigation [citation:original text].

3. What challenges have the investigating agencies faced?

The CBI and SITs have faced significant challenges, including a fragile law and order situation, displaced witnesses who are difficult to examine, language barriers, prolonged internet shutdowns impeding digital evidence collection, and restrictions on the movement of investigating officers [citation:original text].

4. What did the court order regarding victim access to chargesheets?

The court directed the legal aid counsel representing victims to approach the offices of the Chief Justices of the Gauhati and Manipur High Courts to obtain copies of chargesheets. The authorities were ordered to supply the chargesheets within one week of being contacted [citation:original text].

5. What other issues did the court address during the hearing?

The court directed the Manipur High Court to look into cases of 30 persons who have remained missing since the violence. The court also heard submissions regarding the reconstruction of damaged places of worship and encroachment on church land, and directed the government to take steps to prevent encroachment [citation:original text].

Delhi High Court Declines Interim Injunction Against OpenAI in ANI Copyright Suit

By Soibam Rocky Singh
New Delhi, July 25, 2026

The Delhi High Court on Friday refused to grant interim relief to news agency Asian News International (ANI) in its copyright infringement suit against OpenAI, holding that it had failed to establish a prima facie case that ChatGPT infringed its copyright [citation:original text].

Justice Amit Bansal held that OpenAI’s ChatGPT use of ANI’s literary works for training the Large Language Models (LLMs) was covered by the fair dealing exception under Section 52 (1)(a) of the Copyright Act [citation:original text]. The court also remarked, “There is no averment in the plaint nor has any material been placed on record to show that the activities of OpenAI have resulted in ANI losing subscribers or suffering a loss from its news syndication business” [citation:original text].

The Copyright Challenge and ANI’s Claims

The court said that ANI had failed to establish that ChatGPT had infringed on copyright [citation:original text]. ANI had, as an interim relief, sought deletion of the “plaintiff’s (ANI) works held and stored in whatever form” by OpenAI [citation:original text]. The news agency had earlier described AI tools as “absolutely unregulated” and argued that they were being used to create “fake news” . The court observed that the deletion of the data at this stage would cause irreparable prejudice not only to OpenAI but also to the public at large [citation:original text].

The Public Interest and Economic Viability of AI

The court observed that “AI and its applications are being used beneficially in several sectors, such as education, healthcare, financial support sector, agriculture and for providing other skill development resources…The development of LLMs and their success depends on availability of data. It would be economically unviable to develop an LLM if training of an LLM would require licenses from multiple sources” [citation:original text]. This finding was in line with the court’s view that the public interest in AI development outweighs the harm that ANI would suffer if the injunction was not granted [citation:original text].

The Quantifiable Nature of the Claim

ANI had offered a licence to OpenAI for its content for a fee of USD 7.5 million . This offer, the court noted, meant that ANI’s claim was “quantifiable” and could be compensated in monetary terms if ANI succeeds in the present case. The court noted that “ANI itself has offered a licence to OpenAI for its content for a fee of USD 7.5 million vide its communication dated October 2, 2024. Therefore, the claim of ANI is quantifiable and ANI can be compensated in monetary terms, if ANI succeeds in the present case” [citation:original text].

Global Context and Regulatory Developments

The Delhi High Court’s decision comes amid a global wave of litigation over AI training data and copyright. In the United States, a Washington D.C. court recently allowed a class-action lawsuit against Anthropic to proceed, alleging that the AI company used copyrighted works to train its Claude chatbot without permission . In India, the Ministry of Electronics & Information Technology (MeitY) notified the Information Technology (Intermediary Guidelines and Digital Media Ethics Code) Rules, 2021, which impose due diligence obligations on intermediaries, including AI platforms . The government has also constituted the IndiaAI Mission to promote AI innovation and address regulatory issues .

The Road Ahead: A Test Case for Indian Law

The ANI vs. OpenAI case is likely to be a significant test case for Indian copyright law in the age of AI. The interim relief ruling was based on a reading of Section 52 of the Indian Copyright Act, 1957, which governs the “fair dealing” exception. The court’s interpretation of this provision as covering text and data mining in the context of AI model training is a crucial point of law that will be tested at trial.

Section 52(1)(a) of the Copyright Act allows the “fair dealing with a literary, dramatic, musical or artistic work for the purposes of private or personal use, including research, criticism or review, whether for profit or not” . The court has now held that OpenAI’s use of the works for training a language model is covered by this exception. However, the final outcome will depend on whether the exception applies to a for-profit entity like OpenAI, and whether the use qualifies as “fair dealing” within the meaning of the statute. The trial is set to continue, with the court expected to examine the scope of copyright protection in the context of generative AI, and to assess the commercial viability of licensing agreements in the burgeoning field of artificial intelligence.

Q&A Section

1. What was the Delhi High Court’s ruling in the ANI vs. OpenAI copyright case?

The Delhi High Court refused to grant interim relief to ANI, holding that OpenAI’s use of ANI’s works to train its large language models was covered by the “fair dealing” exception under Section 52(1)(a) of the Copyright Act. The court found that ANI had failed to establish a prima facie case of infringement or that it would suffer irreparable harm.

2. What was ANI’s argument and what relief did it seek?

ANI argued that OpenAI was infringing its copyright by using its content to train ChatGPT without a license. The news agency sought an interim injunction requiring OpenAI to delete all of its works from its training data. ANI had offered OpenAI a license for a fee of USD 7.5 million, which the court noted made its claim quantifiable.

3. What was the court’s reasoning regarding fair dealing?

The court held that the training of large language models (LLMs) is covered by the fair dealing exception because it involves private or personal use, including research. The court emphasized the public interest in AI development, noting that AI applications are being used beneficially across various sectors and that requiring licenses from multiple sources for training data would be economically unviable.

4. Why did the court refuse to grant an interim injunction?

The court refused an interim injunction because it found that ANI had not established a prima facie case of infringement, nor had it shown it would suffer irreparable harm. The court noted that the claim was quantifiable and could be compensated monetarily if ANI prevails at trial. The court also considered the public interest in AI development and the potential prejudice to OpenAI and the public if the data were deleted.

5. What is the significance of this ruling for AI development in India?

The ruling is significant because it is one of the first judicial interpretations of copyright law in the context of generative AI in India. The court’s reading of the fair dealing exception to cover text and data mining provides legal support for AI companies and recognizes the public interest in AI development. However, the final outcome will depend on the trial, which will examine whether the exception applies to for-profit entities like OpenAI .

India Brushes Off Pakistan’s Flood Allegations: A Tale of Hydrology, Humanity, and the Indus Treaty

By Kallol Bhattacherjee
New Delhi, July 25, 2026

India will continue to share “high-flood data” with Pakistan on “humanitarian grounds”, the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) said on Friday . Speaking at a media briefing, MEA official spokesperson Randhir Jaiswal said Pakistan media reports alleging India is deliberately creating a flood situation in Pakistan’s Punjab province by increasing water flow of the Chenab river is “baseless” . Officials said the non-operational status of the Indus Waters Treaty (IWT) has not impacted water-related cooperation between the two sides and India has shared flood-related data at least 23 times in 2025 itself . The Chenab has remained in “high-flood state” in the past week as monsoon rains continued over Jammu and Punjab .

The “Baseless” Allegation and the Natural Hydrological Response

Jaiswal rejected the Pakistani allegations, calling them “without factual basis” and “contrary to the facts” . He explained that the recent increase in flows in the Chenab River is a direct consequence of intense monsoon rainfall over Jammu and adjoining catchment areas during 20–23 July 2026 . “The rise in river flows is, therefore, a natural hydrological response to heavy monsoon rainfall and not the result of any deliberate action by India,” he said . “Attempts to portray a weather-driven flood event as an upstream intervention are factually incorrect, technically untenable, and contradicted by Pakistan’s own official flood advisories” .

Significantly, Pakistan’s own Flood Forecasting Division in Lahore, in its Flood Advisory issued on July 22, attributed the high flood levels in the Chenab River to heavy rainfall over the upper catchment . It stated that high flows at Marala were expected to persist before gradually receding as rainfall over the catchment decreased . This acknowledgment by Pakistan’s own authorities forms a key part of India’s rebuttal.

The Data Sharing Protocol: “Extraordinary Discharges” and the 23 Warnings

Regarding flood warnings, Jaiswal clarified that the river flows during this period did not reach extraordinary discharge levels requiring the issuance of special flood warnings . Under Article IV(8) of the Indus Waters Treaty (IWT), flood data sharing is required only during extraordinary discharges or high flood flows capable of impacting the downstream nation . As of July 23, 2026, recorded flows at Akhnoor on the Chenab stood at 122,000 cusecs against a communication threshold of 300,000 cusecs .

Despite the treaty being in “abeyance” following the April 2025 terror attack in Pahalgam, India shared flood-related data on at least 23 occasions with Pakistan in 2025 alone, and has committed to sharing similar data as and when the requirement arises this year as well .

The Treaty in Abeyance: A Hardline Stance on Terrorism

The exchange comes amid renewed tensions over the Indus Waters Treaty (IWT). A day earlier, Pakistan raised the treaty and the Kashmir issue at the ASEAN Regional Forum in Manila, urging that the water-sharing agreement be restored through dialogue . India, in response, criticised Pakistan for raising bilateral issues at a multilateral forum and reaffirmed that Jammu and Kashmir and Ladakh remain integral parts of India .

The MEA spokesperson reiterated India’s position: “our position remains unchanged and very clear. The Indus Waters Treaty remains in abeyance until Pakistan irrevocably and credibly abjures its support for cross-border terrorism” . This stance, first articulated after the Pahalgam attack in April 2025, represents a hardening of India’s position on the treaty, linking its operationalisation to Pakistan’s actions on terrorism rather than solely on water-sharing protocols.

On the Ground in Pakistan: A “High-Alert” Precaution

Pakistan’s concerns are not without context. With India’s reluctance to share real-time data, Pakistani authorities are forced to rely on alternative sources, including social media and less credible channels . The Punjab government has asked the irrigation department to prepare for flooding under a “high-alert category” . Commissioner Lahore Nauman Yousaf directed officials to take extra precautionary measures, essentially scaling up their preparedness to a higher level than the current threat assessment might warrant . The Federal Flood Commission (FFC) has also been obtaining information on water conditions in India through alternative sources, as official Indian websites are inaccessible in Pakistan . This climate of uncertainty underscores the real-world impact of the diplomatic standoff.

Q&A Section

1. What was India’s response to Pakistan’s allegations of deliberately causing flooding?

India rejected the allegations as “baseless,” attributing the surge in the Chenab river’s water level to intense monsoon rainfall over Jammu and its catchments between July 20-23, 2026, a “natural hydrological response” rather than an upstream intervention .

2. Has India stopped sharing all water data with Pakistan after suspending the Indus Waters Treaty?

No. While the IWT is in abeyance, India maintains that it continues to share flood-related data on humanitarian grounds. It pointed out that it shared such data at least 23 times with Pakistan in 2025 and will continue to do so when a situation arises .

3. Why did India not issue a specific flood warning to Pakistan during this event?

India stated that the Chenab’s water levels did not reach the threshold of “extraordinary discharge” as per the historical standards set by the Permanent Indus Commission, which would require such a warning. The observed flows were consistent with normal monsoon conditions .

4. What did Pakistan’s own Flood Forecasting Division say about the flooding in the Chenab?

Pakistan’s own flood advisory on July 22, 2026, attributed the high flood levels to heavy rainfall over the upper catchment and projected the flows would recede as the rains subsided . India cited this as proof that its position was factually correct.

5. What is India’s condition for restoring the normal functioning of the Indus Waters Treaty?

India has reiterated that the IWT will remain in abeyance until Pakistan “irrevocably and credibly abjures its support for cross-border terrorism” . India first placed the treaty in abeyance following the Pahalgam terror attack in April 2025.

SC Prohibits Unauthorised Recording, Monetisation of Court Videos on Social Media

By Aaratrika Bhaumik
New Delhi, July 25, 2026

Observing that the misuse of video clips from livestreamed court proceedings was “trivialising” the administration of justice, the Supreme Court on Friday barred the extraction, editing, dissemination, reposting, uploading and monetisation of audio and video recordings of judicial proceedings on social media and other digital platforms without prior permission from the court registrars concerned [citation:original text].

A Bench comprising Chief Justice of India (CJI) Surya Kant and Justices Joymalya Bagchi and V. Mohana passed the interim order while issuing notice on a public interest litigation (PIL) petition seeking safeguards against the misuse of livestreamed court proceedings through selective clipping and “commercial exploitation” [citation:original text].

The petition, filed by journalist Harshita Grover, contended that “isolated excerpts” of judicial proceedings were being clipped, circulated and monetised in a manner that undermined the sanctity and dignity of the judicial process [citation:original text]. It argued that while livestreaming has advanced transparency and public access to the justice system, the absence of adequate safeguards has enabled courtroom exchanges to be taken out of context and disseminated for “sensationalism” and “commercial gain” [citation:original text].

The Interim Order: A Ban on Extraction and Monetisation

“As an interim measure, it is directed that there shall be no extraction, modification, dissemination, monetisation, posting, reposting or uploading of audio-video recordings of judicial proceedings on social media or other digital platforms without permission of the Secretary General of the Supreme Court or the Registrar General of the jurisdictional High Courts,” the Bench directed [citation:original text].

The Bench, however, clarified that the embargo would not extend to news reporting of court proceedings. It also directed the Supreme Court and all High Courts to upload the order on their official websites [citation:original text]. Justice Mohana also remarked that the court was not attempting to pass a “gag order” on the press, but was merely giving effect to the Supreme Court’s 2022 ‘Model Rules for Live Streaming and Recording of Court Proceedings’, which prohibit the recording, sharing or dissemination of livestreamed court proceedings by unauthorised persons [citation:original text].

The Need for Safeguards: Preventing Sensationalism and Commercial Exploitation

The court’s order was prompted by concerns that livestreaming, while a positive step towards transparency, was being exploited for commercial gain and sensationalism. The petition highlighted how isolated excerpts of judicial proceedings were being clipped, circulated, and monetised, often stripping them of their context and undermining the dignity of the judicial process [citation:original text]. The court noted that the misuse of video clips was “trivialising” the administration of justice [citation:original text].

The order seeks to address this by requiring prior permission from the court registrars for any use of audio-video recordings beyond official news reporting. This places the control of the official record of court proceedings firmly in the hands of the judiciary, preventing unauthorised parties from manipulating or profiting from the footage.

Balancing Transparency and Dignity: The 2022 Model Rules

The interim order is in line with the Supreme Court’s 2022 ‘Model Rules for Live Streaming and Recording of Court Proceedings’, which established the framework for livestreaming of court cases. The Model Rules explicitly prohibit the recording, sharing, or dissemination of livestreamed court proceedings by unauthorised persons [citation:original text]. The court’s order essentially gives effect to these rules, providing the necessary legal backing to prevent their violation.

The 2022 Model Rules were a landmark step in increasing judicial transparency, allowing the public to observe court proceedings in real-time. However, the rules also recognised the potential for misuse, hence the prohibition on unauthorised recording and sharing. The court’s latest order is a direct response to the growing evidence that this potential for misuse has become a reality.

A Clarification: Not a Gag Order

The Bench was careful to clarify that the embargo would not extend to news reporting of court proceedings [citation:original text]. Justice Mohana also remarked that the court was not attempting to pass a “gag order” on the press [citation:original text]. This is an important distinction, as it ensures that the media can continue to report on court proceedings without restriction, while preventing the selective and sensationalised use of video clips for commercial gain. The order does not affect the reporting of court proceedings by journalists, but simply prohibits the unauthorised extraction, modification, and monetisation of the official audio-video recordings of the proceedings.

The Legal Basis: Article 21, Transparency, and the Right to Information

The court’s order is grounded in the constitutional right to access justice and the need to balance transparency with the dignity of the judicial process. The Supreme Court has previously held that the right to access justice is a facet of Article 21 of the Constitution . Livestreaming was seen as a way to make the judicial process more accessible to the public, especially in the wake of the COVID-19 pandemic . However, the court has now recognised that this transparency must be balanced with safeguards to prevent the misuse of the technology. The order also responds to concerns regarding the potential for commercial exploitation of court proceedings, which could undermine the integrity of the judicial process.

Q&A Section

1. What has the Supreme Court prohibited regarding court proceedings?

The Supreme Court has barred the extraction, editing, dissemination, reposting, uploading and monetisation of audio and video recordings of judicial proceedings on social media and other digital platforms without prior permission from the court registrars concerned [citation:original text].

2. What prompted the court to issue this interim order?

The order was prompted by a PIL petition highlighting that “isolated excerpts” of judicial proceedings were being clipped, circulated and monetised in a manner that undermined the sanctity and dignity of the judicial process [citation:original text]. The court observed that the misuse of video clips was “trivialising” the administration of justice [citation:original text].

3. Does this order apply to news reporting of court proceedings?

No. The Bench clarified that the embargo would not extend to news reporting of court proceedings [citation:original text]. Justice Mohana also remarked that the court was not attempting to pass a “gag order” on the press [citation:original text].

4. What is the legal basis for this order?

The order gives effect to the Supreme Court’s 2022 ‘Model Rules for Live Streaming and Recording of Court Proceedings’, which already prohibit the recording, sharing or dissemination of livestreamed court proceedings by unauthorised persons [citation:original text]. The order also aims to balance the transparency of livestreaming with the need to protect the dignity of the judicial process .

5. Who is required to grant permission for using court recordings?

The permission must be obtained from the Secretary General of the Supreme Court for proceedings before the Supreme Court, or the Registrar General of the jurisdictional High Courts for proceedings before the High Courts [citation:original text].

10% U.S. Tariff Elicits Mixed Reaction from Indian Exporters

By The Hindu Bureau
Coimbatore, July 25, 2026

The U.S. government’s decision to impose a 10% tariff on Indian goods under the newly announced Section 301 duties has elicited a mixed response from Indian exporters, reflecting the varied impact across different sectors. While some exporters view the levy as a relatively favourable outcome given the broader context, others express concern over the pressure on margins and the potential loss of competitiveness .

The Tariff Structure: A Sectoral Analysis

The Trump administration announced on July 23 that it would impose Section 301 tariffs on 60 trading partners, citing inadequate enforcement of forced-labour import prohibitions . India was placed in the lower 10% tariff category, while several competing nations—including China, Vietnam, Thailand, Turkey, UAE, Brazil, and South Africa—face a higher tariff of 12.5% .

This differentiation has been attributed to India’s swift action in banning the import of goods made using forced labour earlier in July 2026, which was acknowledged by the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) . The tariff structure, however, is not uniform across all products, with certain exemptions for raw materials that would cause economy-wide disruptions or products that cannot be grown or produced in sufficient quantities in the U.S. .

Mixed Reactions Across Sectors

The Gem and Jewellery Sector: A Cause for Concern

Rajesh Rokde, chairman of the All India Gem and Jewellery Domestic Council, expressed concern over the impact on the industry. “The U.S. government’s decision… will undoubtedly create challenges for our gem and jewellery exporters, making Indian products less price competitive in one of our largest markets,” Mr. Rokde said. “While the rate is lower than that imposed on some other countries, this measure still places significant pressure on margins and could dent the growth trajectory of our industry” .

The Textile Sector: Reputational Risks and Tariff-Rate Quotas

The Confederation of Indian Textile Industry (CITI) said, “The tariff imposition on the issue of forced labour is deeply unfortunate as it does not indicate an expiry date and causes reputational risks. The CITI looks forward to the Indian government taking up this issue with the U.S. given the detrimental impact it can have on textile and apparel exports from India,” said chairman Ashwin Chandran .

He further noted, “What can raise a serious challenge for Indian textile and apparel exporters is the fact that although many key competitors of ours have also been subject to the same tariff rate, a window has been opened for textile and apparel exports from these countries to enter the U.S. free of the Section 301 tariffs. This differential treatment risks diverting sourcing orders for textile and apparel items away from India” .

The Automotive Components Sector: A Relatively Favorable Position

An executive from an automotive components manufacturers body said, on condition of anonymity, that while any additional tariff is a concern, the 10% levy is lower than what the industry had anticipated. With competing countries such as China, the EU and others also facing U.S. tariffs, India auto component exporters can emerge relatively more competitive in the U.S. market .

The Forced Labour Framework: A Silver Lining

S.C. Rahnan, president of the Federation of Indian Export Organisations (FIEO), struck a more positive note, arguing that India’s relatively lower tariff reflects the recognition by the U.S. of the policy measures taken by the Indian government to strengthen its framework relating to forced labour. “This has helped India secure a relatively favourable position compared with many of its global competitors,” he added .

India has also implemented four Labour Codes to protect workers’ rights, which the industry body sees as a proactive step that aligns with international expectations . However, the lack of an expiry date on the tariffs and the reputational risks associated with the forced labour investigation remain a concern .

The Global Context: A “National Emergency”

The new tariff regime is part of a broader restructuring of U.S. trade policy under the Trump administration. USTR Jamieson Greer, testifying before the Senate Finance Committee, characterized the U.S. trade deficit of $1.2 trillion in 2025 as a “national emergency” and committed the administration to continuing the use of tariffs as a tool of economic policy . The administration is reportedly using these tariffs as a starting point for negotiations on reciprocal trade agreements, creating leverage to extract concessions from its trading partners, including India .

The pending second Section 301 investigation on structural excess capacity in manufacturing sectors, which covers 16 economies including India, adds a layer of uncertainty. This investigation could result in entirely new duties on additional sectors, potentially including manufactured goods where India has a strong export presence .

Q&A Section

1. What is the new U.S. tariff rate on Indian goods and why was it imposed?

The U.S. has imposed a 10% tariff on Indian goods under Section 301 of the Trade Act, 1974, citing inadequate enforcement of forced-labour import prohibitions. This replaces the temporary 10% tariff under Section 122 that expired on July 24, 2026 . India’s rate is lower than the proposed 12.5% because India banned the import of forced labour goods earlier in July 2026 .

2. How does India’s tariff rate compare to other competing nations?

India faces a 10% tariff, while several competing exporting nations, including China, Vietnam, Thailand, Turkey, UAE, Brazil, and South Africa, face a higher tariff of 12.5% . This differentiation is attributed to India’s proactive policy measures on forced labour .

3. What are the concerns raised by the textile and apparel industry?

The Confederation of Indian Textile Industry (CITI) has expressed concern over reputational risks and the potential diversion of sourcing orders away from India, as some competing countries have received tariff-rate quota exemptions for textile and apparel exports . The lack of an expiry date on the tariffs is also a concern .

4. What is the impact of the tariff on the gem and jewellery sector?

The All India Gem and Jewellery Domestic Council has stated that the tariff will make Indian products less price competitive in one of the largest markets, placing significant pressure on margins and potentially denting the growth trajectory of the industry .

5. What is the broader context of these U.S. tariffs?

The U.S. has characterized its $1.2 trillion trade deficit as a “national emergency” and is using tariffs as a tool of economic policy. The administration is reportedly using these tariffs as a starting point for negotiations on reciprocal trade agreements. A pending second investigation on structural excess capacity could result in further tariffs on additional sectors .

Zomato’s Platform Fee, Delivery Levy No Abuse of Dominance: CCI

By T.C.A. Sharad Raghavan
New Delhi, July 25, 2026

The Competition Commission of India (CCI) has found the platform fee, delivery charges and restaurant commissions collected by Zomato do not constitute an abuse of dominance and are not anti-competitive practices [citation:original text]. They are charges for legitimate and differentiated services being provided, the CCI said [citation:original text].

The order was in response to an application by R. Suresh, who alleged Eternal (previously Zomato) was charging an inflated price for food on its delivery platform as a result of platform fees, delivery charges and the commission it charges restaurants [citation:original text].

The Complaint: A Ghee Pongal Tale

Mr. Suresh said he paid ₹198 for a plate of ghee pongal ordered on Zomato from Sree Ariya Bhavan. However, when he went to the restaurant himself, he was charged only ₹105 for the same dish [citation:original text]. He further said the higher price on the delivery platform was due to ₹43 delivery partner fee, ₹14.90 platform fee and ₹16.6 Goods and Services Tax and added the dish’s base price was also higher on the platform at ₹123.5, than ₹100 the restaurant charged him in person [citation:original text].

“Upon enquiry, the restaurant management informed approximately 33% commission is deducted by Zomato from restaurants, compelling restaurants to artificially inflate prices on the platform,” the CCI order read [citation:original text].

The complainant also argued that Zomato introduced a platform fee of around ₹2 per order in 2023, which had increased to ₹14.90 per order within less than three years—a jump of more than 645%—without any “transparent rationale” or corresponding improvement in services . He alleged that these practices amounted to an abuse of Zomato’s dominant position, prohibited under Section 4 of the Competition Act, 2002 .

The CCI’s Findings: Distinct Business Models

The Commission rejected the complainant’s allegation that the price of the ghee pongal on Zomato was unfair by observing that food sold through an online delivery platform cannot be directly compared with food purchased at a restaurant . It reasoned that online food delivery involves additional services beyond the food itself, including online ordering, platform access and doorstep delivery . Consumers who choose to avail of these services pay additional charges, such as delivery fees and platform fees .

“The business model of selling food items through restaurant and online food delivery services are different,” the CCI order stated. “So, the price of a food product varies in both the models” [citation:original text]. A consumer who is unable to visit a restaurant may choose the convenience of online food delivery by paying additional charges such as delivery fee and platform fee .

Multi-Sided Platforms and Commission Structures

Addressing the allegation that restaurants inflate menu prices to offset Zomato’s commissions, the Commission observed that online food delivery platforms operate as multi-sided businesses . They charge consumers platform and delivery fees for facilitating online ordering and delivery, while also charging restaurants commissions for listing and selling food through the platform .

The CCI noted that since commissions are paid by restaurants, restaurants may choose to pass on that burden to consumers by increasing menu prices on the platform . It held that this, by itself, did not establish a violation of the Competition Act .

“Drip Pricing” No Competition Concern

The CCI also rejected the allegation of “drip pricing”—a sales practice where only part of a product’s price is displayed initially, with additional mandatory charges revealed progressively during checkout . The Commission observed that these charges were levied for distinct services provided by the platform and that consumers remained free to accept or reject the order until the final stage of checkout . “Thus, drip pricing does not raise any competition issue, as such,” the CCI said . It noted that such charges are linked to additional services and are disclosed before the order is placed .

A Single Transaction Insufficient

The Commission also found that the complainant’s comparison was based on a single, low-priced food item that showed an 88% price difference . It noted that because delivery charges are largely fixed, the percentage difference would be considerably lower for higher-value orders . “If the price of the food item is high, percentage difference in price would accordingly decline as the delivery charge is a fixed charge,” the CCI observed .

A Limited Ruling: Competition Law, Not Consumer Law

The CCI closed the complaint under Section 26(2) of the Competition Act, concluding that no prima facie case of contravention of Sections 3 or 4 of the Act was made out against Eternal . A closure order under Section 26(2) is appealable before the National Company Law Appellate Tribunal (NCLAT) .

According to Toshit Shandilya, a partner in the competition law practice at AZB & Partners, while consumers may feel aggrieved by Zomato’s pricing, the CCI does not deal with individual consumer grievances. “To secure a favourable order under the Competition Act, a complainant must show a distinct anti-competitive design, which ordinarily requires market-wide evidence rather than evidence drawn from a single transaction,” he told The Hindu . He further noted that the order does not deal with consumer law: “A finding by the CCI under competition law does not determine the outcome under consumer law. This order is confined to Competition Act. It has no bearing on how a claim on drip pricing would be assessed under consumer law” .

Q&A Section

1. What was the basis of the complaint against Zomato filed with the CCI?

The complainant, R. Suresh, alleged that Zomato (Eternal) was abusing its dominant position by charging inflated prices for food on its delivery platform. He cited a specific example where a plate of ghee pongal cost ₹198 on Zomato, compared to ₹105 when purchased directly from the same restaurant. He attributed this to platform fees, delivery charges, and the commissions Zomato charges restaurants, which he argued forced restaurants to artificially inflate menu prices .

2. What were the CCI’s key findings in dismissing the complaint?

The CCI held that the business models of restaurants and online food delivery platforms are fundamentally different. Online platforms provide additional services such as platform access and doorstep delivery, for which consumers pay additional charges. The regulator also found that charges like platform and delivery fees are for distinct services and are disclosed before order placement, giving consumers the option to proceed or reject the transaction. It concluded that a single transaction comparison was insufficient to establish anti-competitive conduct .

3. What is “drip pricing” and why did the CCI find it does not raise competition concerns?

“Drip pricing” is a sales technique where only part of the total price is shown initially, and additional mandatory fees are disclosed progressively during checkout. The CCI observed that these additional charges are linked to specific services and are disclosed before the order is placed. Since consumers have the option to accept or reject the order until the final stage of checkout, the CCI held that the practice does not raise any competition issue .

4. Does the CCI’s order mean Zomato’s platform fees are legal under all circumstances?

The CCI’s order is limited to competition law under the Competition Act, 2002. It found that, based on the evidence presented in this case, the pricing practices did not constitute an abuse of dominance. However, the order does not address consumer law concerns. As competition law experts have noted, a finding under competition law does not determine the outcome under consumer law, and claims like those related to drip pricing could still be assessed under consumer protection frameworks .

5. What is the broader context of antitrust scrutiny against Zomato beyond this complaint?

Beyond this consumer complaint, Zomato and Swiggy are also facing a separate, long-running antitrust investigation initiated by the National Restaurant Association of India (NRAI). This probe covers allegations including price-parity clauses, exclusivity arrangements, and other vertical restraints imposed on restaurant partners. The Director General’s investigation has reportedly concluded that three categories of contractual arrangements used by Zomato—exclusivity conditions, minimum business guarantees, and wide price-parity clauses—may contravene competition law, though this is not the CCI’s final decision .

Refinery Expansion Not to Be Hit on West Asia Flare-Up: BPCL

By Saptaparno Ghosh
New Delhi, July 25, 2026

Bharat Petroleum Corporation Ltd. (BPCL) has kept expansion of refinery capacity on despite the tensions in West Asia [citation:original text]. “We expect this to be a temporary period (the recent flare-up of tensions in West Asia). However, if you look at the overall dynamics of crude availability in terms of supply and demand, it is still in surplus,” Vetsa Ramakrishna Gupta, director (finance) of BPCL told The Hindu in an interaction on Thursday [citation:original text].

Mr. Gupta added if the conflict resolved soon, it is expected the crude prices would cool off and Bharat Petroleum would be able to recoup losses [citation:original text]. The June-end quarter turned out to be particularly strenuous for India’s oil-marketing companies as they sought to shield prices of retail fuels such as petrol, diesel and liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) despite elevated crude prices because of the conflict in West Asia [citation:original text].

As a standard practice, refiners usually reinvest net profits for enhancing capacities and fine-tuning them to accommodate more varieties of crude [citation:original text].

The Q1 FY2027 Performance: A Tale of Resilience

BPCL reported a standalone net profit of ₹1,732.4 crore for the April-June quarter of FY2027, marking a significant decline from the ₹4,724.8 crore profit in the same period last year . Revenue from operations, however, increased by 10% to ₹1.40 lakh crore, driven by higher net sales .

The company’s gross refining margin (GRM)—the difference between the value of petroleum products and the cost of crude oil—stood at $11.5 per barrel. This was a drop from $14.8 in Q1FY26 and $12.1 in Q4FY26 . The company processed 7.31 million metric tonnes (MMT) of crude, down from 7.69 MMT a year earlier . The company’s average crude oil cost rose to $86.64 per barrel for the quarter, compared to $72.68 per barrel in the same period of the previous year .

BPCL’s marketing margin, however, remained steady, rising to 6.04% from 5.13% a year earlier . Its market sales grew 2%, with petrol sales rising 5% and diesel sales remaining flat . LPG sales grew 5%, and ATF sales grew 8% .

The Crude Supply Dynamics: A Surplus Amidst Conflict

Mr. Gupta’s observation that crude availability is still in surplus is a crucial insight into the market dynamics. Despite the geopolitical turmoil, the physical oil market has not experienced a supply shock severe enough to disrupt refinery operations fundamentally. The surplus stems from a combination of factors:

• Global Demand Concerns: Slowing economic growth in key economies, particularly China, has tempered demand growth .

• OPEC+ Spare Capacity: The OPEC+ alliance, led by Saudi Arabia and Russia, has significant spare production capacity that can be brought online if needed .

• Sanctions and Rerouting: While sanctions on Russia and Iran have disrupted trade flows, oil has been rerouted to alternative markets, maintaining overall supply .

This surplus has allowed BPCL to continue its capital expenditure plans. The company has earmarked ₹48,000 crore for expansion and growth over the next five years, with plans to invest ₹18,000 crore in the current financial year . This investment is directed towards increasing refining capacity by about 5 million tonnes over the next 2-3 years and expanding its petrochemicals footprint .

The LPG Diversification Strategy

In response to the drying up of supplies from traditional sources, BPCL has diversified its LPG procurement. In Q1, the company procured more LPG from the U.S. in the spot market. Subhankar Sen, director (marketing) told The Hindu, “We increased spot purchases from the U.S., and they were available without any disturbance though they take a longer voyage time” [citation:original text]. Mr. Gupta added local LPG production was slated to continue the momentum acquired with contingency steps taken at the peak of the conflict to ensure adequate availability [citation:original text].

The Refining Expansion: Confidence in the Long Term

The company’s confidence in its expansion plans reflects a longer-term view. BPCL is planning to ramp up its crude processing capacity by 5 million tonnes over the next few years, taking its total capacity to around 45 million tonnes . This expansion is being done with an eye on the future demand for petroleum products, which remains robust despite the global energy transition. The company is also investing in petrochemicals, EV charging infrastructure, and renewable energy, positioning itself for the transition to a low-carbon economy .

Q&A Section

1. How has BPCL’s Q1 FY2027 financial performance been impacted by the West Asia conflict?

BPCL reported a standalone net profit of ₹1,732.4 crore for Q1 FY2027, down from ₹4,724.8 crore in the same quarter last year. This decline was primarily due to elevated crude prices, which led to a drop in gross refining margins (GRM) from $14.8 to $11.5 per barrel. The company’s average crude oil cost rose to $86.64 per barrel, compared to $72.68 a year earlier .

2. Is BPCL continuing its refinery expansion plans despite the geopolitical tensions?

Yes, BPCL has kept expansion of refinery capacity on despite the tensions in West Asia. The company plans to invest ₹18,000 crore in the current financial year as part of a five-year ₹48,000 crore capital expenditure plan. This includes increasing refining capacity by about 5 million tonnes over the next 2-3 years .

3. What is BPCL’s assessment of the crude oil market dynamics?

BPCL’s finance director, Vetsa Ramakrishna Gupta, expects the tensions to be temporary. He noted that crude availability remains in surplus due to global demand concerns, OPEC+ spare capacity, and rerouting of supply from sanctioned countries. The company expects crude prices to cool off if the conflict resolves, allowing BPCL to recoup its losses .

4. How is BPCL managing its LPG supply amid the disruptions?

To manage disruptions, BPCL procured more LPG from the U.S. in the spot market during Q1. The company also noted that local LPG production is slated to continue the momentum acquired with contingency steps taken at the peak of the conflict to ensure adequate availability .

5. What are the key highlights of BPCL’s performance in its marketing segment?

BPCL’s marketing margin remained steady, rising to 6.04% from 5.13% a year earlier. Market sales grew 2%, with petrol sales rising 5% and diesel sales remaining flat. LPG sales grew 5%, and aviation turbine fuel (ATF) sales grew 8%. The company also expanded its EV charging network by 12,800 new charge points .

Telecom Infra Firms Can’t Share Data Out of India, Says Government

By Press Trust of India
New Delhi, July 25, 2026

The government has barred communication infrastructure providers, including those involved in cloud-based networks for telecom services, mobile towers and satellite gateways, from sharing any data outside the country, as per an official notification [citation:original text].

The Department of Telecom, in a notification for the authorisation framework for infrastructure providers, made it mandatory the entire telecommunication data should be stored within the country [citation:original text].

“Every new authorised entity shall ensure all systems of its telecommunication network and the data, logs and information associated with its telecommunication network shall be stored within India and no copies of such data, logs and information shall be routed, shared or made available outside India,” the notification, dated July 20, said [citation:original text].

Authorisation frameworks are part of government strategy to shift from licensing regime to light regulation, as per the Telecommunications Act 2023 [citation:original text].

The Notification: A Comprehensive Data Localisation Mandate

The Department of Telecommunications (DoT) issued the notification under the Telecommunications Act 2023, introducing a new authorisation framework for infrastructure providers (IPs) . The notification applies to entities involved in providing:

• Cloud-based networks for telecom services

• Internet and broadband services through mobile towers

• Satellite gateways

• Mobile towers

• Other communication infrastructure

The data localisation mandate applies to “all systems of its telecommunication network and the data, logs and information associated with its telecommunication network” . The notification also specifies that the data storage requirement applies to both domestic and international communication, not just domestic traffic [citation:original text]. This means that even data related to international calls and data flows must be stored in India, with no copies allowed outside the country.

The Legal Framework: Telecommunications Act 2023

The notification is issued under the Telecommunications Act 2023, which replaced the 138-year-old Indian Telegraph Act, 1885 . The Act establishes a new regulatory framework for the telecommunications sector, transitioning from a licensing regime to a light-touch authorisation framework.

Under Section 3 of the Act, the government may grant an authorisation for:

• Telecommunication services

• Telecommunication networks

• Telecommunication infrastructure

• Other matters related to telecommunications

The Act also empowers the central government to grant, modify, suspend, or cancel authorisations and specify the terms and conditions, including those related to:

• Security

• Safety

• Sovereignty and integrity of India

• Public interest

• National security

The data localisation mandate under the infrastructure provider authorisation is a direct exercise of this power, aligning with the Act’s emphasis on security and sovereignty.

Impact on Infrastructure Providers: Existing vs. New Entities

The notification applies to “every new authorised entity” . This means that entities that have already been authorised for infrastructure provision are not immediately subject to the mandate, at least not under this specific notification. However, the notification also states that “all existing authorised entities which are granted authorisation for infrastructure provider category shall comply with the provisions of this authorisation as and when specified by the Central Government” . This suggests that the government may extend the mandate to existing entities through a future notification.

For new entities, however, the mandate is effective immediately. This creates a two-tier system where new entrants must meet stricter data localisation requirements than incumbents, at least for now.

The Broader Context: India’s Push for Data Sovereignty

The notification is part of a broader push by the Indian government to assert control over data generated within its borders. This push has been evident across multiple sectors:

• Digital Personal Data Protection (DPDP) Act, 2023: Provides a comprehensive framework for data protection, including provisions for data localisation and cross-border data transfers .

• RBI Guidelines: The Reserve Bank of India has mandated that payment system data be stored only in India .

• Cloud Service Providers: The government has been encouraging cloud service providers to store data locally, with major players like AWS, Microsoft, and Google establishing local data centres in India .

The notification extends this data sovereignty principle to the telecom infrastructure layer, ensuring that even the operational data of the telecom network—including logs, metadata, and system information—remains within India’s jurisdiction.

Implications for Cloud and Satellite Providers

The notification has significant implications for cloud infrastructure providers and satellite communication operators who are entering the Indian market. Companies like Amazon Web Services, Microsoft Azure, Google Cloud, and satellite providers like Starlink, OneWeb, and Amazon’s Project Kuiper will be required to ensure that all telecom-related data remains in India, with no copies routed or shared outside the country [citation:original text]. This requirement applies not just to user data but also to network management data, logs, and system information, which is a more comprehensive requirement than typical data localisation norms. For cloud providers, this means that their infrastructure and operational processes must be redesigned to ensure that the data never leaves India. For satellite operators, this means that ground infrastructure and gateways must be set up in India to handle all data processing within the country, which could affect latency and cost structures.

The Shift from Licensing to Authorisation

The notification is part of the government’s strategy to shift from a licensing regime to a “light regulation” framework under the Telecommunications Act 2023 . This shift is designed to lower entry barriers for new players and encourage innovation while ensuring that regulatory oversight remains effective. However, the data localisation mandate shows that this “light regulation” does not mean a relaxation of national security and data sovereignty requirements. The government is using the authorisation framework to impose a stricter data localisation mandate than was previously in place, demonstrating that national security concerns will continue to be a priority, even in a deregulated environment.

Q&A Section

1. What is the key data localisation mandate issued by the Department of Telecommunications?

The Department of Telecommunications has mandated that all telecom infrastructure providers must store the entire telecommunication data, logs, and system information within India. No copies of such data may be routed, shared, or made available outside the country [citation:original text]. This applies to both domestic and international communication and covers cloud-based networks, mobile towers, and satellite gateways .

2. Which entities are covered by the new data localisation mandate?

The mandate applies to “every new authorised entity” providing telecommunication infrastructure, including cloud-based networks for telecom services, internet and broadband services through mobile towers, satellite gateways, and mobile towers. Existing authorized entities will be required to comply as and when specified by the Central Government .

3. What is the legal basis for this notification?

The notification is issued under the Telecommunications Act 2023, which replaced the 138-year-old Indian Telegraph Act, 1885. The Act establishes a new regulatory framework for the telecommunications sector, transitioning from a licensing regime to a light-touch authorisation framework. Section 3 of the Act empowers the government to grant authorisations and specify terms and conditions related to security, safety, and national sovereignty .

4. What is the government’s strategy behind the new authorisation framework?

The authorisation framework is part of the government’s strategy to shift from a licensing regime to “light regulation” under the Telecommunications Act 2023 . This shift is designed to lower entry barriers and encourage innovation while maintaining regulatory oversight. However, the data localisation mandate shows that national security concerns will continue to be a priority in this new framework .

5. What are the implications of this notification for cloud and satellite providers?

Cloud infrastructure providers and satellite communication operators entering the Indian market will be required to ensure that all telecom-related data remains in India, with no copies routed or shared outside the country [citation:original text]. For cloud providers, this means redesigning infrastructure and operational processes. For satellite operators, this means establishing ground infrastructure and gateways in India to handle all data processing within the country, which could affect latency and cost structures .

U.S. Hits Iran from South to North After Trump Threats Over Red Sea

By Reuters
Dubai, July 25, 2026

U.S. missiles struck targets across Iran, reaching as far as its Caspian coast, on Friday after President Donald Trump vowed “major military punishment” for Tehran and its Houthi allies in Yemen for extending the war to a second major shipping chokepoint, the mouth of the Red Sea. Two weeks after the collapse of an interim truce meant to end the war, the Iranian armed forces responded by firing at U.S. bases in neighbouring Arab countries and warning people there that they may strike non-military buildings used by U.S. personnel. The Iranian army said Mr. Trump’s threats only strengthened its resolve [citation:original text].

The Houthis, who control northern and western Yemen, said this week they were imposing a naval blockade on Saudi Arabia, which has diverted millions of barrels of oil each day by pipeline to the Red Sea to skirt Iran’s near-total blockade in the Strait of Hormuz. Mr. Trump wrote on social media he would hold Iran accountable for any further attacks by the fighters, “and major military punishment will be inflicted upon Iran and, of course, the Houthis, themselves” [citation:original text].

He told Axios he was considering re-launching major combat operations in Iran and was close to a decision. “They haven’t received enough pain yet,” the U.S. news outlet quoted Mr. Trump as saying [citation:original text]. Trump also said on social media that any damage to cargo ships would be paid for with Iranian money, referring to frozen Iranian assets held by the U.S., but without specifying how [citation:original text].

Escalation Across the Region

Iranian state media said missiles had struck Qeshm Island on the Strait of Hormuz. U.S. airstrikes hit Piranshahr, in West Azerbaijan Province near Iran’s border with Iraq, damaging several vehicles, according to the province’s emergency services [citation:original text].

The Iranian army said it had attacked U.S. military equipment depots at Al-Adiri, latterly named Camp Buehring, in northern Kuwait, and the positions of U.S. troops at Camp Arifjan and at Camp Doha, near Kuwait City. Iran’s Revolutionary Guards said they had significantly damaged a surveillance tower used by the U.S. Fifth Fleet in Bahrain [citation:original text].

The U.S. military confirmed it had launched its 13th consecutive night of strikes against Iran, targeting Iranian military assets and facilities, including drone storage sites, to reduce the threat to commercial shipping in the Strait of Hormuz . U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) stated the strikes were designed to “hold Iran accountable and diminish threats from the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps to commercial shipping” .

The Diplomatic Impasse

The resurgence in fighting came after a U.S. ceasefire proposal, reportedly delivered by Iraqi Prime Minister Ali al-Zaidi during his visit to Tehran, was rejected by Iran. Iranian officials insisted they would not accept a temporary truce that left the status of the strategic Strait of Hormuz unresolved . Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi stated, “The problem is America’s outlook, which is illogical, greedy and controlling” .

Trump is scheduled to meet Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu in the coming days to discuss the conflict . Meanwhile, American intelligence agencies believe Iran’s new supreme leader, Ayatollah Mojtaba Khamenei, is far more interested than his father in pursuing a nuclear weapon, which could provide further justification for an escalation .

Economic Impact

The escalating conflict has driven **Brent crude oil prices above $100 a barrel** for the first time since May, settling at $100.95 on Friday before dropping slightly . The price is nearly 40% higher since the start of the war . The Houthi blockade of Saudi shipping in the Red Sea has injected further uncertainty into global energy markets . The cost of the war has also been staggering, with the Pentagon confirming that the U.S. has spent $37.5 billion** on military operations and requested an additional **$87 billion from Congress to continue . At least 18 American service members have been killed since the war began in February .

Iran, for its part, has warned that if the U.S. continues to target its civilian infrastructure, the conflict could expand far beyond the Middle East . The war between the U.S. and Iran, which began with the “Operation Epic Fury” strikes on February 28, is now entering its fifth month with no end in sight.

Q&A Section

1. What triggered the recent escalation in U.S.-Iran hostilities?

The conflict escalated after a 60-day ceasefire collapsed. The U.S. and Iran clashed over control of the Strait of Hormuz—Iran wants to manage passage and potentially charge fees, while the U.S. demands it be fully reopened to international navigation . The Houthis, Iran’s allies in Yemen, also declared a naval blockade on Saudi shipping in the Red Sea, opening a second front.

2. What has been the scale of U.S. military action in Iran?

The U.S. has launched 13 consecutive nights of airstrikes against Iranian military targets . The Pentagon has spent $37.5 billion on the war and requested another $87 billion from Congress . At least 18 U.S. service members have been killed since the war began . Iran, meanwhile, has reported over 50 killed and more than 500 wounded in the post-MoU strikes, with U.S. attacks hitting infrastructure and civilian areas.

3. What was Iran’s response to the U.S. strikes?

Iran has retaliated with missile and drone attacks on U.S. military bases in Kuwait, Bahrain, and elsewhere in the region . Iran’s Revolutionary Guards have also claimed attacks on surveillance towers, drone depots, and logistics facilities. The Iranian military has reiterated its resolve to maintain control of the Strait of Hormuz, and warned it could expand the conflict if the U.S. continues to hit civilian infrastructure.

4. What is the status of diplomatic efforts to end the war?

A U.S. ceasefire proposal delivered via Iraq was rejected by Iran, which refused any temporary truce that did not resolve the status of the Strait of Hormuz . Both sides have said they are open to talks but have accused each other of bad faith . President Trump has said he is considering a “massive attack” and that Iran “has not received enough pain yet” .

5. How has the conflict impacted global oil prices and energy security?

Brent crude oil briefly surged past $100 per barrel for the first time since May, driven by the closure of the Strait of Hormuz and the new Houthi blockade in the Red Sea . The dual chokepoint disruption has threatened global energy supplies, with prices now nearly 40% higher than before the war .

The Unseen Enforcers: Police Identity, Plainclothes Operations, and the Battle for Accountability at the Jantar Mantar Protests

By Aditi Nayar
New Delhi, July 25, 2026

When tens of thousands of protesters attempted to march from New Delhi’s Jantar Mantar to Parliament on Monday as part of the “Sansad Chalo” protest, some videos emerged showing Delhi Police and Rapid Action Force (RAF) personnel in civilian clothes or without visible names [citation:original text]. This raised questions over police identification and accountability [citation:original text].

The protests, organised by the Cockroach Janta Party (CJP) over the NEET paper leak and demanding the resignation of Education Minister Dharmendra Pradhan, swelled beyond expectations on Monday [citation:original text]. As the crowd marched towards Parliament, police lathi-charged it, leading to violent clashes between police and protesters [citation:original text]. Both the police and members of the crowd sustained injuries [citation:original text].

By evening, some videos circulating on social media appeared to show unidentified men in civilian clothes wielding standard police lathis and assaulting demonstrators [citation:original text]. The CJP questioned the Delhi Police on social media, asking: “Who are these lathi-armed goons in plain clothes? Who have you hired to beat us up?” [citation:original text] Some other videos appeared to show uniformed Delhi Police and RAF personnel without visible names [citation:original text]. In the clips, protesters are seen filming officers and asking, “Where is your nameplate? Please answer us,” while the personnel do not respond [citation:original text].

Delhi Police has not responded publicly to the allegations of the videos [citation:original text]. But The Indian Express has learnt that the force has issued directions that all personnel deployed at Jantar Mantar must report in uniform and not in civilian clothing [citation:original text].

The Legal Framework: The Principle of Identification

While certain operations, such as those involving intelligence collection, genuinely require hiding identification or even impersonation, regular policing is guided by statutory procedure and judicial guidelines [citation:original text].

The maintenance of public order and tranquillity is governed by Chapter XI of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita (Sections 148 to 160, formerly Chapter X of the CrPC) [citation:original text]. While it does not specifically state whether police or armed forces personnel are required to identify themselves during a law and order situation, sources said that the very fact that the law allows only a magistrate or a “police officer” to disperse a crowd implies identification [citation:original text]. The argument is that an unidentified crowd of armed men cannot legally demand a public gathering to disperse [citation:original text]. “If a police officer is unidentified, his command to disperse cannot carry statutory weight,” said a criminal lawyer practising in Delhi [citation:original text].

In D K Basu vs State of West Bengal (1997), the Supreme Court laid down detailed safeguards for arrests and detention, including the requirement that the arresting officer bear clear and visible identification [citation:original text]. The court directed that “the police personnel carrying out the arrest and handling the interrogation of the arrestee should bear accurate, visible and clear identification and name tags with their designations” [citation:original text]. Although the ruling addressed arrests rather than crowd control, lawyers say it reflects the broader judicial emphasis on the identifiability of police officers while exercising coercive powers [citation:original text].

In August 2025, the Andhra Pradesh High Court, while hearing a petition filed by YSRCP MLA Nallapareddy Prasanna Kumar Reddy, questioned how citizens were expected to recognise plainclothes personnel as police officers while they were performing official duties [citation:original text]. Reddy, who was facing the charge of obstructing a police officer from discharging his duty, had argued that the officers were not in uniform [citation:original text].

Why Do Police Avoid Identification?

Police officers argue that visible identification can expose individual personnel to prolonged litigation, online harassment and even threats to their families [citation:original text]. “This practice originated in conflict between the police and the public,” said a former Delhi Police officer, adding that the police had been using the term “identification” to describe the practice [citation:original text]. He noted that the practice originated in conflict theatres such as Jammu and Kashmir, Punjab and Chhattisgarh, where personnel often avoided displaying nameplates or rank insignia because they could make them easier targets for militants [citation:original text]. Over time, it appears to have filtered into routine policing [citation:original text].

However, critics argue that this practice erodes statutory accountability. Concealing identification prevents citizens and oversight bodies from identifying decision-makers, attributing the specific use of force, or auditing whether coercive measures were proportionate [citation:original text]. Anonymous policing removes individual responsibility, severely hindering administrative inquiries, judicial oversight, and internal disciplinary proceedings against misconduct [citation:original text]. Unidentifiable enforcement personnel undermine the perceived legitimacy of state authority, alienating citizens and eroding confidence in procedural fairness [citation:original text].

The Deployment of Plainclothes Officers

The deployment of police personnel in plain clothes at protests is part of the force’s operational strategy for managing large public gatherings [citation:original text]. These duties are usually carried out by the intelligence unit in any police force. Officers of such units do not have to mandatorily wear uniform [citation:original text]. Besides, there are certain units, like the Special Cell, Crime Branch and Special Staff where wearing a uniform is not mandatory as well [citation:original text]. These officers too are often deployed on law and order duty [citation:original text].

An official source said such practice is a “deliberate strategy” to blend into crowds where there is a possibility of anti-social elements exploiting large gatherings [citation:original text]. He said the visible presence of uniformed personnel can alert potential troublemakers, making it more difficult to identify and monitor them [citation:original text].

On Monday, several people seen alongside Delhi Police officers during the clashes at the CJP protest march in civilian clothes were carrying lathis—raising several questions [citation:original text]. Sources said the plainclothes officers had been deployed at Jantar Mantar since the beginning of the protest who continued to monitor the movements throughout, but when the clashes broke out during Monday’s march, they took part in the crackdown [citation:original text].

Accountability and the Way Forward

The episodes at Jantar Mantar have once again brought into focus the use of plainclothes personnel during protests and crowd-control operations [citation:original text]. The presence of unidentifiable enforcement personnel raises serious questions of legality and accountability [citation:original text]. Legal experts have noted that under the BNSS, dispersal orders must be issued by identifiable police officers or magistrates [citation:original text]. Unidentifiable personnel using force undermines the rule of law and erodes public trust [citation:original text].

The Delhi Police’s decision to enforce a uniform rule at Jantar Mantar is a step in the right direction [citation:original text]. However, the broader debate over police identification during protests remains unresolved. The Supreme Court’s decision to hear petitions alleging police excesses on July 27 provides an opportunity for the judiciary to clarify the legal position on police identification and accountability during crowd-control operations [citation:original text]. As the The Hindu editorial noted, “those who unleashed violence, whether authorised police personnel or vigilantes who infiltrated the student protests, need to be identified, pursued, and held accountable” .

Q&A Section

1. What legal provisions govern police identification during protests?

The Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita (BNSS) empowers magistrates and police officers to disperse unlawful assemblies but implicitly presumes that the entity exercising coercive authority is an identifiable statutory authority [citation:original text]. The Supreme Court’s ruling in D K Basu vs State of West Bengal (1997) requires police personnel carrying out arrests to bear clear, visible identification [citation:original text]. While this judgment specifically addressed arrests, its underlying principle of transparency and accountability is considered equally relevant to crowd-control operations [citation:original text].

2. Why did Delhi Police deploy plainclothes officers at the Jantar Mantar protests?

Plainclothes officers are deployed as part of a “deliberate strategy” to blend into crowds where there is a possibility of anti-social elements exploiting large gatherings [citation:original text]. The visible presence of uniformed personnel can alert potential troublemakers, making it more difficult to identify and monitor them [citation:original text]. These duties are usually carried out by intelligence units, Special Cell, Crime Branch and Special Staff, where wearing a uniform is not mandatory [citation:original text].

3. What is the significance of the D K Basu vs State of West Bengal (1997) judgment?

The Supreme Court laid down detailed safeguards for arrests and detention, including the requirement that the arresting officer bear clear and visible identification with name tags and designations [citation:original text]. Although the ruling addressed arrests rather than crowd control, lawyers say it reflects the broader judicial emphasis on the identifiability of police officers while exercising coercive powers [citation:original text]. The judgment remains the backbone of arrest procedures in India [citation:original text].

4. What arguments do police officers make for avoiding visible identification?

Police officers argue that visible identification can expose individual personnel to prolonged litigation, online harassment and even threats to their families [citation:original text]. The practice originated in conflict theatres such as Jammu and Kashmir, Punjab and Chhattisgarh, where personnel often avoided displaying nameplates or rank insignia because they could make them easier targets for militants [citation:original text]. Over time, the practice appears to have filtered into routine policing [citation:original text].

5. What action has Delhi Police taken in response to the videos from the Jantar Mantar protests?

Delhi Police has issued directions that all personnel deployed at Jantar Mantar must report in uniform and not in civilian clothing [citation:original text]. The decision came after videos of Monday’s clashes spread widely online, showing men in civilian clothes, some with their faces covered, hitting protesters, and uniformed officers without name tags or clear identification [citation:original text]. However, the police have not issued a detailed public explanation of the identity or role of the plainclothes individuals seen in the videos [citation:original text].

Google as Licensee: An Ill-Conceived Precedent for India’s Power Sector

By Aditi Nayar
New Delhi, July 25, 2026

The Andhra Pradesh government’s recent notification proposing to grant a “deemed distribution licensee” status to data centres in the state with a minimum load of 300 megawatts (Mw) has sparked a significant legal and policy debate . The move, widely seen as a facilitation for Google’s planned $15 billion, 1-gigawatt (Gw) data centre in Visakhapatnam, raises fundamental questions about the interpretation of the Electricity Act, 2003, and the permissible scope of executive discretion in the power sector .

The Legal Framework: Deemed Licences Under the Electricity Act, 2003

The first thing which comes to one’s mind is whether it is legally possible to grant a deemed distribution licensee status on the basis of an executive order, especially when there is no such provision in the parent Act, that is the Electricity Act, 2003 . The Act does speak of a deemed licensee status, but specifically for transmission companies already in the business of transmission prior to the law’s enactment . There is no mention of deemed distribution licensees unless it’s a government company—which Google, of course, is not .

The Andhra Pradesh government has relied on a 2022 amendment to the 2005 rules, which granted the state government the power to determine the minimum area of supply for a new distribution licensee . However, this amendment pertains to new distribution licences, not deemed distribution licences. The legal basis for creating a new category of deemed licensee through an executive notification is, at best, tenuous.

The Supreme Court’s Verdict on Railways: A Binding Precedent

The Andhra Pradesh government’s move is fraught with legal risk, particularly in light of the Supreme Court’s recent judgment on the Indian Railways’ claim to deemed distribution licensee status. In a May 2026 order, the Supreme Court held that the Railways is a consumer, not a deemed distribution licensee .

The court held that a distribution licensee must not only operate and maintain a distribution system, but it is also required to supply electricity to consumers . The Railways, which operates a closed network for its own operational requirements, does not pass this test unambiguously . The court distinguished the Railways from entities like the Military Engineering Services, which supply electricity to residents in cantonments, clarifying that a government entity must perform the function of distribution to different consumers to qualify as a deemed licensee under the third proviso to Section 14 .

The court also held that since the Railways buys electricity for its own use, like any other consumer, it would have to pay the associated cross-subsidy surcharge and additional surcharge . This ruling has significant implications for entities seeking deemed-licensee status, including data centres, which primarily consume electricity for their own operations rather than distributing it to third-party consumers.

The Andhra Pradesh Model: A Deemed Consumer in Licensee Clothing

The Andhra Pradesh notification says that the deemed licensee can only supply power for activities which fall under the operations of a data centre . This is essentially a data centre consuming power for its own operations—the very activity the Supreme Court has ruled does not qualify as “distribution.”

The policy framework for Deemed Distribution Licences (DDLs) restricts power supply exclusively to data centre loads within the licensed area and prohibits the DDL from supplying power to any third-party consumer . This is a closed-loop system, akin to an open-access consumer operating within the geography of a distribution licensee, but without paying open-access charges . The only difference is that an open-access consumer pays for the open access and other related charges for the loss of revenue to the incumbent utility. In this particular case, no open-access charges would be paid since it is a distribution utility by itself, albeit a deemed one .

It is not difficult to see why this route has been adopted by the state government. The idea is to ensure that the data centres do not pay open-access charges and can access power at a much cheaper rate . If the deemed licence finally comes through, there will not be any immediate impact on the revenue of the incumbent utility since the data centre is not one of its existing consumers. However, its future revenue will be unduly affected . The utility serving Visakhapatnam is Eastern Power Distribution Company of Andhra Pradesh Limited, and its peak load is about 4 Gw. The data centre will have a final load of 1 Gw, which means that it would have been a gold mine for the utility had the data centre been one of its consumers .

The Consequences of a Flawed Model

The move to award a deemed licensee status to Google is ill-conceived and legally untenable . The state government’s reliance on a 2022 amendment to determine the minimum area of supply for a new distribution licence does not provide a legal basis for creating a deemed distribution licence through executive fiat. The Supreme Court’s Railways judgment has made it considerably harder for data centres to rely on deemed licence status . Entities may instead have to obtain a regular distribution licence under the Act and satisfy the accompanying regulatory obligations, including demonstrating that they intend to supply electricity to consumers rather than merely consume it themselves .

Similar to the Railways case, the move to award a deemed licensee status to Google is ill-conceived and legally untenable. It’s not a good decision and somebody needs to bell the cat .

Q&A Section

1. What is the Andhra Pradesh government’s policy on deemed distribution licences for data centres?

The Andhra Pradesh government has introduced a policy to grant Deemed Distribution Licences (DDLs) to strategic data centres with a minimum connected load of 300 MW. The licence allows data centres to procure and distribute power within their licensed area, but the power supply must be restricted exclusively to data centre loads, and the DDL holder is not permitted to supply power to third-party consumers .

2. What is the legal basis for the government’s notification?

The government has relied on a 2022 amendment to the 2005 rules on additional requirements for granting a new distribution licence, which granted the state government the power to determine the minimum area of supply. However, this amendment pertains to new distribution licences, not deemed distribution licences .

3. What did the Supreme Court rule in the Indian Railways case?

The Supreme Court held that the Indian Railways is a consumer, not a deemed distribution licensee, because it does not distribute or supply electricity to consumers. The court ruled that a distribution licensee must operate and maintain a distribution system and supply electricity to consumers, and that a closed network for self-consumption does not qualify .

4. Why is the Andhra Pradesh policy considered legally risky?

The policy is legally risky because it attempts to create a new category of deemed distribution licensee through executive notification, which is not provided for in the Electricity Act, 2003. The Supreme Court’s Railways judgment has made it considerably harder for entities that primarily consume electricity for their own use to claim deemed licensee status .

5. What are the potential consequences of this policy?

The policy could allow data centres to avoid paying open-access charges, affecting the revenue of incumbent utilities. The utility serving Visakhapatnam, Eastern Power Distribution Company of Andhra Pradesh Limited, with a peak load of 4 Gw, could lose a significant revenue stream from the 1 Gw data centre . The policy is also likely to face legal challenges, similar to the Railways case .

Custodian of Reserves to Manager of Risk: The RBI’s $100 Billion Transformation

By Prabal Basu Roy
New Delhi, July 25, 2026

Every generation of central bankers leaves behind a defining innovation. There was a time when the credibility of a central bank was measured by the gold in its vaults. Later, inflation targeting became the gold standard of monetary policy. After the global financial crisis, quantitative easing redefined the role of central banks across the developed world.

India may now be witnessing another such transformation — one that has attracted far less public attention than it deserves .

The RBI’s recently declared foreign exchange forward position exceeding $100 billion has attracted predictable headlines, ranging from a looming crisis to sophisticated financial management. Yet, the real story is not its size but what it reveals about the changing philosophy of India’s central bank .

Traditionally, defending a currency was straightforward. When the rupee weakened excessively, the RBI sold dollars from its foreign exchange reserves. The intervention was visible, easily understood, and immediately reflected in reserve numbers. Markets could see both the action and its cost .

Today, that model is undergoing a fundamental transformation .

The Scale of the Shift: A Record Forward Book

Over the past two years, India’s central bank built one of the world’s largest bearish dollar bets to support a persistently weak rupee. The book had ballooned to a record $106.7 billion in May, as per Bloomberg calculations based on RBI data . The measure was $67.8 billion in January 2026, and last hit a record $88.8 billion in February 2025 . The accumulation reflects the RBI’s heavy use of forwards to cushion the rupee from volatile oil prices and weak capital flows .

The RBI’s net-short dollar book, a measure of the degree it has sold forward its stockpile of US currency, is nearing $100 billion across offshore and onshore markets . The buildup comes as emerging markets faced renewed pressure from a resurgent dollar. Even before the West Asia conflict broke out, the RBI was already heavily intervening to steady the rupee for months as high US tariffs spurred record equity outflows .

The Strategic Rationale: Why Derivatives?

Instead of relying primarily on outright dollar sales, the RBI has increasingly turned to forwards, swaps, and other derivative instruments. These allow it to influence the exchange rate without immediately drawing down reserves. In effect, the central bank is managing not merely the currency but its own balance sheet .

This approach provides several advantages. First, it allows the RBI to intervene without depleting foreign exchange reserves, preserving them for genuine systemic stress. Second, it offers flexibility to calibrate interventions and manage liquidity efficiently. Third, it signals policy intent and can steady the currency during periods of volatility .

The RBI has focused much of its intervention in offshore markets, particularly through non-deliverable forwards (NDFs), which account for a significant share of its derivatives book . Using NDFs allows the RBI to influence the exchange rate without immediately depleting foreign-exchange reserves, while also keeping intervention costs relatively lower .

The Unwinding Challenge: A Delicate Balancing Act

The RBI now faces the challenge of unwinding this massive position without destabilizing the currency market . The balancing act lies in the pace and extent of the unwind. Leaving the contracts in place for too long can be costly and prolongs the RBI’s forward exposure, while scaling them back too quickly risks diluting the positive impact fresh overseas inflows would otherwise have on the rupee. A misstep could potentially stoke volatility, complicating the RBI’s currency defence just as a renewed flare-up in US-Iran tensions drives oil prices higher .

The conundrum has come up in internal meetings at the central bank, where officials have discussed how to reduce the position . The rupee, which strengthened last month following the support measures, has resumed declines in July and remains on track for an unprecedented ninth straight year of losses .

The RBI’s net short forward position is heavily front-loaded, with nearly $29 billion maturing within three months (as of May) and about $51 billion over a one-year horizon. This concentration creates a material overhang and policy conundrum . In the past fortnight, short-term FX maturities worth about $20 billion are expected to have rolled off the central bank’s forward book .

The Capital Inflows Opportunity

Some of that strain eased last month as India relaxed rules for foreign investments in government bonds and cut taxes on debt returns. Sentiment was also boosted by the slump in oil prices after the US and Iran signed an interim peace deal . The RBI’s package of measures aimed at supporting the rupee attracted more than $20 billion as of July 17, with more than four-fifths coming from foreign currency non-resident (FCNR) deposits mobilised by banks .

Seizing on the improved backdrop, the RBI is estimated to have trimmed the offshore portion of its short dollar forward book by $10 billion to $15 billion since mid-June, according to traders familiar with the developments . The central bank likely used part of the initial inflows from its foreign-currency deposit drive to unwind a portion of its massive foreign exchange forward book, economists said, helping the central bank reduce near-term obligations .

The Risks: Kicking the Can Down the Road

A forward contract is ultimately a commitment that must be honoured, unwound, or rolled over. Today’s intervention, therefore, becomes tomorrow’s management challenge. This is popularly called kicking the can down the road — an economic philosophy tuned to perfection by Ben Bernanke after the 2008 Lehman crisis. In that sense, derivatives shift risks across time rather than eliminate them .

Critics may therefore ask whether India is replacing one vulnerability with another — substituting visible reserve depletion with less visible derivative exposure akin to speculation on forward markets. In my view, this is not speculation but prudent risk management. Unlike a hedge fund pursuing objectives of maximising profits, the RBI uses derivatives to minimise instability by moderating currency volatility while preserving reserves for periods of genuine systemic stress .

However, the risks are real. The hedging of interest obligations on foreign currency deposits is expected to further cap the rupee’s upside. Assuming deposit inflows of around $50 billion and applying a 6% annual interest rate over an average maturity of four years, banks would need to hedge nearly $12 billion via forward dollar purchases, with implications for both spot and forward premiums . In effect, through a subsidized swap window, the RBI is effectively borrowing expensive 3-to-5-year dollars from the market. If the rupee weakens against the greenback over this period, the central bank would face mark-to-market losses on these fresh forward commitments .

The Path Forward: Transparency and Accountability

The real test will come during market stress. A surge in oil prices, a stronger dollar, and simultaneous capital outflows would require the RBI to defend the rupee while managing a large forward book — a very complex policy challenge .

The question is not whether the RBI can manage it; there is every reason to believe it can. The real question is whether the public understands what has changed. Unlike reserve depletion whose costs are immediately visible, derivative positions shift obligations into the future and thus demand greater transparency. Complexity is not a weakness; opacity can be. The debate should therefore move beyond headlines about “$100-billion bets.” The RBI has not gambled — it has adopted a more sophisticated framework for managing currency risk. The challenge is ensuring that transparency in disclosure of the derivative management strategy, and its eventual unwinding, evolves alongside policy innovation .

Should markets receive more guidance on the strategy for unwinding large forward positions? Should Parliament and financial commentators devote greater attention to derivative exposures that increasingly shape India’s external balance sheet? As central banking evolves, public understanding must evolve with it .

The paradox of modern central banking is that the more sophisticated its financial instruments become, the greater the need for transparency and accountability. Confidence ultimately rests not only on strong reserves or clever balance-sheet management, but also on trust in the institution deploying them .

The RBI’s $100-billion forward position is, therefore, neither a cause for panic nor a reason for celebration. It marks the quiet evolution of India’s central bank from being principally the custodian of foreign exchange reserves to becoming an active manager of financial risk demanding exceptional judgement in the use of its chosen instruments .

This transformation may well prove necessary — even visionary — in hindsight. But every transformation of this magnitude deserves informed public debate and disclosures today — not because we distrust the institution, but because we value it .

Q&A Section

1. Why has the RBI built a record $100 billion short dollar forward position?

The RBI accumulated this massive forward book over the past two years to defend the rupee against persistent depreciation caused by a stronger dollar, geopolitical tensions, higher crude oil prices, and punishing US tariffs. Forward contracts help support the rupee without immediately depleting foreign exchange reserves .

2. What is a short dollar forward position and how does it work?

A short dollar forward position is essentially a commitment by the RBI to sell US dollars and buy rupees at a future date. These transactions can ease pressure on the rupee and have the benefit of not immediately drawing down foreign-exchange reserves. Unwinding the position requires buying dollars with rupees, which can return pressure on the Indian currency .

3. Why is the RBI now trying to unwind this position?

The RBI has started trimming its forward book after a series of measures attracted foreign capital inflows, including over $20 billion from foreign currency deposits. However, leaving the contracts in place for too long is costly, while scaling them back too quickly could dilute the positive impact of inflows and potentially stoke volatility in the currency market .

4. What are the key risks associated with the RBI’s forward book?

Nearly $29 billion of the forward contracts mature within three months, creating a material overhang. Unwinding the position itself may become a fresh source of rupee depreciation pressure. Additionally, through a subsidized swap window, the RBI is effectively borrowing expensive dollars; if the rupee weakens, the central bank would face mark-to-market losses on these forward commitments .

5. What does this transformation mean for the RBI’s role?

The RBI is evolving from being principally the custodian of foreign exchange reserves to becoming an active manager of financial risk. This represents a more sophisticated framework for managing currency risk that uses derivatives to shift obligations across time. However, it demands greater transparency and accountability in disclosure of the derivative management strategy and its eventual unwinding .

India’s Energy Crossroads: Navigating the Strait of Hormuz Crisis and the Imperative of Self-Reliance

By Aditi Nayar
New Delhi, July 25, 2026

Brent spot prices have gone well past $90 a barrel with the war clouds over West Asia. The prospect for costlier oil is bad news for countries like India that imports 88% of its energy requirements, which would widen its trade deficit and push up inflation. The ongoing hostilities between the US and Iran clearly indicates that their memorandum of understanding (MoU) on June 18 to end the conflict and open the Strait of Hormuz has swiftly unravelled [citation:original text]. This has dashed hopes of a further decline in oil prices from $85 a barrel in June due to expectations of the US Energy Information Administration that production will soon return to near pre-conflict levels and that the majority of the shut-in crude production will be back on line. Instead there is the prospect that Brent could surge beyond the peak levels of $117 a barrel registered in April [citation:original text].

Unfortunately, India has been hit with a double whammy for its energy and other supplies. Hopes were raised when as many as 59 vessels heading for India — 23 Indian-flagged and 36 foreign-flagged ships — safely transited the Strait of Hormuz from March 1 to July 17, according to Shipping Minister Sarbananda Sonowal’s written reply to a question in the Rajya Sabha [citation:original text]. But with the US strikes on Iran and Tehran targeting American bases in the region, India has to brace for a complete shutdown of the Strait. As if all of this weren’t bad enough, the Iran-aligned Houthi threat to blockade Saudi Arabia’s shipments through the Bab-el-Mandeb subjects India to a fresh shock. Two oil tankers headed for India and China reversed course following these threats. This is a major setback to the growing share of Saudi crude in India’s import basket [citation:original text].

The Geopolitical Stress Test: A System Under Siege

The West Asia conflict is reshaping India’s risk management and creating an opportunity to accelerate and complete its energy reform agenda . The sustained nature of the war is changing Indian risk management from providing immediate buffers to reorienting medium- to long-term strategies . Even before the conflict, the Economic Survey 2026 highlighted risks of a “disorderly multipolar breakdown,” rupee depreciation, and foreign portfolio outflows. These risks are now likely to be exacerbated .

The scale of the challenge is immense. Before the conflict, India was dependent on flows inside the Strait of Hormuz for approximately 60 per cent of its crude oil and liquefied natural gas (LNG) imports and approximately 85 per cent of its liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) imports . This is a level of exposure that leaves little room for error.

The Indian government has responded by rationalising cooking gas allocation, resuming Russian crude purchases, and announcing additional fuel and fertiliser subsidies and large excise duty cuts on petrol and diesel. It has also unveiled an economic stabilisation fund designed to serve as a fiscal and financial buffer against future external shocks . Defence Minister Rajnath Singh has described the situation in West Asia as uncertain and volatile, stating that India must be ready for both de-escalation and any possible escalation .

Russia’s Rising Role: A Strategic Pivot

These are challenging times for India’s energy security as there are also relentless US pressures to reduce over dependence on Russian oil. In memory of the late Lindsey Graham, 60 US senators signed a bill proposing a 100% import duty on the top five countries, including India, that purchase oil from Russia [citation:original text]. India of course is unlikely to change its sourcing strategy of accessing supplies at the best possible price. India’s imports from Russia in fact surged by 53% in the April-June quarter of this fiscal [citation:original text].

India’s imports from Russia rose from 1.07 million barrels per day (mbpd) in February to a high of 2.73 mbpd in June. As of July 15, imports stood at 2.59 mbpd. Russia is now supplying nearly four times as much crude as Saudi Arabia, India’s second-largest supplier during the month . In June alone, Russian oil accounted for approximately 50% of India’s total crude oil imports, solidifying Moscow’s position as New Delhi’s largest supplier . July imports are expected to surpass 5 million barrels per day, with Russia accounting for around 2.6-2.7 mbpd .

The main driver behind Indian refineries’ increased purchases of Russian oil is its competitive price. Russian crude oil is still traded at a discount compared to many other types of oil on the international market, helping refineries reduce input costs, improve profitability, and secure fuel supplies . “India is the buyer,” and that concentration carries extra weight, now that the US licence used to protect buyers from sanctions has expired . On the strength of New Delhi’s stand that “Russian oil is not sanctioned,” Indian refiners have imported record volumes .

The LPG and LNG Vulnerability: A Kitchen Crisis Averted

The situation continues to evolve and is precarious for LPG, which fuels Indian kitchens. India chose to shore up domestic supplies from refineries while undertaking a massive demand-management exercise. Natural gas demand management is ongoing as policymakers prioritise gas availability for residential customers, leaving India’s key industrial corridors without fuel .

Imports of LPG—primarily used as cooking gas—increased in May from the previous month, although they fell by more than 50 per cent compared to pre-conflict levels, as traffic through the Strait of Hormuz continues to be choked. LPG imports increased 11 per cent month-on-month in May to 1.08 million tonnes, largely driven by shipments from the US, which accounted for more than half of the total imports. The US emerged as India’s largest LPG supplier in May, exporting 0.57 million tonnes, followed by Iran and the UAE at 0.14 million tonnes and 0.11 million tonnes, respectively .

In May, India’s LNG imports were also largely driven by supplies from the US, which accounted for over 38 per cent of the country’s total gas imports. The US emerged as India’s largest LNG supplier in May, followed by Nigeria and Oman, while imports from Qatar—traditionally the country’s biggest supplier—remained at zero .

The Strategic Reserves Push: Immediate Buffers

The prospects of costlier oil and constrained supplies through the Strait of Hormuz and Bab-el-Mandeb underscore the near-term need to augment strategic oil reserves [citation:original text]. India is seeking to do so through cooperation with the United Arab Emirates and Japan [citation:original text]. The good news is also that the Oil and Natural Gas Corporation (ONGC) is building a 13-million-barrel strategic petroleum reserve in Mangalore [citation:original text].

Under a deal announced on May 15, ADNOC said it aims to increase its crude holdings in India’s SPRs to up to 30 million barrels amid wars in the Middle East and Russia, as well as growing domestic demand . Under a separate agreement, India will explore storing crude at Fujairah, the UAE’s eastern oil hub, which will be part of India’s SPRs .

India’s current strategic stockpiles cover about 9.5 days of net oil imports, while state-run oil companies hold crude oil and petroleum products in storage equivalent to 64.5 days of net imports. According to petroleum ministry data, this brings the country’s total storage capacity for crude and petroleum products to roughly 74 days of net imports . This falls short of the 90-day minimum required for International Energy Agency member countries .

The Long-Term Imperative: Boosting Domestic Production

The strategic imperative, however, is to go all in to increase relative self-sufficiency by boosting domestic production over the medium term [citation:original text]. To be sure, the ruling dispensation has sought to incentivise domestic producers and global giants for exploration and production by enacting the Oilfields (Regulation and Development) Amendment Act, 2025 [citation:original text]. The Act introduces a revised regulatory framework designed to attract investment and simplify operations in India’s oil and gas sector .

Key features of the reforms include a single petroleum lease covering exploration, development and production of all hydrocarbons, lease tenures of up to 30 years extendable for the full economic life of a field, removal of criminal penalties replaced with financial penalties, and an expedited dispute resolution mechanism . Applications for petroleum leases must now be decided within 180 days . Industry participants have welcomed the move, noting that the simplified licensing regime and longer lease tenures could help unlock India’s untapped hydrocarbon potential .

A good augury for increasing domestic exploration is the Ministry of Petroleum and Natural Gas signing a tripartite MoU with Assam and Nagaland which was earlier impacted by insurgency [citation:original text]. To facilitate this process, the policy regime must ease the high fiscal and regulatory burdens including withdrawing the archaic oil development cess. This would straightaway double ONGC’s exploration budget, according to former foreign secretary Ranjan Mathai. This is the way forward [citation:original text].

Conclusion: A Choice Between Two Futures

Supply diversification has long been a policy objective for India, but the war highlights an uncomfortable reality: proximity, infrastructure compatibility and contractual legacy continue to anchor India to West Asian molecules. Alternative sources can mitigate shock but rarely replace the economic and logistical efficiency of the Gulf in real time .

India’s resilience will depend less on abandoning legacy trade routes than on improving flexibility in contracts, refining configurations, expanding shipping access and enhancing demand response . The West Asia war offers an unprecedented opportunity to accelerate and complete India’s energy reform agenda. There are five areas of immediate attention: rapidly increase secure domestic energy sources, secure access to oil and gas supplies less affected by geopolitics, promote internationalisation of Indian oil companies, improve flexibility in contracts and logistics, and adopt a “stake-in-supplier” strategy rather than a “faith-in-supplier” strategy .

Q&A Section

1. How has India’s crude oil import strategy shifted during the West Asia crisis?
India has dramatically increased imports of Russian crude oil, which rose from 1.07 mbpd in February to over 2.7 mbpd in June, accounting for about 50% of India’s total crude imports . This shift has been driven by the competitive pricing of Russian crude and the need to compensate for disrupted supplies from West Asia through the Strait of Hormuz .

2. What is the status of India’s strategic petroleum reserves (SPRs) and what steps are being taken to expand them?
India’s current SPRs cover about 9.5 days of net oil imports . ONGC is building a 13-million-barrel SPR in Mangalore . India is also cooperating with the UAE, which will store up to 30 million barrels in Indian reserves , and exploring storage at Fujairah in the UAE to avoid Strait of Hormuz transit .

3. What policy reforms has India undertaken to boost domestic oil and gas production?
The government enacted the Oilfields (Regulation and Development) Amendment Act, 2025, which introduces a single petroleum lease covering all hydrocarbons, lease tenures of up to 30 years, removal of criminal penalties, and an expedited dispute resolution mechanism . The aim is to attract investment and reduce regulatory complexity .

4. What are the key vulnerabilities in India’s LPG and LNG supply chains?
India is highly dependent on the Strait of Hormuz for LPG imports (nearly 90%) and LNG imports (over 50%) . During the crisis, LPG imports fell by more than 50% compared to pre-conflict levels, forcing a shift to US supplies . Natural gas demand management has been prioritised for residential customers, leaving industrial corridors without fuel .

5. What is the “double whammy” India faces in the current energy crisis?
India faces both the effective closure of the Strait of Hormuz and a new Houthi threat to blockade Saudi shipping through the Bab-el-Mandeb strait [citation:original text]. Two oil tankers headed for India reversed course following these threats, affecting Saudi crude supplies [citation:original text]. This comes alongside US pressure to reduce Russian oil imports and a proposed 100% tariff on Russian oil purchases [citation:original text].

A Fuse Has Been Lit: India’s Gen-Z Spring and the Battle for Accountability

By Ritwik Sharma
New Delhi, July 25, 2026

It seems a fuse has been lit. A “Gen-Z” movement was anticipated in India after youth-led protests in Bangladesh last year, Nepal more recently, and in Sri Lanka back in 2022. The dust is yet to settle at Jantar Mantar. But this week’s march to Parliament, led by the Cockroach Janta Party (CJP), drew India’s Gen-Z although it was not limited to them [citation:original text].

It is different from the other upsurges in South Asia in that they were singularly focused on unseating regimes. The CJP’s raison d’être is something much less radical. It started as a satirical online movement that tapped into public anger over a broken education system, with student supporters from across India enthusiastically joining a chorus of demand for the resignation of Education Minister Dharmendra Pradhan. It has merely sought accountability while Gen-Z demonstrations elsewhere reacted against elite privilege and graft [citation:original text].

The Anatomy of an Explosion: From a Slur to a Movement

The CJP’s origin story is a masterclass in modern political alchemy. It was born not from a manifesto, but from a single, incendiary remark. In May, Supreme Court Chief Justice Surya Kant, in a verbal aside, compared sections of unemployed young people to “cockroaches”—disposable, numerous, and a nuisance to be managed [citation:original text]. The remark was intended to criticize a specific misuse of the legal system, but its impact was far wider. The youth did not merely accept the insult; they reclaimed it. Within days, the “Cockroach Janta Party” was born online, its mascot a suited insect representing the very people the system had sought to ignore .

The movement’s immediate catalyst was the leak of the NEET-UG 2026 medical entrance exam question paper, which forced over 2 million aspirants to endure a grueling re-test . But for the protesters, this was not just an administrative failure; it was the final confirmation of a broken system. In a country where a government job is the only safety net for millions and where the social contract promises hard work will be rewarded, a paper leak is a theft of a future .

Yet, a core, common concern has festered in India just as much — unemployment and bleak job prospects, which are directly linked to the education-related anxiety of India’s youths. Employed youths too have to contend with concerns like inequality, as voiced in Noida earlier this year by industrial workers and youths seeking higher wages and improved labour conditions [citation:original text].

The Crackdown and the Sympathy Wave

One reason Monday’s march has snowballed is the state’s response. The heavy-handed police action, including caning and tear-gassing protesters, many of them in their teens, has attracted more sympathisers and handed the Opposition a political opening it was quick to seize. The images of Rahul Gandhi, suffering a nosebleed and being dragged away outside the Prime Minister’s residence, and defiantly invoking democracy as he lay on the ground, inevitably added to the government’s discomfort and gave the protests a wider political resonance [citation:original text].

Whether the Opposition can turn that opening to its advantage is another matter. It has struggled to build sustained political momentum around public discontent and has yet to establish the credibility needed to put the government seriously on the defensive. Indeed, too overt a political embrace could allow what began as a spontaneous youth protest to be dismissed as partisan mobilisation. The significance of the moment, therefore, lies less in the opportunity it offers the Opposition than in the warning it carries for the government: grievances over education, examinations, and employment can acquire a political force of their own when met with indifference or coercion [citation:original text].

The Politics of the Moment

Irrespective of the political support it attracts, the movement carries echoes of previous popular protests against the current regime. The year-long farmers’ agitation at the doorstep of Delhi compelled the Narendra Modi government to repeal three agricultural laws. Prior to that, the historic Shaheen Bagh protests, led by Muslim women, opposed the controversial Citizenship (Amendment) Act, 2019, for months until the Covid-19 pandemic broke out [citation:original text].

A research of resistance movements between 1900 and 2006 by Harvard professor Erica Chenoweth has shown that non-violent civil resistance campaigns are more than twice as likely to achieve their goals as compared to armed uprisings. India, with its long history of youth-led protests, has had a thriving culture of civil disobedience. In the past 12 years, the BJP government has repeatedly tried to crush any civil opposition and encouraged its supporters to perceive dissenters as “anti-national”. That was reflected in the brutal police crackdowns on university campuses such as JNU and Jamia Millia Islamia. This not only does a disservice to democracy but also erodes public faith in the state as a guardian of citizens [citation:original text].

Unemployment, too, has been a touchy topic for the Modi government. While it has batted for self-employment and atmanirbharta, such a push also touches formal sector growth and the lack of quality jobs. No doubt, policy has taken initiatives to bridge skilling gaps to ensure India’s youths find smoother pathways between education and employment. However, unless it urgently plugs technical loopholes to prevent paper leaks for a gruelling exam like NEET, millions will suspect its sincerity. Worse, it will further fuel criticism of the government tending to promote pseudoscience at the cost of scientific temper [citation:original text].

For the CJP, the lack of a concrete ideology within its ranks will be a handicap if it tries to expand and take up other causes that civil society or political parties have failed to highlight. But for now, theirs is not a political fight. The government now faces their anger; it should not respond with condescension [citation:original text].

Q&A Section

1. What triggered the Cockroach Janta Party (CJP) protests in India?
The protests were initially triggered by the leak of the NEET medical entrance exam paper, which affected roughly 2 million students and led to widespread anger over the government’s handling of the education system. However, the movement was quickly turbocharged by the government’s heavy-handed response and the growing frustration over youth unemployment and an unresponsive political system [citation:original text].

2. Who is Sonam Wangchuk and what role did he play in the protests?
Sonam Wangchuk, a well-known educator and environmental activist from Ladakh, joined the CJP protests on a hunger strike on June 28. He ended his 26-day hunger strike on July 23 after the government assured him that no action would be taken against peaceful protesters and that Parliament would debate the issue. His participation gave the movement significant moral authority and helped it gain national attention .

3. What were the key demands of the CJP protesters?
The CJP’s primary demands included the resignation of Education Minister Dharmendra Pradhan, compensation for families of students who died by suicide linked to exam-related stress, and sweeping reforms to the examination system to prevent future paper leaks. The movement also aimed to address broader concerns about youth unemployment and government accountability .

4. How did the government respond to the protests?
The government initially responded with a heavy-handed police crackdown on July 20, which included lathi charges, tear gas, and reported use of pellet guns, injuring hundreds of protesters . Subsequently, Prime Minister Modi announced fast-track courts for paper leak cases, and the government held two rounds of talks with CJP leaders. However, the government has refused to concede the demand for the Education Minister’s resignation .

5. How did the opposition parties, particularly the Congress, respond to the protests?
The Congress party initially kept its distance from the CJP due to speculation about the movement’s political affiliations. However, on July 22, Rahul Gandhi led a dramatic sit-in outside PM Modi’s residence. The resulting visuals of Gandhi bleeding and being dragged away by police helped the Congress reclaim the opposition space and escalate political pressure on the government .

The Grimm Economics of Exam Leaks: Why the Prize is the Problem

By Anushitwary Peddidayakar
New Delhi, July 25, 2026

Sonam Wangchuk was carried out of Jantar Mantar on the 21st day of his hunger strike. As Parliament’s monsoon session opened this week, his movement’s march was met with tear gas and its protagonist detained. Whether the education minister should go is not the central question—a minister on whose watch this happened twice, no doubt, owes an explanation. The larger one is: why does this keep happening, under governments of every stripe? [citation:original text]

The list is grim. Vyapam in 2013. SSC’s Combined Graduate Level exam in 2018. Rajasthan’s REET and Uttar Pradesh’s Teacher Eligibility Test in 2021. Telangana’s TSPSC and Maharashtra’s Talathi recruitment in 2023. UP Police Constable and UGC-NET in 2024. NEET-UG twice: 2024 and again this May 2026. Some investigations count 89 cases over the decade affecting 6.5 crore aspirants. No party has a clean sheet; the failure is shared [citation:original text].

So what is actually going on?

Economists have a name for it. In 1967, Gordon Tullock explored what happens when a government creates something scarce and valuable like a licence, a job, a contract and lets people compete. Anne Krueger called it rent-seeking. People spend money, time, and risk until the cost of competing equals the prize’s value. Much effort creates no new value [citation:original text].

The Prize: A Government Job as Default Insurance

A government job in India is exactly this prize. Fixed in number, worth more across a working life than the informal economy offers. It provides a pension, protection against dismissal, and social standing that can alter a family’s prospects. Roughly 2.2 crore people apply each year; fewer than one in a thousand succeed [citation:original text]. The government is the largest employer in the country and remains the largest source of employment, formal or otherwise. Government jobs are the largest source of employment, formal or otherwise. Government jobs provide security, pension, and a stable life—a trifecta that is missing in the private sector, where 73.1% of non-agricultural workers are in informal enterprises [citation:original text].

The coaching industry built around this queue is worth close to ₹58,000 crore. Coaching and leak networks are not opposites but the same spectrum, priced differently. Coaching teaches concepts and fills schooling gaps. But much of its growth is about rank: spending to move ahead of the next candidate. Economically, this differs little from paying for a leaked paper. Both buy relative advantage. A leak is where legal spending turns illegal [citation:original text].

The Reward: Medical Seats and the Tournament for Life

The prize need not be a job. NEET is an entrance exam for a medical seat. In 2024, 2.3 million aspirants competed for about 1.09 lakh MBBS seats; odds of twenty-one to one. Given the gateway to a medical career, that seat is worth stealing for the same reason a job is. This means the biggest exams attract the most sophisticated leak networks. Because these exams rank candidates against one another rather than against a minimum standard, the incentive to cheat rises with the gap between winning and losing. When 1.08 crore people applied for 32,000 Railway Group D posts last year, the Board was running a tournament where winning meant a stable life and losing meant a precarious one [citation:original text].

The gap between winning and losing is the source of the rent. The government itself determines the size of this gap. India’s vast informal economy—73.1% of non-agricultural workers in informal enterprises—means that for the vast majority, there is no middle ground between a government job and precariousness. Government jobs have become default insurance, not because they pay well, but because almost nothing else insures a certain life [citation:original text].

The Economics of Crime: Detection and Penalty

High rents create the incentive; weak institutions decide whether it becomes organised crime. China’s gaokao, sat by over nine million students yearly, has recorded only three confirmed nationwide leaks since 1949, achieved through paper-setters quarantined for months, armed convoys, signal jammers, and drones. South Korea grounds domestic flights for the Suneung’s listening test. Neither country has a smaller prize. What differs is the odds of being caught and the will to bear the costs of those measures. Replicating them in India’s federal, resource-constrained system would be expensive, but the question is whether the will exists [citation:original text].

Becker’s economics of crime is blunt: people offend when expected gain exceeds expected cost, penalty times probability of detection. India’s 2024 law raises the penalty considerably; it raises the odds of detection far less. Better vetting, tighter paper custody, and prosecutions that conclude would do more than any new prison term [citation:original text].

The Social Cost: More Than a Number

Fairness is not the only casualty. When a weaker candidate takes a seat or post a stronger one would have filled, the harm is to a health system or police force now carrying someone less capable. A leak sorts by capacity to pay, not capacity to do the job. None of this makes honest preparation worthless; a doctor’s training produces something real. But Tullock’s warning was narrower: duplication, retakes, years chasing rank instead of competence. When 48 lakh people had each put in six months preparing for the cancelled UP Police Constable exam, that cancellation wiped out hundreds of millions of hours. A second cost is harder to price. An exam works only because it convinces millions that a scarce chance will go by rule, not favour. Every leak withdraws from that account. Enough leaks, and candidates stop asking how to prepare, and start asking whether preparing is the point. A system built to reward learning starts, quietly, rewarding access [citation:original text].

The Way Forward

Encryption and prison terms alone will not fix this. What would shrink the prize is slower: a private labour market offering something closer to a government job, a pension, protection, wages that do not vanish [citation:original text]. In the interim, independent exam commissions, randomised paper allocation, and biometric verification would raise the cost of cheating [citation:original text].

Wangchuk’s fast will end within days, and the contest that makes leaking profitable will be exactly where it was. The problem is not that papers are stolen. Every leak begins in a printing room, but the market for it begins much earlier. It is in an economy where one examination decides who receives security and who does not. Until that changes, new encryption will only make the next leak more expensive, not less profitable [citation:original text].

Q&A Section

1. What is the economic concept behind India’s recurring exam leaks?

The problem is rooted in “rent-seeking,” a concept developed by economists Gordon Tullock and Anne Krueger. When the government creates a scarce, valuable prize—like a government job or a medical seat—people will compete for it. The coaching industry and leak networks are part of this competition; they are not opposites but part of the same spectrum of buying relative advantage. The gap between winning and losing determines the incentive to cheat [citation:original text].

2. Why is India’s exam system particularly vulnerable to leaks?

India’s vulnerability stems from two factors: (1) the massive prize attached to government jobs and medical seats, which offer security, pension, and social standing in an economy where 73.1% of non-agricultural workers are in informal enterprises; and (2) weak institutions and low probability of detection. While the 2024 law raised penalties, it did little to improve the odds of catching offenders [citation:original text].

3. What is the coaching industry’s role in the leak ecosystem?

The coaching industry is worth ₹58,000 crore and is part of the same spectrum as leak networks. Both are about buying relative advantage—coaching legally, leaks illegally. The growth of coaching is driven not by filling schooling gaps but by the need to move ahead of the next candidate. Economically, this differs little from paying for a leaked paper [citation:original text].

4. What lessons can India learn from countries like China and South Korea?

China’s gaokao and South Korea’s Suneung have much lower leak rates despite having similar-scale exams. The difference lies in the odds of being caught and the will to bear the costs of those measures. China uses paper-setters quarantined for months, armed convoys, signal jammers, and drones. South Korea grounds domestic flights for the listening test. Replicating these measures in India would be expensive, but the question is whether the will exists [citation:original text].

5. What is the ultimate solution to India’s exam leak crisis?

Encryption and prison terms alone will not fix the problem. The fundamental solution is to shrink the prize by creating a private labour market that offers something close to a government job—security, pension, and stable wages. Until that changes, every new encryption measure will only make the next leak more expensive, not less profitable. In the interim, independent exam commissions, randomised paper allocation, and biometric verification would raise the cost of cheating [citation:original text].

Japan Can Catalyse India’s Circular Bio-Economy: The Promise and Peril of 1,000 Biogas Plants

By Aditi Nayar
New Delhi, July 25, 2026

The ongoing geopolitical conflict in West Asia has exposed India’s vulnerability to disruptions in global energy and fertilizer supply chains. India imports over half of its liquefied natural gas (LNG) requirements, with approximately 60 per cent originating from the Gulf region. India also sources a significant share of its fertilizer requirements, particularly nitrogenous and phosphatic fertilizers, from this region. Natural gas is also a feedstock for urea production, and India’s reliance on imports of both casts a shadow of dual vulnerability [citation:original text].

Yet, it is paradoxical that one of India’s most abundant energy resources is not found underground but above it, on its farmlands. With a bovine population of more than 300 million, the country produces approximately 1.27 billion tonnes of dung annually. For centuries, dung has been used as a household cooking fuel and organic manure. However, with the expansion of LPG and chemical fertilizers, dung has gradually lost economic importance [citation:original text].

The Resource Potential: Turning Waste into Wealth

Nonetheless, with scientific management, dung is a tremendous source of renewable energy and organic fertilizer. Recent estimates from the New Delhi-based ICAR-National Institute of Agricultural Economics and Policy Research indicate that this dung can generate nearly 47 billion cubic meters of biogas or 22 million tonnes of bio-CNG annually, while simultaneously producing over 9 million tonnes of organic fertilizers. This can virtually replace both LNG and fertilizer imports. In practice, collecting and processing the entire volume of dung produced is unfeasible. However, if even half of it is used for the production of biogas, it could significantly improve the country’s energy and fertilizer security, reduce vehicular pollution, and improve soil health. This also creates new income opportunities for livestock-owning households [citation:original text].

India generates over 700 million tonnes of agricultural residue, 150 million tonnes of municipal solid waste, and more than 3 million tonnes of cattle dung daily . Yet, most of this is burned, dumped in landfills, or left to decay—emitting harmful methane, a greenhouse gas over 25 times more potent than CO2 . Meanwhile, the nation spends nearly Rs 2 lakh crore annually on fertiliser subsidies and over Rs 50,000 crore on LPG subsidies . The paradox is striking: India continues to import energy even as it sits on an ocean of it in the form of waste.

The India-Japan Partnership: A New Initiative

To unlock the potential of dung for clean energy and organic fertilizers, the Ministry of Cooperation and Japan’s Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI) launched the India-Japan Cooperative Biogas for Growth (CBG) initiative at the India-Japan Summit on July 2. The initiative aims to establish 1,000 cooperative biogas and organic fertilizer plants across India by leveraging the extensive dairy cooperative network. Japan has extensive experience with biogas plants and waste management [citation:original text].

The two Prime Ministers agreed to take forward their partnership in the clean energy sector and appreciated the launch of the India-Japan Cooperative Biogas for Growth Initiative (CBG Initiative) as a new project of India-Japan cooperation to scale up biogas production . Prime Minister Modi stated that this initiative would strengthen India’s GOBARdhan (Galvanizing Organic Bio-Agro Resources Dhan) scheme, bringing sustainability, prosperity and new strength to rural livelihoods .

The Cooperative Advantage: Aggregating Feedstock

India’s dairy sector is dominated by smallholders, with most households owning two to three animals. Individually, these farmers produce little dung, making its collection and transport uneconomical. However, India has one of the world’s largest dairy cooperative networks, with over 2.3 lakh village dairy cooperative societies serving nearly 20 million producers. This network can support dung aggregation, ensuring feedstock supply, reducing transaction costs, and sharing the benefits of biogas and organic fertilizer production among participating farmers [citation:original text].

Successful models already exist. A notable example is Maruti Suzuki India Ltd’s partnership with Banas Dairy in Gujarat to procure dung for producing compressed biogas and organic fertilizers [citation:original text]. Suzuki Motor Corporation has also partnered with the National Dairy Development Board and selected dairy cooperatives to produce and supply compressed biomethane gas and organic fertilizers, aiming to improve energy self-sufficiency, create new jobs, and boost rural incomes through the purchase of cattle dung . Similarly, Adani TotalEnergies Biomass Ltd has established a large CBG plant at Barsana, Mathura, Uttar Pradesh, sourcing dung from Shri Mataji Gaushal [citation:original text].

The Commercial Viability Challenge

The India-Japan initiative should be regarded not only as a clean energy programme but also as a catalyst for developing a circular rural bio-economy. Unlike most renewable energy technologies, biogas simultaneously generates clean energy, recycles nutrients, enhances soil health, reduces greenhouse gas emissions and creates rural employment opportunities [citation:original text]. However, the programme’s success will rely more on the long-term commercial viability of the established plants than on their coverage [citation:original text].

A techno-economic assessment of circular economy-based biogas plants in India found that a 300-tonne-per-day capacity plant in rural areas shows a positive net present value (NPV) of US $3.24 million . The study identified the selling price of CBG, CO2, and solid fertilizer, followed by feedstock buying price and discount rate, as the most sensitive parameters for economic viability . For smaller cattle shelters, a plant with 500 cattle showed an NPV of US $0.089 million, while a large shelter with 5,000 cattle showed an NPV of US $2.78 million .

Priority should be given to developing cost-efficient feedstock aggregation systems at the village level, transparent pricing mechanisms for dung, and a gas distribution infrastructure. Simultaneously, organic fertilizers produced from biogas plants must be integrated into mainstream fertilizer markets through quality standards, certification, branding, and production-linked incentives in the initial years [citation:original text]. The digestate (bio-slurry) from biogas plants is rich in nutrients and can substitute 10-15 per cent of India’s chemical fertiliser use, translating to Rs 20,000-30,000 crore in annual savings at current subsidy levels .

The Fiscal Revolution: Beyond Energy Security

In rural India, the case for biogas is even more compelling. There are around 80 million cattle-owning households, and nearly 40 million of them have 2-6 cattle suitable for household or community-scale biogas plants . Currently, many families rely on LPG under the Ujjwala scheme, which provides a Rs 300 subsidy per cylinder. Transitioning 40 million families to biogas could eliminate 480 million subsidised cylinders, saving the Government over Rs 1.2 lakh crore annually . This is not just energy reform, but a fiscal revolution.

The sector is poised for significant growth. India’s biogas sector is expected to see investments exceeding Rs 5,000 crore by 2026-27, fueled by strong investor interest and a growing compressed biogas pipeline . The reduction of GST on biogas plants to five per cent is expected to bring more private investment and make projects cheaper . However, translating potential into reality will require decisive policy integration, a shift in mindset from treating waste as a liability to viewing it as a wealth-creating asset.

Q&A Section

1. What is the India-Japan Cooperative Biogas for Growth (CBG) Initiative?

It is a partnership launched at the India-Japan Summit on July 2, 2026, by the Ministry of Cooperation and Japan’s Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI). The initiative aims to establish 1,000 cooperative biogas and organic fertilizer plants across India, leveraging the country’s extensive dairy cooperative network and Japan’s expertise in biogas and waste management [citation:original text].

2. Why is biogas considered a strategic resource for India?

India’s vulnerability to global energy and fertilizer supply disruptions was exposed by the West Asia conflict. Biogas, produced from cattle dung, agricultural residue, and organic waste, can reduce dependence on imported LNG and chemical fertilizers. India’s bovine population of over 300 million produces enough dung to generate significant renewable energy and organic fertilizer, contributing to energy security, fiscal savings, and improved soil health [citation:original text].

3. How does the dairy cooperative network support the biogas initiative?

India’s dairy sector is dominated by smallholders who own just two to three animals, making individual dung collection uneconomical. However, India has a vast dairy cooperative network with over 2.3 lakh village societies serving nearly 20 million producers. This network can aggregate dung from small farmers, ensuring feedstock supply and sharing benefits among participants [citation:original text].

4. What are the economic benefits of biogas production for rural households?

Households can earn additional income by selling cattle dung to biogas plants. Families using biogas can save Rs 3,600 annually on LPG subsidy (Rs 300 per cylinder × 12 cylinders). If 40 million families transition to biogas, it could eliminate 480 million subsidised LPG cylinders annually, saving the government Rs 1.2 lakh crore per year. The bio-slurry produced can also reduce chemical fertilizer costs .

5. What are the key challenges for the success of the India-Japan biogas initiative?

The primary challenge is ensuring long-term commercial viability. Priority must be given to developing cost-efficient feedstock aggregation systems at the village level, transparent pricing mechanisms for dung, and a gas distribution infrastructure. Organic fertilizers need to be integrated into mainstream fertilizer markets through quality standards and production-linked incentives. The most sensitive economic parameters are the selling price of CBG and fertilizers, feedstock prices, and the discount rate [citation:original text].

Broken System: Students Deserve Reforms, Accountability—Not Police Action

By Aditi Nayar
New Delhi, July 25, 2026

The July 20 police crackdown on unarmed protestors in central Delhi spotlights the failure of the government to quickly address issues that have eroded students’ faith in the education system. From repeated controversies surrounding NEET to mounting concerns over CBSE’s digital evaluation process, what began as isolated grievances has hardened into a broader crisis of trust. The Centre is on the defensive, as perhaps never before .

In this context, firing teargas shells and baton-charging unarmed protestors was a misstep of monumental proportions. Scores of students are in Delhi’s hospitals, some with pellet injuries. One student was on ventilator support. There is palpable tension at the protest site in Jantar Mantar where thousands of students and their concerned parents are continuing to assemble and demand the resignation of Education Minister Dharmendra Pradhan . This anger did not emerge overnight. It has accumulated over examination cycles, particularly since the 2024 NEET controversy, when 67 candidates secured a perfect score of 720/720 with six top scorers originating from a single examination centre in Jhajjar, Haryana. The National Testing Agency (NTA), that conducts NEET, initially attributed abnormal scores to “grace marks” awarded for lost time. Later, investigations by the Bihar police and the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) uncovered an organised, multi-state racket. The Supreme Court ruled that the paper leak was an “undisputed fact”, but did not cancel the exam. The Ministry of Education said it had set up a committee to overhaul NTA operations .

A Crisis of Institutional Legitimacy

Such assurances have done little to restore confidence. Fresh controversies surrounding this year’s examination process have reinforced perceptions that infirmities within the system remain intact. The NTA has had to cancel the NEET exam undertaken by over 22 lakh students when leaked ‘guess papers’ matched up to 140 exam questions in chemistry and biology. A re-examination was scheduled . In the intervening period of 37 days between the two tests, an estimated 12 students committed suicide. Families and police accounts pointed to uncertainty and the emotional toll surrounding the cancelled exam and the upcoming re-test as the reason for these suicides . Equally troubling was the controversy over CBSE’s badly executed shift to on-screen evaluation . The Congress party, in a notice for an urgent debate, highlighted “at least 93 reported NEET-linked student suicides over the past five years” .

The CBI has also given a clean chit to Sanjeev Mukhiya, the alleged kingpin of the 2024 NEET paper leak, prompting allegations of shielding the prime accused at a time a repeat exam scandal has rocked the country. The agency exonerated Mukhiya in a communication to the media, which came a day after Opposition members asked in Parliament why the chargesheets did not name him and why no one had been convicted in the 2024 case yet . The CBI stated it did not find evidence to establish his involvement in the theft or distribution of the stolen NEET-UG question paper. He had already received bail by default after the agency failed to file a chargesheet within 90 days . This has only deepened public distrust.

The State’s Response: From Silence to Brutality

The official response has been marked with an almost Kafkaesque apathy . Education Minister Dharmendra Pradhan’s handling of the 2026 leak has been marked by contradictions, mirroring his 2024 responses. While he initially admitted the breach, stating “Rakshak hi bhakshak ban gaye” (protectors became predators), he has also slammed the Opposition for “shamelessly exploiting students as political tools” . Prime Minister Narendra Modi vowed strict action against those involved in paper leaks with a video message late at night . However, the government’s primary response to the protest itself was brute force. On July 20, tens of thousands of protesters flooded central Delhi after the CJP called for a march to parliament. At least 60 people were injured after police used batons and tear gas to disperse the crowds . Officers also dismantled the stage and makeshift tents at Jantar Mantar, the protest’s main base .

The crackdown, far from dispersing the movement, has galvanized it. A day after the violence, they were visited by several senior opposition leaders such as former Delhi chief minister Arvind Kejriwal and veteran politician Sharad Pawar . Later on Tuesday, Congress president Mallikarjun Kharge and Rahul Gandhi led a surprise march to Modi’s house, demanding the resignations of Pradhan, Home Minister Amit Shah and PM Modi . Gandhi said the government must apologise to students for the crackdown . The crackdown also sparked protests across the country, with demonstrations in Mumbai, Kolkata, Hyderabad, Lucknow, Bhopal and other cities . The Congress escalated its campaign, directing its state units to organise candlelight marches and satyagrahas across the country on Saturday evening .

A Nationwide Movement of Dissent

The government now faces a crisis that extends well beyond a single exam. The CJP, which began as a satirical online movement, has evolved into a force capable of drawing tens of thousands onto the streets . Protesters, who have been camped for the past month at Jantar Mantar, gained global attention after activist Sonam Wangchuk joined them and began an indefinite hunger strike . He was forcibly removed from the protest site by the police on Saturday and taken to hospital where he continues to fast . The movement has broadened into one of the most visible expressions of public dissent against Modi in recent years .

The government must now recognise that this is no longer simply an examination controversy; it is a crisis of institutional legitimacy that needs to be addressed by serious reforms. Accountability cannot stop with lower-level officials or committees of inquiry. The need for empathy cannot be overstated. Students who feel their futures have been compromised should be heard, not dispersed by force. Restoring confidence will require a willingness to initiate systemic reforms and fix accountability — at all levels, perhaps not excluding the Minister .

Q&A Section

1. What was the immediate trigger for the July 20 protest in Delhi?
The immediate trigger was the Cockroach Janta Party’s (CJP) call for a “Sansad Chalo” (March to Parliament) on the opening day of the Monsoon Session. The protest was organized over the NEET paper leak and the demand for the resignation of Education Minister Dharmendra Pradhan. When tens of thousands of protesters attempted to march, police used lathi charges and tear gas to disperse them.

2. Why has the NEET exam been at the center of such intense controversy?
The NEET exam has been plagued by repeated controversies. In 2024, 67 candidates secured a perfect score, with six toppers from a single center, leading to revelations of a “grace marks” scandal and an organized racket uncovered by the CBI. In 2026, the exam was cancelled after leaked ‘guess papers’ matched up to 140 exam questions, affecting over 22 lakh students and leading to a re-examination.

3. How has the government responded to the protests and the NEET controversy?
The government’s response has been a mix of heavy-handed police action and belated political engagement. On July 20, police used lathi charges and tear gas on protesters. Prime Minister Modi later announced fast-track courts for paper leak cases, and Health Minister Nadda met with CJP leaders. However, the government has not conceded the protesters’ central demand for the Education Minister’s resignation.

4. What role has the Opposition played in the protests?
The Opposition, particularly the Congress, has actively supported the protests. Rahul Gandhi led a march to the Prime Minister’s residence, and Congress MPs have given adjournment notices in Parliament. The Congress has also directed its state units to organize nationwide candlelight marches and satyagrahas, elevating the student movement into a broader political campaign.

5. Why has the CJP movement gained such widespread support?
The CJP movement has tapped into a deep-seated frustration among India’s youth regarding unemployment, a broken education system, and a perceived lack of accountability. The movement’s origins as a satirical response to the Chief Justice’s “cockroach” remark resonated widely. The heavy-handed police crackdown on July 20 also attracted sympathizers and gave the movement a new rallying cry, transforming it from an online phenomenon into a nationwide protest movement.