NEET’s Promise Has Failed, It’s Time to Trust States
By M.K. Stalin
New Delhi, July 25, 2026
The unprecedented protests by students across the country following the NEET question paper leak are not merely about one compromised examination. They reflect a deeper crisis of confidence in a system that was projected as the ultimate guardian of merit. When lakhs of students lose faith in the fairness of the process that determines their future, the nation’s conscience is shaken .
Tamil Nadu was the first State to raise the red flag against NEET – not because of irregularities in its conduct, but because of the very philosophy behind a single, high-stakes national examination deciding the future of every aspiring medical student. The problem was structural, not procedural. Recent events have vindicated that concern .
The Union Government introduced NEET with three principal promises. First, that it would reduce the burden of multiple entrance examinations. Second, that it would eliminate the scourge of capitation fees and commercialisation of medical admissions. Third, that it would improve standards by ensuring only the most meritorious students entered medical colleges, thereby producing better doctors .
On every one of these counts, NEET has failed .
The Illusion of Merit
Instead of reducing inequality, it has merely shifted the centre of learning from schools to coaching centres. A student’s 12 years of schooling have been reduced to a secondary consideration before a three-hour multiple-choice examination. Merit is no longer measured through sustained academic performance but by the ability to master coaching-centric test-taking techniques. This has disproportionately benefited those who can afford expensive coaching while disadvantaging rural students, government school students, first-generation learners, women, and those studying in State Boards and vernacular languages .
The assumption that a single objective test measures merit better than years of consistent academic achievement is not supported by international evidence. Research across advanced federal democracies suggests exactly the opposite for undergraduate admissions. Countries such as the U.S., Canada, Australia and Germany admit students through school performance, standardisation methods, and holistic evaluation – not through a single nationwide entrance examination. Where entrance tests are used, they are generally one component among several, not the sole determinant .
Medical education demands perseverance, empathy, discipline and long-term academic excellence. These qualities cannot be captured adequately in a single examination conducted in one day .
NEET’s own experience further exposes the myth of merit. The qualifying threshold for undergraduate admissions remains remarkably low. For postgraduate and super-speciality admissions, qualifying percentiles have repeatedly been reduced to zero percentile and, in some cases, even negative marks, simply to fill expensive private college seats. If merit truly governed the system, such extraordinary relaxations would never become necessary. Instead, the reality is stark: poor students must compete at the highest level for limited government seats, while those with financial means can access private medical education with far lower benchmarks. That is not meritocracy; it is privilege institutionalised .
The Failure to Curb Commercialisation
Equally misplaced is the belief that NEET has curbed commercialisation. The coaching industry has flourished into a multi-thousand-crore enterprise, with families spending enormous sums over several years to prepare their children. The burden that NEET promised to eliminate has merely changed form – from capitation fees to coaching fees. Simultaneously, deemed universities and private self-financing medical colleges have found new ways to commercialise medical education. Instead of demanding capitation fees and donations upfront, many have sharply increased tuition fees and other institutional charges, making medical education increasingly unaffordable for poor and middle-class families. The nomenclature may have changed, but the financial burden has not. Commercialisation has merely been repackaged, not eliminated .
Tamil Nadu’s Stand
Tamil Nadu recognised these concerns early. We constituted the Justice A.K. Rajan Committee, which received overwhelming public participation and concluded that NEET neither improved medical education nor ensured social justice. It found that the examination disproportionately disadvantaged students from rural backgrounds, economically weaker sections, State Board students, women and first-generation learners .
Acting on these findings, the Tamil Nadu Legislative Assembly unanimously passed legislation seeking exemption from NEET. The Governor withheld assent. The Union Government declined to engage meaningfully with the substance of the State’s concerns. Instead of consultation, there was confrontation. Instead of cooperative federalism, there was centralised insistence on uniformity. Genuine constitutional concerns were viewed through an ideological prism rather than addressed through dialogue .
Education is a subject where diversity is a constitutional strength, not a weakness. States have invested for decades in building public education systems and expanding medical infrastructure. Over the past two decades, India has witnessed a remarkable increase in medical colleges. Today, almost every district in Tamil Nadu has a government medical college, built largely through State resources and public investment .
If States are trusted to establish institutions, recruit faculty, maintain standards and fund medical education, they must also be trusted to determine admissions consistent with their own educational systems and social justice policies. One nation need not mean one examination .
The All India Quota Problem
Another aspect requiring urgent reconsideration is the All India Quota (AIQ). This judicially created system diverts State-funded medical seats to a central pool, weakening federalism, State autonomy and social justice. It disproportionately burdens women as they are unlikely to relocate to another State for postgraduation, fails to address regional disparities effectively, and deprives States of the benefits of their investments. It should be replaced with a voluntary, State-led framework .
The solution lies in strengthening school education, restoring confidence in School Board assessments and allowing States to formulate admission policies suited to their constitutional responsibilities and local realities. Statistical harmonisation can fairly compare marks awarded by different Boards. The answer to multiple applications is a common application portal – not a common entrance examination. States that seek exemption from NEET should be allowed to do so. Diversity in admissions need not compromise standards; indeed, it can strengthen both equity and excellence .
The Wake-Up Call
The recent student protests must serve as a wake-up call – not merely to improve examination security but to fundamentally rethink the entire framework of high-stakes national entrance examinations. The Union Government must consult States, educators, students, medical professionals and all stakeholders with an open mind rather than treating uniformity as an end in itself. India does not need greater centralisation. It needs greater trust in its States, its schools and its students .
The strength of our Union lies not in uniformity imposed from above, but in respecting diversity within a shared constitutional framework. It is time to move beyond the illusion that one examination can measure every student’s potential .
The future of medical education – and the aspirations of millions of young Indians – deserve a fairer, more humane and more federal approach. NEET has failed its own promises. It is time to trust the States again .
Q&A Section
1. What were the three principal promises made when NEET was introduced?
The Union Government introduced NEET with three principal promises: (1) to reduce the burden of multiple entrance examinations; (2) to eliminate the scourge of capitation fees and commercialisation of medical admissions; and (3) to improve standards by ensuring only the most meritorious students entered medical colleges .
2. According to M.K. Stalin, how has NEET failed on each of these promises?
Stalin argues that NEET has failed on every count. Instead of reducing the burden, it has shifted the centre of learning from schools to expensive coaching centres. Instead of curbing commercialisation, it has merely replaced capitation fees with coaching fees while private colleges have increased tuition fees. Instead of improving standards, it has institutionalised privilege by allowing zero percentile qualifying thresholds to fill expensive private seats .
3. Why is the All India Quota (AIQ) system criticised?
The AIQ diverts State-funded medical seats to a central pool, weakening federalism and State autonomy. It disproportionately burdens women who are unlikely to relocate for postgraduation, fails to address regional disparities effectively, and deprives States of the benefits of their own investments in medical education infrastructure .
4. What did the Justice A.K. Rajan Committee conclude about NEET?
The committee, constituted by Tamil Nadu, received overwhelming public participation and concluded that NEET neither improved medical education nor ensured social justice. It found that the examination disproportionately disadvantaged students from rural backgrounds, economically weaker sections, State Board students, women and first-generation learners .
5. What is the alternative framework proposed to NEET?
The proposed alternative is to strengthen school education, restore confidence in School Board assessments, and allow States to formulate their own admission policies consistent with their constitutional responsibilities and local realities. Statistical harmonisation can fairly compare marks from different Boards. States seeking exemption from NEET should be allowed to do so, and diversity in admissions can strengthen both equity and excellence .
Restoration of J&K Statehood Calls for a Phased and Negotiated Roadmap
By Haseeb Drabu
New Delhi, July 25, 2026
It has been seven years since Jammu & Kashmir was downgraded to a Union Territory. It has been five years since the Union government committed in Parliament to restore statehood. It has been four years since delimitation was done. It has been three years since the Supreme Court was assured of restoration. It has been two years since an elected government took office .
Yet, so far, there has not even been a serious conversation about it. The only response from the Centre, a clear and consistent one, has been an assurance wrapped in ambiguity: Statehood will be restored at the “appropriate time”. The “appropriate time” is not a date on the calendar; it is whatever time suits the present dispensation. “At the appropriate time” is not a promise but an instrument of power. Every demand for a date is an indicator of impatience, and every postponement a proof of prudence .
Faced with growing public disillusionment locally over the Omar Abdullah-led government’s performance, the National Conference recently launched an outreach drive. After civil-society consultations, it called for a protest in New Delhi on July 20 .
The Fractured Protest: A Display of Fragmentation
The National Conference positioned its protest as a broad-based political initiative rather than a party-specific agitation. Though well-placed to lead the J&K parties and wider civil society by virtue of a strong electoral mandate, all the Valley-centric parties decided not to participate in the protest. This has turned a potential show of strength into a display of fragmentation, thereby significantly reducing the political pressure on the Union government to act .
Without a united front at least from the Valley, the Centre can easily treat the demand as partisan rather than regional, and delay statehood restoration on its own timeline .
Being a constituent of the INDIA bloc, the National Conference had also reached out to the national and regional parties to build a wider constituency of support and gain greater political traction. This could have provided an opportunity to frame the demand as a larger federal issue that touches upon the basic structure of India’s constitutional arrangements. For the most potent blueprint for the restoration of statehood is not a political manifesto of any party, but an agenda for federal democratic polity of India. But that was not to be.
As the National Conference assembled in New Delhi for the restoration of statehood for J&K, the refrain in the lacklustre affair was unfulfilled promises rather than rights denied. Speeches, slogans and bytes invoked constitutional morality, legislative assurances, judicial precedents and political commitments. These are valid, necessary political arguments but have limited relevance in the current context .
The Security Imperative: The Centre’s Non-Negotiable Precondition
For the Centre, it is amply evident that security and “normalcy” are the non-negotiable pre-conditions for restoring statehood. This is not a temporary hurdle. Until these concerns are credibly addressed, arguments based only on constitutional grounds will remain secondary in the decision-making process at the highest levels .
The restoration of statehood is not a simple administrative decision or a one-sided concession. It will be the outcome of a political bargain in which enhanced powers and privileges will come with greater responsibilities, aka conditionalities. This is already visible in the case of Ladakh, where statehood has been made contingent on meeting certain revenue and self-sustainability criteria. J&K is unlikely to be treated differently .
This is why the political leadership in J&K needs to move beyond making a legal case. Engaging substantively with the Centre’s stated concerns on security and governance could prove more consequential than constitutional arguments alone .
Treating the security issue as a chicken-and-egg problem — the lack of full powers is cited as the reason for limited initiative — is technically correct but politically unwise because it restricts the space for political agency. While the elected government’s limited powers are a structural constraint, demonstrating statecraft even within the current framework could help build credibility with the Centre .
Chief Minister Omar Abdullah, while leading the campaign, has questioned this very premise. He has pointed to what he calls contradictory positions on the security situation: “On one hand, you tell us that militancy still exists, which is why you cannot grant us statehood. On the other hand, when a Kashmiri Pandit files a security-related case in the High Court seeking transfer from Srinagar to Jammu, the High Court says there is no terrorism here” . He has argued that there has been a marked improvement in the situation and questioned why the Centre continues to cite law and order as a reason for delay, adding: “If the situation is poor, who is responsible for it? Security and law and order are not our responsibility” .
The ‘Appropriate Time’ Paradox: A Strategic Ambiguity
Chief Minister Omar Abdullah, who has been at the forefront of the demand for statehood, has repeatedly questioned the Centre’s ambiguity. Addressing a workers’ convention, he asked, “I ask them, for God’s sake, how will we know that the appropriate time has come? What do I and my colleagues have to do to reach that appropriate time?” . He has also warned that the Centre should not mistake his government’s patience for weakness, saying, “We have to keep patience, but patience is not the path of weakness. It does not mean we will not raise our voice for our rights. It does not mean you can take undue advantage of our patience” .
He further questioned whether the Centre’s reference to an “appropriate time” meant that statehood would be restored only after the BJP came to power in Jammu and Kashmir. “If that is what you mean, then have the courage to say it publicly. At least we will not remain under the illusion that you will fulfil your promise,” he said .
A Phased Process, Not a Simple Decision
From the Union’s point of view, the restoration of statehood may be seen as a decision to be taken at an appropriate time. However, from the perspective of J&K, it will be a process. Statehood cannot simply be restored by an executive order changing its status. Such a move would leave the underlying administrative and financial distortions created since 2019 largely unaddressed. Converting the former state into a Union Territory did not just alter its administrative boundaries, it fundamentally changed its governance DNA and deepened J&K’s dependence on the Centre .
It is high time to move away from the binary of statehood restoration to what it will entail, politically and administratively. A more strategic approach would require the J&K political leadership to move from episodic mobilisation to a sustained, multi-track engagement. In the short term, this would mean building a unified negotiating position across parties on the benchmarks for “normalcy” that the Centre considers non-negotiable .
In parallel, the focus should shift to negotiating a time-bound framework, possibly through a structured administrative mechanism of unwinding the central controls. Without such a phased and negotiated roadmap, the demand for statehood risks remaining a recurring political slogan instead of becoming a manageable political settlement .
It is unlikely that the recent Delhi protest will be the starting point of a political process for statehood with the Centre. To reach a milestone on that road, the Valley-centric political leadership needs to prioritise pragmatic sequencing over fragmented posturing. This will determine if J&K can convert public sentiment into concrete constitutional gains in the coming years .
Q&A Section
1. What is the current status of Jammu and Kashmir?
Jammu and Kashmir was downgraded to a Union Territory in August 2019, following the abrogation of Article 370. The region has an elected legislative assembly, similar to Delhi and Puducherry, but its powers are strictly curtailed. Key subjects like policing, public order and the bureaucracy answer to the Lieutenant Governor, who is appointed by the Centre, rather than the elected Chief Minister . In a full state, the state cabinet holds legislative autonomy over subjects in the State List; currently, the LG retains expansive veto powers and discretionary authority .
2. What promise has the Union government made regarding statehood?
The Union government, including Prime Minister Modi, has consistently promised to restore statehood to Jammu and Kashmir. This commitment was made in Parliament, before the Supreme Court, and during the 2024 election campaigns by BJP candidates . The Centre has maintained that statehood would be restored at the “appropriate time,” but has not provided a specific timeline or defined the criteria for that determination .
3. Why did the National Conference’s July 20 protest in Delhi fail to generate significant political pressure?
The National Conference’s protest at Jantar Mantar on July 20, 2026, did not generate the intended pressure because it lacked a united front. Most of the Valley-centric parties, including the Peoples Democratic Party (PDP) and other regional groups, decided not to participate . This allowed the Centre to treat the demand as partisan rather than a unified regional sentiment, thereby reducing the political impact of the protest .
4. What is Chief Minister Omar Abdullah’s critique of the Centre’s “appropriate time” formula?
Chief Minister Omar Abdullah has been vocal in his criticism of the Centre’s ambiguous “appropriate time” formula. He has questioned what specific criteria or benchmarks the government is using to determine when that time has arrived . He has warned the Centre not to mistake his government’s patience for weakness and has demanded a clear, transparent timeline for the restoration of statehood . He has also accused the Centre of governing J&K through the Lieutenant Governor’s office, effectively rendering the elected government powerless .
5. What strategic approach is needed for the restoration of statehood?
The restoration of statehood should not be viewed as a single executive decision, but as a phased and negotiated process . The political leadership of J&K needs to move beyond episodic protests to a sustained, multi-track engagement with the Centre. This would involve building a unified negotiating position across parties on benchmarks for “normalcy,” and focusing on a time-bound framework to unwind the central controls imposed since 2019 . Without a structured roadmap, the demand for statehood risks remaining a political slogan rather than a constitutional settlement .
Due Process is Not a Waste of Anyone’s Time
By The Editorial Board
New Delhi, July 25, 2026
This is a time when mostly young protesters are still thronging Jantar Mantar in the national capital, and when, in the aftermath of the police crackdown on July 20, they are not assuaged by the government’s assurances. At this time, the message from the highest court of the land should be: Its doors are open to any process that protects the rights of the vulnerable, fosters accountability and expands the ground for negotiations. With due respect, however, Chief Justice of India Surya Kant’s response to a lawyer who sought the Court’s intervention against police excess, seemed to highlight a gulf between citizen and institution, instead of offering a healing touch: “Don’t waste our time and your time,” he said. And, “We are not interested in videos. We don’t have time to watch.” These may be only oral observations. It is also true that the CJI cannot be expected to wade through countless Instagram reels and in this polarised climate, even videos whose authenticity is in doubt. But in the social media age, words travel far, often away from their contexts. They can take on a life of their own — it was the CJI’s choice of words, earlier, that provided the spark for the satirical online platform, Cockroach Janta Party, the protests’ centrepiece .
The “Cockroach” Remark and the Birth of a Movement
In May 2026, during a Supreme Court hearing, Chief Justice Surya Kant made a remark about lawyers misusing public interest litigation. Unemployed youth activists, he said in tone and implication, were like cockroaches—disposable, numerous, and a nuisance to be managed rather than a constituency to be heard. The Chief Justice later clarified that his comments had been directed at the lawyers, not the unemployed youth themselves. By then, it did not matter. Within 78 hours of the remark, a satirical Instagram page had amassed three million followers .
Digital communications strategist Abhijeet Dipke founded the Cockroach Janta Party (CJP) on May 16, 2026, as a political satire directly parodying the ruling Bharatiya Janata Party’s name while making the CJI remark its founding statement. The name said: if the system sees us as cockroaches, we will be cockroaches. We will be everywhere. We will survive everything. We will not go away . The reclamation of an insult as an identity is a familiar political move, but rarely has it happened this fast or at this scale . The movement quickly grew to over 20 million followers on Instagram, making it one of the largest youth-led mobilisations in recent Indian history .
The July 20 Crackdown and Its Aftermath
The CJP called for a Sansad Chalo (March to Parliament) on the opening day of the Monsoon Session, demanding accountability for the examination system’s collapse. As thousands of protesters tried to move forward, clashes broke out. Police used tear gas shells, lathi charges, and physical force to disperse the crowd . Videos from the scene showed students running through tear gas, volunteers carrying injured protesters to safety, and demonstrators trying to shield one another from baton blows. Many protesters claimed they were beaten even after they had stopped resisting, while several alleged that women protesters were dragged, manhandled and even molested during the crackdown . Hospital officials said at least 100 protesters received treatment for injuries following the crackdown, while the Delhi Police put the number of injured at around 60. A 22-year-old woman injured during the police action continues to remain in the intensive care unit (ICU) at Ram Manohar Lohia Hospital, according to her family .
The Question of Police Excesses and Due Process
Reports from the Delhi street have pointed to the use of disproportionate force, including pellet guns, apart from lathi charges and tear gas shells. They have highlighted, too, the short-circuiting, if not outright flouting, of established restraints and protocols. Delhi Police Standing Order 309 and Standing Order 152 lay down the specific guidelines that police must follow to disperse protesters — the Supreme Court’s 2012 ruling in the Ramlila Maidan case underlined these . An inquiry must ask if the police went through the required paces. Given the demographics and nature of the protesters, largely students, did the police observe the principle, as laid down by the Court, of “least invasiveness”? Did it use water cannons before resorting to more injurious methods? Did it fire the tear gas away from the crowd, rather than directly into it?
The Supreme Court’s 2012 judgment in the Ramlila Maidan case had laid down clear guidelines for police conduct during protests. The Court had found that the police had failed to follow the prescribed procedure before using force, including making announcements asking protesters to disperse. It had held that the use of force must be regulated according to the circumstances of each case, and that the object of the use of force should be to quell the disturbance of peace or to disperse the assembly which threatens such disturbance . The Court had also noted that Standing Order 152 requires that before tear smoke action is commenced, a regular warning should be issued, and that tear smoke shells should be fired away from the crowd rather than into the crowd .
The Supreme Court’s Response: A Matter of Procedure
On July 22, a lawyer sought urgent hearing on the police action against students. “I have the videos as well regarding police brutality… If it can be listed tomorrow (Thursday)… students are there,” the lawyer had said . The CJI declined the request and made it clear that the bench was not inclined to examine video footage at the mentioning stage. “We are not interested in videos, we don’t have time to watch… We don’t want to watch videos,” the CJI said. When the counsel reiterated that students had been beaten up and again referred to the video evidence, the CJI said, “Don’t waste our time. We don’t want to watch any videos” .
However, on July 24, Chief Justice Surya Kant clarified that reports claiming he had refused an urgent hearing were incorrect, as no petition had been filed and only a representation had been sent to the court. “In the last two days, a completely false statement was made that a matter was filed, and the media is absolutely free from all responsibility and falsely reporting that the Chief Justice refused to list the matter,” he said. “Till morning 10 am, not a single page has been filed. It was one representation…sent by Mishra or someone. How can I treat the representation as a writ petition? And people start recklessly reporting this” .
The Delhi High Court’s Intervention
While the Supreme Court declined to entertain the plea, the Delhi High Court on July 23 sought responses from the Centre and Delhi Police on allegations of excessive force during the July 20 protest and directed authorities to preserve CCTV footage and all other relevant electronic records linked to the incident . A Division Bench comprising Chief Justice DK Upadhyaya and Justice Tejas Karia granted the respondents four weeks to file their replies and listed the matter for further hearing on September 11 .
During the hearing, the Bench questioned the Centre’s objection to the maintainability of the petitions, observing that even if the gathering had been an unlawful assembly, the authorities were required to follow a prescribed legal procedure. “We have some questions for you. Was this an isolated incident? Perhaps not. Even if this was an unlawful assembly, there is a procedure to deal with it,” the Bench observed . The Court further observed that where issues of alleged police excess are raised through a PIL, it cannot simply ask every affected individual to lodge a separate FIR .
The Way Forward
A small section of the protesters, too, have resorted to violence and vandalism. Physically assaulting journalists not to their liking to pelting stones, these need to be strongly condemned. A fair and independent probe — the Delhi High Court has done well to agree to hear two PILs on the issue — must set those aberrations in the larger context. In a clash between unequals, it must ensure that the powerful state does not weaponise the rulebook to subdue the powerless citizen. That’s why, with due respect to the Court, this needs to be underlined: Due process is not a waste of time .
Q&A Section
1. What is the Cockroach Janta Party and how did it begin?
The Cockroach Janta Party (CJP) was founded in May 2026 by Abhijeet Dipke as a satirical online response to Chief Justice of India Surya Kant’s remark comparing unemployed youth activists to “cockroaches.” The movement reclaimed the label as a badge of identity, declaring that if the system sees them as cockroaches, they will be everywhere and will not go away. It quickly grew to over 20 million followers on Instagram .
2. What happened during the July 20 CJP protest?
The CJP called for a “Sansad Chalo” (March to Parliament) on the opening day of the Monsoon Session, demanding accountability for the examination system’s collapse. As thousands of protesters tried to move forward, clashes broke out. Police used tear gas shells, lathi charges, and physical force to disperse the crowd. Videos showed protesters being beaten by police personnel, with many sustaining injuries. Hospital officials said at least 100 protesters received treatment .
3. What was the Supreme Court’s response to the plea on police excesses?
On July 22, a lawyer sought urgent hearing on the police action against students. The CJI declined the request, saying, “Don’t waste our time. We don’t want to watch any videos.” However, on July 24, the CJI clarified that reports claiming he had refused an urgent hearing were incorrect, as no petition had been filed and only a representation had been sent to the court .
4. What action has the Delhi High Court taken on the matter?
The Delhi High Court on July 23 sought responses from the Centre and Delhi Police on allegations of excessive force during the July 20 protest and directed authorities to preserve CCTV footage and all other relevant electronic records linked to the incident. The Bench observed that even if the gathering had been an unlawful assembly, there was a prescribed legal procedure to deal with it .
5. What guidelines govern police conduct during protests?
Delhi Police Standing Order 309 and Standing Order 152 lay down the specific guidelines that police must follow to disperse protesters. The Supreme Court’s 2012 ruling in the Ramlila Maidan case underlined these, requiring that the “least invasiveness” principle be observed, that warnings be issued before using force, and that tear gas be fired away from the crowd rather than into it .
Left Behind: The Stark Reality of India’s Children with Special Needs
By Nitika Francis
New Delhi, July 25, 2026
The Unified District Information System for Education (UDISE) 2025-26 report has raised concerns about Children With Special Needs (CWSN) enrolled in schools, whose numbers have remained stagnant over the past eight years despite initiatives to get more of them enrolled. As per the data, there were 21.66 lakh CWSN in schools, a number that has remained fairly constant over the years. While one could argue that the overall number of children enrolled in schools has also remained fairly the same, the other question to be answered in this context is whether all the CWSN in the country are getting enrolled in schools .
The 2011 Census said that there were 32.5 lakh disabled children in India, just under the age of nine. If one were to include persons with disability in the 10-19 age group, the number increases to 78.7 lakh. The number of CWSN in schools in 2025-26 were not even 30% of the 2011 Census data. Moreover, their numbers would have surely grown since .
The Inclusion Gap: 22% Enrolment, 100% Challenge
In the absence of Census data and estimates of children with disability released by the government in recent years, The Hindu used the National Family Health Survey (NFHS-5) data on disability and the government’s population estimates in the Report of The Technical Group on Population Projects to estimate the number of CWSN in the country .
The estimate showed that the number of CWSN in India could have grown from 92.3 lakh to 98.8 lakh between 2018-19 and 2025-26. These estimates when compared with CWSN in schools showed that, only 22% of the children seem to have been enrolled in schools . This is a conservative estimate since the population estimates could be calculated, as explained above, only for the 5-14 age group. This was compared with the total number of CWSN enrolled across primary, upper primary, secondary and higher secondary stages, which would include those who are at least a year or two older than 14 .
The NFHS-5 data itself paints a broader picture of disability prevalence in India. The overall prevalence of disability in the country is 4.52%, with locomotor disabilities accounting for 44.70% of all disabilities, followed by mental and speech disabilities . While the survey is not specifically focused on children, it establishes that disability is a significant factor in the population, and the enrolment gap for children is not a marginal issue.
The Dropout Crisis: A Bleak Trajectory
Moreover, the number of CWSN shrinks significantly as they move up different stages of schooling. The shrinking is more pronounced among CWSN than the overall number of students enrolled. Nearly 75% of CWSN who have enrolled in primary school are in upper primary, data showed. This reduced to 48% between upper primary and secondary, and 46% between secondary and higher secondary levels. As the table shows, these shares are higher for the overall number of children .
This steep dropout rate is a major concern. While the national dropout rate at the secondary level has improved to 7% in 2025-26 from 8.2% the previous year, the CWSN dropout rate is significantly higher . The infrastructure also fails them; as per UDISE data, nearly 32,228 (29.8%) of schools still do not have dedicated toilets for CWSN, and while only 3,845 schools lack ramp access, 16,341 schools have ramps without handrails, limiting safe access for many students . As disability rights activist Dharmendra Satav noted, “Even where dedicated toilets exist, they are often poorly maintained… For children with locomotor or visual impairments, an unclean toilet can make the facility unusable” .
The Gender Gap: A Persistent Inequality
The data also showed that the gender distribution remained worryingly the same despite minor fluctuations in the number of CWSN enrolled. Only about 43 of every 100 CWSN enrolled in schools are girls . However, the number of girls with special needs dropping out of schools seem to be lower than boys. The number of girls with special needs in upper primary level, for instance, is about 80% of those in primary level . This suggests that while fewer girls are enrolled in the first place, those who are enrolled are more likely to continue their education than boys. This could be due to a variety of factors, including cultural biases that prioritize the education of boys with disabilities over girls, or a lack of accessible facilities for girls, such as separate and functional toilets.
The Data Blind Spot: Underreporting and the Act’s Unfinished Business
Shashank Pandey, lawyer and founder of the Politics and Disability Forum, who works on political representation of Persons with Disabilities said that underreporting of the numbers cannot be ruled out. He told The Hindu that at times the schools that provide data for the UDISE reports are not updated with the 21 categories of disabilities now recognised by the Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016, and still categorise students based on the eight categories provided in the 2011 Census .
The RPWD Act 2016, which came into effect in April 2017, was a landmark legislation that expanded the recognized disability conditions from 7 to 21 . The new list includes conditions like dwarfism, acid attack survivors, Parkinson’s disease, chronic neurological conditions, and three blood disorders—thalassemia, hemophilia, and sickle cell disease . However, the underreporting highlighted by Pandey suggests that the implementation of the Act’s provisions on the ground is severely lagging. Schools, the primary data collection points, are still operating with an outdated understanding of disability, which leads to an underestimation of the true scale of the challenge and a failure to provide appropriate support.
Conclusion: A Failure of Policy and Implementation
The UDISE 2025-26 data paints a grim picture of India’s failure to include children with special needs in the educational system. Despite the progressive framework of the RPWD Act, 2016, and the constitutional promise of free and compulsory education, the enrolment gap remains frozen. The data shows that only 22% of the estimated 98.8 lakh CWSN are enrolled in schools, and those who are enrolled face a steep drop-off in higher classes, with girls being a minority among the enrolled.
The issue is not merely one of access; it is also one of infrastructure. The fact that a significant number of schools lack basic facilities like functional toilets and accessible ramps for CWSN is a fundamental violation of their rights. The policy is clear, but the implementation is abysmal.
As India moves forward, it must prioritize the inclusion of CWSN. This requires not only strengthening policy frameworks but also ensuring that every school is equipped with accessible infrastructure, every teacher is trained in inclusive education, and every child with a disability is identified and enrolled. The data from the UDISE report is a wake-up call. It is time to move beyond data collection to concrete action, to ensure that no child is left behind.
Q&A Section
1. What is the current status of CWSN enrolment in Indian schools?
As per the UDISE 2025-26 report, only 21.66 lakh CWSN are enrolled in schools, a number that has remained stagnant for eight years. The estimated number of CWSN in India is around 98.8 lakh, meaning only about 22% of children with disabilities are enrolled in schools .
2. What is the estimated number of Children with Special Needs (CWSN) in India?
Using NFHS-5 data and population projections, the estimated number of CWSN is approximately 98.8 lakh in 2025-26. This is a conservative estimate, focusing on the 5-14 age group .
3. How does the enrolment of CWSN change as they move up educational levels?
The proportion of CWSN shrinks significantly at higher educational levels. Around 75% of CWSN enrolled in primary school continue to upper primary, but this drops to 48% between upper primary and secondary, and 46% between secondary and higher secondary. This drop is more pronounced than the general student population, indicating a higher dropout rate for CWSN .
4. What is the gender gap in CWSN enrolment?
Only about 43 out of every 100 CWSN enrolled in schools are girls, showing a persistent gender gap. However, girls with special needs who do enroll have a slightly lower dropout rate than boys, with 80% of those in primary continuing to upper primary .
5. What are the reasons for the underreporting of CWSN numbers?
Underreporting is a significant issue. Many schools still use the older eight disability categories from the 2011 Census rather than the 21 categories now recognized under the Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016. This leads to children being incorrectly categorized or not counted at all, masking the true scale of the enrolment gap .
Pellet Guns and Shock Batons: The Weaponisation of India’s Protest Spaces
By Vijaita Singh
New Delhi, July 25, 2026
At least one of the 80 protesters injured in police action during the march to Parliament on Monday (July 20), called by the Cockroach Janta Party (CJP) sustained pellet gun injuries. The victim identified as Shaikh Irshad Mansoori (25), a resident of Gurugram, underwent surgery at a government hospital to remove the pellets lodged under his eye [citation:original text]. Most pellets were lodged in the upper part of his body.
Another video of a woman being stunned by a “shock baton,” also emerged on Tuesday (July 21) [citation:original text]. The use of pellet guns and shock batons against civilian protesters, appears to be the first in Delhi [citation:original text].
What Are Pellet Guns?
Pellet guns, whose technical name is ‘pump action guns’, are a form of non-lethal crowd-control method used by police and military worldwide. The other popular measures are tear gas, water cannon, pepper spray and taser guns among others [citation:original text].
Intended to immobilise an individual, they are effective over short ranges of up to 500 yards but when fired from close quarters can be lethal, particularly when sensitive parts like the eyes are hit. The pellets can penetrate soft tissues [citation:original text]. There are standing instructions to open minimal fire at protesters and if necessary “below their waist.” A cartridge of a pellet gun contains a few hundred pellets made of lead, which disperses a few hundred metres when fired. Pellets can be of various shapes either like ball bearings or irregular. They are manufactured at the Ordnance Factory, Ishapore [citation:original text].
The July 20 Incident: A First in the Capital
While the Delhi Police have denied its use against protesters, pellets guns and shock batons are part of the gear of the Rapid Action Force (RAF) – the anti-riot unit under the Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF) – which was deployed alongside police personnel on July 20 and continues to be deployed near the Jantar Mantar protest site [citation:original text]. The incident marks the first known deployment of these weapons against civilians in the national capital .
On Monday, the victim Shaikh Irshad Mansoori was hit near Palika Bazaar by a RAF official. His friend said that there are around 30-40 injuries on his face and across his body. Four of them, including one in the neck, had penetrated deeply, which is why he underwent surgery [citation:original text]. Originally from Jabalpur in Madhya Pradesh, Mr. Mansoori works at a private company in Gurugram and was attending the protests in solidarity [citation:original text].
Since then, at least three cases of pellet gun injuries have come to light. 19-year-old Sahil Lochab, a Delhi University student, was admitted to the AIIMS Trauma Centre and has been told that he may lose vision in the right eye . A 28-year-old journalist with the Outlook magazine also sustained pellet injuries, with a medical report recording injuries from “physical assault at Jantar Mantar by pellet gun” .
The History of Pellet Guns in India
Pellet guns were first deployed in Jammu and Kashmir after Kashmir Valley’s summer unrest of 2010 that claimed the lives of 112 protesters in police firing. The then Congress-led government at the Centre deployed pellet guns as a “non-lethal” measure to avoid civilian fatalities [citation:original text].
After violent protests broke out in the Kashmir Valley post July 8, 2016 – when the Hizbul Mujahideen (HM) commander Burhan Wani was killed in an encounter with security forces – several people were blinded due to injuries inflicted by pellet guns, used by the CRPF as a crowd control measure [citation:original text]. In 2016, 13 people were killed and more than 250 were injured, while some lost their vision [citation:original text].
In 2016, a Supreme Court bench headed by then Chief Justice T.S. Thakur held that pellet guns could not be used indiscriminately to control street protests in Kashmir, and that authorities could resort to them only after proper application of mind . The court sought a report from an Expert Committee constituted to explore alternatives to pellet guns .
In 2017, a year later, the first batch of less lethal “plastic bullets” were dispatched to the Kashmir Valley. Instead of metal, this round of ammunition had a plastic head [citation:original text]. They were last known to have been used during the 2024 farmers’ protest at Khanauri and Shambhu barriers along the Punjab-Haryana border. Though the police denied using pellet guns, farmer leaders had alleged that several persons were injured. In 2023, they were used against protesters in the ethnic-strike torn Manipur, leading to a massive public outrage [citation:original text].
The CRPF’s Internal Review and Ban
Following the July 20 crackdown, the CRPF initiated an inquiry to ascertain the exact sequence of events and determine whether pellet guns were used by personnel of its Rapid Action Force . The RAF is a specialised unit of the CRPF, raised in 1992 to deal with riots and other public disturbances .
The Rapid Action Force (RAF) has identified serious operational deficiencies in its handling of the July 20 protest and has issued an extensive set of corrective directions, including a ban on the use of Projectile Attack Guns (PAG), Anti-Riot Guns (ARG), Electric Shock Weapons and Electric Shields during the ongoing deployment in the national capital until further orders .
The directions were issued during a video conference chaired by Inspector General Seema Dhundia on July 22, where senior RAF officers reviewed the force’s role during the protest, acknowledged shortcomings and laid down 26 corrective measures aimed at improving crowd-control operations, discipline and accountability . Inspector General Seema Dhundia expressed “serious dissatisfaction” with the RAF’s performance during the Jantar Mantar protest .
The review also criticised videos allegedly showing personnel using force against individuals who had already moved away from the crowd, deliberately pushing people to the ground and striking persons outside barricades . The headquarters further directed that personnel transferred from counter-insurgency environments such as Jammu & Kashmir should not be deployed in crowd-control operations until they are trained in RAF’s crowd-control philosophy and “Sensitive Policing” .
Shock Batons and Accountability
Shock batons are also a part of the RAF personnel gear [citation:original text]. In 2021, the Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA), through the Border Security Force (BSF), prescribed Qualitative Requirements (QRs) for handheld ‘Shock Batons’ intended for self-defence and operational use by security personnel [citation:original text]. The device is expected to have a service life of at least five years and be powered by a rechargeable battery [citation:original text].
A group of 93 retired civil servants has sought an independent judicial inquiry into the July 20 police action, alleging that security personnel used pellet guns, electric batons and tear gas against unarmed demonstrators . The Constitutional Conduct Group called for action against officers responsible for what it described as the “illegal and disproportionate” use of force . The signatories included former Delhi Lieutenant Governor Najeeb Jung, former Election Commissioner Ashok Lavasa, former Foreign Secretary Shivshankar Menon, and several other retired IAS, IPS and IFS officers .
Q&A Section
1. What is a pellet gun and how does it work?
Pellet guns, technically ‘pump action guns’, are crowd-control weapons that fire cartridges containing hundreds of lead pellets. The pellets disperse over a range and are intended to immobilise individuals when fired from a distance. However, when fired at close range or targeting sensitive areas like the eyes, they can penetrate soft tissue and cause serious injury or even death [citation:original text].
2. When was the first known use of pellet guns in India, and where?
Pellet guns were first deployed in Jammu and Kashmir following the summer unrest of 2010, where they were introduced as a “non-lethal” alternative to conventional firearms. Their use was significantly expanded after the 2016 unrest that followed the killing of Hizbul Mujahideen commander Burhan Wani [citation:original text].
3. What was the Supreme Court’s position on pellet guns?
In 2016, the Supreme Court held that pellet guns could not be used indiscriminately for crowd control, and that authorities must apply proper judgment before resorting to them. The court also sought a report from an Expert Committee on alternatives to pellet guns . However, despite this directive, pellet guns have continued to be used in various protests across the country [citation:original text].
4. What happened during the July 20 protest in Delhi?
During the Cockroach Janta Party’s march to Parliament on July 20, security forces used pellet guns and shock batons against protesters for the first time in Delhi. At least three people required hospital treatment for pellet injuries, including a 19-year-old student who may lose vision in one eye, and a journalist. The Delhi Police denied using pellet guns, but the weapons are standard RAF gear [citation:original text].
5. What changes has the RAF made after the July 20 incident?
The RAF has banned the use of pellet guns, electric shock weapons and electric shields until further orders. It has also made Body Worn Cameras mandatory, directed dedicated videography of major incidents, and instructed that only personnel trained in crowd-control philosophy should be deployed for such duties. Personnel transferred from counter-insurgency environments like J&K must be trained in “Sensitive Policing” before deployment .
