NEET’s Promise Has Failed, It’s Time to Trust States
By M.K. Stalin
New Delhi, July 25, 2026
The unprecedented protests by students across the country following the NEET question paper leak are not merely about one compromised examination. They reflect a deeper crisis of confidence in a system that was projected as the ultimate guardian of merit. When lakhs of students lose faith in the fairness of the process that determines their future, the nation’s conscience is shaken .
Tamil Nadu was the first State to raise the red flag against NEET – not because of irregularities in its conduct, but because of the very philosophy behind a single, high-stakes national examination deciding the future of every aspiring medical student. The problem was structural, not procedural. Recent events have vindicated that concern .
The Union Government introduced NEET with three principal promises. First, that it would reduce the burden of multiple entrance examinations. Second, that it would eliminate the scourge of capitation fees and commercialisation of medical admissions. Third, that it would improve standards by ensuring only the most meritorious students entered medical colleges, thereby producing better doctors .
On every one of these counts, NEET has failed .
The Illusion of Merit
Instead of reducing inequality, it has merely shifted the centre of learning from schools to coaching centres. A student’s 12 years of schooling have been reduced to a secondary consideration before a three-hour multiple-choice examination. Merit is no longer measured through sustained academic performance but by the ability to master coaching-centric test-taking techniques. This has disproportionately benefited those who can afford expensive coaching while disadvantaging rural students, government school students, first-generation learners, women, and those studying in State Boards and vernacular languages .
The assumption that a single objective test measures merit better than years of consistent academic achievement is not supported by international evidence. Research across advanced federal democracies suggests exactly the opposite for undergraduate admissions. Countries such as the U.S., Canada, Australia and Germany admit students through school performance, standardisation methods, and holistic evaluation – not through a single nationwide entrance examination. Where entrance tests are used, they are generally one component among several, not the sole determinant .
Medical education demands perseverance, empathy, discipline and long-term academic excellence. These qualities cannot be captured adequately in a single examination conducted in one day .
NEET’s own experience further exposes the myth of merit. The qualifying threshold for undergraduate admissions remains remarkably low. For postgraduate and super-speciality admissions, qualifying percentiles have repeatedly been reduced to zero percentile and, in some cases, even negative marks, simply to fill expensive private college seats. If merit truly governed the system, such extraordinary relaxations would never become necessary. Instead, the reality is stark: poor students must compete at the highest level for limited government seats, while those with financial means can access private medical education with far lower benchmarks. That is not meritocracy; it is privilege institutionalised .
The Failure to Curb Commercialisation
Equally misplaced is the belief that NEET has curbed commercialisation. The coaching industry has flourished into a multi-thousand-crore enterprise, with families spending enormous sums over several years to prepare their children. The burden that NEET promised to eliminate has merely changed form – from capitation fees to coaching fees. Simultaneously, deemed universities and private self-financing medical colleges have found new ways to commercialise medical education. Instead of demanding capitation fees and donations upfront, many have sharply increased tuition fees and other institutional charges, making medical education increasingly unaffordable for poor and middle-class families. The nomenclature may have changed, but the financial burden has not. Commercialisation has merely been repackaged, not eliminated .
Tamil Nadu’s Stand
Tamil Nadu recognised these concerns early. We constituted the Justice A.K. Rajan Committee, which received overwhelming public participation and concluded that NEET neither improved medical education nor ensured social justice. It found that the examination disproportionately disadvantaged students from rural backgrounds, economically weaker sections, State Board students, women and first-generation learners .
Acting on these findings, the Tamil Nadu Legislative Assembly unanimously passed legislation seeking exemption from NEET. The Governor withheld assent. The Union Government declined to engage meaningfully with the substance of the State’s concerns. Instead of consultation, there was confrontation. Instead of cooperative federalism, there was centralised insistence on uniformity. Genuine constitutional concerns were viewed through an ideological prism rather than addressed through dialogue .
Education is a subject where diversity is a constitutional strength, not a weakness. States have invested for decades in building public education systems and expanding medical infrastructure. Over the past two decades, India has witnessed a remarkable increase in medical colleges. Today, almost every district in Tamil Nadu has a government medical college, built largely through State resources and public investment .
If States are trusted to establish institutions, recruit faculty, maintain standards and fund medical education, they must also be trusted to determine admissions consistent with their own educational systems and social justice policies. One nation need not mean one examination .
The All India Quota Problem
Another aspect requiring urgent reconsideration is the All India Quota (AIQ). This judicially created system diverts State-funded medical seats to a central pool, weakening federalism, State autonomy and social justice. It disproportionately burdens women as they are unlikely to relocate to another State for postgraduation, fails to address regional disparities effectively, and deprives States of the benefits of their investments. It should be replaced with a voluntary, State-led framework .
The solution lies in strengthening school education, restoring confidence in School Board assessments and allowing States to formulate admission policies suited to their constitutional responsibilities and local realities. Statistical harmonisation can fairly compare marks awarded by different Boards. The answer to multiple applications is a common application portal – not a common entrance examination. States that seek exemption from NEET should be allowed to do so. Diversity in admissions need not compromise standards; indeed, it can strengthen both equity and excellence .
The Wake-Up Call
The recent student protests must serve as a wake-up call – not merely to improve examination security but to fundamentally rethink the entire framework of high-stakes national entrance examinations. The Union Government must consult States, educators, students, medical professionals and all stakeholders with an open mind rather than treating uniformity as an end in itself. India does not need greater centralisation. It needs greater trust in its States, its schools and its students .
The strength of our Union lies not in uniformity imposed from above, but in respecting diversity within a shared constitutional framework. It is time to move beyond the illusion that one examination can measure every student’s potential .
The future of medical education – and the aspirations of millions of young Indians – deserve a fairer, more humane and more federal approach. NEET has failed its own promises. It is time to trust the States again .
Q&A Section
1. What were the three principal promises made when NEET was introduced?
The Union Government introduced NEET with three principal promises: (1) to reduce the burden of multiple entrance examinations; (2) to eliminate the scourge of capitation fees and commercialisation of medical admissions; and (3) to improve standards by ensuring only the most meritorious students entered medical colleges .
2. According to M.K. Stalin, how has NEET failed on each of these promises?
Stalin argues that NEET has failed on every count. Instead of reducing the burden, it has shifted the centre of learning from schools to expensive coaching centres. Instead of curbing commercialisation, it has merely replaced capitation fees with coaching fees while private colleges have increased tuition fees. Instead of improving standards, it has institutionalised privilege by allowing zero percentile qualifying thresholds to fill expensive private seats .
3. Why is the All India Quota (AIQ) system criticised?
The AIQ diverts State-funded medical seats to a central pool, weakening federalism and State autonomy. It disproportionately burdens women who are unlikely to relocate for postgraduation, fails to address regional disparities effectively, and deprives States of the benefits of their own investments in medical education infrastructure .
4. What did the Justice A.K. Rajan Committee conclude about NEET?
The committee, constituted by Tamil Nadu, received overwhelming public participation and concluded that NEET neither improved medical education nor ensured social justice. It found that the examination disproportionately disadvantaged students from rural backgrounds, economically weaker sections, State Board students, women and first-generation learners .
5. What is the alternative framework proposed to NEET?
The proposed alternative is to strengthen school education, restore confidence in School Board assessments, and allow States to formulate their own admission policies consistent with their constitutional responsibilities and local realities. Statistical harmonisation can fairly compare marks from different Boards. States seeking exemption from NEET should be allowed to do so, and diversity in admissions can strengthen both equity and excellence .
Restoration of J&K Statehood Calls for a Phased and Negotiated Roadmap
By Haseeb Drabu
New Delhi, July 25, 2026
It has been seven years since Jammu & Kashmir was downgraded to a Union Territory. It has been five years since the Union government committed in Parliament to restore statehood. It has been four years since delimitation was done. It has been three years since the Supreme Court was assured of restoration. It has been two years since an elected government took office .
Yet, so far, there has not even been a serious conversation about it. The only response from the Centre, a clear and consistent one, has been an assurance wrapped in ambiguity: Statehood will be restored at the “appropriate time”. The “appropriate time” is not a date on the calendar; it is whatever time suits the present dispensation. “At the appropriate time” is not a promise but an instrument of power. Every demand for a date is an indicator of impatience, and every postponement a proof of prudence .
Faced with growing public disillusionment locally over the Omar Abdullah-led government’s performance, the National Conference recently launched an outreach drive. After civil-society consultations, it called for a protest in New Delhi on July 20 .
The Fractured Protest: A Display of Fragmentation
The National Conference positioned its protest as a broad-based political initiative rather than a party-specific agitation. Though well-placed to lead the J&K parties and wider civil society by virtue of a strong electoral mandate, all the Valley-centric parties decided not to participate in the protest. This has turned a potential show of strength into a display of fragmentation, thereby significantly reducing the political pressure on the Union government to act .
Without a united front at least from the Valley, the Centre can easily treat the demand as partisan rather than regional, and delay statehood restoration on its own timeline .
Being a constituent of the INDIA bloc, the National Conference had also reached out to the national and regional parties to build a wider constituency of support and gain greater political traction. This could have provided an opportunity to frame the demand as a larger federal issue that touches upon the basic structure of India’s constitutional arrangements. For the most potent blueprint for the restoration of statehood is not a political manifesto of any party, but an agenda for federal democratic polity of India. But that was not to be.
As the National Conference assembled in New Delhi for the restoration of statehood for J&K, the refrain in the lacklustre affair was unfulfilled promises rather than rights denied. Speeches, slogans and bytes invoked constitutional morality, legislative assurances, judicial precedents and political commitments. These are valid, necessary political arguments but have limited relevance in the current context .
The Security Imperative: The Centre’s Non-Negotiable Precondition
For the Centre, it is amply evident that security and “normalcy” are the non-negotiable pre-conditions for restoring statehood. This is not a temporary hurdle. Until these concerns are credibly addressed, arguments based only on constitutional grounds will remain secondary in the decision-making process at the highest levels .
The restoration of statehood is not a simple administrative decision or a one-sided concession. It will be the outcome of a political bargain in which enhanced powers and privileges will come with greater responsibilities, aka conditionalities. This is already visible in the case of Ladakh, where statehood has been made contingent on meeting certain revenue and self-sustainability criteria. J&K is unlikely to be treated differently .
This is why the political leadership in J&K needs to move beyond making a legal case. Engaging substantively with the Centre’s stated concerns on security and governance could prove more consequential than constitutional arguments alone .
Treating the security issue as a chicken-and-egg problem — the lack of full powers is cited as the reason for limited initiative — is technically correct but politically unwise because it restricts the space for political agency. While the elected government’s limited powers are a structural constraint, demonstrating statecraft even within the current framework could help build credibility with the Centre .
Chief Minister Omar Abdullah, while leading the campaign, has questioned this very premise. He has pointed to what he calls contradictory positions on the security situation: “On one hand, you tell us that militancy still exists, which is why you cannot grant us statehood. On the other hand, when a Kashmiri Pandit files a security-related case in the High Court seeking transfer from Srinagar to Jammu, the High Court says there is no terrorism here” . He has argued that there has been a marked improvement in the situation and questioned why the Centre continues to cite law and order as a reason for delay, adding: “If the situation is poor, who is responsible for it? Security and law and order are not our responsibility” .
The ‘Appropriate Time’ Paradox: A Strategic Ambiguity
Chief Minister Omar Abdullah, who has been at the forefront of the demand for statehood, has repeatedly questioned the Centre’s ambiguity. Addressing a workers’ convention, he asked, “I ask them, for God’s sake, how will we know that the appropriate time has come? What do I and my colleagues have to do to reach that appropriate time?” . He has also warned that the Centre should not mistake his government’s patience for weakness, saying, “We have to keep patience, but patience is not the path of weakness. It does not mean we will not raise our voice for our rights. It does not mean you can take undue advantage of our patience” .
He further questioned whether the Centre’s reference to an “appropriate time” meant that statehood would be restored only after the BJP came to power in Jammu and Kashmir. “If that is what you mean, then have the courage to say it publicly. At least we will not remain under the illusion that you will fulfil your promise,” he said .
A Phased Process, Not a Simple Decision
From the Union’s point of view, the restoration of statehood may be seen as a decision to be taken at an appropriate time. However, from the perspective of J&K, it will be a process. Statehood cannot simply be restored by an executive order changing its status. Such a move would leave the underlying administrative and financial distortions created since 2019 largely unaddressed. Converting the former state into a Union Territory did not just alter its administrative boundaries, it fundamentally changed its governance DNA and deepened J&K’s dependence on the Centre .
It is high time to move away from the binary of statehood restoration to what it will entail, politically and administratively. A more strategic approach would require the J&K political leadership to move from episodic mobilisation to a sustained, multi-track engagement. In the short term, this would mean building a unified negotiating position across parties on the benchmarks for “normalcy” that the Centre considers non-negotiable .
In parallel, the focus should shift to negotiating a time-bound framework, possibly through a structured administrative mechanism of unwinding the central controls. Without such a phased and negotiated roadmap, the demand for statehood risks remaining a recurring political slogan instead of becoming a manageable political settlement .
It is unlikely that the recent Delhi protest will be the starting point of a political process for statehood with the Centre. To reach a milestone on that road, the Valley-centric political leadership needs to prioritise pragmatic sequencing over fragmented posturing. This will determine if J&K can convert public sentiment into concrete constitutional gains in the coming years .
Q&A Section
1. What is the current status of Jammu and Kashmir?
Jammu and Kashmir was downgraded to a Union Territory in August 2019, following the abrogation of Article 370. The region has an elected legislative assembly, similar to Delhi and Puducherry, but its powers are strictly curtailed. Key subjects like policing, public order and the bureaucracy answer to the Lieutenant Governor, who is appointed by the Centre, rather than the elected Chief Minister . In a full state, the state cabinet holds legislative autonomy over subjects in the State List; currently, the LG retains expansive veto powers and discretionary authority .
2. What promise has the Union government made regarding statehood?
The Union government, including Prime Minister Modi, has consistently promised to restore statehood to Jammu and Kashmir. This commitment was made in Parliament, before the Supreme Court, and during the 2024 election campaigns by BJP candidates . The Centre has maintained that statehood would be restored at the “appropriate time,” but has not provided a specific timeline or defined the criteria for that determination .
3. Why did the National Conference’s July 20 protest in Delhi fail to generate significant political pressure?
The National Conference’s protest at Jantar Mantar on July 20, 2026, did not generate the intended pressure because it lacked a united front. Most of the Valley-centric parties, including the Peoples Democratic Party (PDP) and other regional groups, decided not to participate . This allowed the Centre to treat the demand as partisan rather than a unified regional sentiment, thereby reducing the political impact of the protest .
4. What is Chief Minister Omar Abdullah’s critique of the Centre’s “appropriate time” formula?
Chief Minister Omar Abdullah has been vocal in his criticism of the Centre’s ambiguous “appropriate time” formula. He has questioned what specific criteria or benchmarks the government is using to determine when that time has arrived . He has warned the Centre not to mistake his government’s patience for weakness and has demanded a clear, transparent timeline for the restoration of statehood . He has also accused the Centre of governing J&K through the Lieutenant Governor’s office, effectively rendering the elected government powerless .
5. What strategic approach is needed for the restoration of statehood?
The restoration of statehood should not be viewed as a single executive decision, but as a phased and negotiated process . The political leadership of J&K needs to move beyond episodic protests to a sustained, multi-track engagement with the Centre. This would involve building a unified negotiating position across parties on benchmarks for “normalcy,” and focusing on a time-bound framework to unwind the central controls imposed since 2019 . Without a structured roadmap, the demand for statehood risks remaining a political slogan rather than a constitutional settlement .
Due Process is Not a Waste of Anyone’s Time
By The Editorial Board
New Delhi, July 25, 2026
This is a time when mostly young protesters are still thronging Jantar Mantar in the national capital, and when, in the aftermath of the police crackdown on July 20, they are not assuaged by the government’s assurances. At this time, the message from the highest court of the land should be: Its doors are open to any process that protects the rights of the vulnerable, fosters accountability and expands the ground for negotiations. With due respect, however, Chief Justice of India Surya Kant’s response to a lawyer who sought the Court’s intervention against police excess, seemed to highlight a gulf between citizen and institution, instead of offering a healing touch: “Don’t waste our time and your time,” he said. And, “We are not interested in videos. We don’t have time to watch.” These may be only oral observations. It is also true that the CJI cannot be expected to wade through countless Instagram reels and in this polarised climate, even videos whose authenticity is in doubt. But in the social media age, words travel far, often away from their contexts. They can take on a life of their own — it was the CJI’s choice of words, earlier, that provided the spark for the satirical online platform, Cockroach Janta Party, the protests’ centrepiece .
The “Cockroach” Remark and the Birth of a Movement
In May 2026, during a Supreme Court hearing, Chief Justice Surya Kant made a remark about lawyers misusing public interest litigation. Unemployed youth activists, he said in tone and implication, were like cockroaches—disposable, numerous, and a nuisance to be managed rather than a constituency to be heard. The Chief Justice later clarified that his comments had been directed at the lawyers, not the unemployed youth themselves. By then, it did not matter. Within 78 hours of the remark, a satirical Instagram page had amassed three million followers .
Digital communications strategist Abhijeet Dipke founded the Cockroach Janta Party (CJP) on May 16, 2026, as a political satire directly parodying the ruling Bharatiya Janata Party’s name while making the CJI remark its founding statement. The name said: if the system sees us as cockroaches, we will be cockroaches. We will be everywhere. We will survive everything. We will not go away . The reclamation of an insult as an identity is a familiar political move, but rarely has it happened this fast or at this scale . The movement quickly grew to over 20 million followers on Instagram, making it one of the largest youth-led mobilisations in recent Indian history .
The July 20 Crackdown and Its Aftermath
The CJP called for a Sansad Chalo (March to Parliament) on the opening day of the Monsoon Session, demanding accountability for the examination system’s collapse. As thousands of protesters tried to move forward, clashes broke out. Police used tear gas shells, lathi charges, and physical force to disperse the crowd . Videos from the scene showed students running through tear gas, volunteers carrying injured protesters to safety, and demonstrators trying to shield one another from baton blows. Many protesters claimed they were beaten even after they had stopped resisting, while several alleged that women protesters were dragged, manhandled and even molested during the crackdown . Hospital officials said at least 100 protesters received treatment for injuries following the crackdown, while the Delhi Police put the number of injured at around 60. A 22-year-old woman injured during the police action continues to remain in the intensive care unit (ICU) at Ram Manohar Lohia Hospital, according to her family .
The Question of Police Excesses and Due Process
Reports from the Delhi street have pointed to the use of disproportionate force, including pellet guns, apart from lathi charges and tear gas shells. They have highlighted, too, the short-circuiting, if not outright flouting, of established restraints and protocols. Delhi Police Standing Order 309 and Standing Order 152 lay down the specific guidelines that police must follow to disperse protesters — the Supreme Court’s 2012 ruling in the Ramlila Maidan case underlined these . An inquiry must ask if the police went through the required paces. Given the demographics and nature of the protesters, largely students, did the police observe the principle, as laid down by the Court, of “least invasiveness”? Did it use water cannons before resorting to more injurious methods? Did it fire the tear gas away from the crowd, rather than directly into it?
The Supreme Court’s 2012 judgment in the Ramlila Maidan case had laid down clear guidelines for police conduct during protests. The Court had found that the police had failed to follow the prescribed procedure before using force, including making announcements asking protesters to disperse. It had held that the use of force must be regulated according to the circumstances of each case, and that the object of the use of force should be to quell the disturbance of peace or to disperse the assembly which threatens such disturbance . The Court had also noted that Standing Order 152 requires that before tear smoke action is commenced, a regular warning should be issued, and that tear smoke shells should be fired away from the crowd rather than into the crowd .
The Supreme Court’s Response: A Matter of Procedure
On July 22, a lawyer sought urgent hearing on the police action against students. “I have the videos as well regarding police brutality… If it can be listed tomorrow (Thursday)… students are there,” the lawyer had said . The CJI declined the request and made it clear that the bench was not inclined to examine video footage at the mentioning stage. “We are not interested in videos, we don’t have time to watch… We don’t want to watch videos,” the CJI said. When the counsel reiterated that students had been beaten up and again referred to the video evidence, the CJI said, “Don’t waste our time. We don’t want to watch any videos” .
However, on July 24, Chief Justice Surya Kant clarified that reports claiming he had refused an urgent hearing were incorrect, as no petition had been filed and only a representation had been sent to the court. “In the last two days, a completely false statement was made that a matter was filed, and the media is absolutely free from all responsibility and falsely reporting that the Chief Justice refused to list the matter,” he said. “Till morning 10 am, not a single page has been filed. It was one representation…sent by Mishra or someone. How can I treat the representation as a writ petition? And people start recklessly reporting this” .
The Delhi High Court’s Intervention
While the Supreme Court declined to entertain the plea, the Delhi High Court on July 23 sought responses from the Centre and Delhi Police on allegations of excessive force during the July 20 protest and directed authorities to preserve CCTV footage and all other relevant electronic records linked to the incident . A Division Bench comprising Chief Justice DK Upadhyaya and Justice Tejas Karia granted the respondents four weeks to file their replies and listed the matter for further hearing on September 11 .
During the hearing, the Bench questioned the Centre’s objection to the maintainability of the petitions, observing that even if the gathering had been an unlawful assembly, the authorities were required to follow a prescribed legal procedure. “We have some questions for you. Was this an isolated incident? Perhaps not. Even if this was an unlawful assembly, there is a procedure to deal with it,” the Bench observed . The Court further observed that where issues of alleged police excess are raised through a PIL, it cannot simply ask every affected individual to lodge a separate FIR .
The Way Forward
A small section of the protesters, too, have resorted to violence and vandalism. Physically assaulting journalists not to their liking to pelting stones, these need to be strongly condemned. A fair and independent probe — the Delhi High Court has done well to agree to hear two PILs on the issue — must set those aberrations in the larger context. In a clash between unequals, it must ensure that the powerful state does not weaponise the rulebook to subdue the powerless citizen. That’s why, with due respect to the Court, this needs to be underlined: Due process is not a waste of time .
Q&A Section
1. What is the Cockroach Janta Party and how did it begin?
The Cockroach Janta Party (CJP) was founded in May 2026 by Abhijeet Dipke as a satirical online response to Chief Justice of India Surya Kant’s remark comparing unemployed youth activists to “cockroaches.” The movement reclaimed the label as a badge of identity, declaring that if the system sees them as cockroaches, they will be everywhere and will not go away. It quickly grew to over 20 million followers on Instagram .
2. What happened during the July 20 CJP protest?
The CJP called for a “Sansad Chalo” (March to Parliament) on the opening day of the Monsoon Session, demanding accountability for the examination system’s collapse. As thousands of protesters tried to move forward, clashes broke out. Police used tear gas shells, lathi charges, and physical force to disperse the crowd. Videos showed protesters being beaten by police personnel, with many sustaining injuries. Hospital officials said at least 100 protesters received treatment .
3. What was the Supreme Court’s response to the plea on police excesses?
On July 22, a lawyer sought urgent hearing on the police action against students. The CJI declined the request, saying, “Don’t waste our time. We don’t want to watch any videos.” However, on July 24, the CJI clarified that reports claiming he had refused an urgent hearing were incorrect, as no petition had been filed and only a representation had been sent to the court .
4. What action has the Delhi High Court taken on the matter?
The Delhi High Court on July 23 sought responses from the Centre and Delhi Police on allegations of excessive force during the July 20 protest and directed authorities to preserve CCTV footage and all other relevant electronic records linked to the incident. The Bench observed that even if the gathering had been an unlawful assembly, there was a prescribed legal procedure to deal with it .
5. What guidelines govern police conduct during protests?
Delhi Police Standing Order 309 and Standing Order 152 lay down the specific guidelines that police must follow to disperse protesters. The Supreme Court’s 2012 ruling in the Ramlila Maidan case underlined these, requiring that the “least invasiveness” principle be observed, that warnings be issued before using force, and that tear gas be fired away from the crowd rather than into it .
Left Behind: The Stark Reality of India’s Children with Special Needs
By Nitika Francis
New Delhi, July 25, 2026
The Unified District Information System for Education (UDISE) 2025-26 report has raised concerns about Children With Special Needs (CWSN) enrolled in schools, whose numbers have remained stagnant over the past eight years despite initiatives to get more of them enrolled. As per the data, there were 21.66 lakh CWSN in schools, a number that has remained fairly constant over the years. While one could argue that the overall number of children enrolled in schools has also remained fairly the same, the other question to be answered in this context is whether all the CWSN in the country are getting enrolled in schools .
The 2011 Census said that there were 32.5 lakh disabled children in India, just under the age of nine. If one were to include persons with disability in the 10-19 age group, the number increases to 78.7 lakh. The number of CWSN in schools in 2025-26 were not even 30% of the 2011 Census data. Moreover, their numbers would have surely grown since .
The Inclusion Gap: 22% Enrolment, 100% Challenge
In the absence of Census data and estimates of children with disability released by the government in recent years, The Hindu used the National Family Health Survey (NFHS-5) data on disability and the government’s population estimates in the Report of The Technical Group on Population Projects to estimate the number of CWSN in the country .
The estimate showed that the number of CWSN in India could have grown from 92.3 lakh to 98.8 lakh between 2018-19 and 2025-26. These estimates when compared with CWSN in schools showed that, only 22% of the children seem to have been enrolled in schools . This is a conservative estimate since the population estimates could be calculated, as explained above, only for the 5-14 age group. This was compared with the total number of CWSN enrolled across primary, upper primary, secondary and higher secondary stages, which would include those who are at least a year or two older than 14 .
The NFHS-5 data itself paints a broader picture of disability prevalence in India. The overall prevalence of disability in the country is 4.52%, with locomotor disabilities accounting for 44.70% of all disabilities, followed by mental and speech disabilities . While the survey is not specifically focused on children, it establishes that disability is a significant factor in the population, and the enrolment gap for children is not a marginal issue.
The Dropout Crisis: A Bleak Trajectory
Moreover, the number of CWSN shrinks significantly as they move up different stages of schooling. The shrinking is more pronounced among CWSN than the overall number of students enrolled. Nearly 75% of CWSN who have enrolled in primary school are in upper primary, data showed. This reduced to 48% between upper primary and secondary, and 46% between secondary and higher secondary levels. As the table shows, these shares are higher for the overall number of children .
This steep dropout rate is a major concern. While the national dropout rate at the secondary level has improved to 7% in 2025-26 from 8.2% the previous year, the CWSN dropout rate is significantly higher . The infrastructure also fails them; as per UDISE data, nearly 32,228 (29.8%) of schools still do not have dedicated toilets for CWSN, and while only 3,845 schools lack ramp access, 16,341 schools have ramps without handrails, limiting safe access for many students . As disability rights activist Dharmendra Satav noted, “Even where dedicated toilets exist, they are often poorly maintained… For children with locomotor or visual impairments, an unclean toilet can make the facility unusable” .
The Gender Gap: A Persistent Inequality
The data also showed that the gender distribution remained worryingly the same despite minor fluctuations in the number of CWSN enrolled. Only about 43 of every 100 CWSN enrolled in schools are girls . However, the number of girls with special needs dropping out of schools seem to be lower than boys. The number of girls with special needs in upper primary level, for instance, is about 80% of those in primary level . This suggests that while fewer girls are enrolled in the first place, those who are enrolled are more likely to continue their education than boys. This could be due to a variety of factors, including cultural biases that prioritize the education of boys with disabilities over girls, or a lack of accessible facilities for girls, such as separate and functional toilets.
The Data Blind Spot: Underreporting and the Act’s Unfinished Business
Shashank Pandey, lawyer and founder of the Politics and Disability Forum, who works on political representation of Persons with Disabilities said that underreporting of the numbers cannot be ruled out. He told The Hindu that at times the schools that provide data for the UDISE reports are not updated with the 21 categories of disabilities now recognised by the Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016, and still categorise students based on the eight categories provided in the 2011 Census .
The RPWD Act 2016, which came into effect in April 2017, was a landmark legislation that expanded the recognized disability conditions from 7 to 21 . The new list includes conditions like dwarfism, acid attack survivors, Parkinson’s disease, chronic neurological conditions, and three blood disorders—thalassemia, hemophilia, and sickle cell disease . However, the underreporting highlighted by Pandey suggests that the implementation of the Act’s provisions on the ground is severely lagging. Schools, the primary data collection points, are still operating with an outdated understanding of disability, which leads to an underestimation of the true scale of the challenge and a failure to provide appropriate support.
Conclusion: A Failure of Policy and Implementation
The UDISE 2025-26 data paints a grim picture of India’s failure to include children with special needs in the educational system. Despite the progressive framework of the RPWD Act, 2016, and the constitutional promise of free and compulsory education, the enrolment gap remains frozen. The data shows that only 22% of the estimated 98.8 lakh CWSN are enrolled in schools, and those who are enrolled face a steep drop-off in higher classes, with girls being a minority among the enrolled.
The issue is not merely one of access; it is also one of infrastructure. The fact that a significant number of schools lack basic facilities like functional toilets and accessible ramps for CWSN is a fundamental violation of their rights. The policy is clear, but the implementation is abysmal.
As India moves forward, it must prioritize the inclusion of CWSN. This requires not only strengthening policy frameworks but also ensuring that every school is equipped with accessible infrastructure, every teacher is trained in inclusive education, and every child with a disability is identified and enrolled. The data from the UDISE report is a wake-up call. It is time to move beyond data collection to concrete action, to ensure that no child is left behind.
Q&A Section
1. What is the current status of CWSN enrolment in Indian schools?
As per the UDISE 2025-26 report, only 21.66 lakh CWSN are enrolled in schools, a number that has remained stagnant for eight years. The estimated number of CWSN in India is around 98.8 lakh, meaning only about 22% of children with disabilities are enrolled in schools .
2. What is the estimated number of Children with Special Needs (CWSN) in India?
Using NFHS-5 data and population projections, the estimated number of CWSN is approximately 98.8 lakh in 2025-26. This is a conservative estimate, focusing on the 5-14 age group .
3. How does the enrolment of CWSN change as they move up educational levels?
The proportion of CWSN shrinks significantly at higher educational levels. Around 75% of CWSN enrolled in primary school continue to upper primary, but this drops to 48% between upper primary and secondary, and 46% between secondary and higher secondary. This drop is more pronounced than the general student population, indicating a higher dropout rate for CWSN .
4. What is the gender gap in CWSN enrolment?
Only about 43 out of every 100 CWSN enrolled in schools are girls, showing a persistent gender gap. However, girls with special needs who do enroll have a slightly lower dropout rate than boys, with 80% of those in primary continuing to upper primary .
5. What are the reasons for the underreporting of CWSN numbers?
Underreporting is a significant issue. Many schools still use the older eight disability categories from the 2011 Census rather than the 21 categories now recognized under the Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016. This leads to children being incorrectly categorized or not counted at all, masking the true scale of the enrolment gap .
Pellet Guns and Shock Batons: The Weaponisation of India’s Protest Spaces
By Vijaita Singh
New Delhi, July 25, 2026
At least one of the 80 protesters injured in police action during the march to Parliament on Monday (July 20), called by the Cockroach Janta Party (CJP) sustained pellet gun injuries. The victim identified as Shaikh Irshad Mansoori (25), a resident of Gurugram, underwent surgery at a government hospital to remove the pellets lodged under his eye [citation:original text]. Most pellets were lodged in the upper part of his body.
Another video of a woman being stunned by a “shock baton,” also emerged on Tuesday (July 21) [citation:original text]. The use of pellet guns and shock batons against civilian protesters, appears to be the first in Delhi [citation:original text].
What Are Pellet Guns?
Pellet guns, whose technical name is ‘pump action guns’, are a form of non-lethal crowd-control method used by police and military worldwide. The other popular measures are tear gas, water cannon, pepper spray and taser guns among others [citation:original text].
Intended to immobilise an individual, they are effective over short ranges of up to 500 yards but when fired from close quarters can be lethal, particularly when sensitive parts like the eyes are hit. The pellets can penetrate soft tissues [citation:original text]. There are standing instructions to open minimal fire at protesters and if necessary “below their waist.” A cartridge of a pellet gun contains a few hundred pellets made of lead, which disperses a few hundred metres when fired. Pellets can be of various shapes either like ball bearings or irregular. They are manufactured at the Ordnance Factory, Ishapore [citation:original text].
The July 20 Incident: A First in the Capital
While the Delhi Police have denied its use against protesters, pellets guns and shock batons are part of the gear of the Rapid Action Force (RAF) – the anti-riot unit under the Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF) – which was deployed alongside police personnel on July 20 and continues to be deployed near the Jantar Mantar protest site [citation:original text]. The incident marks the first known deployment of these weapons against civilians in the national capital .
On Monday, the victim Shaikh Irshad Mansoori was hit near Palika Bazaar by a RAF official. His friend said that there are around 30-40 injuries on his face and across his body. Four of them, including one in the neck, had penetrated deeply, which is why he underwent surgery [citation:original text]. Originally from Jabalpur in Madhya Pradesh, Mr. Mansoori works at a private company in Gurugram and was attending the protests in solidarity [citation:original text].
Since then, at least three cases of pellet gun injuries have come to light. 19-year-old Sahil Lochab, a Delhi University student, was admitted to the AIIMS Trauma Centre and has been told that he may lose vision in the right eye . A 28-year-old journalist with the Outlook magazine also sustained pellet injuries, with a medical report recording injuries from “physical assault at Jantar Mantar by pellet gun” .
The History of Pellet Guns in India
Pellet guns were first deployed in Jammu and Kashmir after Kashmir Valley’s summer unrest of 2010 that claimed the lives of 112 protesters in police firing. The then Congress-led government at the Centre deployed pellet guns as a “non-lethal” measure to avoid civilian fatalities [citation:original text].
After violent protests broke out in the Kashmir Valley post July 8, 2016 – when the Hizbul Mujahideen (HM) commander Burhan Wani was killed in an encounter with security forces – several people were blinded due to injuries inflicted by pellet guns, used by the CRPF as a crowd control measure [citation:original text]. In 2016, 13 people were killed and more than 250 were injured, while some lost their vision [citation:original text].
In 2016, a Supreme Court bench headed by then Chief Justice T.S. Thakur held that pellet guns could not be used indiscriminately to control street protests in Kashmir, and that authorities could resort to them only after proper application of mind . The court sought a report from an Expert Committee constituted to explore alternatives to pellet guns .
In 2017, a year later, the first batch of less lethal “plastic bullets” were dispatched to the Kashmir Valley. Instead of metal, this round of ammunition had a plastic head [citation:original text]. They were last known to have been used during the 2024 farmers’ protest at Khanauri and Shambhu barriers along the Punjab-Haryana border. Though the police denied using pellet guns, farmer leaders had alleged that several persons were injured. In 2023, they were used against protesters in the ethnic-strike torn Manipur, leading to a massive public outrage [citation:original text].
The CRPF’s Internal Review and Ban
Following the July 20 crackdown, the CRPF initiated an inquiry to ascertain the exact sequence of events and determine whether pellet guns were used by personnel of its Rapid Action Force . The RAF is a specialised unit of the CRPF, raised in 1992 to deal with riots and other public disturbances .
The Rapid Action Force (RAF) has identified serious operational deficiencies in its handling of the July 20 protest and has issued an extensive set of corrective directions, including a ban on the use of Projectile Attack Guns (PAG), Anti-Riot Guns (ARG), Electric Shock Weapons and Electric Shields during the ongoing deployment in the national capital until further orders .
The directions were issued during a video conference chaired by Inspector General Seema Dhundia on July 22, where senior RAF officers reviewed the force’s role during the protest, acknowledged shortcomings and laid down 26 corrective measures aimed at improving crowd-control operations, discipline and accountability . Inspector General Seema Dhundia expressed “serious dissatisfaction” with the RAF’s performance during the Jantar Mantar protest .
The review also criticised videos allegedly showing personnel using force against individuals who had already moved away from the crowd, deliberately pushing people to the ground and striking persons outside barricades . The headquarters further directed that personnel transferred from counter-insurgency environments such as Jammu & Kashmir should not be deployed in crowd-control operations until they are trained in RAF’s crowd-control philosophy and “Sensitive Policing” .
Shock Batons and Accountability
Shock batons are also a part of the RAF personnel gear [citation:original text]. In 2021, the Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA), through the Border Security Force (BSF), prescribed Qualitative Requirements (QRs) for handheld ‘Shock Batons’ intended for self-defence and operational use by security personnel [citation:original text]. The device is expected to have a service life of at least five years and be powered by a rechargeable battery [citation:original text].
A group of 93 retired civil servants has sought an independent judicial inquiry into the July 20 police action, alleging that security personnel used pellet guns, electric batons and tear gas against unarmed demonstrators . The Constitutional Conduct Group called for action against officers responsible for what it described as the “illegal and disproportionate” use of force . The signatories included former Delhi Lieutenant Governor Najeeb Jung, former Election Commissioner Ashok Lavasa, former Foreign Secretary Shivshankar Menon, and several other retired IAS, IPS and IFS officers .
Q&A Section
1. What is a pellet gun and how does it work?
Pellet guns, technically ‘pump action guns’, are crowd-control weapons that fire cartridges containing hundreds of lead pellets. The pellets disperse over a range and are intended to immobilise individuals when fired from a distance. However, when fired at close range or targeting sensitive areas like the eyes, they can penetrate soft tissue and cause serious injury or even death [citation:original text].
2. When was the first known use of pellet guns in India, and where?
Pellet guns were first deployed in Jammu and Kashmir following the summer unrest of 2010, where they were introduced as a “non-lethal” alternative to conventional firearms. Their use was significantly expanded after the 2016 unrest that followed the killing of Hizbul Mujahideen commander Burhan Wani [citation:original text].
3. What was the Supreme Court’s position on pellet guns?
In 2016, the Supreme Court held that pellet guns could not be used indiscriminately for crowd control, and that authorities must apply proper judgment before resorting to them. The court also sought a report from an Expert Committee on alternatives to pellet guns . However, despite this directive, pellet guns have continued to be used in various protests across the country [citation:original text].
4. What happened during the July 20 protest in Delhi?
During the Cockroach Janta Party’s march to Parliament on July 20, security forces used pellet guns and shock batons against protesters for the first time in Delhi. At least three people required hospital treatment for pellet injuries, including a 19-year-old student who may lose vision in one eye, and a journalist. The Delhi Police denied using pellet guns, but the weapons are standard RAF gear [citation:original text].
5. What changes has the RAF made after the July 20 incident?
The RAF has banned the use of pellet guns, electric shock weapons and electric shields until further orders. It has also made Body Worn Cameras mandatory, directed dedicated videography of major incidents, and instructed that only personnel trained in crowd-control philosophy should be deployed for such duties. Personnel transferred from counter-insurgency environments like J&K must be trained in “Sensitive Policing” before deployment .
Convergent Perils: Luminaries Demand Human Ethics Not Be Outsourced to AI
By Krishna Ravi Srinivas
New Delhi, July 25, 2026
In mid-July, a group of Nobel laureates, AI scientists, religious leaders, and other luminaries signed the ‘Rome Declaration for an Unarmed and Disarming Peace’. The Declaration calls for an international treaty to ban autonomous systems from accessing nuclear launches while emphasising that the threat is also not so far-fetched .
The view that artificial intelligence (AI) can pose an existential threat to humankind using technologies like nuclear weapons has been around for some years now. Last year, a study from the Rand Corporation argued that such risks could not be ruled out. The study identified four capabilities that AI would need to possess to pose an existential threat: “(i) integration with key cyber-physical systems, (ii) the ability to survive without human maintainers, (iii) the objective to cause human extinction, and (iv) the ability to persuade or deceive humans to avoid detection” . Recent developments, including conflicts in West Asia, South Asia, and Eastern Europe, have kept these concerns alive .
The Philosophical Foundation: An “Unarmed and Disarming” Peace
In the absence of a specific treaty to address such a threat, on July 16, a group of more than 200 signatories, including Nobel laureates, AI scientists, religious leaders, former heads of state and government, and representatives from leading research institutions, gathered at Rome’s Capitoline Hill to sign the Declaration . The Assembly was inspired by Pope Leo XIV’s encyclical Magnifica Humanitas, which issued a “clarion call” to protect human dignity against technological overreach . The Pope’s encyclical is a defining theological statement on AI, calling for the technology to be “disarmed”—”freed from logics that turn it into an instrument of domination, exclusion and death” . The Declaration can be read more as a nudge than as an impactful push for a treaty, as there is currently no consensus among countries on what such a treaty should cover .
Principles of the Declaration
The Declaration articulates six principles: (i) Disarming the next arms race, (ii) Responsible development, (iii) Responsible use of AI, (iv) Responsible governance, (v) Responsible leadership, and (vi) Nuclear disarmament .
To these ends, it also put forth five ethical and operational principles :
-
“Mandatory meaningful human control” – absolutely prohibiting any automated, algorithmic or AI-driven system from making the final decision regarding the use or deployment of nuclear weapons.
-
“The ‘digital commons’ model” – based on the fact that those who do not have access or control over technologies such as AI are likely to be affected more by its unintended consequences; the Declaration calls for more data for experts to better understand existential threats, including ungoverned AI.
-
“Responsible development” – a mandate for the developers of AI to publish the ethical frameworks guiding their models and explicitly forbidding the pursuit of fully autonomous and self-improving systems that cannot be monitored, audited or abruptly halted by human operators.
-
“Internal arsenal vulnerability audits” – an urgent request to the world’s nuclear states to conduct rigorous internal reviews to protect existing atomic command-and-control systems from AI-driven cyber-tampering or unauthorised algorithmic interference.
-
“Time-bound, verifiable disarmament” – a renewal of good-faith international negotiations in pursuit of completely, irreversibly, and verifiably eliminating nuclear weapons.
The Unique Danger of AI-Nuclear Convergence
The Declaration is timely and commendable. To understand why, one must look past the standard anti-war rhetoric and towards the contemporary operational realities. The concept of ‘mutually assured destruction’ relied heavily on human hesitation, diplomatic backchannels, and moral pause. During the 1962 Cuban missile crisis and the 1983 Soviet nuclear false alarm incident, disaster was averted precisely because human beings exercised caution, intuition, scepticism, and moral choice . However, AI-driven predictive logistics and autonomous battle management systems operate at speeds that compress decision-making windows from several hours to just seconds. When an algorithm flags what it has concluded is an incoming missile, a human operator may not have the practical window of time required to critically verify the data, consult peers or de-escalate .
Second, large language models and deep neural networks are plagued by well-documented failure modes such as hallucinations and data poisoning. An algorithm misinterpreting an image or a routine network ping as an imminent threat could automatically trigger a retaliatory sequence, leading to catastrophic consequences. Since the reasoning of most AI models happens within a ‘black box’, relying on them to guide decisions that could affect millions of lives is the antithesis of ethical and scientific responsibility .
Third, the global order is in deep crisis. Decades of hard-won security infrastructure—whether the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, the Open Skies Treaty or New START—are teetering. At the same time, an uncontrolled, multipolar arms race is underway as nuclear nations actively expand or modernise their stockpiles. The New START agreement expired in February 2026, and the traditional U.S.-Russia duopoly has given way to a multi-polar environment featuring nations like India, China, North Korea, and Pakistan .
Fourth, the Declaration correctly identifies that true peace requires dismantling the underlying motivations for violence, such as fear, systemic hubris, and the illusion of absolute safety through digital dominance. When technologies become concentrated in the hands of a few companies and/or nations, they cease to be neutral, heightening security anxieties among non-nuclear states .
Conclusion: A Vital Intervention
During the summit when the Declaration was signed, Nobel Physics laureate David Gross said the ultimate success of the text lies in generating intense public awareness that then drives grassroots pressure . The Declaration also provides the moral, philosophical, and technical lexicon necessary to challenge the uncontrolled militarisation of the digital frontier. The thorny fact is that while technology can be automated, our collective ethical responsibility—required to ensure the survival of future generations—must never be outsourced to a machine or a system driven by AI, no matter how intelligent it is made to be .
How the world’s states respond to the Declaration’s calls to action remains to be seen. Given the reluctance of many states to negotiate and sign a treaty that deals with the use and role of AI in warfare, the goals of the Declaration seem ambitious. But there must be no doubt that its warnings are on point .
Q&A Section
1. What is the Rome Declaration for an Unarmed and Disarming Peace?
The Rome Declaration is a statement signed on July 16, 2026, by more than 200 Nobel laureates, AI scientists, religious leaders, and other luminaries. It calls for an international treaty to ban autonomous systems from accessing nuclear launches and emphasizes the need for “mandatory meaningful human control” over decisions regarding the use of nuclear weapons . It was inspired by Pope Leo XIV’s encyclical Magnifica Humanitas .
2. Why is the convergence of AI and nuclear weapons considered so dangerous?
The convergence of AI and nuclear weapons is considered dangerous because AI-driven systems operate at speeds that compress decision-making windows from hours to seconds, potentially eliminating the human hesitation and moral pause that have historically averted nuclear disasters . Additionally, AI models are prone to errors like “hallucinations,” and a system error or misinterpreting a routine signal could trigger an unintended retaliation. The “black box” nature of AI also makes it difficult to understand or audit its decisions .
3. What are the key principles outlined in the Rome Declaration?
The Declaration outlines six principles: Disarming the next arms race, Responsible development, Responsible use of AI, Responsible governance, Responsible leadership, and Nuclear disarmament . It further specifies five ethical-operational guidelines, including a ban on automated decisions for nuclear launches, promoting a “digital commons” for data sharing, mandating responsible AI development, conducting arsenal vulnerability audits, and pursuing time-bound, verifiable nuclear disarmament .
4. How was the Declaration influenced by Pope Leo XIV?
The Declaration was inspired by Pope Leo XIV’s encyclical Magnifica Humanitas, which the Pope described as a call for an “unarmed and disarming peace” . The encyclical urges that AI be “disarmed” and freed from logics of domination. The Pope’s message provided the moral and philosophical foundation for the Assembly and the subsequent Declaration, which calls for a “disarmed and disarming peace in the age of artificial intelligence” .
5. What is the significance of the Declaration given the current geopolitical context?
The Declaration is significant because it comes at a time when the traditional architecture of arms control is crumbling. The New START treaty expired in February 2026, and there is an uncontrolled, multipolar arms race . The Declaration aims to serve as a moral and technical intervention against technological fatalism, urging states to establish binding legal frameworks before AI systems are fully embedded into nuclear command-and-control structures, a scenario that could lead to an unmanageable, spiraling escalation .
US-Saudi Deal & A New Nuclear Model for West Asia: A Revolutionary Precedent or a Recipe for Catastrophe?
By Anju Gupta
New Delhi, July 25, 2026
On July 22, a press release by the US Department of Energy announced that Secretary of Energy Chris Wright and Saudi Minister of Energy Prince Abdulaziz bin Salman had signed a peaceful nuclear cooperation agreement — commonly known as a 123 agreement — and an accompanying bilateral safeguards agreement . Apart from describing this as a “legal foundation for a decades-long, multi-billion-dollar partnership that advances several priority economic and strategic objectives, including nuclear nonproliferation”, the press release said that the agreement would also “advance American and regional security by upholding high standards of nuclear safety, security, and nonproliferation” .
Saudi Arabia’s Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman (MbS) has often spoken about working to develop nuclear weapons if Iran was not prevented from getting them. Some experts may interpret the 123 agreement as a long-term “enabler” for Riyadh to pursue this goal . Given that the US-Israel war on Iran is being fought on a core point of preventing the latter from building nuclear weapons, does it add fuel to the fire or signal a reworking of the US role in the security architecture of the region?
Long before “limited” US military action against Iranian nuclear facilities at Fordow, Natanz, and Isfahan during the 12-day Israel-Iran conflict in June 2025, Saudi Arabia had been taking concrete steps to build its civil nuclear programme. In 2017, it approved a National Project for Atomic Energy, which included plans for building large and small nuclear reactors. A signatory to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) since 1988, Saudi Arabia has, since then, made agreements to observe some of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards, though limited in scope. On September 17, 2025, Saudi Arabia also signed a Strategic Mutual Defence Agreement with Pakistan.
Since then, the US seemed to have fast-tracked efforts to sign the 123 agreement. As a result, during MbS’s November 2025 visit to the US, the two sides signed a “Joint Declaration on the Completion of Negotiations on Civil Nuclear Energy Cooperation”, which, the White House said “builds the legal foundation for a decades-long, multi-billion-dollar nuclear energy partnership… confirms that the United States and American companies will be the Kingdom’s civil nuclear cooperation partners of choice; and ensures that all cooperation will be conducted in a manner consistent with strong nonproliferation standards”. This set in motion the framework for the 123 agreement.
It appears that, for years, Saudi Arabia had been moving as well as posturing towards a civil nuclear programme with or without the agreement with the US. In recent years, its bilateral relations with China, a possible competitor, have improved so significantly that Beijing brokered a rapprochement between Saudi and Iran in March 2023. This may be one of the compelling reasons for signing the 123 deal sooner rather than later.
However, the current state of the US-Iran war has created serious constraints in resolving the Iranian nuclear issue. The dangerous and currently escalating tug of war over the Strait of Hormuz is unlikely to end anytime soon. Without any amicable resolution over the Strait, US-Iran nuclear talks will remain in limbo.
The “Revolutionary” Departure from the “Gold Standard”
The 123 agreement does not, per se, enable Saudi Arabia to develop nuclear weapons. It reportedly presents a “US-enabled civilian nuclear enrichment program” that could potentially allow Riyadh to enrich its own uranium after a joint US-Saudi feasibility study . This is where the model “sells” the idea of bringing billions of dollars to the American nuclear and allied industries, while assuaging the concerns of non-proliferation advocates and the “hawks” .
Crucially, the agreement is not expected to include the IAEA’s Additional Protocol, which would allow for more intrusive inspections and verification . This marks a significant departure from the “gold standard” set by the 2009 US-UAE agreement, where Abu Dhabi forwent domestic enrichment and accepted the Additional Protocol . As Alexander Bollfrass, a nuclear expert at the International Institute for Strategic Studies, described it, the deal represents “a revolutionary new approach” to US nonproliferation policy .
The “revolutionary aspect,” as Bollfrass put it, “is that the United States is not asking Saudi Arabia to abide by the highest possible safeguards, internationally monitored safeguards that are standard and are available today, but instead is willing to at least theoretically transfer highly sensitive technology without the same level of oversight that one would expect” . This has sparked fears of a regional arms race, with Israel warning that Riyadh’s civilian programme “will end in nuclear weapons and lead to a mad arms race across the entire Middle East” .
The “Abraham Accords” Hinge: A Chaotic Afterthought
The agreement’s announcement was immediately followed by confusion. President Trump, reportedly furious at the rollout, declared on social media that the deal was “totally subject to Saudi Arabia joining the Abraham Accords” . This condition had not been part of the official announcement and blindsided the Saudis . The kingdom has long refused to recognise Israel without a pathway toward a Palestinian state . This episode highlights the transactional and chaotic nature of the Trump administration’s foreign policy .
Once cleared by Congress, the 123 model could be offered to Iran during nuclear negotiations. However, Iran sees the right to enrichment as an absolute sovereign right that it won’t give up. The deal signals that the idea of a US security umbrella in support of a potential Israeli-Arab accord against the “common threat of Iran” is no longer on the table.
As Garsha Vazirian wrote in the Tehran Times, the Saudi agreement provides “undeniable proof” that “the nuclear nonproliferation regime is a political weapon designed to preserve Western hegemony” . If enrichment is a sovereign right for Saudi Arabia, it has always been a sovereign right for Iran . The deal ultimately validates Tehran’s long-standing argument for nuclear sovereignty.
Q&A Section
1. What is the US-Saudi “123 Agreement” and what does it allow?
It is a civilian nuclear cooperation agreement signed on July 22, 2026. It paves the way for US companies to build Saudi Arabia’s nuclear infrastructure and could potentially allow the kingdom to enrich its own uranium for civilian reactors after a joint US-Saudi study . Crucially, the agreement does not include the IAEA’s Additional Protocol, which would allow for more intrusive inspections .
2. Why is this deal considered a departure from US non-proliferation policy?
It abandons the “gold standard” set by the 2009 US-UAE agreement, where Abu Dhabi forwent domestic enrichment and accepted the IAEA’s Additional Protocol . The Saudi deal allows for potential enrichment without the highest level of IAEA oversight, raising fears it could trigger a nuclear arms race in the region .
3. What condition did President Trump attach to the deal after it was signed?
In a social media post on July 23, Trump declared that the agreement is “totally subject to Saudi Arabia joining the Abraham Accords” and normalizing relations with Israel . This condition was not part of the official announcement and blindsided Saudi Arabia, which has long refused to recognise Israel without a pathway to Palestinian statehood .
4. How has Israel reacted to the agreement?
Israel has reacted sharply, with former defence minister Avigdor Liberman declaring that Riyadh’s civilian programme “will end in nuclear weapons and lead to a mad arms race across the entire Middle East” . However, Israeli officials have welcomed the prospect of Saudi Arabia joining the Abraham Accords .
5. What are the implications of this deal for Iran?
The deal has been criticized as a “double standard” . As Tehran Times argued, if enrichment is a sovereign right for Saudi Arabia, it has always been a sovereign right for Iran . The agreement validates Iran’s long-standing argument that the nonproliferation regime is a political tool, potentially emboldening Tehran in its nuclear ambitions .
Guardrails for the First AI-Native Generation: A Shared Responsibility
By Pragya Misra
New Delhi, July 25, 2026
The first generation growing up with AI is already here. Millions of children and teenagers are using AI to study, explore interests, and make sense of the world. This creates both an extraordinary opportunity and a shared responsibility. AI has the potential to expand access to learning, creativity, and expertise in previously unimaginable ways. It also raises an urgent question: How can parents, educators, policymakers, and technology companies build the safeguards, support systems, and trust to ensure young people benefit from these tools safely and responsibly? [citation:original text]
Transformative technologies scale best when the protections around them scale too. Electricity became widely trusted because societies built standards, insulation, and circuit breakers. Cars became safer because protections such as seat belts, licensing, and traffic rules became part of the system. Over time, the most important safeguards shift from being optional to default. AI is entering a similar phase, wherein the utility of the technology is well-established, but the opportunity is to build safeguards early and well enough for people to use these systems with confidence [citation:original text].
Much of the conversation still swings between hype and fear. One view assumes the market will sort everything out and young people will adapt on their own. Another assumes the only safe answer is to keep children away from AI altogether. The first understates the risks. The second ignores reality. Young people are already using these tools. As an industry, we have to make that access safer, more age-appropriate, and more responsible [citation:original text].
The Industry’s Responsibility: Safety by Design
It starts with companies like ours, where safety is not simply a feature added later. It is built into these systems from the outset, with initiatives such as the Teen Safety Blueprint. For younger users, that means stronger defaults, clearer boundaries, better detection of higher-risk situations, and experiences designed with well-being in mind. It also means recognising a basic principle: When privacy, freedom, and safety come into tension for younger users, safety should carry special weight [citation:original text].
OpenAI’s Teen Safety Blueprint for India, released in February 2026, outlines a comprehensive framework to address these challenges . A pivotal element of this framework is an understanding that safety should be prioritised ahead of privacy and freedom for teenage users . The framework recognises that a 15-year-old should not be treated the same as an adult in AI interactions .
The blueprint acknowledges a hurdle unique to the Indian market: approximately 62% of Indian teens access the internet via shared family devices, making traditional individual-device safety tools ineffective . Consequently, the company is moving towards built-in, age-appropriate safeguards that complement the collective role played by Indian families, schools, and communities .
The Blueprint introduces several key features:
-
Age-Aware AI Behaviour: AI companies should identify teens on their platforms using privacy-protective, risk-based age estimation tools to distinguish between teens and adults. These tools should minimize the collection of sensitive personal data while still effectively distinguishing users under 18 .
-
Parental Controls: Parents can link accounts, set “blackout hours” for AI usage, remotely disable chat history and memory features, and receive notifications if their teen’s activity suggests an intent to harm themselves .
-
Industry-Leading CSAM/CSEM Prevention: The framework emphasises strengthening detection methods for child sexual abuse material (CSAM) and child sexual exploitation material (CSEM), reporting confirmed CSAM to relevant authorities .
-
Guardrails for Under-18 Users: Explicit guidelines prohibit AI systems from depicting suicide or self-harm, facilitating dangerous stunts, enabling access to illegal substances, reinforcing harmful body ideals, or allowing graphic and immersive sexual or violent scenarios for users under 18 .
The Role of Parental Agency
One of the clearest lessons of the social media era is that platforms moved too quickly for most parents to keep pace with. With a fast-moving technology like AI, parents need guidance they can use, controls they can understand, and enough visibility to help shape how these tools are used at home [citation:original text]. The Teen Safety Blueprint is designed to empower parents with the tools to actively participate in their children’s digital journey, addressing the reality that parents, caregivers, and educators are deeply involved in shaping teens’ digital experiences in India .
The Role of Educators
Because many young people are using AI for learning, classrooms are where both the upside and the risks will appear first. Teachers need support that reflects classroom reality: practical training, responsible-use frameworks, and guidance on academic integrity, critical thinking, and digital literacy. The aim for educational institutions should be to identify ways in which AI can strengthen learning rather than shortcut it [citation:original text]. The Indian EdTech industry is already playing a major role, with AI’s adaptive learning abilities having a big impact on education delivery .
The Role of Policymakers
The lesson from earlier technologies is that adoption works best when the rules are clear. In AI, that means age-appropriate standards, accountability for high-risk failures, clarity around data practices, and ongoing input from educators, child-safety experts, families, and young people themselves [citation:original text].
India has taken significant steps in this direction. The Government has a comprehensive AI strategy based on the Prime Minister’s vision of democratizing technology . India’s AI Governance Guidelines promote human-centric and responsible AI development and recognize children as a vulnerable group that may face risks from AI systems .
India’s legal framework already provides several safeguards:
-
Digital Personal Data Protection (DPDP) Act, 2023: Provides special safeguards for processing children’s data by mandating verifiable parental consent and prohibiting tracking or targeted advertising directed at children .
-
Information Technology (IT) Act, 2000: Requires intermediaries to prevent hosting content harmful to children, with platforms required to remove unlawful content within three hours .
-
India AI Governance Guidelines: Recognizes children as a vulnerable group and recommends risk assessment frameworks for AI systems .
-
Recent IT Rules Amendments: The notification of 10 February 2026 formally covers deepfakes, AI-generated videos, and other hyper-realistic manipulated content, with platforms required to remove unlawful content within three hours .
Experts at the AI India Impact Summit have called for a shift from “child safety” to “child well-being by design” and stressed the need to strengthen the legal framework . Proposals under consideration include the creation of a national child safety observatory and a youth advisory council to ensure young voices inform policymaking .
India’s Unique Moment
India stands at a unique moment. Its demographic dividend, entrepreneurial energy, and digital public infrastructure give it an opportunity to ensure that AI expands opportunity at an unprecedented scale. As the country works toward the vision of an Atmanirbhar Bharat, AI can help unlock productivity, widen access to knowledge, and empower a new generation of students, workers, and entrepreneurs. But realising that opportunity will require more than widespread adoption. It will require ensuring that access is accompanied by safety, trust, and the skills needed to use AI effectively and responsibly [citation:original text].
That is the challenge in front of us. Not whether AI will be powerful or enough people will use it, but how quickly companies, schools, parents, and policymakers can build the safeguards and support systems around it .
Q&A Section
1. Why did OpenAI launch a Teen Safety Blueprint specifically for India?
India is OpenAI’s second-largest market globally, with adoption growing rapidly. Additionally, India has a unique digital landscape where approximately 62% of teens access the internet via shared family devices, making traditional individual-device safety tools ineffective . The Blueprint is designed to address these unique challenges.
2. What are the key features of the Teen Safety Blueprint?
The Blueprint includes: (1) “Age-aware AI behaviour” using privacy-protective age estimation tools; (2) Enhanced Parental Controls allowing parents to set “blackout hours” and disable chat history; (3) A critical safety feature notifying parents if their teen’s activity suggests intent to self-harm; and (4) Explicit guardrails for under-18 users, including prohibitions on content depicting self-harm, dangerous stunts, illegal substances, and graphic violence .
3. What is the “age-aware AI behaviour” principle?
The principle is that AI responses should not be “one-size-fits-all.” A 15-year-old should be treated differently from an adult. AI companies should identify teens using privacy-protective, risk-based age estimation tools to distinguish between teens and adults, ensuring that the right protections are applied to the right users .
4. What legal safeguards already exist in India to protect children online?
India has several legal safeguards: the Digital Personal Data Protection (DPDP) Act, 2023, which mandates verifiable parental consent and prohibits targeted advertising to children; the IT Act, 2000, which requires platforms to remove unlawful content harmful to children within three hours; and the India AI Governance Guidelines, which recognize children as a vulnerable group. The recent IT Rules amendments of February 2026 also regulate deepfakes and AI-generated content, with a mandatory takedown requirement .
5. What is the role of teachers and schools in AI safety?
Teachers and schools need to be treated as central actors because classrooms are where both the upside and the risks of AI will appear first. Teachers need practical training, responsible-use frameworks, and guidance on academic integrity and digital literacy. Educational institutions should focus on ways AI can strengthen learning rather than shortcut it, especially given that 92% of students now use AI .
Law is an Ass: A Former Bureaucrat’s Brush with a 17-Year-Old ‘Scam’
By Ashok Lavasa
New Delhi, July 25, 2026
In a season of protests against paper leaks and manipulations in examinations, I found myself last week “caught” in a recruitment scam. My crime? Signing a letter in April 2009 conveying the Home Minister’s (HM) permission to prosecute an Inspector General (IG) of the Central Reserve Police Force .
The HM was himself “recruited” after his predecessor resigned following the November 26, 2008 terrorist attack in Mumbai. It was conceivable in those days to see ministers suffering for the “failure to perform” . The HM wanted to fix accountability and revamp the recruitment system of the central paramilitary forces as the CBI unearthed the scam. The permission to prosecute the IG-in-charge was for enforcing accountability. Later, the recruitment process was reformed by converting the written test for constables into an OMR-based test, while the interview was abolished to avoid discretion, and the physical eligibility test was made more stringent. I never thought that signing the letter would haunt me 17 years later and give me the opportunity to see why Charles Dickens wrote, “the law is an ass” .
The Summons: A Journey into Absurdity
I was summoned to Patna to testify that I had signed the permission letter. I wrote to the Home Ministry, pointing to the absurdity of testifying to something that could be affirmed by government records and wasting public money for my travel and stay. I also requested the Court to take my evidence through a video conference . Unsurprisingly, I received no response but fresh summons .
Patna, which I was visiting after five years, seemed to compete with other upcoming cities in exemplifying urban chaos. Everything was like a strange stasis in motion. The automobile was the new autocrat on the road, allowing space for nothing else. Everyone was blowing their horn, yet nothing was moving .
Inside the Courtroom: A System Designed to Demean
The courts were open but the entry gate was locked. I went to the other gate where a sentry raised three fingers to suggest that I go to Gate 3. Vehicles entering the premises and those coming out were locked like adversaries in a never-ending legal battle. Regulating this seemed unfair because both needed the right of way. Like many things these days, the commotion had to resolve itself or those bearing the brunt were left to find their own solutions .
I jostled through and climbed three floors to reach the designated courtroom. A hearing was on but the judge, seated in his low chair behind a high table, was barely visible. A few court officials sat taking notes, surrounded by piles of files, that concealed the past and the future of litigants. The clock on the wall stood still and below it was a poster prohibiting the use of cell phones in the courtroom. Before the poster stood a lawyer speaking softly into his cell phone .
There was an air conditioner near the judge, and a few fans, but the lawyers were sweating, more because of their black coats than their weak cases . The lawyer arguing his case read aloud from his file, standing beside another. On either side, people like me sat on benches, awaiting our turn. There was no hierarchy, no status, no reputation. Everyone in the room looked guilty of being part of a system designed to demean everyone equally .
The two accused stood expressionless in the box, indifferent to the arguments, their hands folded, hoping that their posture alone could deliver them from the dungeon. Meanwhile, lawyers went in and out, whispering something to the court officials or opening the trunks containing case files and exhibits .
A Five-Minute Testimony
After half an hour, the Public Prosecutor limped into the room. He hardly knew why I was there. No one briefed me about the more than 17-year-old case. After waiting for an hour, I climbed into the witness box, was shown the letter bearing my signature and asked if I had signed it. I said “yes”, which the court clerk typed into a computer. Realising that I ought to have sworn an oath before testifying, he asked me to read from a piece of cardboard hanging in the witness box. I was done in five minutes. As I waited to sign my statement, another witness was examined. I was the 58th of the more than 200 witnesses listed by the prosecution .
Meanwhile, the lawyer and the judge vehemently discussed the difference between inquiry and investigation. The lawyer insisted that only material obtained during investigation after registering an FIR was admissible evidence. It reminded me of the Ram Janmabhoomi theft case in which the SIT was constituted before any FIR was registered .
The Cross-Examination: A Farce
I was then told to await cross-examination as the defence lawyer was absent during my statement. He appeared only after an hour when the judge warned “if he doesn’t come in 10 minutes, the witness will stand discharged” .
He showed up, wiping the sweat from his forehead. I was back in the witness box. The defence lawyer sheepishly requested to see my statement for which the court clerk turned the screen of the computer towards him. As he kept reading for three minutes, the judge wondered why he took “so long to read three sentences”. The clerk and the lawyer realised that a wrong statement was being read. Having read the right one, the lawyer spent five minutes gaping at the permission letter and asked me if the name of the person who typed the letter was written on it, “what was the meaning of having considered”, and if I had “considered the matter objectively or subjectively” .
Irked by such inanities, the judge ended the cross-examination saying “you will continue till 4 pm, if not stopped”. He directed the transcript be printed. The clerk left the court, returned after 10 minutes wiping his hands, and printed the statement. I signed and wrote “ROAC”. Forty-four years ago, holding court as Subdivisional Magistrate, I had learnt this acronym that meant “read over and affirmed to be correct” .
The Verdict on the System
Was Charles Dickens correct in his assertion? The experience left no doubt. A 17-year-old letter, a cross-country journey, repeated summons, hours in a chaotic courtroom, a five-minute testimony, a cross-examination featuring questions about the meaning of “having considered”—all for a simple affirmation. The real indictment was not of the accused, but of a system that treats its witnesses with the same disregard it treats its litigants. As I walked out, the weight of the absurdity lingered—a reminder that the law, in its most ordinary moments, can indeed be an ass.
Q&A Section
1. Why was Ashok Lavasa summoned to Patna?
Lavasa was summoned to Patna to testify as a witness in a 17-year-old recruitment scam case. His “crime” was signing a letter in April 2009 that conveyed the Home Minister’s permission to prosecute an Inspector General of the CRPF for enforcing accountability in the recruitment process .
2. What request did Lavasa make to avoid traveling to Patna?
Lavasa wrote to the Home Ministry requesting that his evidence be taken through video conference, pointing out that his testimony could be affirmed by government records. He also highlighted the waste of public money involved in his travel and stay. He received no response to this request .
3. How would you describe the experience of being a witness in the Patna court?
The experience was marked by chaos, inefficiency, and absurdity. The courtroom was disorganized, the judge was barely visible, and the process was designed to demean everyone equally. Lavasa waited for hours, gave a five-minute testimony, and then faced a cross-examination that involved questions about the meaning of “having considered” and whether he had acted “objectively or subjectively” .
4. What does the acronym “ROAC” stand for in the context of court proceedings?
“ROAC” stands for “Read Over and Affirmed to be Correct.” Lavasa learned this acronym 44 years ago when he served as a Subdivisional Magistrate. It is used to certify that a witness has read their statement and confirmed its accuracy .
5. What broader point is Lavasa making about the Indian legal system?
Lavasa uses his experience to illustrate the absurdity and inefficiency of the Indian legal system. The system, he suggests, treats witnesses and litigants with disregard, wasting time and resources on trivial formalities while neglecting the substance of justice. His experience is a powerful indictment of a system that has not kept pace with the needs of those it serves .
Opposition Must Not Use Young as Fodder: The Battle for India’s Student Movement
By Guru Prakash Paswan
New Delhi, July 25, 2026
Before a single word of politics, a word of conscience. For a young Indian, a competitive examination is not a single morning in one year. It is the compression of a childhood’s savings, a family’s faith, and a small town’s hope into three hours and an answer sheet. When a leak compromises that sheet, something more than a test is broken; trust is broken. I’ve spent enough time in the classroom to know the look of a student when the promises she built her hopes on suddenly vanish [citation:original text].
And yet a mature democracy must be honest enough to draw one line: Between those who grieve and those who have learnt to feed on grief [citation:original text].
Let no one mistake the Bharatiya Janata Party for a party that fears dissent. We are, in our very origins, a child of dissent. The Jana Sangh and the movement around it were forged in protest, in Syama Prasad Mookerjee’s sacrifice for the full integration of the nation, in the jails of the Emergency where Atal Bihari Vajpayee, Lal Krishna Advani and Nanaji Deshmukh sat in defence of the Constitution. The Ram Janmabhoomi movement was a mass mobilisation on a scale independent India had rarely seen. Dissent expanded the democratic space of a nation, provided it is not weaponised to manufacture a permanent “us versus them” [citation:original text].
But experience also teaches caution, because I have watched what becomes of movements. The JP movement began as a moral revolt against authoritarianism and ended, rightly, as a vehicle of democratic change. The Anna Hazare andolan I witnessed more closely. It began in 2011 as a genuine call against the rampant corruption of the UPA-II government. And then, slowly, the idea was captured. Political entrepreneurs sensed the opportunity. The ideals did not survive the personal ambitions of those leaders [citation:original text].
The Anatomy of a Movement: Legitimate Grievance and Political Opportunism
I recall this history not to disparage today’s students, but to protect them from it. Because on the streets right now, three very different actors are being deliberately blurred into one [citation:original text].
The first are the students, and their grievance is entirely legitimate. They want fair examinations, honest accountability, and transparency. They are owed all three, without qualification [citation:original text]. Nearly 2.28 million candidates sat for the NEET-UG 2026 exam on May 3, and it was cancelled days later following reports of a paper leak, with a re-test conducted weeks later . The CBI registered an FIR and launched a comprehensive inquiry . The anger is real, and the demand for reform is justified.
The second is the government, and its conduct is a matter of record. The compromised paper was cancelled. The CBI traced the leak toward a source within the testing agency itself; a retired teacher and an insider are among those arrested, and the government has said that the strictest actions will be taken. A fresh NEET-UG was conducted within weeks. The Education Minister did not claim the system was perfect; he said that even after the reforms, a breach still occurred and the government would correct it. The Prime Minister posted on X that “we have decided to set up fast-track courts to ensure swift and stringent punishment for those involved in paper leaks” [citation:original text]. Union Home Minister Amit Shah endorsed this move, calling it a “landmark step” and a “milestone” in cracking down on those who toy with the future of the youth .
The Political Opportunists and the Danger of Hijack
The third actor is the one the students should be warned about: The political opportunists. Watch how the demand evolves. It begins with a call to fix the leak. Soon it becomes a demand for the Education Minister’s resignation, then the Prime Minister’s resignation, then for the entire system to be torn down, before culminating in the dangerous suggestion that India, too, must settle its political disputes on the streets rather than through its institutions. A paper leak is an institutional failure that demands correction. Regime instability is a political objective. The two are fundamentally different [citation:original text].
Political observers have noted that while the current movement displays greater courage and spontaneity than the 2011 Anna Hazare movement, it appears to have a “void” at the leadership level—a void that political opportunists are eager to fill . The CJP, which began as an online satire after the Chief Justice compared unemployed youth to cockroaches, has grown to over 23 million followers on Instagram and evolved into a movement capable of drawing tens of thousands onto the streets . But the risk of hijack is real, as the history of the Anna movement demonstrates.
The Government’s Principled Response
It is here that the Leader of the Opposition owes the country an answer. When Rahul Gandhi chose to stage a dharna outside the Prime Minister’s residence, disregarding security protocol and inconveniencing ordinary citizens, the government, through the Minister of State in the PMO, conveyed within the hour its readiness for a full discussion on NEET on the floor of the House. The intention was never dialogue; it was always to create a politics of spectacle [citation:original text].
Unlike the UPA government in 2011, which appeared visibly unsure and jittery—with five senior ministers deployed to negotiate, images of ministers rushing to the airport, and even a meeting where rasgullas were ordered in the hope of striking a deal—the current government has handled the situation with composure and principle . The choice of interlocutors was carefully calibrated, with Health Minister JP Nadda and MoS Jitendra Singh tasked with engaging the protesters. Cabinet heavyweights were kept away from direct negotiations, and the government remained open to dialogue but insisted it would not take place at Jantar Mantar, the epicentre of the protests . Prime Minister Modi communicated directly, posting on social media and releasing a short vertical-format video well-suited for Instagram, the platform that has fuelled much of the student mobilisation .
A Generational Transition in Leadership
The BJP has sought not merely to speak to young Indians, but to entrust them with responsibility. The appointment of 45-year-old Nitin Nabin as the party’s youngest national president reflects a deliberate effort to bring a new generation into positions of leadership . My own appointment, as a Dalit law teacher and the party’s youngest national spokesperson, is another expression of that belief [citation:original text]. The party has also revamped its youth wing, imposing an age cap of 35 for the Yuva Morcha national president and 32 for state unit presidents .
Students deserve justice. Parents deserve confidence. The government deserves scrutiny, unsparing and continuous. The Opposition deserves its space, fully and without harassment. But democracy deserves something greater than endless agitation. India’s republic has always been strengthened by dissent; it has never once been strengthened by those who mistake every moment of dissent for an opportunity to inherit power. We owe students answers, reforms, and accountability, and that, not the theatre outside the Parliament, is the work this government intends to finish [citation:original text].
Q&A Section
1. What triggered the Cockroach Janta Party (CJP) protests?
The protests were triggered by the cancellation of the NEET-UG 2026 medical entrance exam on May 3 following a paper leak . The CJP, which began as an online satire after the Chief Justice compared unemployed youth to cockroaches, evolved into a major movement demanding education reforms and the resignation of Union Education Minister Dharmendra Pradhan .
2. What was the government’s response to the NEET paper leak and the protests?
The government acted swiftly by cancelling the compromised exam, ordering a CBI investigation, conducting a fresh NEET-UG within weeks, and arresting those involved [citation:original text]. Prime Minister Modi announced the establishment of fast-track courts for swift and stringent punishment for those involved in paper leaks . Union Home Minister Amit Shah endorsed this move, calling it a “landmark step” . The government also engaged in dialogue with protesters through Health Minister JP Nadda .
3. How does the government’s response to the 2026 protests compare to the UPA’s response to the 2011 Anna Hazare movement?
Unlike the UPA government, which appeared visibly unsure and jittery—with five senior ministers deployed to negotiate, images of ministers rushing to the airport, and even rasgullas ordered in the hope of striking a deal—the current government has handled the situation with composure and principle . Cabinet heavyweights were kept away from direct negotiations, and the government insisted that dialogue would not take place at the protest site . Prime Minister Modi communicated directly, posting on social media and releasing a video well-suited for Instagram .
4. What steps has the BJP taken to empower young leadership?
The BJP appointed 45-year-old Nitin Nabin as the party’s youngest national president . The party also revamped its youth wing, imposing an age cap of 35 for the Yuva Morcha national president and 32 for state unit presidents . The BJP has emphasized giving greater responsibility to the youth in its organisational framework .
5. What are the three actors the author identifies in the protest movement?
The author identifies three actors: (1) the students, whose grievance is entirely legitimate—they want fair examinations, honest accountability, and transparency; (2) the government, which has taken action by cancelling the exam, ordering a CBI investigation, and announcing fast-track courts; and (3) the political opportunists, who seek to hijack the movement for political gain, escalating demands from a call to fix the leak to calls for resignation and regime change [citation:original text].
The Green We Celebrate, The Forests We Fell: Uttarakhand’s “Black Harela” and the Battle for the Doon Valley
By Mrinal Pande
New Delhi, July 25, 2026
“May you live and have a lively year/ Be fearless as a tiger, sharp as the fox/ Bring relief like the snow and remain steadfast as the Himalayas/ Keep coming to see us each year in this month of greening.” This is the blessing children in rural Uttarakhand receive each year from their family elders on the festival of Harela. Mothers and sisters touch the young ones from head to toe with fresh young shoots of five grains grown in baskets exactly nine days prior to Harela. The soft green blades signal the return of the sowing season in the hills. Touching the green blades of saplings to the bodies of family members and wearing them in your caps is believed to bring good health and good luck through the year.
This year however, on July 16, the day of the merry green festival was marred by news of a youth-led “Black Harela” demonstration staged across towns in Uttarakhand. Young Uttarakhandis had lodged an angry protest against the proposed chopping down of some 4,000 mature trees in a massive drive to widen the national highway and link roads. “Is cutting down 4,000 trees in Rishikesh to save 30 minutes for tourists worth it?” the protesters ask [citation:original text].
The Irony of Development: Plantations Amidst Felling
Anoop Nautiyal, social activist and a local man, questioned the absence of public information regarding the mass felling of vital green cover. The capital Dehradun, he says, accounts for 21,618 hectares — or almost 47 per cent — of all forest land diverted across Uttarakhand for infrastructural expansions, including the Bhaniyawala-Rishikesh highway. Ironic when you consider that the government — like other states — is also driving another big abhiyan: Ek Ped Maa Ke Naam (Plant a tree in the name of the mother). An RTI reply Nautiyal got in June revealed that since the formation of the state in 2000, 46,203 hectares of forest land has been diverted towards various projects [citation:original text].
The Ek Ped Maa Ke Naam campaign, a nationwide initiative to plant trees in honour of mothers, had seen significant participation in Uttarakhand, with the state contributing 82 lakh saplings to the effort . The ruling BJP had also planned a “mega Harela campaign” to plant over six lakh saplings across the state. Yet, while the state was promoting plantations, it was simultaneously clearing centuries-old forests for a ₹743 crore highway project. This contradiction—celebrating greenery on one hand while sanctioning its destruction on the other—lay at the heart of the “Black Harela” protests .
The Ecological Cost: 46,000 Hectares and Counting
In the Doon valley, knowledgeable locals point out, the planned felling will directly affect the entire ecologically sensitive area that houses the Shivalik Elephant Reserve and several other wildlife corridors. Local conservationists have a point when they say how building activity in this ecologically sensitive area has increasingly made the hills fragile and subject to landslides. Widening the roads and building infrastructural support for roads, bridges and tunnels will also use up already scant groundwater and deprive the new saplings of an irreplaceable, centuries-old canopy [citation:original text].
The RTI data released by Nautiyal paints a stark picture. Since Uttarakhand’s formation in November 2000, 46,203.76 hectares of forest land have been diverted for development projects . Road projects accounted for 10,070.03 hectares (22%), while mining accounted for 9,289.81 hectares (20%) . Hydropower projects consumed 2,250.08 hectares, transmission lines used 3,005.51 hectares, irrigation works consumed 456.18 hectares, and drinking water schemes took 294.56 hectares. Another 20,837.63 hectares (45%) were classified under “Others” .
The district-wise data is even more alarming. Dehradun alone accounted for 21,618.32 hectares—nearly 47% of the state’s total forest diversion—despite covering only about 6% of Uttarakhand’s geographical area . This concentration of ecological damage in a single valley has serious implications. As Nautiyal warned, “The ecological carrying capacity of the Doon Valley and the surrounding Shivalik landscape cannot be treated as limitless” . Ecologists fear that this lopsided development model is leading to shrinking green cover, declining groundwater, fragmentation of wildlife habitats, higher urban temperatures, and increased vulnerability to floods and landslides . The Doon-Rishikesh corridor, with its combination of religious tourism, infrastructure expansion and speculative land investment, is placing unprecedented pressure on forests and agricultural land .
The Protest: A Modern Chipko Movement
The protests at the ‘Saat Mod’ (Seven Turns) stretch of the Dehradun-Rishikesh highway evoked memories of the historic Chipko movement. Villagers had once again wrapped their arms around trees, peacefully resisting the felling of thousands of trees, and reminding the nation that forests are more valuable standing than felled. History, it seems, was repeating itself more than 50 years later .
For nearly two weeks, environmentalists, locals, students, and social organisations camped at the site, opposing the tree cutting . On Harela day, dozens of protesters dressed in black observed the festival as ‘Black Harela’, protesting the destruction of Uttarakhand’s green cover . Standing beside a tree estimated to be more than 50 years old, environmentalist Shalu appealed to the public to recognise its value. “You won’t see this tree tomorrow. Take a last look at it today. Does the government want to turn this place into a desert or a concrete jungle?” she asked .
The Government’s Response: A Partial Victory
A strange situation has developed in our state, says Nautiyal in a clip on his Facebook page. Our government seems adamant on chopping up trees in the holy month of Harela that celebrates the resurgence of new life. Why is the Chief Minister permitting this? What message does this send to local voters? He quotes poet Dinakar’s moving lines: “Jab nash manuj par chhata hai,/Pehle vivek mar jata hai (When you are headed for total destruction, the first to go is your common sense)” [citation:original text].
On July 18, under mounting public pressure, Chief Minister Pushkar Singh Dhami announced an immediate halt to the tree felling at the ‘Saat Mod’ forest stretch, stating that no work will happen until a consensus is reached with all stakeholders . He directed officials to consider local sentiments, the environment, and stakeholder concerns, adding that the government will move forward on the basis of dialogue and public interest . However, by that time, over 350 trees had already been cut down .
The NHAI defended the project, saying it was being executed “in accordance with mitigation measures recommended by experts, particularly in view of elephant corridors along the stretch” . Provisions such as an approximately 3.5-kilometre-long elephant underpass and special culverts for the movement of smaller wildlife were included to reduce incidents of human-wildlife conflict . Yet, for the protesters, the fundamental question remained unanswered: Why must development always come at the cost of Uttarakhand’s green cover?
Q&A Section
1. What is the Harela festival and why did protesters observe “Black Harela” in 2026?
Harela is a traditional festival celebrated in Uttarakhand to mark the beginning of the sowing season and to honour nature and greenery. Families grow five grains in baskets nine days before the festival and touch the young shoots to family members as a blessing for good health and luck. In 2026, environmentalists observed “Black Harela” to protest the proposed felling of over 4,000 trees for the Bhaniyawala-Rishikesh highway widening project. They argued that it was contradictory to celebrate greenery while simultaneously destroying forests [citation:original text].
2. What did the RTI data reveal about forest land diversion in Uttarakhand?
RTI data obtained by activist Anoop Nautiyal revealed that since Uttarakhand’s formation in 2000, 46,203 hectares of forest land have been diverted for development projects. Road projects accounted for 22% of this, mining for 20%, and hydropower projects for a significant portion. Dehradun district alone accounted for nearly 47% of the total forest diversion, despite covering only about 6% of the state’s geographical area .
3. What was the government’s response to the protests?
On July 18, 2026, Chief Minister Pushkar Singh Dhami announced a halt to the tree felling at the ‘Saat Mod’ forest stretch, stating that no work will happen until a consensus is reached with all stakeholders. However, by that time, over 350 trees had already been cut down. The NHAI defended the project by citing mitigation measures including elephant underpasses and special culverts for wildlife .
4. Why is the Dehradun-Rishikesh highway project controversial?
The project involves the widening of the Bhaniyawala-Jolly Grant-Rishikesh stretch of NH-7, which passes through an ecologically sensitive Shivalik landscape that houses the Shivalik Elephant Reserve and several wildlife corridors. The project would require the felling of over 4,000 mature trees. Environmentalists argue that the area’s ecological carrying capacity cannot be treated as limitless, and that the construction will make the hills more fragile and prone to landslides [citation:original text].
5. What is the historical significance of these protests?
The protests at the ‘Saat Mod’ stretch evoked memories of the historic Chipko movement of 1973, when villagers in Uttarakhand hugged trees to prevent their felling. The modern protesters once again wrapped their arms around trees, peacefully resisting the felling and reminding the nation that forests are more valuable standing than felled. As one observer noted, history was repeating itself more than 50 years later .
The Silent Claws of the Coast: How INS Malvan Will Help Shield India’s Coastline
By Sushant Kulkarni
New Delhi, July 25, 2026
The Indian Navy on Wednesday commissioned the INS Malvan, its second Mahe-class Anti-Submarine Warfare Shallow Water Craft (ASW-SWC) . The vessel, a specialised submarine hunter designed to patrol the shallow waters along the coast, represents a significant leap in India’s ability to secure its littoral zones .
The commissioning ceremony at Karwar, Karnataka, was presided over by Chief of the Air Staff Air Chief Marshal AP Singh, who emphasised the critical importance of safeguarding sea lines of communication to ensure uninterrupted maritime trade amid growing global uncertainties .
ASW-SWC is a specialised class of warships in India that is designed for anti-submarine and patrolling operations along the littoral zone — the shallow maritime zone near the shore that is strategically and economically critical. Other countries too deploy such littoral craft, but under different names .
The Craft and Its Crest: A Tribute to Shivaji’s Maritime Legacy
INS Malvan is the second of eight Mahe-class vessels being built by Cochin Shipyard Ltd (CSL), Kochi, and the sixth of 16 ASW-SWCs under construction by CSL and Garden Reach Shipbuilders and Engineers (GRSE), Kolkata . With more than 80% indigenous content, the vessel is a strong symbol of India’s ‘Aatmanirbhar Bharat’ (Self-reliant India) initiative in defence shipbuilding .
The ship derives its name from the coastal town of Malvan in Maharashtra, a region synonymous with the maritime vision and legacy of Chhatrapati Shivaji Maharaj . The vessel also carries forward the legacy of an earlier Indian naval vessel bearing the same name, an inshore minesweeper that served the Navy until 2003 .
INS Malvan’s crest bears the ‘Bagh Nakha’ (Wagh Nakh) — a tribute to the tiger-claw weapon associated with Shivaji . This is meant to symbolise courage, audacity and agility — in line with the ship’s role of attacking rapidly and silently . The waves on the Bagh Nakha crest reflect the vast sea surrounding the coasts. The ship’s motto — ‘Silent Claws’ — also reflects the crest, embodying lethality, stealth and the ability to strike the adversary swiftly, the Navy said .
Historian Pandurang Balkawade said naming the ship after Malvan strengthens the connection with India’s maritime heritage. “Shivaji Maharaj recognised centuries ago that maritime security was essential for protecting trade and sovereignty. Sindhudurg and Malvan became the foundation of an indigenous naval doctrine. The commissioning of INS Malvan acknowledges that India’s modern naval thinking has deep historical roots,” he noted .
Strategic Importance: The Need for Dedicated Submarine Hunters
The ASW-SWC fleet significantly enhances the Navy’s ability to secure the coastline against underwater threats. Designed for operations in shallow waters, these vessels fill a long-standing capability gap by detecting and countering stealthy diesel-electric submarines that larger surface vessels can’t effectively pursue .
Their low draught (meaning they require less water beneath the hull to operate), advanced sonar systems and high manoeuvrability make them well suited to protect harbour approaches, sea lanes, offshore energy installations and key naval bases . With India’s 7,500-km coastline, 12 major ports, 184 minor ports and 1,197 islands, dedicated shallow-water ASW platforms are considered critical for coastal surveillance and maritime security .
The vessel is equipped with an advanced underwater sensors suite, including the Abhay hull-mounted sonar, an underwater acoustic communication system and low-frequency sonar . To counter underwater threats, it carries lightweight torpedoes, ASW rockets, anti-torpedo decoys and advanced mine-laying capabilities .
The Technical Backbone: Power and Automation
A Navy official, explaining the technical prowess of the vessel, described the Machinery Control Room as the “engineering nerve center.” “Our ship INS Malvan is powered by three high-speed diesel engines which provide us unmatched agility, high speeds, and rapid acceleration in shallow waters, which is basically the role of the ship,” the official said .
He further emphasised the role of digital integration in modern naval warfare, stating, “The propulsion and the auxiliary system which is fitted on board is controlled by a state-of-the-art integrated platform management system which we also call as IPMS” . This digital architecture allows the crew to monitor all parameters from a single console, reducing the workload while maintaining operational reliability . The vessel is 78 metres long, 11.36 metres wide, with a draught of about 2.7 metres and a displacement of about 900 tons. It has a maximum speed of 25 knots and endurance of 1,800 nautical miles .
The Broader Picture: A Programme of Indigenous Might
Before the ASW-SWC programme, the Navy operated four Abhay-class corvettes — customised versions of the Soviet-origin Pauk II-class — for coastal patrol and anti-submarine warfare. They served for decades before being decommissioned between 2017 and October 2025. To replace and expand this capability, the Defence Acquisition Council approved the acquisition of 16 ASW-SWCs in December 2013 at over Rs 13,000 crore .
Contracts were subsequently awarded to CSL and GRSE to build eight vessels each . Of the 16 vessels, the Arnala-class is being built by GRSE and comprises INS Arnala, Androth, Anjadip, Amini, Abhay, Agray, Ajay and Akshay. CSL is constructing the Mahe-class, comprising INS Mahe, Malvan, Mangrol, Malpe, Mulki, Magdal and Machilipatnam. All 16 are expected to be inducted over the next two to three years .
The commissioning of INS Malvan adds a significant punch to the Indian Navy’s Anti-Submarine Warfare capabilities. With the ability to operate seamlessly with larger surface combatants, submarines, and aviation assets, induction of INS Malvan enables the Indian Navy to remain Combat Ready, Credible, Cohesive, and Future Ready to ensure national security and safeguard India’s maritime interests at all times and at all locations .
Q&A Section
1. What is INS Malvan and why is its commissioning significant?
INS Malvan is the second Mahe-class Anti-Submarine Warfare Shallow Water Craft (ASW-SWC) commissioned by the Indian Navy on July 22, 2026 . It is a specialised submarine hunter designed to operate in India’s coastal and shallow waters. Its commissioning is significant because it enhances the Navy’s ability to secure the coastline against underwater threats, while also showcasing India’s growing indigenous naval shipbuilding capabilities under the ‘Aatmanirbhar Bharat’ initiative .
2. What does the ‘Bagh Nakha’ (Wagh Nakh) on INS Malvan’s crest symbolise?
The ‘Bagh Nakha’ (tiger’s claw) is a tribute to the legendary weapon associated with Chhatrapati Shivaji Maharaj . It symbolises courage, audacity, agility, stealth, and the ability to strike the adversary swiftly—qualities essential for anti-submarine warfare. The ship’s motto, ‘Silent Claws’, further embodies these attributes .
3. What is the strategic need for Anti-Submarine Warfare Shallow Water Craft (ASW-SWCs)?
ASW-SWCs are designed to operate in the littoral zone—the shallow maritime zone near the shore that is strategically and economically critical. Larger surface vessels cannot effectively pursue stealthy diesel-electric submarines in these shallow waters . These craft fill a critical capability gap by detecting and countering underwater threats, and protecting harbour approaches, sea lanes, offshore energy installations, and naval bases . With India’s 7,500-km coastline and 1,197 islands, such vessels are essential for coastal surveillance and maritime security .
4. What is the current status of the ASW-SWC construction programme?
The Indian Navy is set to induct a total of 16 ASW-SWCs under a project worth nearly Rs 13,000 crore . Cochin Shipyard Ltd (CSL) and Garden Reach Shipbuilders & Engineers (GRSE) have been contracted to build eight ships each. GRSE is building the Arnala-class (INS Arnala, Androth, Anjadip, Amini, Abhay, Agray, Ajay, Akshay), while CSL is constructing the Mahe-class (INS Mahe, Malvan, Mangrol, Malpe, Mulki, Magdal, Machilipatnam). All 16 ships are expected to be commissioned over the next two to three years .
5. Who presided over the commissioning ceremony and what were the key messages?
The commissioning ceremony was presided over by Chief of the Air Staff Air Chief Marshal AP Singh . He emphasised the critical importance of safeguarding sea lines of communication amid global uncertainties, lauded the Navy’s commitment to indigenous production (highlighting the warship’s over 80% indigenous content), and called for greater tri-service integration to ensure the nation operates as a unified force in future conflicts .
Fast-Track Courts: A Silver Bullet or a Flawed Promise?
By Vineet Bhalla and Amaal Sheikh
New Delhi, July 25, 2026
Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s promise to set up fast-track courts (FTCs) to take up paper leaks has turned attention to what’s seen as a silver bullet for judicial delays [citation:original text]. The announcement comes amidst mounting outrage over the NEET paper leak controversy and demands for tougher action against those accused of compromising competitive examinations . But what exactly are these courts, how do they work, and can they truly deliver justice in a timely manner?
What are Fast-Track Courts?
There is no single central legislation that governs these courts. The 14th Finance Commission (2015–2020) recommended FTCs to expedite the trial of heinous crimes such as murder, kidnapping, and property disputes pending for over five years. It also recommended them for cases involving vulnerable demographics, such as women and children [citation:original text].
In 2019, following an amendment to the criminal laws and a directive from the Supreme Court, the Union government launched a centrally sponsored scheme to establish fast-track special courts (FTSCs). Funded partially by the Nirbhaya Fund, these courts are exclusively for the time-bound trial of rape cases and offences under the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act [citation:original text]. As of April 2026, 775 fast-track special courts, including 398 exclusive POCSO courts, were functional across 29 States and Union Territories . The Centre has released Rs 1,259.51 crore to States and UTs since the scheme’s inception to support these courts .
Can it be set up for an individual case?
The creation of special courts must satisfy Article 14, which guarantees equality before the law. In State of West Bengal vs. Anwar Ali Sarkar (1952), the Supreme Court struck down a law that allowed the government to arbitrarily pick cases for special courts simply for the “object of speedier trial” [citation:original text]. The court warned that “speed” is too vague and elusive a criterion on its own. To survive constitutional scrutiny, the cases chosen must have a rational, objective basis — such as the nature of the offence or the vulnerability of the victims. However, courts have to pass a legal test to determine whether a case is special or not. The SC directed the Centre to establish a special court to handle the 2G case, ensuring a day-to-day trial. It will have to be seen if the NEET case, which is being heard in Delhi court, will be sent to a special court by the government or through a court order [citation:original text].
The government has directed the establishment of fast-track courts in four states (jurisdictions of Bombay, Calcutta, Delhi, and Madhya Pradesh High Courts) on a priority basis to hear cases under the Public Examinations (Prevention of Unfair Means) Act, 2024 . These courts will hear cases on a day-to-day basis . The Madhya Pradesh High Court has already designated four special fast-track courts for paper leak cases, directing them to dispose of cases within three months of filing charge sheets .
How quick are fast-track courts?
Litigants do not have an automatic statutory right to a fixed deadline for their trials. The Bharatiya Nagrik Suraksha Sanhita recommends that trials should ideally be completed within two years and trials for sexual offences within two months [citation:original text]. Under the FTSC scheme, each FTC is expected to dispose of 41-42 cases per quarter, or at least 165 cases annually . In the landmark R. Rama Chandra Rao v. State of Karnataka ruling (2002), a seven-judge Constitution Bench ruled it is “neither advisable or feasible, nor judicially permissible to draw or prescribe an outer limit for conclusion of all criminal proceedings” [citation:original text].
How have FTCs performed?
The disposal rate for the special courts is around 96%, meaning that many cases were either heard or dismissed. On average, an FTSC disposes of about 9.5 cases per month, compared to the 3.3 cases cleared by a regular trial court of similar jurisdiction [citation:original text]. However, the volume of litigation means pendency is a persistent challenge. By the end of 2023, over 2.4 lakh cases were still pending in FTSCs [citation:original text]. As of December 2025, the number of pending cases stood at 2,45,579 . In 2025, annual disposals by FTSCs dropped to 66,500 cases, down from a record 85,595 in 2024—a decline of more than 22% . While some states manage comparatively low pendency per court, others operate under far heavier workloads .
In a 2026 Lok Sabha response, the Ministry of Law and Justice stated that delays in disposal are caused by many factors, including “availability of physical infrastructure, complexity of facts involved, quality of investigation, nature of evidence, co-operation of stakeholders… and proper application of rules” [citation:original text].
Advocate Kartik Venu, a criminal trial lawyer, told The Indian Express: “Fast track courts will not answer the issue of heavy case burdens, case dockets, lack of judicial officers to hear them, natural delays over the course of trial based on the twists and turns that trials normally take.” He said FTCs also require accompanying infrastructure [citation:original text].
The efficacy of fast-track courts varies according to subject matter, Venu said. In POCSO and IPC, they have been an “utter failure” given the sheer volume of work and courts’ inability to allocate specific judges. “In the Prevention of Corruption Act… there is perhaps a healthier ratio,” he said [citation:original text]. Conviction rates are also a concern—in West Bengal, just two per cent of fast-track cases decided in 2024 ended in a conviction .
Q&A Section
1. What are Fast-Track Courts and what is their legal basis?
There is no single central legislation that governs these courts. The 14th Finance Commission recommended FTCs to expedite trials of heinous crimes and cases involving vulnerable demographics. In 2019, following the Criminal Law (Amendment) Act, 2018 and a Supreme Court directive, the Union government launched a centrally sponsored scheme to establish Fast Track Special Courts (FTSCs) exclusively for rape and POCSO Act cases, partially funded through the Nirbhaya Fund [citation:original text].
2. Can a Fast-Track Court be established for an individual case like the NEET paper leak?
The creation of special courts must satisfy Article 14. In State of West Bengal vs. Anwar Ali Sarkar (1952), the Supreme Court struck down a law that allowed the government to arbitrarily pick cases for special courts simply for the “object of speedier trial.” However, courts have directed special court establishment for specific cases. The government has now directed the establishment of fast-track courts in four states for paper leak cases under the Public Examinations (Prevention of Unfair Means) Act, 2024 [citation:original text].
3. How fast do Fast-Track Courts actually work?
The Bharatiya Nagrik Suraksha Sanhita suggests sexual-offence trials should finish within two months, but the reality is vastly different. On average, each FTSC clears about 9.5 cases a month, nearly three times the 3.3 managed by a comparable regular court. However, in Delhi, a fast-track case took an average of 1,639 days in 2024 [citation:original text].
4. What are the key challenges facing Fast-Track Courts?
Delays are caused by lack of physical infrastructure, complexity of facts, quality of investigation, and cooperation of stakeholders [citation:original text]. A third-party evaluation found that only 34% of FTSCs meet the scheme’s disposal benchmark. Conviction rates remain low—in West Bengal, just 2% of fast-track cases ended in a conviction .
5. How are paper leak cases being handled under the new framework?
The government has directed the establishment of fast-track courts in four states (Bombay, Calcutta, Delhi, and Madhya Pradesh High Court jurisdictions) on a priority basis. These courts will hear cases under the Public Examinations (Prevention of Unfair Means) Act, 2024 on a day-to-day basis. The MP High Court has already designated four special fast-track courts for paper leak cases, directing disposal within three months of charge sheet filing .
The Export Exception: How India’s FDI Policy Shift Could Reshape E-Commerce and Global Trade
By Aditi Nayar
New Delhi, July 25, 2026
The Department for Promotion of Industry and Internal Trade (DPIIT) on Thursday permitted foreign direct investment (FDI) in the inventory-based model of e-commerce, a step that is aimed at boosting exports . This decision, announced via Press Note No. 3 (2026 Series) dated July 23, 2026, marks a significant departure from India’s long-standing policy that prohibited foreign-invested e-commerce platforms from owning the inventory they sell .
The move comes a day before the US is expected to replace 10% global tariffs under Section 122 with new tariffs. The US has currently proposed a 12.5% tariff on India for “importation of goods that are deemed to be produced through forced labour” . A section of MSMEs had been asking the government to allow FDI in the inventory-based model as it could help ease the compliance burden. With this move, Indian manufacturers would potentially avoid tedious paperwork on an individual basis, which could be better handled by large e-commerce players like Amazon and Walmart-owned Flipkart .
The Policy Shift: A New Para in the FDI Framework
Before this move, 100% FDI was allowed under the automatic route in the marketplace model of e-commerce, but FDI was not permitted in the inventory-based model of e-commerce . Under the inventory-based model of e-commerce, inventory of goods and services can be owned by e-commerce entities and sold directly to consumers . The marketplace-based model, by contrast, only allows e-commerce companies to have a digital and electronic network to act as a facilitator between buyer and seller .
The DPIIT order introduces a new clause stating that the restrictions on inventory-based e-commerce “shall not apply in case of exports of domestically manufactured and/or produced goods/products” . The new framework permits an e-commerce entity to engage in the inventory-based model exclusively for the export of goods or products manufactured and produced in India as per the applicable provisions of the Foreign Trade Policy 2023 read with the Handbook of Procedures and the Foreign Exchange Management (Export of Goods & Services) Regulations, 2015, as amended from time to time .
The decision is a direct response to the lobbying by e-commerce stakeholders and the recommendations of the Directorate General of Foreign Trade (DGFT), which has been advocating for such a policy reform to unlock India’s potential in cross-border digital commerce . An official noted that “The DGFT will come out with details and safeguards around the new policy in a few weeks and it could take another 4-5 months to get operational” .
The Rationale: Bridging the E-Commerce Export Gap
India’s e-commerce exports are estimated at around $4-5 billion annually, significantly lower than China’s $350 billion . The global e-commerce trade is estimated at nearly $800 billion and is projected to reach $2 trillion by 2030 . The government has set a target of $1 trillion of merchandise exports by 2030, and cross-border e-commerce trade has been identified as a key source to meet this aim .
The policy is expected to particularly benefit MSMEs, manufacturers, and exporters, enabling them to directly serve overseas customers through online platforms. India’s e-commerce industry is primarily dominated by small businesses that export products valued between $25 and $1,000, including handicrafts, art, books, ready-made garments, gems and jewellery, home decor, ayurveda products and sports goods . Ecommerce giant Amazon welcomed the policy decision, saying it “empowers tier-2 and tier-3 manufacturers to go global” as the country targets $80-billion cumulative exports by 2030. An Amazon spokesperson said, “This enabling amendment unlocks opportunities for regional manufacturers and SMEs, allowing us to better serve seller partners and contribute meaningfully to India’s export-led growth strategy” .
The Concerns and Caveats
The policy shift has raised several concerns. Think tank GTRI said that permitting inventory-based e-commerce for exports is unlikely to remain a narrow exception. “Once foreign-funded platforms are allowed to own and manage inventory in India, pressure will inevitably grow to extend the same model to domestic sales — a demand global e-commerce companies have pursued for years,” the think tank said . “In practice, maintaining separate inventories for exports and domestic sales will be difficult to monitor, making the export-only carve-out a likely stepping stone towards full-scale inventory-based e-commerce under FDI” .
GTRI founder Ajay Srivastava also argued that the policy represents another unilateral concession to foreign commercial interests without securing reciprocal market access for Indian exporters. “Had these measures been negotiated as part of a trade agreement, India could have exchanged them for commercially meaningful US concessions. Instead, by offering them in advance, India is eroding its negotiating leverage and reducing its ability to secure reciprocity in future trade talks,” he said .
Professor at the Indian Council for Research on International Economic Relations, Arpita Mukherjee, said that lifting restrictions on inventory models was necessary, especially with traceability-related norms coming into effect in several developed countries, like Digital Product Passport (DPP) regulations in the EU which require digital records spanning the entire lifecycle of a product. “So with traceability becoming a norm going forward, Indian MSME exports could get locked out of foreign markets without compliance. From this standpoint, an inventory model is a necessity as large companies can support compliance,” Mukherjee said .
The government has indicated that the upcoming guardrails could be around demarcation, mechanism for export entities to claim goods and services tax refunds and duty remissions, besides establishing safeguards to prevent misuse of seller-level data .
The Bigger Picture: A Stepping Stone to Full-Scale Inventory E-Commerce?
While the government has stressed that the relaxation is limited solely to export activities, industry experts and economists view the decision as a major step towards increasing India’s share in global e-commerce exports without affecting the interests of domestic retailers . However, the long-term implications are significant. As GTRI pointed out, maintaining separate inventories for exports and domestic sales will be difficult to monitor, making the export-only carve-out a likely stepping stone towards full-scale inventory-based e-commerce under FDI . For now, companies like Flipkart, Amazon India and Meesho will continue to operate under the existing domestic policy as it doesn’t change the domestic marketplace framework .
Q&A Section
1. What change has the Indian government made to its FDI policy regarding e-commerce?
The Department for Promotion of Industry and Internal Trade (DPIIT) has permitted foreign direct investment (FDI) in the inventory-based model of e-commerce exclusively for the export of goods manufactured or produced in India . This means foreign-invested e-commerce companies can now own inventory in India for the purpose of selling products to overseas markets .
2. What was the FDI policy for e-commerce before this change?
Prior to this change, 100% FDI was allowed under the automatic route in the marketplace model, where e-commerce companies act as digital facilitators between buyers and sellers without owning the inventory. However, FDI was not permitted in the inventory-based model, where the e-commerce entity owns the goods and sells them directly to consumers .
3. Why has the government made this policy change?
The move is aimed at boosting India’s e-commerce exports, which currently stand at only about $5 billion annually compared to China’s $350 billion . It is intended to help Indian manufacturers, particularly MSMEs, access global markets more easily, avoid tedious paperwork, and support compliance with international traceability norms such as the EU’s Digital Product Passport (DPP) regulations .
4. What are the concerns raised by experts and think tanks regarding this policy shift?
The Global Trade Research Initiative (GTRI) has expressed concern that the export-only exception could be a stepping stone towards allowing full-scale inventory-based e-commerce under FDI for domestic sales. GTRI also argued that the policy is a unilateral concession to foreign commercial interests that could erode India’s negotiating leverage in future trade agreements .
5. What are the next steps for implementing this policy?
The decision will take effect from the date of notification under the Foreign Exchange Management Act (FEMA) . The Directorate General of Foreign Trade (DGFT) is expected to come out with details and safeguards around the new policy in a few weeks, with full operationalization expected in 4-5 months .
Adani’s Airline Ambition: The Battle Over Airport-Airline Cross-Ownership in India
By Aditi Nayar
New Delhi, July 25, 2026
In a development that could fundamentally reshape India’s aviation landscape, the Adani Group is considering entering the airline business, while the government is actively evaluating a relaxation of rules that currently restrict airport operators from owning airlines [citation:original text]. The move has drawn sharp criticism from IndiGo, the country’s largest airline, which has warned that any such relaxation would create a “massive conflict of interest” and would ultimately be “against the interest of consumers” [citation:original text].
Preliminary discussions on easing restrictions on cross-ownership in both airline and airport businesses have begun at the Ministry of Civil Aviation (MoCA) [citation:original text]. The existing rule, embedded in concession agreements from the 2006 privatization of Delhi and Mumbai airports, bars airport operators from holding more than a 10% stake in a scheduled carrier . The Adani Group, which operates eight airports in the country, is seeking the removal of this particular condition, with sources indicating that the conglomerate is considering having its own airline with full control, and not just a minority stake in another carrier [citation:original text].
The Adani Group’s Aviation Ambition
The Adani Group already has a significant presence in the aviation ecosystem, operating eight airports—including Mumbai and Lucknow—and having a major footprint in ground handling, maintenance, repair and overhaul (MRO), and pilot training [citation:original text]. The conglomerate also plans to set up an aircraft manufacturing facility in India in partnership with Brazil’s Embraer [citation:original text]. Jeet Adani, who looks after the group’s aviation business, had earlier stated that the group was not interested in the airline business, as it didn’t fit the group’s capital discipline . However, the thought process has evidently changed, largely due to two factors: the government’s push for more airlines to increase competition, and the Adani Group’s own venture to set up a final assembly line (FAL) of Embraer’s passenger jets [citation:original text]. An Adani-controlled airline would be a ready customer for the FAL project [citation:original text].
Sources close to the group indicated that while nothing has been finalized yet, the idea of potentially owning an airline is under consideration [citation:original text]. The Adani Group has a 74% stake in Mumbai airport, while GMR has 74% in Delhi airport, both of which are subject to the current restriction [citation:original text]. The MoCA is learnt to have initiated preliminary discussions internally, and is seeking legal opinion on the matter, with any change requiring approval from the Union Cabinet [citation:original text].
The IndiGo Objection: A “Massive Conflict of Interest”
Rahul Bhatia, managing director of IndiGo, the country’s largest airline with over 65% domestic market share, strongly objected to the proposed change in his post-earnings investor call on July 23 [citation:original text]. “All I can say is that, if the news has any merit, one, it has no global precedent … and typically (it will create) a massive conflict of interest. Over a period of time, it would actually be against the interest of consumers,” Bhatia said [citation:original text]. He added that IndiGo would closely watch the developments [citation:original text].
Bhatia’s concerns center on the potential for an airport operator that also owns an airline to favor its own carrier in the allocation of scarce airport infrastructure, including slots, gates, and parking stands. This is a classic conflict-of-interest scenario, particularly at capacity-constrained airports where access to infrastructure is a critical determinant of an airline’s success. The fear is that the airport operator could use its control to disadvantage competitors, ultimately reducing consumer choice and increasing fares.
The Government’s Dilemma: Breaking the Duopoly
The government’s interest in allowing airport operators to own airlines stems from a desire to break the growing duopoly in Indian skies. IndiGo and Air India together now account for nearly 90% of the domestic market [citation:original text]. The collapse of Kingfisher, Jet Airways, and Go First, and the consolidation of Vistara into Air India, have left a vacuum . Recent operational disruptions have also shown that excessive concentration is not merely a matter of fares or consumer choice; it creates systemic vulnerability when problems at one large carrier ripple across the network [citation:original text].
The government wants strong corporate groups with deep pockets to foray into the sector given the challenging operating environment in the world’s fastest-growing major aviation market [citation:original text]. The airline sector in India has seen a number of airlines fail due to a difficult operating environment, fierce competition, and global supply chain woes [citation:original text]. IndiGo’s network-wide operational crisis in December 2024, which brought the country’s aviation sector to its knees, underscored the vulnerability of a market dominated by a single carrier [citation:original text]. The Adani Group, with its deep pockets and long-term investment horizon, is precisely the kind of corporate group the government is hoping will enter the fray.
The Global Precedent and Regulatory Risks
Bhatia’s claim that allowing airport operators to own airlines has “no global precedent” is not entirely accurate. While the practice is not common, there are examples. In the United States, Alaska Air Group owns airports in Alaska, though these are not major hubs. In Europe, some airport operators have minority stakes in airlines. However, the model is often discouraged by regulators due to the clear conflict of interest. The European Commission, for instance, has scrutinized such arrangements to ensure non-discriminatory access to airport infrastructure .
The risk is that by allowing an airport operator to own an airline, the regulator is creating a vertically integrated monopoly that could effectively lock out competitors. The Adani Group, which also plans to set up an Embraer manufacturing facility, would create a comprehensive ecosystem: it would manufacture aircraft, provide airport infrastructure, and operate the airline. This would give it an almost unassailable competitive advantage, raising serious antitrust concerns.
Q&A Section
1. What is the key change in the aviation sector that is being proposed?
The Ministry of Civil Aviation is considering easing restrictions on airport operators owning airlines . Currently, airport operators are barred from holding more than a 10% stake in a scheduled carrier. The proposed relaxation would allow entities like the Adani Group, which operates eight airports, to fully own an airline [citation:original text].
2. Why does IndiGo oppose the proposal?
IndiGo’s Managing Director Rahul Bhatia called the proposal “massively conflict of interest” and noted it has “no global precedent” [citation:original text]. The fear is that an airport operator with an airline could favor its own carrier in allocating scarce infrastructure like slots, gates and parking, disadvantaging competitors and ultimately harming consumers [citation:original text].
3. Why is the government considering this change?
The government wants to break the duopoly of IndiGo and Air India, which together control nearly 90% of the domestic market [citation:original text]. The collapse of multiple airlines and the recent operational crisis at IndiGo have exposed the vulnerability of an over-concentrated market. The government sees the Adani Group, with its deep pockets, as a potential challenger to the two dominant carriers [citation:original text].
4. What are the potential conflicts of interest?
The primary conflict is that an airport operator could allocate preferential treatment—such as prime slots, better gates, and lower fees—to its own airline while making it harder for competitors. This vertical integration would give the Adani Group an almost unassailable competitive advantage, raising serious antitrust concerns. Critics argue that this goes against the spirit of fair competition and could ultimately harm consumers .
5. What is the Adani Group’s existing presence in aviation?
The Adani Group operates eight airports in India, including Mumbai and Lucknow [citation:original text]. It has a strong presence in ground handling, MRO, and pilot training . The conglomerate also plans to set up an Embraer final assembly line in India, which would be a ready customer for its own airline if it enters the market [citation:original text].
The Battle for Accountability: Supreme Court to Hear Police Excess Pleas as Pellet Gun Allegations Mount
By Aditi Nayar
New Delhi, July 25, 2026
The Supreme Court has agreed to hear on Monday two freshly instituted petitions alleging police excesses during the July 20 crackdown on student protesters in the national capital [citation:original text]. The development came hours after Chief Justice of India (CJI) Surya Kant clarified in open court on Friday that “no petition” had previously been filed on the issue. He criticised “reckless” reports suggesting that the court had refused to list such a matter [citation:original text].
The Cockroach Janta Party (CJP), which is spearheading the protests, announced on Friday that it would launch a website to archive videos and photographs documenting alleged police brutality during the crackdown. It said the material would form the basis of legal proceedings seeking the registration of FIRs against the police personnel allegedly responsible for the violence [citation:original text].
The Supreme Court’s Clarification
CJI Surya Kant made it clear that he was misquoted in the media when he refused to entertain another advocate who was highlighting the issues arising from the July 20 protest march and police action . “He (petitioner) said he has filed a petition and sent a letter to SC. On inquiry, we found that neither the petition had been filed nor the letter had been sent. How can a court entertain a plea without a single paper before it?” the CJI asked . The Bench led by the CJI will now hear the matter on July 27, after senior advocates Shyam Divan and Gopal Sankaranarayanan requested an early hearing, informing the court that the petitions had been filed and numbered by the Supreme Court registry .
In one of the petitions, advocate Shailendra Mani Tripathi has sought an independent commission headed by a retired SC judge to inquire into the excessive force used against students and arbitrary detentions by Delhi Police during Monday’s CJP’s march to Parliament, and suspension and prosecution of all identified delinquent police officers . He also urged the SC to ban “rolling, repetitive, or blanket prohibitory orders in any area without an objectively verified, proximate and recorded threat of grave public disorder” .
The Pellet Gun Controversy
Meanwhile, after The Hindu reported that two unarmed protesters were struck by pellets allegedly fired by Rapid Action Force (RAF) personnel, the Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF) said on Friday that it was “verifying the media reports”. A CRPF official said no action has been taken so far [citation:original text]. Earlier, the Delhi Police had denied using pellet guns against the protesters. The RAF, a specialised anti-riot force, had been deployed under the overall control of the Delhi Police during the July 20 operations [citation:original text].
One of the injured protesters, 19-year-old Sahil Lochab, risks losing vision in his right eye after a pellet pierced his pupil [citation:original text]. His family alleged that he suffered serious eye injuries in a police pellet gun attack and is at risk of losing his vision . According to his uncle, doctors initially told the family that there was only a “1 per cent chance” Sahil would regain his vision . He has undergone one surgery to repair the injured eye and remove pellets and is awaiting another . The teenager has multiple pellet injuries to his face, neck, chest, right shoulder and arm. A pellet was lodged in his right eye, causing corneal perforation, while another was found in his right lung and pericardial fat .
Another protester, Sheikh Irshad Mansoori, a 25-year-old Gurugram resident, was admitted to Lady Hardinge Medical College and Hospital on July 20 and underwent surgery . His associates alleged that more than 20 pellet-like projectiles struck his face, neck and body during the police action, putting his eyesight at risk . A 28-year-old journalist also sustained pellet injuries, with a medical report recording injuries from “physical assault at Jantar Mantar by pellet gun” .
The Police Response and Internal Investigations
The CRPF headquarters has sought an “incident report” from the RAF unit regarding its handling of the July 20 student protests . The report will include the veracity of claims that pellet guns were fired and the circumstances necessitating their alleged use . The RAF has begun an internal verification of the conduct of its personnel during the protests . A formal Court of Inquiry has not yet been ordered, with CRPF officers stating that such a probe will be initiated only if the ongoing verification establishes grounds for further investigation .
Delhi Police has also taken action against one of its officers. Additional DCP Sandeep Lamba was removed from duty at the CJP protest site after a video allegedly showing him slapping a female protester spread widely across social media . Police sources claimed the woman allegedly had a nail-like object in her hand and did not leave the area despite repeated instructions, and Lamba lost his temper during the exchange .
The CJP’s Response
The CJP, which has been spearheading protests over the NEET row and examination irregularities since June 6, has demanded that Education Minister Dharmendra Pradhan be immediately sacked and Rs 1 crore compensation be given to the families of those who died by suicide after the NEET paper leak . The protest gained momentum after activist Sonam Wangchuk joined the demonstration and began a hunger strike from June 28 . He was earlier forcibly shifted to Safdarjung Hospital by police . The CJP has now launched a website to archive videos and photographs documenting alleged police brutality during the crackdown, which will form the basis of legal proceedings [citation:original text].
Q&A Section
1. What petitions will the Supreme Court hear on July 27, 2026?
The Supreme Court will hear two petitions alleging police excesses during the July 20 crackdown on student protesters at Jantar Mantar. The petitions seek an independent commission of inquiry, suspension and prosecution of delinquent police officers, and a ban on blanket prohibitory orders .
2. What did Chief Justice Surya Kant clarify about the earlier media reports?
The CJI clarified that he was misquoted when media reports claimed he had refused to list a matter on police excesses. He stated that no writ petition had been filed at that time—only a representation had been sent to the court—and a court cannot entertain a plea without a single paper before it .
3. What are the allegations regarding pellet gun use during the protest?
Several protesters, including 19-year-old Sahil Lochab and 25-year-old Sheikh Irshad Mansoori, have alleged they were hit by pellets fired by security forces. Lochab risks losing vision in his right eye after a pellet pierced his pupil. A 28-year-old journalist also sustained pellet injuries. The Delhi Police has denied using pellet guns, while the CRPF is verifying media reports .
4. What internal actions have the police and CRPF taken?
The CRPF headquarters has sought an incident report from its RAF unit regarding the handling of the protests and the alleged use of pellet guns . The RAF has begun an internal verification of its personnel’s conduct. Additionally, Delhi Police removed ADCP Sandeep Lamba from protest duty after a video showed him slapping a female protester .
5. What is the CJP doing in response to the police action?
The CJP has announced it will launch a website to archive videos and photographs documenting alleged police brutality during the crackdown. The material will form the basis of legal proceedings seeking the registration of FIRs against the police personnel allegedly responsible for the violence [citation:original text].
Government Sacks 47 NTA Officials, Tightens Anti-Paper Leak Law: A Comprehensive Crackdown on Exam Malpractices
By Aditi Nayar
New Delhi, July 25, 2026
In a move to crack down on exam malpractices, the Centre has taken a slew of actions, including strengthening the anti-paper leak law and terminating the services of up to 47 officials in the National Testing Agency (NTA) [citation:original text]. The Union Cabinet on Friday cleared a proposal to introduce amendments to the Public Examinations (Prevention of Unfair Means) Act, 2024, endowing the anti-paper leak law with tougher penalties and time-bound trial mechanisms [citation:original text].
Sources in the Ministry of Education said that the NTA had terminated 47 officials from their services. “Legal and criminal actions will also be taken against some of these officials. More reformative actions will follow. This is part of a complete overhaul of the NTA that has been in controversy over paper leaks,” a source said [citation:original text]. The proposed amendments to the anti-cheating law include steeper jail sentences, higher financial penalties and setting up of fast-track courts for speedy trials [citation:original text].
The NTA Overhaul: A Complete Restructuring
The decision to terminate 47 officials is part of a broader effort to overhaul the National Testing Agency, which has been under intense scrutiny for repeated paper leaks and administrative failures . The NTA has been at the centre of a major controversy following the leak of the NEET-UG 2026 question paper, which led to widespread protests and demands for accountability . The Ministry of Education has indicated that more reformative actions will follow, signalling a comprehensive restructuring of the agency’s operations and personnel.
The government is also planning to transform the NTA into a more robust and transparent body, with a focus on technology-driven solutions to prevent future leaks. This includes the introduction of computer-based testing (CBT) for the NEET-UG examination—a move that has been under consideration for some time . The Supreme Court on Friday indicated that it would closely monitor the proposed overhaul and directed the government to file a detailed response on whether it intends to shift the NEET-UG exam to a computer-based test and the safeguards it proposes to put in place .
The Amendments: Tougher Penalties and Speedy Trials
The proposed amendments to the Public Examinations (Prevention of Unfair Means) Act, 2024, represent a significant strengthening of the legal framework against paper leaks and malpractices . The Act, which was passed unanimously by both Houses of Parliament in 2024, was introduced to curb organised gangs, mafia, and other elements involved in paper leaks and cheating in public examinations . The law provides for a maximum punishment of 10 years of imprisonment and a fine of up to ₹1 crore for those involved in leaking question papers or answer keys . It also mandates that the government bring in legislation to provide for punishments for those who resort to cheating in competitive examinations .
The proposed amendments include:
-
Steeper Jail Sentences: Increasing the maximum punishment for those involved in paper leaks.
-
Higher Financial Penalties: Imposing more substantial fines to deter offenders.
-
Fast-Track Courts: Setting up special courts for speedy trials to ensure that cases are resolved quickly and justice is delivered without delay.
The Education Ministry has also set up a Joint Committee to examine the comprehensive overhaul of the NTA . The committee will make recommendations for reforms to the NTA and improve the examination processes overall .
The NEET Crisis and the Government’s Response
The NEET-UG 2026 examination, taken by over 24 lakh medical aspirants across the country, was cancelled in June 2026 after reports emerged that the question paper had been leaked . The government ordered a CBI probe into the leak, and the re-test was conducted on July 11 . The controversy has been a major political flashpoint, with students demanding the resignation of Union Education Minister Dharmendra Pradhan . The government’s decision to sack 47 NTA officials and tighten the anti-paper leak law is seen as a direct response to the public outcry.
The government has also established fast-track courts in four states (Bombay, Calcutta, Delhi, and Madhya Pradesh High Court jurisdictions) to handle paper leak cases under the Act . These courts will hear cases on a day-to-day basis . The Madhya Pradesh High Court has already designated four special fast-track courts for paper leak cases, directing them to dispose of cases within three months of filing charge sheets .
The Supreme Court’s Role
The Supreme Court has taken a keen interest in the matter. On July 24, the Court indicated that it would closely monitor the proposed overhaul of the NEET and directed the government to file a detailed response on whether it intends to shift the NEET-UG exam to a computer-based test and the safeguards it proposes to put in place . The Court’s involvement underscores the seriousness with which the judiciary views the crisis and its determination to ensure that the examination system is fair and transparent.
The CJP Protest: A Movement for Accountability
The government’s actions come amid ongoing protests by the Cockroach Janta Party (CJP), which has been demanding the resignation of Union Education Minister Dharmendra Pradhan and a thorough investigation into the NEET paper leak . The CJP protests have drawn thousands of students from across the country and have been marked by a heavy police crackdown on July 20 . The government’s move to sack NTA officials and tighten the law is likely to be seen as a concession to the protesters’ demands, though the CJP has insisted that the Education Minister must resign.
Q&A Section
1. How many NTA officials have been terminated and why?
The government has terminated 47 officials from the National Testing Agency (NTA) . This is part of a complete overhaul of the NTA, which has been in controversy over paper leaks. Legal and criminal actions will also be taken against some of these officials, with more reformative actions to follow .
2. What amendments are being proposed to the Public Examinations (Prevention of Unfair Means) Act, 2024?
The proposed amendments include steeper jail sentences, higher financial penalties, and the setting up of fast-track courts for speedy trials . The Act already provides for a maximum punishment of 10 years of imprisonment and a fine of up to ₹1 crore for those involved in paper leaks .
3. What is the status of the NEET-UG 2026 examination?
The NEET-UG 2026 examination was cancelled in June 2026 after a paper leak . A re-test was conducted on July 11, 2026 . The government has ordered a CBI probe into the leak. The Supreme Court has directed the government to file a response on whether it intends to shift the NEET-UG exam to a computer-based test .
4. What is the role of fast-track courts in handling paper leak cases?
The government has directed the establishment of fast-track courts in four states (Bombay, Calcutta, Delhi, and Madhya Pradesh High Court jurisdictions) to hear cases under the Public Examinations (Prevention of Unfair Means) Act, 2024 . These courts will hear cases on a day-to-day basis . The Madhya Pradesh High Court has designated four special fast-track courts, directing disposal within three months of charge sheet filing .
5. What are the key demands of the Cockroach Janta Party (CJP) protests?
The CJP protests have been demanding the resignation of Union Education Minister Dharmendra Pradhan, a thorough investigation into the NEET paper leak, and accountability for the examination system’s failures. The protests drew thousands of students to Jantar Mantar, with a heavy police crackdown on July 20 . The government’s actions to sack NTA officials and tighten the law are seen as a response to these demands, but the CJP has insisted that the Education Minister must resign .
Can EC Do Whatever It Wants? Delhi High Court Questions Teacher Deployment for Electoral Roll Revision
By The Hindu Bureau
New Delhi, July 25, 2026
The Delhi High Court on Friday sought the Election Commission’s (EC) response to a public interest litigation (PIL) plea challenging the “large-scale” deployment of government school teachers as Booth-Level Officers (BLOs) and enumeration staff for the ongoing special intensive revision (SIR) of electoral rolls in the national capital [citation:original text].
A Bench of Chief Justice D.K. Upadhyaya and Justice Tejas Karia directed the EC to file a short affidavit after hearing the PIL plea filed by advocates Rajesh Kumar Gogna and Ashok Agarwal [citation:original text]. The plea questioned whether government school teachers could be mandatorily assigned election duties [citation:original text].
The Trigger: A Teacher’s Death and the Burden of Dual Duties
The PIL gained urgency following the death of Suman Lata, 51, a teacher at a Municipal Corporation of Delhi primary school, who died of a heart attack on July 22, while assigned BLO duties for the SIR exercise . Her husband, Sanjeev Kumar Yadav, said Lata had been under considerable stress over the past few days while balancing her responsibilities as a teacher and duties as a BLO . The incident has brought the human cost of the SIR exercise into sharp focus, raising questions about the well-being of teachers who are being asked to perform multiple duties.
The PIL and the “Large-Scale” Deployment of Teachers
The PIL plea contends that the mass deployment of government, municipal and government-aided school teachers for the SIR is adversely affecting the education of lakhs of students in Delhi . It alleged that in several schools, regular teaching staff had been withdrawn during school hours, forcing classes to be handled by guest teachers or teachers from unrelated subjects [citation:original text]. The plea sought a direction to the authorities to “rationalise” the deployment of school teachers by capping it at 10% and scheduling their duties outside teaching hours [citation:original text]. The plea argued that the withdrawal of regular teaching staff is affecting the quality of education in Delhi’s government schools.
The Election Commission’s Defence: “Voluntary” and “Liberal”
The EC’s counsel submitted that the SIR is a nationwide exercise and teachers are required to perform poll-related work only during non-teaching hours or on holidays. He said teachers receive honorarium and compensation for the work, adding that only 10-14% of teachers are ultimately deployed [citation:original text]. “If a request is made for nine teachers, the school deploys only three to four. I don’t have a problem with four teachers showing up,” the EC’s counsel said, describing the poll panel’s approach as “liberal” [citation:original text]. However, this assertion was met with skepticism by the Bench, which pointed out that teachers may not be interested in the honorarium and need rest.
The High Court’s Observations: “Can They Be Said to Be Mandatory?”
The Bench observed that if the EC states that participation by teachers is voluntary rather than mandatory, the court could dispose of the matter. “Can they be said to be mandatory? Somebody is not interested in your honorarium or compensation. They need rest. It should be voluntary. Taking shade of Article 324, you can do whatever you want?” the court orally remarked. “If you are calling them volunteers, make that statement. We will dispose of it,” it added [citation:original text].
Article 324 grants EC the power of “superintendence, direction and control” over polls in India [citation:original text]. The Bench’s observation suggests that the court is concerned that the EC may be using its constitutional powers to impose mandatory duties on teachers, without giving them the option to decline. The question of whether teachers can be forced to take on election duties, and whether such mandatory deployment can be justified as “voluntary” when the alternative is effectively non-existent, lies at the heart of the matter.
The Broader Context: The SIR and Its Controversies
The SIR exercise is a nationwide effort to update electoral rolls, remove duplicate, deceased, shifted and foreign voters, and ensure eligible citizens are enrolled . However, its implementation has raised serious concerns about wrongful exclusion and the disproportionate burden on government employees, particularly teachers . The SIR in West Bengal had been particularly controversial, with over 60 lakh names under scrutiny and the Supreme Court having to intervene to prevent the use of SIR outcomes for purposes other than voting .
The deployment of teachers for SIR duties is not new, but the scale of the exercise in Delhi has raised alarm. The PIL estimated that around 15,000-20,000 teachers in Delhi may be engaged in SIR duties, significantly impacting the teaching staff available in schools . The plea argued that the SIR is an administrative exercise and is not a statutory activity mandated by the Constitution, and that the EC cannot use its powers under Article 324 to impose such a burden on the teaching community .
The Way Forward: Balancing Electoral Integrity and Educational Needs
The Delhi High Court is scheduled to hear the matter again on July 28 . The court has given the EC an opportunity to clarify whether teacher participation is mandatory or voluntary. If the EC confirms that it is voluntary, the court is likely to dispose of the PIL. However, if the court determines that the deployment is mandatory, it could strike down the EC’s practice as unconstitutional, or direct the EC to cap the number of teachers deployed and ensure that their duties do not interfere with their teaching responsibilities .
The case raises a broader question: Can a constitutional body like the EC, while exercising its powers under Article 324, impose mandatory duties on teachers for administrative exercises like the SIR, particularly when the exercise’s necessity and impact are contested? The Delhi High Court’s intervention is a crucial step in determining the balance between the EC’s constitutional mandate and the fundamental right to education of lakhs of students.
Q&A Section
1. What is the PIL filed in the Delhi High Court about?
The PIL challenges the “large-scale” deployment of government school teachers as Booth-Level Officers (BLOs) and enumeration staff for the Special Intensive Revision (SIR) of electoral rolls in Delhi. It argues that this is adversely affecting the education of lakhs of students, as regular teaching staff are being withdrawn during school hours [citation:original text].
2. What happened to Suman Lata, and why is her death significant?
Suman Lata, a 51-year-old teacher at a Municipal Corporation of Delhi primary school, died of a heart attack on July 22 while assigned BLO duties for the SIR exercise . Her husband said she was under “considerable stress” while balancing teaching and election work . Her death has highlighted the human cost of the SIR exercise and the burden on teachers.
3. What did the Election Commission argue in its defence?
The EC argued that teachers are required to perform poll-related work only during non-teaching hours, receive honorarium, and that only 10-14% of teachers are ultimately deployed. It described its approach as “liberal”. However, the court expressed skepticism, questioning whether participation is genuinely voluntary .
4. What did the High Court ask the Election Commission?
The High Court asked the EC to file a short affidavit clarifying whether teacher participation in the SIR is voluntary or mandatory. The court observed that if the EC states participation is voluntary, the matter could be disposed of. The court also questioned whether the EC can use Article 324 to impose mandatory duties on teachers .
5. What is the next hearing date and what is at stake?
The Delhi High Court has listed the next hearing for July 28 [citation:original text]. The court is likely to decide whether the EC’s deployment of teachers is constitutional and whether it violates the fundamental right to education. The outcome could set a precedent for how the EC can use government employees for election-related work, potentially limiting the EC’s power to impose mandatory duties on teachers .
SC Proposes Special Courts for Manipur Violence Cases: A Bid for Justice After Years of Delay
By Aaratrika Bhaumik
New Delhi, July 25, 2026
The Supreme Court on Friday proposed the establishment of special courts to conduct day-to-day trials in cases arising out of the 2023 Manipur violence and directed the investigating agencies to expedite the pending probes to ensure that there is no further “inordinate delay” [citation:original text].
A Bench comprising Chief Justice of India Surya Kant and Justices Joymalya Bagchi and V. Mohana was hearing a batch of petitions relating to the ethnic violence in the State [citation:original text]. Referring to status reports filed by the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) and the Special Investigation Team (SIT), the Bench noted that the prevailing law and order situation had made the examination of witnesses difficult, with many having been displaced or relocated [citation:original text].
The court also pointed out that the prolonged suspension of Internet services had impeded the collection of digital evidence, while restrictions on the movement of investigating officers had hampered field investigations, contributing to delays in the probe [citation:original text].
The Context: The 2023 Manipur Violence
The ethnic violence in Manipur, which began on May 3, 2023, following a protest over the demand for Scheduled Tribe status by the Meitei community, has resulted in over 200 deaths, hundreds of injuries, and the displacement of tens of thousands of people . The conflict between the Meitei and Kuki-Zo communities has left a trail of destruction, with allegations of sexual violence, mass killings, and arson . The violence has exposed deep fissures in the state’s social fabric and raised serious questions about the efficacy of the state’s response.
In July 2023, the Supreme Court had taken suo motu cognizance of the situation, directing the Union government to formulate a comprehensive plan for relief, rehabilitation, and the restoration of peace . The Court had also ordered the CBI to investigate a video that surfaced showing two women being paraded naked and molested . The Court’s continued monitoring reflects the gravity of the situation and the need for accountability.
The Challenges of Investigation and Prosecution
The SC’s observations on Friday laid bare the formidable obstacles to delivering justice in Manipur. The law and order situation has made the examination of witnesses difficult, with many having been displaced or relocated, as the Bench noted [citation:original text]. The lack of witness protection has also been a major challenge, with many witnesses fearing reprisals .
The Court also noted that the prolonged suspension of Internet services had impeded the collection of digital evidence [citation:original text]. Internet shutdowns, which have become a frequent tool in Manipur, have hampered the ability of investigators to collect crucial digital evidence, including social media posts, videos, and messages that could be used to identify perpetrators.
Restrictions on the movement of investigating officers have also hampered field investigations, contributing to delays in the probe [citation:original text]. The situation in Manipur has been described as a “post-conflict scenario” with a “fragile peace,” requiring delicate and complex investigations .
The Proposal: Special Courts for Day-to-Day Trials
“We tentatively propose to constitute special courts, with the concurrence of the State of Manipur and the High Courts of Manipur and Gauhati, for trials to be taken up on a day-to-day basis, especially in light of the inordinate delay that has already taken place in the ongoing investigation,” the Bench said [citation:original text]. This is a significant step aimed at accelerating the judicial process and ensuring that perpetrators are held accountable.
To facilitate the establishment of the proposed special courts, the Bench directed Additional Solicitor General Aishwarya Bhati, appearing for the State government, the SIT and the CBI, to collate details of cases in which investigations have been completed and chargesheets filed, as well as those in which the probe is still under way [citation:original text]. “This information is eminently required for the purpose of determining the strength of the special courts which we propose to establish,” the Bench said [citation:original text].
The Need for Accountability and the Quest for Justice
The Supreme Court’s intervention comes at a time when the demand for accountability for the 2023 violence has only intensified . Civil society organizations, human rights groups, and the families of victims have repeatedly called for thorough investigations and swift trials. The Court’s proposal to establish special courts is a direct response to these demands.
The establishment of special courts is not a new concept. Fast-track courts have been used in the past for cases involving heinous crimes and sexual offences. However, their effectiveness depends on several factors, including the availability of judicial officers, adequate infrastructure, and the cooperation of witnesses . As the Ministry of Law and Justice has acknowledged, delays in disposal are caused by many factors, including the availability of physical infrastructure, the complexity of facts, the quality of investigation, and the cooperation of stakeholders .
The Supreme Court’s monitoring of the Manipur violence cases is a crucial reminder that the state has a duty to deliver justice to the victims of ethnic violence. The proposal for special courts is a step in the right direction, but it must be accompanied by adequate resources, witness protection, and a commitment to ensuring that the trials are fair and expeditious.
Q&A Section
1. What did the Supreme Court propose regarding cases from the 2023 Manipur violence?
The Supreme Court proposed the establishment of special courts to conduct day-to-day trials in cases arising out of the 2023 Manipur violence . The Court noted that the prevailing law and order situation had made the examination of witnesses difficult, with many having been displaced or relocated, and directed investigating agencies to expedite pending probes .
2. What challenges have hindered the investigation and prosecution of cases?
The challenges include a difficult law and order situation that has displaced witnesses, prolonged suspension of Internet services that has impeded digital evidence collection, and restrictions on the movement of investigating officers that have hampered field investigations . The lack of witness protection has also been a major issue.
3. What steps did the Bench direct to facilitate the establishment of special courts?
The Bench directed the Additional Solicitor General to collate details of cases in which investigations have been completed and chargesheets filed, as well as those in which the probe is still under way. This information is required to determine the strength of the special courts to be established .
4. How many people were affected by the 2023 Manipur violence?
The ethnic violence, which began on May 3, 2023, resulted in over 200 deaths, hundreds of injuries, and the displacement of tens of thousands of people. The conflict between the Meitei and Kuki-Zo communities has left a trail of destruction, with allegations of sexual violence, mass killings, and arson .
5. What is the legal basis for the Supreme Court’s intervention in the Manipur violence cases?
The Supreme Court is exercising its constitutional jurisdiction to ensure justice and accountability. In July 2023, the Court took suo motu cognizance of the situation and has been monitoring the investigations. The Court’s proposal to establish special courts is a direct response to the demands for accountability and the need for a fair and expeditious trial process .
Karnataka Considers Raising BPL Income Ceiling to ₹3 Lakh: A Step Towards Expanding Welfare Access
By The Hindu Bureau
Bengaluru, July 25, 2026
The Karnataka government is considering raising the annual income ceiling for eligibility under the Below Poverty Line (BPL) category from ₹1.20 lakh to ₹3 lakh, based on the recommendations of the Administrative Reforms Commission, K.H. Muniyappa, Food, Civil Supplies and Consumer Affairs Minister, said on Friday .
Mr. Muniyappa said the proposal was aimed at expanding access to welfare benefits for eligible families. “I am planning to place it before the Cabinet soon,” he told presspersons after a review meeting chaired jointly with H.M. Revanna, chairman of the Karnataka State Guarantee Schemes Implementation Committee .
The Rationale Behind the Revision
The current income ceiling of ₹1.20 lakh was fixed in 2017 and has remained unchanged for nearly a decade . Over this period, the cost of living, particularly in urban areas like Bengaluru, has increased substantially, making the existing threshold outdated .
The Administrative Reforms Commission, headed by senior Congress leader R.V. Deshpande, has already submitted its report recommending the increase to ₹3 lakh . The government is now examining this proposal to ensure that more deserving families can access the benefits of the Public Distribution System (PDS) and other welfare schemes .
The Scale of the Public Distribution System
Karnataka currently has approximately 1.24 crore households holding BPL or Priority Household (PHH) ration cards, covering around 4.42 crore beneficiaries—about 65.9% of the state’s population . This is one of the highest coverage rates among states under the National Food Security Act .
Under the PDS, the state provides 10 kg of foodgrains per beneficiary every month—5 kg supplied by the Central government and an additional 5 kg under the state’s Anna Bhagya scheme . The government is now transitioning from the additional 5 kg of free rice to the ‘Indira food kit’, which will include pulses, edible oil, sugar and salt to improve nutritional diversity and reduce misuse .
The Ration Card Verification Exercise
The proposal to raise the income ceiling comes amid a state-wide verification of BPL cards. Of the 7.8 lakh cards flagged by the Centre, 4.3 lakh have been reclassified to the Above Poverty Line (APL) category . However, Mr. Muniyappa clarified that no cards are being cancelled arbitrarily—only those found ineligible under Union government guidelines are being shifted to APL .
“Even if a daily wager works 25 days a month and earns Rs 500 a day, the annual income comes to Rs 1.5 lakh,” he noted, highlighting how the current ceiling of ₹1.2 lakh excludes many deserving families . The Minister also emphasised that genuine beneficiaries would be issued new BPL cards within 15 days to ensure no eligible family is left out .
Technological Interventions to Curb Diversion
To address concerns about the diversion of foodgrains to the black market, the department is implementing several technological measures :
-
GPS tracking on vehicles transporting foodgrains .
-
CCTV surveillance at warehouses, taluk societies and fair price shops .
-
A centralised command and control centre to monitor nearly 22,000 fair price shops in real time .
-
33 additional inspection vehicles to monitor weights and measures .
Challenges and Concerns
Despite the government’s efforts, the verification exercise has raised concerns among opposition parties and citizen groups. BJP leaders have alleged that thousands of BPL cards are being cancelled without proper door-to-door surveys, particularly in urban areas where the cost of living is high . JDS leaders have also pointed out that BPL cards are essential not just for food but for accessing healthcare, education scholarships and other government schemes .
The government has responded by stating that the verification is being conducted in accordance with central guidelines and that the proposed income ceiling revision will address many of these concerns .
Q&A Section
1. What is the current income ceiling for BPL ration cards in Karnataka, and what is the proposed revision?
The current annual income ceiling for Below Poverty Line (BPL) ration cards is ₹1.20 lakh. The Karnataka government is considering raising this to ₹3 lakh, based on the recommendations of the Administrative Reforms Commission .
2. Why is the government proposing to raise the BPL income ceiling?
The existing limit of ₹1.20 lakh was fixed in 2017 and is now outdated. The cost of living has increased significantly over the past nine years, and a daily wager earning ₹500 per day for 25 days would have an annual income of ₹1.5 lakh, exceeding the current threshold .
3. What is the Indira food kit and how is it changing the PDS?
The Indira food kit is replacing the additional 5 kg of free rice provided under the Anna Bhagya scheme. The kit includes items such as tur dal, moong dal, sugar, salt and cooking oil . This change aims to improve nutritional diversity, reduce the diversion of rice to the black market, and save the government approximately ₹306 crore annually .
4. How many BPL cards have been reclassified during the verification exercise?
Of the 7.8 lakh BPL cards flagged by the Centre, 4.3 lakh have been reclassified to the Above Poverty Line (APL) category. However, the government has clarified that no cards are being cancelled arbitrarily—only those found ineligible under Union government guidelines are being shifted .
5. What technological measures is the government implementing to monitor the PDS?
The government is installing GPS tracking devices on vehicles transporting foodgrains, implementing CCTV surveillance at warehouses and fair price shops, and setting up a centralised command and control centre to monitor nearly 22,000 fair price shops in real time. Additional inspection vehicles have also been deployed to monitor weights and measures .
Cabinet Clears ₹1,264-Crore Rail Project in Karnataka, Andhra Pradesh
By The Hindu Bureau
New Delhi, July 25, 2026
The Cabinet Committee on Economic Affairs chaired by Prime Minister Narendra Modi on Friday approved the third and fourth lines of the Ballari-Guntakal rail section across Karnataka and Andhra Pradesh. The project is estimated to cost ₹1,264 crore [citation:original text].
The multi-tracking project covering three districts across the two States will increase the existing network of Indian Railways by about 46 km and will be completed by 2028-29 [citation:original text]. The proposed multi-tracking project will enhance connectivity to approximately 99 villages with a combined population of about seven lakh, a spokesperson for the Railway Ministry stated [citation:original text].
A Vital Economic Corridor
The Ballari-Guntakal section is a critical economic corridor linking Andhra Pradesh and Karnataka, serving as a major freight route for transporting commodities such as iron ore, dolomite, limestone, iron and steel, coal, fertilisers, and food grains . The capacity augmentation works will result in additional freight traffic of magnitude 16.22 MTPA (Million Tonnes Per Annum) .
The project will improve rail connectivity to several prominent tourist destinations, including Ballari Fort and Sri Kumara Swamy Temple [citation:original text]. The capacity enhancement will improve rail connectivity to several prominent tourist destinations across the country, including Ballari Fort, Sri Kumara Swamy Temple .
Environmental and Economic Benefits
The project is planned under the PM GatiShakti National Master Plan with focus on enhancing multi-modal connectivity and logistics efficiency through integrated planning and stakeholder consultations [citation:original text]. The Railways being environment friendly and energy efficient mode of transportation, will help both in achieving climate goals and minimizing logistics cost of the country . The project is estimated to save 1.32 crore litres of oil and cut 6.67 crore kilograms of carbon dioxide emissions, equivalent to planting 0.27 crore trees .
The project is in line with Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s vision of a New India which will make people of the region “Atmanirbhar” by way of comprehensive development in the area which will enhance their employment/ self-employment opportunities .
Q&A Section
1. What is the total cost and scope of the Ballari-Guntakal rail project?
The project has been approved at a total cost of ₹1,264 crore and will add approximately 46 km of new railway lines to the existing network [citation:original text]. The project involves the construction of third and fourth railway lines on the Ballari-Guntakal section spanning Karnataka and Andhra Pradesh .
2. Which districts and villages will benefit from this project?
The project covers three districts across Karnataka and Andhra Pradesh and will enhance connectivity to approximately 99 villages with a combined population of about seven lakh people [citation:original text].
3. What is the strategic importance of this rail section?
The Ballari-Guntakal section is a vital economic corridor for transporting commodities such as iron ore, dolomite, limestone, iron and steel, coal, fertilisers, and food grains . The capacity augmentation is expected to generate an additional freight traffic of 16.22 million tonnes per annum .
4. What are the environmental benefits of the project?
The project is expected to save 1.32 crore litres of oil and reduce carbon dioxide emissions by 6.67 crore kilograms, which is equivalent to planting approximately 0.27 crore trees . The shift to rail transport will help in achieving climate goals while minimising logistics costs .
5. When is the project expected to be completed?
The multi-tracking project is scheduled for completion by 2028-29 [citation:original text]. The project was approved under the PM Gati Shakti National Master Plan to enhance multimodal connectivity and logistics efficiency .
Like Children, Elderly Too Need State-Led Care Mechanism: Karnataka High Court’s Landmark Directive
By The Hindu Bureau
Bengaluru, July 25, 2026
Taking note of increasing litigation related to the violation of the rights of senior citizens, the High Court of Karnataka has directed the State to examine the feasibility of creating a comprehensive policy or legislative framework for “senior citizens in need of care and protection”, broadly modelled on the lines of protection given to minors through the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015 .
The court also directed the Mysuru district administration to admit a 74-year-old woman, suffering from gangrene and age-related ailments, and who was not taken care of by her children, to a government hospital and to provide her with all necessary treatment and care at the cost of the government .
Justice Suraj Govindaraj passed the order while hearing a petition filed by the woman’s 38-year-old son, who had challenged an order passed by the Assistant Commissioner, Mysuru, in favour of his mother on issues related to her maintenance .
The Case That Sparked the Intervention
The case before the High Court involved a 74-year-old woman suffering from gangrene and age-related ailments. Her son, who was the petitioner, had challenged an order passed by the Assistant Commissioner, Mysuru, in favour of his mother on issues related to her maintenance . The court’s intervention, however, went far beyond the immediate dispute, focusing on the systemic failure to protect the elderly.
During the hearing, the court noted that many petitions involving neglect, abandonment, abuse, exploitation, deprivation of maintenance, denial of residence, unlawful deprivation of property, lack of medical care, absence of institutional support and other circumstances affecting their dignity, safety and well-being have been filed . This recognition of a recurring pattern of elderly neglect prompted the court to ask a larger question: Is the existing legal framework adequate to protect the elderly?
The Inadequacy of the Existing Framework
The court directed the State government to examine whether the existing statutory framework under the Maintenance and Welfare of Parents and Senior Citizens Act, 2007, adequately addresses all such situations or whether additional executive, policy or legislative measures are required to identify and extend to the senior citizens required extended measures relating to rescue, protection, shelter, healthcare, and community-based care, on the lines of the provisions in the JJ Act, 2015 .
The Maintenance and Welfare of Parents and Senior Citizens Act, 2007, was a landmark legislation that provided a legal framework for the maintenance and welfare of parents and senior citizens. It made it a legal obligation for children and heirs to provide maintenance to their parents and senior citizens, and established Tribunals to hear complaints . The Act also provided for the establishment of old age homes and protection of life and property of senior citizens . However, despite the existence of this Act, the court noted that the number of cases of elderly neglect and abuse has only increased . The implementation of the Act has been poor, with many states having a low conviction rate . Moreover, the Act does not provide for a comprehensive state-led care mechanism for the elderly, similar to the one provided for children .
The Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015, provides a comprehensive framework for the care and protection of children, including provisions for the identification, rescue, and rehabilitation of children in need of care and protection. The Act establishes a network of institutions, including Child Welfare Committees, Juvenile Justice Boards, and Children’s Homes, to ensure that children are protected and cared for . The court suggested that a similar framework, adapted for the elderly, could address the gaps in the current system.
The Demographic Imperative: India’s Ageing Population
The court’s directive comes at a critical time. India is witnessing a demographic shift, with the proportion of the elderly population rising rapidly. According to the 2011 Census, India had approximately 104 million elderly persons (aged 60 years and above) . By 2031, this number is projected to increase to 178 million, and by 2050, it is expected to reach 319 million, constituting around 20% of the total population . This demographic shift means that the challenges of elderly care will only intensify in the coming years.
India’s elderly population is also becoming increasingly vulnerable due to changing family structures and economic pressures . Urbanization and migration have led to a breakdown of traditional joint family systems, leaving many elderly persons alone and without support . The nuclear family is increasingly unable to care for the elderly due to economic pressures, and the burden of care often falls disproportionately on women, who themselves are often in vulnerable positions .
The Way Forward: A Comprehensive Policy Framework
The Karnataka High Court’s directive is a significant step towards recognising the elderly as a vulnerable group requiring state protection. The court’s suggestion to model a framework on the lines of the Juvenile Justice Act is a powerful acknowledgment that the state has a constitutional duty to protect the elderly in the same way it protects children.
The court has asked the State government to examine whether the existing framework under the Maintenance and Welfare of Parents and Senior Citizens Act, 2007, adequately addresses all situations or whether additional executive, policy or legislative measures are required . The government is now expected to respond by examining the feasibility of creating a comprehensive policy or legislative framework for senior citizens . The court has also directed the State to explore the creation of a “state-led care mechanism” for the elderly, similar to the one that exists for children . This could include the establishment of a network of institutional care, community-based care, and support services for the elderly.
Q&A Section
1. What was the Karnataka High Court’s directive regarding senior citizens?
The High Court directed the State government to examine the feasibility of creating a comprehensive policy or legislative framework for “senior citizens in need of care and protection”, modelled on the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015. The court recognised that the elderly, like children, are a vulnerable group requiring state protection and a robust care mechanism .
2. What specific case prompted the court’s intervention?
The court was hearing a petition by a 38-year-old son challenging a maintenance order in favour of his 74-year-old mother, who was suffering from gangrene and other age-related ailments and was not being cared for by her children . The court directed the Mysuru district administration to provide her with necessary medical treatment at government cost .
3. What is the existing legal framework for the care and protection of senior citizens in India?
The primary legislation is the Maintenance and Welfare of Parents and Senior Citizens Act, 2007, which provides for maintenance, establishment of old age homes, and protection of life and property of senior citizens. However, the court noted that despite the Act, cases of elderly neglect and abuse are increasing, and the implementation of the Act has been poor .
4. Why does the court believe a new framework is needed?
The court observed that the existing Act may not adequately address all situations of neglect, abuse, and exploitation of the elderly. The court noted the need for a comprehensive state-led care mechanism, including rescue, protection, shelter, healthcare, and community-based care—similar to the provisions under the Juvenile Justice Act for children .
5. What is the demographic context of this directive?
India’s elderly population is growing rapidly. From approximately 104 million in 2011, it is projected to reach 178 million by 2031 and 319 million by 2050, constituting about 20% of the total population. Changing family structures, urbanization, and economic pressures are making many elderly persons vulnerable and in need of state support .
A Growth Story That Needs Women at Work: India’s Demographic Dividend at Risk
By Aditi Nayar
New Delhi, July 25, 2026
India aspires to become a developed country (Viksit Bharat) by 2047, yet youth unemployment is already double the rate of 2012. India, especially the government, may be forced to recognise the weaknesses of India’s economy due to the West Asia war shock. However, weakness pre-dates this exogenous shock. Policy-induced shocks from 2016 (demonetisation, a poorly designed Goods and Services Tax, NBFCs, COVID-19 pandemic management) to the economy had already reversed structural change (rise in farm employment, falling manufacturing share of gross value added and in employment); non-farm job growth had slowed. The economy became more unequal, and hence aggregate demand collapsed, and with it investment/GDP ratio. So, GDP growth is much slower (even if government figures of 6.2% p.a. are believed, it is actually at best 4.5%, as the former Chief Economic Adviser recently argued) [citation:original text].
The Jobless Growth Conundrum
India’s economic story is plagued by a fundamental contradiction: growth without jobs. As the recently published book India Out of Work by Santosh Mehrotra and Jajati K. Parida argues, India’s race against time has already begun, and the nation is dangerously falling behind. With barely fifteen years left to leverage its historic demographic dividend, India faces the stark possibility of growing old before it grows rich . The authors argue that India must sustain 9% annual growth and create 350 million non-farm jobs by 2055 to secure its future economic stability .
The data paints a grim picture. Youth unemployment has doubled since 2012, and the economy has experienced a slowdown in job creation. Non-farm employment growth has stalled, and the manufacturing sector has failed to absorb the growing workforce. Between 2012 and 2018, labour-intensive sectors such as textiles, food processing, garments, and small-scale manufacturing saw a fall in absolute employment terms [citation:original text]. This is the reality behind the hype of “Make in India” and Performance-Linked Incentives [citation:original text].
The Engine of Growth: Women at Work
Further, India’s growth story will remain incomplete without increasing the work participation rate (WPR) of half the population, i.e., women. In a new study, we estimate that a 10-percentage-point increase in India’s female WPR could add nearly two percentage points to GDP growth, making women’s employment one of the strongest drivers of economic growth. To sustain rapid growth of 8%-9% and emerge as a global economic power, the nation must harness the immense potential of its youth, especially young women [citation:original text]. The World Bank has similarly estimated that raising women’s labour force participation to 50% could increase India’s annual GDP growth rate by 1 percentage point .
Increased female WPR could contribute to economic growth in multiple ways. First, it increases the overall labour supply, thereby expanding productive capacity. When more women enter paid employment, household incomes rise, consumption increases, and savings improve. Higher household incomes also lead to better nutrition, education, and healthcare for children, thereby strengthening long-term human capital. Women’s work participation can also improve productivity and innovation. Based on cross-country evidence, Nobel laureate Claudia Goldin argues that gender-diverse workplaces are often more efficient, creative, and competitive. Including women in the workforce is not merely a welfare measure but also a strategy for enhancing national productivity [citation:original text].
However, the work participation rate (WPR) of women in India remains below 30% – among the lowest in the world, comparable to that of countries such as Saudi Arabia and Yemen. India’s female labour force participation rate (LFPR) is low by international standards, even when compared with countries at similar levels of per capita income. Worse, it declined steadily between 1983 and 2018. As overall job growth in both the farm and non-farm sectors fell between 2012 and 2018, how did women fare? This is a critical question, especially since women are now much better educated than earlier [citation:original text].
The Distress-Driven Feminisation of Agriculture
In the 1980s and during the early 1990s, the WPR for women was high, primarily due to high participation in agricultural activities. However, this trend began to decline as economic growth and structural transformation led to a shift away from agriculture from 2004-05 to 2012. Many rural women withdrew from the workforce due to mechanisation and reduced demand for manual labour. Fortunately, this period also saw a rise in educational attainment among young women, leading to increased school attendance. However, after 2012, the Indian economy experienced a slowdown [citation:original text].
The COVID-19 pandemic induced economic distress, and large-scale return migration from urban to rural areas. With male workers losing urban employment and moving back to villages, women were compelled to intensify their role in subsistence agriculture and allied activities, often as unpaid family labour. This surge in unpaid family labour reflected a “distress-driven feminisation of agriculture”, as women entered or remained in insecure, informal, and unremunerated agricultural work, due to shrinking non-farm opportunities and reinforced gender norms that limited mobility. The collapse of non-farm work for men and women meant that adult, poorly educated women returned to agriculture [citation:original text].
The structure of India’s economic growth has also contributed to weak female employment generation. Much of India’s recent GDP growth has been concentrated in capital-intensive sectors such as finance, information technology, and organised manufacturing, which do not absorb large numbers of workers. Female employment in manufacturing in 2019 was lower than in 2004, showing how manufacturing jobs collapsed, despite all the hype about “Make in India” [citation:original text].
The North-South Divide: Tamil Nadu’s Success Story
There is a real north-south divide. What is achievable is demonstrated by Tamil Nadu, which has been one of India’s fastest-growing States. More than 40% of India’s women factory workers are employed in Tamil Nadu. This is remarkable, given that Tamil Nadu accounts for only about 5%-6% of India’s population. This concentration is driven primarily by the State’s strong presence in textiles and garments (especially in Tiruppur and Coimbatore), footwear, electronics assembly (Sriperumbudur), and automobiles and auto components, as well as by higher female literacy, greater mobility, and well-developed hostel and transport facilities for women workers [citation:original text].
Recent data from the Ministry of Statistics and Programme Implementation places Coimbatore and Madurai among India’s three leading large cities for female labour-force participation. Coimbatore recorded a female LFPR of 41.3%, while Madurai stood at 37% . Tamil Nadu’s lead is especially clear in registered factories, where it accounts for around 40% of all women directly employed in Indian factories .
The most important recent shift is the movement of women from traditional sectors into electronics manufacturing. In 2013-14, Tamil Nadu accounted for about 20% of women directly employed in the manufacture of computers, electronic and optical products. By 2023-24, its share had increased to 43% . Foxconn’s iPhone operations near Chennai have become the most prominent example, but the ecosystem now includes Tata Electronics and numerous component, testing and assembly suppliers .
A key factor behind Tamil Nadu’s success is its housing strategy. The state government has invested in women-only residential complexes near industrial clusters, such as the Vallam Vadagal facility near Sriperumbudur, which has capacity for 18,720 workers. The Thozhi hostels, developed under a public-private partnership model, provide affordable, secure accommodation for working women . Housing is treated as economic infrastructure rather than welfare spending, reducing employers’ need for separate mobility infrastructure and improving retention of migrant labour .
The Way Forward
Hindi-belt States need to invest in health and public education for all, especially of girls and women, to reduce higher-than-African level malnutrition and stunting rates – as the Southern states have done. They can then also see similar outcomes. There is no chance for India being ‘Viksit’ without gender equality in all dimensions, especially in north India [citation:original text].
Some increase of female WPR (who re-entered agriculture) across India since 2020 was due to older adult women engaging in animal husbandry and poultry farming – a welcome development for household incomes. However, the number of young women (aged 15-29 years) who were neither looking for work nor in education was under 70 million until 2004. It increased to 84 million in 2012 and then rose to over 100 million by 2018. Bihar’s female WPR is only 15%. Hence, India will remain out of work, and cannot become a developed country by excluding half its population from productive employment [citation:original text].
Q&A Section
1. What is India’s current female labour force participation rate and how does it compare globally?
India’s female Labour Force Participation Rate (LFPR) stood at 32.7% in June 2026, among the lowest in the world, comparable to countries like Saudi Arabia and Yemen. While this represents a slight increase from 32.0% a year earlier, it remains far below the global average and well short of the levels needed to achieve Viksit Bharat [citation:original text].
2. Why has India’s economic growth failed to generate adequate employment, especially for women?
India’s growth has been concentrated in capital-intensive sectors like finance, IT, and organised manufacturing, which do not absorb large numbers of workers. Labour-intensive sectors such as textiles, food processing, and garments saw a fall in absolute employment between 2012 and 2018. Manufacturing jobs for women in 2019 were lower than in 2004, showing how the “Make in India” initiative failed to create sufficient employment . The COVID-19 pandemic further exacerbated the crisis, pushing women back into subsistence agriculture as unpaid family labour .
3. How would increasing women’s workforce participation benefit India’s economy?
A 10-percentage-point increase in India’s female WPR could add nearly two percentage points to GDP growth. The World Bank estimates that raising women’s participation to 50% could increase India’s annual GDP growth rate by 1 percentage point. Increased female employment expands the labour supply, raises household incomes, improves savings, and enhances long-term human capital through better nutrition, education, and healthcare for children .
4. Why is Tamil Nadu a success story in women’s employment?
Tamil Nadu accounts for over 40% of India’s women factory workers despite having only 5-6% of India’s population. The state’s success is driven by labour-intensive industries (textiles, garments, footwear, electronics), higher female literacy, greater mobility, and well-developed housing and transport facilities for women workers. The Thozhi hostels, providing safe and affordable accommodation near industrial clusters, treat housing as economic infrastructure rather than welfare .
5. What is the book “India Out of Work” about and why is it significant?
“India Out of Work” by Santosh Mehrotra and Jajati Keshari Parida examines why India’s economic growth has failed to generate adequate quality jobs. The authors argue that India must sustain 9% annual growth and create 350 million non-farm jobs by 2055 to secure its future. The book highlights the truth behind India’s “jobless growth,” the widening inequality gap, and the alarming underrepresentation of women in the workforce .
India’s Seafarers: A Maritime Workforce Caught Between Global Commerce and Geopolitical Conflict
By Syed Akbaruddin
New Delhi, July 25, 2026
At sea, nationality is usually clear. Responsibility seldom is. An Indian seafarer may be recruited in Mumbai, hired by a company based in Singapore, placed on a ship flying the flag of Panama, carrying Kuwaiti oil, attacked off the coast of Oman, and detained in a fifth country. His family may know that he is in danger without knowing which government, shipowner, or insurer is responsible for bringing him home. No single authority is fully in charge. For thousands of Indian seafarers, this uncertainty is not an exception but a routine part of ordinary working life [citation:original text].
Of the 14 Indians killed in attacks connected to the conflict in West Asia since February 28, at least eight were seafarers aboard commercial ships. Other Indian seafarers have been injured or stranded because their vessel, its owner or its cargo made them targets in a war they did not choose [citation:original text].
The Forgotten Maritime Workforce
India tends to regard seafarers as a shipping matter until trouble arises. Then, they become a consular case. Government figures put the workforce at about 3.2 lakh as of June 2025, nearly three times its size in 2014 . The 2026 Seafarer Workforce Report ranks it second behind the Philippines, narrowly ahead of China, with just over 12% of global supply .
They work abroad without ever settling abroad. Their workplace moves. That mobility sits awkwardly with a consular system organised by territory. During a single voyage, a seafarer can cross several jurisdictions. No authority follows him all the way. An Indian mission may not even know that one of its nationals is nearby until his ship is seized, abandoned or hit [citation:original text].
India cannot wait for an emergency to find out where its seafarers are. Data compiled by the International Transport Workers’ Federation show that 1,125 Indian seafarers were abandoned in 2025, more than from any other country . In such cases, the file ricochets among a flag State, port authority, owner, insurer and Indian mission [citation:original text].
The Abandonment Crisis: A National Disgrace
India has once again emerged as the world’s worst country for seafarer abandonment, with 1,125 Indian sailors left stranded in 2025, according to new data from the International Transport Workers’ Federation (ITF) . Filipino seafarers were the second worst affected at 539, followed by Syrians at 309. The global seafaring industry hit a new low in 2025, with 6,223 seafarers abandoned on 410 ships — a record .
The Forward Seamen’s Union of India (FSUI) called the situation a “national disgrace”, noting that Indians were the single largest and worst-hit national group. FSUI General Secretary Manoj Yadav accused the Ministry of Shipping and DG Shipping of regulatory failure. “The government’s posturing means nothing if hundreds of Indian families are pushed into debt and distress for the third consecutive year,” he said .
The IMO defines seafarer abandonment under three criteria: failing to cover the cost of a seafarer’s repatriation; leaving a seafarer without necessary maintenance and support; and unilaterally severing ties with a seafarer, including failure to pay contractual wages for a period of at least two months . The ITF data shows abandoned seafarers were owed $25.8 million in 2025. Of this, the ITF recovered $16.5 million and returned it to affected workers .
The Seafarer-First Response: A Long-Overdue Initiative
After the recent strikes in West Asia, the government announced its Seafarer-First response. Officials must now account for every Indian seafarer in West Asia, whatever flag the vessel flies. A dashboard will track ships, threats and crew welfare; each affected family will have a liaison officer [citation:original text].
On July 14, 2026, Union Minister Sarbananda Sonowal launched the comprehensive “Seafarer-First” response, directing authorities to account for every Indian on vessels operating in the Persian Gulf, Strait of Hormuz and Gulf of Oman, irrespective of their flag . The minister ordered real-time vessel-by-vessel monitoring, the appointment of dedicated liaison officers for every affected Indian seafarer and round-the-clock coordination by the Ministry of Ports, Shipping and Waterways in association with the Ministry of External Affairs, the Indian Navy, the Directorate General of Shipping, and Indian missions in Iran and Oman .
The dashboard will provide real-time information on vessel position, ownership, cargo, crew strength, crew welfare, threat assessment, intended voyage, next port of call and the availability of facilities . A dedicated liaison officer will be appointed for every Indian seafarer impacted by the crisis, serving as the single point of contact for families, coordinating medical updates, travel documentation, family assistance, repatriation, Seafarers Welfare Fund support, outstanding wages, contractual entitlements and other compensations .
The Gaps: Technology and Accountability
Technology adds a peculiar cruelty here. A family in Kochi can watch a ship crawl, dot by dot, across a tracking app and still have no idea whether the person aboard is injured, detained or being sent into danger. A moving dot is a poor substitute for a phone call [citation:original text].
The dashboard can locate a ship. It cannot compel an owner or flag State to act, or secure access to a detained seafarer. Continuous tracking is unrealistic. When the system is activated, recruitment agencies should supply current crew and route data from owners and managers. India needs a standing maritime consular protocol that specifies who takes charge from the moment a distress signal is received [citation:original text].
In major shipping centres, Indian missions need a designated officer who knows the port authority, hospitals, insurers and local lawyers. Such relationships cannot be improvised after a ship is hit. Some flag States are quick to register a ship and slow to enforce the Maritime Labour Convention when wages stop, a crew is abandoned or repatriation is due. India must press them to honour those obligations [citation:original text].
The Regulatory Response: Blacklisting and Accountability
The Directorate General of Shipping has taken enforcement, welfare and digital measures over the past year to tackle abandonment and improve accountability across recruitment agencies and shipping companies. Stricter guidelines have been issued for RPSLs and shipping firms, and any agency linked to an abandonment complaint is immediately blocked from further deployment. Distress calls are verified, vessels are blacklisted, and responsible companies face regulatory action .
In the last six months, over 51 RPSL licences have been withdrawn and more than 50 temporarily blocked pending investigation. Audits have been intensified, and higher bank guarantees are being proposed to safeguard seafarer welfare and repatriation. New RPSL licences have been frozen, contracts digitised, and online reporting enabled for seafarers .
The Way Forward
India’s bilateral maritime agreements usually recognise Indian certificates and expand access to jobs. However, they say little about legal assistance, consular access, or repatriation. Shipowners choose the flag under which vessels operate, but they still need crews. The Philippines and Indonesia face similar challenges. Together, the three countries could push for common standards on repatriation, detention, and deployment in conflict zones through the International Maritime Organization and the International Labour Organization. Otherwise, an owner constrained by one country’s rules can simply hire elsewhere [citation:original text].
A cook in the ship galley does not become a combatant because the cargo is disputed or the owner has acquired enemies. India should oppose attacks on commercial shipping, whoever carries them out. Open sea lanes mean little if civilian crews cannot sail through them safely [citation:original text].
Before signing a contract, a seafarer has a right to know who really owns the vessel, where it will sail, whether it is under sanctions, whether its insurance is valid and whether its owners have abandoned a crew before. Routes can change after departure. A seafarer ordered into a designated high-risk region should be able to refuse and return home without penalty [citation:original text].
On May 14, the Directorate General of Shipping prohibited licensed recruitment agencies from placing Indian seafarers on 366 vessels linked to abandonment unless specified compliance requirements were met. A seafarer should not have to hunt for the list. Recruitment agencies must show it to him before he signs and face penalties if they ignore it [citation:original text].
India’s maritime ambitions are usually measured in ports, corridors, naval deployments and tonnage. In a seafarer’s home, the questions are more immediate. Where is he? Who employs him? Who is responsible if he does not return? The flag above the vessel may be foreign. India’s responsibility to its nationals is not [citation:original text].
Q&A Section
1. How many Indian seafarers have lost their lives in the West Asia conflict?
According to the Ministry of External Affairs, 14 Indian seafarers have lost their lives so far in the escalating conflict in West Asia since February 28, 2026. Two more remain missing .
2. What is India’s “Seafarer-First” response?
The Seafarer-First response, launched on July 14, 2026, is a comprehensive government initiative to account for every Indian on every vessel operating in the Persian Gulf, Strait of Hormuz and Gulf of Oman, irrespective of their flag. It includes a vessel-by-vessel operational dashboard, dedicated liaison officers for affected families, and round-the-clock coordination across ministries and Indian missions .
3. How many Indian seafarers were abandoned in 2025?
India topped the global list for seafarer abandonment for the third consecutive year in 2025, with 1,125 Indian seafarers abandoned worldwide. The global industry hit a record high with 6,223 seafarers abandoned on 410 ships .
4. What steps has the government taken to address seafarer abandonment?
The Directorate General of Shipping has withdrawn over 51 RPSL licences, temporarily blocked more than 50 pending investigation, blacklisted vessels with abandonment records, and issued stricter guidelines for recruitment agencies. A 24×7 welfare helpline has been launched, and contracts have been digitised .
5. What rights should seafarers have before signing a contract?
Before signing a contract, a seafarer has a right to know who really owns the vessel, where it will sail, whether it is under sanctions, whether its insurance is valid, and whether its owners have abandoned a crew before. A seafarer ordered into a designated high-risk region should be able to refuse and return home without penalty [citation:original text].
The Dengue Vaccine Must Be Made Affordable to Those at Greatest Risk: India’s Qdenga Rollout at a Crossroads
By Aditi Nayar
New Delhi, July 25, 2026
The CDSCO’s approval of the Qdenga dengue vaccine – the first in India’s history – follows the vaccine’s licensing in over 40 countries and a WHO prequalification . This milestone arrives amidst some of the country’s worst dengue years, a trend that is as much a reflection of better surveillance as it is of the disease’s expanding footprint . The Aedes mosquitoes that spread the disease are increasingly encroaching into semi-urban and rural districts, where conventional vector control measures are far harder to sustain . The long gestation period for developing any dengue vaccine is understandable, given the formidable scientific challenges involved.
The Scientific Hurdle: The Four Serotype Conundrum
The four antigenically distinct dengue serotypes and the possibility of a ‘second infection’ by a different serotype producing more severe disease through antibody-dependent enhancement (ADE) mean that an effective shot has to induce strong immunity against all four at once. This constraint nearly derailed the first licensed dengue vaccine, Dengvaxia, and the controversy in the Philippines in 2017 prompted greater regulatory caution .
The design of Qdenga, by Japan-based Takeda, differs from that of Dengvaxia. Unlike the latter, Qdenga can be administered without screening for a prior dengue infection . It is a live, attenuated tetravalent vaccine developed using recombinant DNA technology, designed to protect against all four dengue virus serotypes (DENV-1, DENV-2, DENV-3, and DENV-4) . In a late-stage trial, the vaccine showed an efficacy of 80.2% against confirmed dengue cases one year after the second dose and 90.4% efficacy against dengue-related hospitalizations after 18 months .
The Gaps: Uneven Protection and a Dangerous Timing Lag
However, the editorial from the image raises critical concerns that the approval alone is insufficient. Its protection against the serotypes varies from highest against DENV-2, followed by DENV-1, while uncertainty remains regarding protection against DENV-3 and DENV-4 in people without prior exposure to dengue . This is concerning because while DENV-2 is more common in India, DENV-3 prevalence is increasing . If the DENV-3 serotype dominates the 2026 monsoon season, Qdenga’s impact could be substantially lower than anticipated, especially if many recipients are dengue-naïve .
Qdenga also requires two doses across three months apart . Clinical data suggest that the first dose protects unevenly, with stronger evidence against DENV-1 and DENV-2 than DENV-3 and DENV-4. If a seronegative person takes the first shot on July 1, when the monsoon begins, and encounters DENV-3 in August, the shot may not suffice to prevent severe illness . Ensuring the highly mobile migrant workforce receives its second dose will be significantly difficult, too; those falling through the cracks may also be exposed to concerns raised in the TIDES trial of a ‘negative efficacy’ against hospitalisation related to DENV-3 among seronegative children .
The Price Barrier: A Public Health Failure in the Making
Finally, and perhaps most critically, following Takeda’s tiered pricing strategy worldwide, Qdenga may be too expensive for the people who need it most . The vaccine is expected to be available in India in the first half of 2027, initially through private healthcare settings . Estimates suggest a cost of Rs 3,000-6,000 per dose, meaning a full two-dose course could be between Rs 6,000 and Rs 12,000 . For residents of dense urban slums with poor drainage, who face the highest risk of exposure, this price point is prohibitive .
The government has not yet announced a procurement strategy, leaving a major question mark over how the vaccine will be deployed. While India accounts for nearly one-third of the global dengue burden, and cases rose 11-fold in the past two decades , the real-world impact of Qdenga will be determined not by its efficacy in clinical trials, but by its accessibility to the populations most vulnerable to severe disease. To ensure sufficient uptake among those at greatest risk, the government must negotiate a lower price and develop a targeted, evidence-based deployment plan . In the end, administering a dengue vaccine properly in a population is no less tricky than developing a vaccine against dengue, and the Qdenga rollout should give no cause for complacency .
Q&A Section
1. What is Qdenga and how does it differ from earlier dengue vaccines?
Qdenga is a live, attenuated tetravalent vaccine developed by Takeda that protects against all four dengue serotypes . Unlike the first licensed vaccine, Dengvaxia, it can be administered without prior screening for a previous dengue infection, making its rollout simpler .
2. What are the key limitations of Qdenga’s protection?
The vaccine’s protection is strongest against DENV-2 and DENV-1, but uncertainty remains regarding protection against DENV-3 and DENV-4 in dengue-naïve individuals . This is a concern because DENV-3 prevalence is increasing in India . The vaccine also requires two doses three months apart, and the first dose alone may not fully protect against severe illness from DENV-3 if infection occurs between doses .
3. Why is the TIDES trial finding significant?
The TIDES trial raised concerns about ‘negative efficacy’ against hospitalisation related to DENV-3 among seronegative children who do not complete both doses . This underscores the importance of ensuring full adherence to the two-dose schedule, which is particularly challenging for mobile migrant workers .
4. How much is Qdenga expected to cost in India, and why is this a concern?
Qdenga is expected to be priced between Rs 3,000 and Rs 6,000 per dose, bringing the full two-dose course to potentially Rs 12,000 . This price is prohibitive for the populations living in dense urban slums and rural areas who are at the highest risk of dengue .
5. What is the likely rollout timeline and strategy for Qdenga in India?
Qdenga is expected to be available in India in the first half of 2027, with an initial launch through private healthcare settings . Takeda is working with Biological E to boost manufacturing, but the government’s procurement strategy and public health deployment plan remain unclear . The vaccine is expected to complement, not replace, existing vector control measures .
