The New Great Game, Decoding the Moscow Format and the Shifting Geopolitical Chessboard in Af-Pak

The New Great Game, Decoding the Moscow Format and the Shifting Geopolitical Chessboard in Af-Pak

The rugged, strategic landscape of Afghanistan and Pakistan (the Af-Pak region) has for centuries been the stage upon which great powers have vied for influence. From the imperial rivalry between Tsarist Russia and British India in the 19th century to the late 20th-century confrontation between the Soviet Union and the United States, this region has been a crucible of geopolitical ambition. Today, a new and more complex “Great Game” is unfolding, characterized not by a binary superpower struggle, but by a multipolar scramble involving regional heavyweights and a resurgent, ideologically driven Taliban. The recent joint statement issued by the Russia-backed Moscow Format consultations serves as a crucial diplomatic X-ray, revealing the emerging power relations, stark contradictions, and fragile alignments that will define the future of this volatile heart of Asia.

The Moscow Format, which includes ten nations—notably Russia, China, Iran, India, and Pakistan—issued a declaration that is significant both for its content and its composition. The group collectively opposed any deployment of foreign military infrastructure in Afghanistan. This statement arrives at a critical juncture, directly countering recent remarks by US President Donald Trump about potentially taking over the sprawling Bagram Airbase. The declaration is a powerful testament to the region’s unified resistance to a renewed American military footprint, a rare consensus in an otherwise fractious neighborhood.

A Rare Consensus: The Unanimity of Adversaries

The most striking feature of the Moscow Format statement is the unanimity it has elicited from traditional adversaries. For India and Pakistan to find common ground on any regional issue is a diplomatic anomaly of the first order. Their long-standing rivalry, centered on Kashmir and manifested in proxy conflicts, has typically rendered them on opposing sides of most geopolitical equations. Yet, on the question of opposing US military re-entry into Afghanistan, their interests have converged.

For India, which has historically been wary of the Pakistan-backed Taliban, this alignment is a pragmatic, if uncomfortable, necessity. New Delhi’s primary interest in Afghanistan is stability, the prevention of its territory from being used as a safe haven for anti-India terrorist groups, and the protection of its significant developmental investments over the past two decades. A renewed US military presence is seen as a potential catalyst for greater instability, re-igniting an insurgency and creating a vortex that could suck in regional powers. Furthermore, India is deeply skeptical of US reliability as a partner, given the chaotic withdrawal in 2021, and is increasingly keen to engage with the de facto authorities in Kabul to protect its interests, a shift evidenced by the upcoming visit of Taliban Foreign Minister Amir Khan Muttaqi to New Delhi.

For Pakistan, the calculus is even more complex. The Pakistani military establishment, long considered the Taliban’s patron, now finds itself in a paradoxical position. While it initially celebrated the US withdrawal and the Taliban’s victory as a strategic defeat for India, it now faces a Taliban regime that is increasingly assertive and less beholden to its creators in Rawalpindi. Cross-border tensions and the presence of the anti-Pakistan Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) have strained relations. Therefore, joining the Moscow consensus against a US return is a way for Islamabad to reassert its influence in Kabul while simultaneously signaling its alignment with other regional powers like Russia and China.

The Taliban’s Diplomatic Coming-Out Party

The Moscow Format meeting marked a significant diplomatic milestone for the Taliban regime. The participation of Foreign Minister Amir Khan Muttaqi as an official delegate—not merely as a representative of an insurgent group—was a carefully orchestrated step towards international legitimacy. The regime’s subsequent statement, urging those with “covetous ambitions” to study the history of the US occupation, was a confident assertion of its sovereignty.

This represents the largest regional endorsement of a core Taliban stance to date. The group has made it clear: it is open for business and diplomatic engagement, but it will not countenance a foreign military presence. By securing the backing of powers like Russia, China, and Iran, the Taliban is building a diplomatic bulwark against Western pressure on human rights and governance, arguing that regional acceptance is more critical for its survival than validation from Washington or Brussels. The Muttaqi visit to India, following closely on the heels of this meeting, is a masterstroke in this diplomatic offensive, demonstrating to the world, and to its own people, that it can engage with major powers on its own terms.

Pakistan’s Contradictory Gambit: Playing All Sides

Beneath the surface of regional unanimity, however, lies a web of profound contradictions, with Pakistan at its center. The country’s endorsement of the Moscow statement, which opposes US military infrastructure “in Afghanistan and even in neighbouring countries,” stands in stark contrast to its reported parallel dealings with the Trump administration.

Reports suggest that Pakistan has offered the US access to Pasni port in Balochistan, ostensibly to facilitate access to the province’s vast, untapped mineral wealth. The strategic implications of this are monumental. Pasni is located a short distance from Gwadar port, the crown jewel of China’s $60 billion China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC). It also sits perilously close to the border with Iran, a nation deeply hostile to the US and a fellow signatory of the Moscow statement.

This dual-track diplomacy reveals Pakistan’s desperate attempt to maintain its diplomatic salience by playing all sides. It seeks to:

• Retain its “all-weather” alliance with China through CPEC.

• Leverage its relationship with a transactional US administration for economic and military aid.

• Position itself as a key regional player within the Russia-China-Iran bloc.

This high-wire act is fraught with existential risk. Pakistan is betting that it can serve as a bridge between competing blocs, but history suggests that such a strategy often ends with the bridge collapsing under the weight of its own contradictions. Offering the US a foothold in Balochistan, a province already rife with a bloody insurgency fueled by grievances over CPEC and central government neglect, could ignite a wider conflagration, drawing in China and Iran directly.

The US-Pakistan Transactional Tango and Regional Ramifications

The current US-Pakistan relationship under the Trump administration is a classic example of transactional realpolitik, stripped of the ideological veneer of the Cold War or the War on Terror. President Trump, who has openly spoken of seeking “client regimes” in the region, sees in Pakistan’s Army Chief, General Asim Munir, a potential partner who can deliver on specific, short-term goals: counterterrorism cooperation, a logistical foothold for potential operations in Afghanistan, and access to strategic resources.

Similarly, Pakistan’s “hybrid” government—a fragile balance of civilian authority and overwhelming military dominance—views the US not as a long-term ally but as a source of immediate financial and military sustenance. This approach, while potentially lucrative in the short term, is inherently unstable. It is not built on shared democratic values or a coherent, long-term geopolitical vision. Instead, it is a marriage of convenience between two powers facing their own internal crises and seeking external leverage.

The long-term ramifications of this unstable equilibrium are dire for an already unsettled region. The contradictions are sure to spill over:

• China will view any permanent US presence in Pakistan, especially near Gwadar, as a direct threat to its strategic investments and a form of containment.

• Iran, already feeling encircled, will see a US-backed Pakistan as an even greater threat, potentially fueling proxy conflicts along their volatile border.

• India will be forced to recalibrate its security doctrine, perceiving a US-Pakistan rapprochement as a betrayal and a direct enhancement of its primary adversary’s capabilities.

Conclusion: A Precarious Balance in the Heart of Asia

The Moscow Format statement is more than a diplomatic communiqué; it is a snapshot of a regional order in flux. It reveals a collective front against American hegemony, a tentative and pragmatic engagement with the Taliban, and the alarming contradictions within Pakistan’s foreign policy. The new Great Game in Af-Pak is no longer a simple contest between two external powers. It is a multifaceted struggle involving regional giants—Russia, China, India, Iran—jostling for influence over a Taliban-led Afghanistan, while a transactional United States and a duplicitous Pakistan engage in a dangerous dance on the sidelines.

The region is a tinderbox of competing ambitions. The fragile consensus against foreign military bases could easily shatter under the pressure of Pakistan’s double-dealing or a precipitous US move. The path forward requires not transactional short-termism, but a sustained, multilateral effort focused on Afghan stability, economic connectivity, and counterterrorism. Without this, the new Great Game risks becoming a very real and devastating conflict, with consequences that would ripple far beyond the mountains of the Hindu Kush.

Q&A: Unpacking the New Great Game in Af-Pak

1. What is the Moscow Format, and why is its recent joint statement so significant?

The Moscow Format is a Russia-backed consultative mechanism involving ten countries, including Russia, China, Iran, India, and Pakistan, to discuss the situation in Afghanistan. Its recent joint statement is highly significant for several reasons:

• Regional Consensus: It demonstrates a rare, unified regional stance against the deployment of any foreign military infrastructure in Afghanistan, directly challenging US intentions regarding Bagram airbase.

• Taliban Legitimization: It marked the first time a Taliban foreign minister participated as an official delegate, representing a major step toward the regime’s regional diplomatic acceptance.

• Adversarial Alignment: It brought traditional rivals like India and Pakistan onto the same page, highlighting a shared desire to prevent renewed US-led instability in the region.

2. Why did both India and Pakistan, despite their rivalry, agree to oppose a US military presence in Afghanistan?

Both nations, for different reasons, see a renewed US military footprint as counter to their interests:

• India fears it would re-ignite insurgency and chaos, jeopardizing its security and its past investments in Afghan development. It also prefers to engage directly with the Taliban to secure its interests rather than rely on an unreliable US.

• Pakistan, despite its history with the US, views a American return as destabilizing. It aims to solidify its influence in Kabul and align with other regional powers like Russia and China, while managing a Taliban regime that is now less compliant.

3. What is the contradiction in Pakistan’s foreign policy as revealed by these developments?

Pakistan’s position is deeply contradictory. It signed the Moscow statement opposing US military infrastructure in “Afghanistan and neighbouring countries.” Simultaneously, it is reportedly negotiating with the US to offer access to Pasni port, which is located near the Chinese-funded Gwadar port and the Iranian border. This reveals a dangerous strategy of trying to maintain alliances with all sides—China, Russia, Iran, and the US—a gambit that risks alienating all of them and triggering a severe regional crisis.

4. How does the US-Pakistan relationship under Trump differ from previous engagements?

The current relationship is characterized by pure transactionalism. Unlike the Cold War alliance or the post-9/1 counterterrorism partnership, it lacks a foundational ideological or long-term strategic basis. The Trump administration seeks “client regimes” for specific, short-term gains (like access to bases or minerals), while Pakistan’s hybrid government views the US as a transactional benefactor for immediate financial and military aid, not a enduring ally.

5. What are the potential long-term ramifications of these shifting alliances for regional stability?

The unstable and contradictory alliances pose a grave threat to regional stability:

• Sino-American Friction: A US presence in Pakistan, especially near Gwadar, would be viewed by China as an act of containment, potentially escalating into a new Cold War front in South Asia.

• Iranian Hostility: Iran would feel further encircled, likely responding with increased support for proxies and escalating tensions along its border with Pakistan.

• Indian Insecurity: India would perceive a strengthened US-Pakistan axis as a direct threat, forcing a major recalibration of its security policy and potentially fueling a more aggressive arms race.
  The region is thus a powder keg where the sparks from these conflicting ambitions could lead to a wider conflagration.