Why Industry Can’t Afford to Wait for the State to Drive the Robotics Revolution
Elon Musk’s vision of “amazing abundance” imagines a world in which goods and services become plentiful and inexpensive, thanks to the unfolding technological revolution. The idea sounds fanciful, but it has a long lineage. Civilisations have long dreamt of magical sources of plenty—the akhaya patra of Indian mythology, the cornucopia of ancient Greeks. Karl Marx, too, believed that advancing productive forces could eventually liberate humanity from drudgery, but the obstacle was in the exploitative structure of social relations. Musk’s bet is narrower than Marx’s. He is convinced that the tech revolution at hand could produce societies of “universal high income.” Whether this seductive vision is real or not, the tech transformation is here and is called “embodied intelligence” or “physical AI.”
Digital AI generates answers to questions and is moving towards the simulation of reality, but it remains locked inside your computer. “Embodied intelligence”—robots, often built in vaguely human form and known as humanoids, that can sense their surroundings, make decisions, and use mechanical limbs to act on them—promises to step into the factory, the hospital ward, and the battlefield. Musk’s bet is that such humanoid robots could become the most consequential product ever made, doing for production what the computer did for information. This is not fantastical futurism. Industrial robots have populated factories for decades. The new ambition is to make them adaptable enough, by empowering them with AI, to work in spaces designed for humans rather than machines. That ambition is fast becoming one of the defining strategic trends of this century, and it increasingly runs through Washington and Beijing.
America still leads in frontier artificial intelligence, advanced chip design, and the software architecture that will eventually serve as the brain of any humanoid robot. China has built something different: an industrial ecosystem to mass-produce the body. According to the International Federation of Robotics, China accounted for 54 per cent of all industrial robots installed worldwide in 2024—some 295,000 units, the highest annual total ever recorded by any single country—and its operational stock crossed 2 million, by far the largest in the world. China is fast becoming for robotics what it already is for solar panels, batteries, and rare-earth processing: the world’s dominant manufacturing platform. In robotics, then, as in several other frontier technologies, America increasingly supplies the brains while China supplies the bodies. Neither side is content to stay in its lane. Beijing is pouring resources into closing the gap in AI models; meanwhile, Washington is rediscovering industrial policy to rebuild advanced manufacturing platforms.
For now, China dominates the global humanoid robot market, producing roughly 85 per cent of all humanoids worldwide. According to The New York Times, Chinese firms like Unitree and AgiBot have begun mass production, and US companies are determined to catch up. Musk plans to begin pilot production of the Optimus 3 humanoid robot soon. He hopes to scale to high-volume manufacturing in the coming years, eventually expanding to a 10-million-unit-per-year production line at a Texas gigafactory.
India’s place in this race remains modest. The country installed 9,100 industrial robots in 2024, a 7 per cent rise on the previous year, but that places it only sixth in the world by annual installations—well behind not just the United States, Japan, and China but also South Korea and Germany. India’s overall robot density of around 10 continues to trail the global average of 132 robots per 10,000 manufacturing workers. It is a fraction of South Korea’s extraordinary 1,200. If America and China are contesting leadership in embodied intelligence, India is more a spectator.
But the stakes for India could hardly be higher. For three decades, the country’s comparative advantage has rested on an abundance of cheap labour. (It is a different matter if we have actually leveraged it for collective benefit.) The age of embodied intelligence puts a big question mark over that asset. The very resource that once seemed to favour India risks becoming a constraint in a world where manufacturing competitiveness depends increasingly on robotics rather than on wage differentials. If robots can do the work of a thousand workers, cheap labour ceases to be an advantage. It becomes a liability.
The Indian government’s Draft National Robotics Strategy has been around since 2023 and could eventually turn into a robotics mission. But if Indian industry waits for a state-led mission to drive the robotics revolution, it may find, as it has with other technologies before, that the revolution has already happened elsewhere. The government can and should set incentives, fund research, and shape regulation. But policy cannot substitute for actions at the firm level. The risk-taking, the investment, and the innovation must come from the private sector. China’s dominance in robotics did not come from government fiat alone; it came from a combination of state support and fierce private-sector competition. India’s private sector has been cautious, perhaps too cautious.
There are grounds for some optimism. SSI Mantra, India’s first indigenous surgical robotic system, has already conducted telesurgeries across thousands of kilometres, demonstrating that Indian engineers can compete at the technological frontier when talent, demand, and regulation align. Several other companies, like GreyOrange, are pressing ahead with robotics development. But these are exceptions. The challenge lies in building industrial-scale robotics. India needs not just a few successful companies; it needs an ecosystem of suppliers, researchers, and customers that can drive innovation and reduce costs. That ecosystem does not yet exist.
Self-reliance rhetoric is no substitute for strategy here. Unlike China, India cannot isolate its robotics ambitions from the world; its near-term task is to combine international collaboration with the patient building of domestic research, design, and manufacturing capability. This means partnering with foreign firms to learn from their expertise, while simultaneously investing in indigenous R&D. It means creating a regulatory environment that encourages innovation, not one that stifles it. It means providing incentives for firms to adopt robotics, not just for export-oriented sectors but for the domestic market as well.
The robotics revolution is not a distant possibility; it is happening now. India’s place in it will be decided mainly by the appetite of Indian capital to invest, innovate, and take risks at the scale the moment demands. The government can help, but it cannot lead. The private sector must step up. If it does not, India will remain a spectator while America and China contest the leadership of embodied intelligence. That would be a missed opportunity of historic proportions.
Questions and Answers
Q1: What is “embodied intelligence” or “physical AI,” and why is it significant?
A1: Embodied intelligence refers to robots that can sense their surroundings, make decisions, and use mechanical limbs to act on them. Unlike digital AI, which remains inside computers, embodied intelligence promises to step into factories, hospitals, and battlefields. It is significant because it could do for production what the computer did for information.
Q2: How do the US and China compare in their robotics capabilities?
A2: America leads in frontier AI, advanced chip design, and software architecture. China leads in mass production, accounting for 54 per cent of industrial robots installed worldwide in 2024. In humanoid robots, China produces roughly 85 per cent of global output. The US supplies the brains; China supplies the bodies.
Q3: What is India’s current position in the global robotics race?
A3: India installed 9,100 industrial robots in 2024, ranking sixth in the world. Its robot density of around 10 robots per 10,000 manufacturing workers is far below the global average of 132, and a fraction of South Korea’s 1,200. India is largely a spectator in the embodied intelligence race.
Q4: Why are the stakes for India particularly high in the robotics revolution?
A4: India’s comparative advantage has long been cheap labour. The robotics revolution puts a question mark over that asset. In a world where manufacturing competitiveness depends increasingly on robotics rather than wage differentials, cheap labour risks becoming a constraint rather than an advantage.
Q5: What does the article suggest is the key to India’s success in robotics?
A5: The article argues that India cannot wait for a state-led mission. While the government can set incentives, fund research, and shape regulation, the private sector must take the lead in investing, innovating, and taking risks. India must combine international collaboration with patient domestic research, design, and manufacturing capability.
