Daily Current Affairs 24-07-2026

How Should Cities Reclaim Footpaths? Bengaluru’s Drive and the Unfinished Business of the Street Vendors Act

By Rishita Khanna
New Delhi, July 24, 2026

Following the Supreme Court’s recognition of the right to walk on safe, obstruction-free footpaths as a fundamental right, Bengaluru Development Minister Krishna Byre Gowda directed the five city corporations under the Greater Bengaluru Authority to launch a 10-day ‘Safe Footpath’ drive. The drive removed thousands of street vendors from pavements and cleared encroachments. While many welcomed the initiative, it also raised questions over whether the removals complied with the Street Vendors (Protection of Livelihood and Regulation of Street Vending) Act, 2014, which seeks to balance pedestrians’ right to walk with street vendors’ right to livelihood .

Why Was the Street Vendors Act Enacted?

The Supreme Court’s recognition of the right to walk does not mean street vendors have no place on public streets. Long before the latest ruling, the court had repeatedly held that street vending is a ‘legitimate’ occupation protected under Article 19 of the Constitution, while making it clear that it can be regulated in the public interest .

Those judgments were born out of a recurring pattern – municipal bodies and police evicting vendors, mostly without notice, reducing years of livelihoods to rubble overnight .

The Street Vendors (Protection of Livelihood and Regulation of Street Vending) Act, 2014, was enacted to end such arbitrary removals by laying down the process for regulating street vending . Contrary to popular perception, the Act is neither an anti-encroachment law nor one that gives vendors an unrestricted right over public spaces. Instead, it seeks to balance two competing rights – the public’s right to safe, obstruction-free footpaths and a street vendor’s right to earn a livelihood. It lays down a step-by-step process that every city is expected to follow before deciding who can vend, where they can vend and when they can be removed or relocated .

The Town Vending Committee: The Missing Link

The first step is the constitution of a Town Vending Committee (TVC), the backbone of the law . The committee includes officials, police, planning authorities, resident representatives and street vendors themselves, who must make up at least 40% of its members, with representation for women and other marginalised communities . The idea is that decisions affecting vendors should not be taken without vendors having a seat at the table. Every subsequent step is expected to flow through this committee .

Once the committee is constituted, the Act requires it to survey all street vendors. The survey is meant to identify existing vendors before the authorities decide who can continue vending and under what conditions. Moreover, the Act protects existing vendors during this process. It states that no street vendor should be evicted or relocated until the survey has been completed and Certificates of Vending have been issued. The protection was built into the law to prevent exactly the kind of arbitrary removals that had prompted its enactment .

Bengaluru’s Footpath Drive: Compliance and Concern

In Bengaluru, corporations started removing vendors before putting in place the mechanism through which the Act is meant to work . Although Karnataka Chief Minister D.K. Shivakumar later promised relocation, the Act requires a TVC to identify vending and no-vending zones. Bengaluru does not have one. 

While the government has said that the drive is not against vendors but for pedestrians, and that they will be relocated to internal roads, street vendors have argued that they are being evicted illegally without prior notice or alternative arrangements . They point to the fact that the eviction drive violates the Act, which requires the formation of Town Vending Committees and a survey before any relocation or eviction can take place . The “Safe Footpath” drive, while clearing 430 km of footpaths by July 8, has been criticized for moving faster than the law allows .

The government’s assurance that street vendors would be relocated also raises another question — who would be relocated? Vendors argued that the city could not rely on a two-year-old survey and called for a fresh enumeration. The 2024 survey had identified 27,665 street vendors in Bengaluru. Vendors have described the figure as a gross underestimate. Government’s own records also point otherwise. Data from the erstwhile BBMP shows that nearly 1.34 lakh street vendors have availed loans under the PM SVANidhi scheme — almost five times the number identified in the survey . The scale of this discrepancy highlights the risk of a flawed survey leading to an incomplete and unjust relocation plan.

The Conflict of Rights: Competing Constitutional Claims

The Bengaluru drive is a classic case of two constitutional rights in conflict. On one hand, the Supreme Court has affirmed that the right to walk on safe, obstruction-free footpaths is a fundamental right under Article 21 . This right is not just a matter of convenience; it is a matter of life and death for millions of pedestrians forced onto roads due to encroachments. In the last three years alone, over 900 pedestrians died in Bengaluru, many of whom were forced to walk on roads because footpaths were blocked .

On the other hand, the right to earn a livelihood through street vending has also been recognized as a right under Article 19(1)(g), protected against arbitrary state action . The Street Vendors Act was specifically designed to protect this right by ensuring that vendors are not removed without due process, including a survey, the formation of a Town Vending Committee, and the issuance of vending certificates .

The Implementation Gap: A History of Unfinished Business

The current crisis is not a new one. The recurring cycle of eviction and re-encroachment points to a structural gap — the incomplete implementation of the Street Vendors Act . Even before the footpath drive, the then-BBMP had identified 230 potential vending zones with 7,000 spots, but no vending zones have been officially notified, no identity cards issued, and the statutory Town Vending Committees remain unconstituted . As advocate Vinay Sreenivasan put it, “The government must complete the survey, constitute vending committees and notify vending zones. You cannot enforce only the eviction provisions of the Act and ignore its protections” .

The Way Forward

The Supreme Court’s judgment should not be seen as a mandate for the state to simply clear footpaths and displace the poor. It is, instead, a directive to create a system where all citizens can exercise their rights without infringing on the rights of others. This requires a nuanced approach that acknowledges the complexity of Indian cities. National standards for footpaths, while well-intentioned, often do not fit the diverse urban contexts of India’s cities . As the Supreme Court’s ruling on joint management of footpaths needs ratification, urban local bodies must be entrusted as the primary custodians of coordination, design, and maintenance of safe footpaths, equipped to co-design streets with residents at the ward level .

While the Karnataka government acted on the Supreme Court’s recognition of pedestrians’ right to safe footpaths, the Street Vendors Act makes it equally clear that reclaiming those footpaths cannot become a justification for bypassing the safeguards enacted to protect street vendors’ livelihoods. That balance, not the primacy of one right over the other, is the very foundation of the law .

Q&A Section

1. Why was the Street Vendors Act enacted?
The Act was enacted to end the arbitrary and often overnight eviction of street vendors by municipal bodies and police, which had been a recurring pattern across Indian cities. It seeks to balance the public’s right to safe footpaths with a street vendor’s right to earn a livelihood, laying down a due process that must be followed before vendors can be removed or relocated .

2. What process does the Street Vendors Act prescribe before vendors can be removed?
The Act requires the constitution of a Town Vending Committee (TVC), which includes officials, police, planners, residents, and at least 40% street vendors. Once formed, the committee must survey all street vendors. Crucially, no vendor can be evicted or relocated until the survey is complete and Certificates of Vending have been issued . The Act does not prohibit removal; it requires that removal follow the law.

3. Why has Bengaluru’s footpath drive come under scrutiny?
The drive has come under scrutiny because the corporations started removing vendors before putting in place the mechanism required by the Street Vendors Act. Bengaluru does not have a constituted Town Vending Committee, and the city cannot rely on a two-year-old survey that vastly underestimated the number of vendors (27,665 surveyed versus nearly 1.34 lakh vendors who have availed PM SVANidhi loans) . The drive is seen by vendors as “illegal” evictions without due process .

4. What is the argument of the street vendors against the drive?
Vendors argue that the eviction drive violates the Street Vendors Act because authorities have carried out evictions without issuing prior notice, providing alternative vending spaces, or referring disputes to the Town Vending Committee . Many have also pointed to a contradiction in government policy: while schemes like PM SVANidhi encourage them to take loans, eviction drives leave them with no means to earn and repay those loans .

5. What is the fundamental conflict highlighted by the footpath drive?
The drive highlights the conflict between two fundamental rights: the right of pedestrians to safe, obstruction-free footpaths (upheld by the Supreme Court in its 2026 judgment)  and the right of street vendors to earn a livelihood (protected under Article 19 and the Street Vendors Act) . The government’s drive is seen as prioritizing one right over the other, bypassing the due process designed to balance them .

The Right to Protest and the Limits of Police Power: A Constitutional Crossroads

By Devyanishi Bihani
New Delhi, July 24, 2026

The events of July 20, 2026, at Jantar Mantar have once again brought into sharp focus a recurring constitutional and legal question: how should a democracy police public protest?  Thousands of young people, responding to the Cockroach Janta Party’s (CJP) call for a “Chalo Sansad” march, gathered to demand accountability over examination paper leaks and the resignation of Union Education Minister Dharmendra Pradhan. Within hours, the demonstration descended into clashes, with police using tear gas and lathi charges to disperse the crowd . The scenes of violence, which left nearly 180 people injured, have sparked a national debate on the legality of the protest, the standards governing police action, and the delicate balance between the right to dissent and the state’s duty to maintain public order .

The Constitutional Framework: Rights and Reasonable Restrictions

The starting point is the Constitution itself. Article 19(1)(a) guarantees freedom of speech and expression, while Article 19(1)(b) protects the right to assemble peaceably and without arms. Neither right, however, is absolute. Under Articles 19(2) and 19(3), the State may impose “reasonable restrictions” in the interests of the sovereignty and integrity of India, security of the State, and public order . This constitutional balance is the foundation of India’s public order laws. In Mazdoor Kisan Shakti Sangathan v. Union of India (2018), the Supreme Court held that the right to protest is a cherished constitutional freedom but must coexist with the rights of other citizens . Two years later, in Amit Sahni v. Commissioner of Police (2020), arising out of the Shaheen Bagh protests, the court reiterated that while dissent is integral to democracy, public ways and roads cannot be occupied indefinitely .

The law, therefore, does not permit either extreme—neither a blanket prohibition on peaceful protests nor an unrestricted right to demonstrate regardless of its impact on public order .

Was the CJP March Unlawful?

Whether a protest is “unlawful” is a legal question that depends on the facts and circumstances of each case. Under the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita (BNS), an assembly of five or more persons becomes an unlawful assembly only if its common object falls within specific categories, such as using criminal force, resisting the execution of law, committing an offence, or compelling another person by force or threat .

Ahead of the march, Delhi Police stated that the CJP had not sought permission for a procession to Parliament. It also pointed to prohibitory orders issued under Section 163 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita (BNSS), which barred protests, marches, and demonstrations in the New Delhi district, except at the designated Jantar Mantar protest site with prior permission . However, whether the march itself was unlawful depends on whether the assembly’s common object fell within the prohibited categories.

When Can Police Use Force?

The primary statutory framework today is the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (BNSS). Section 163 BNSS empowers an executive magistrate to issue prohibitory orders in urgent cases where there is sufficient ground to prevent obstruction, danger to human life, disturbance of public tranquility, or a riot. Such orders often prohibit assemblies of five or more people, processions, or movement in specified areas .

If an assembly nevertheless becomes unlawful or refuses to disperse, Sections 148 to 151 of the BNSS empower an Executive Magistrate or, in certain situations, a police officer in charge, to command the assembly to disperse. If the order is disobeyed, the assembly may be dispersed by force and, in exceptional situations, with the assistance of the armed forces in accordance with the safeguards prescribed under the law .

The Principle of Necessity and Proportionality

Although the BNSS authorises the use of force, it does not define the degree of force that may be employed or prescribe a graduated response mechanism . The contours of this power have largely been shaped by judicial interpretation. The most authoritative pronouncement remains the Supreme Court’s decision in Ramlila Maidan Incident v. Home Secretary, Union of India (2012), which examined the midnight police crackdown on protesters led by Baba Ramdev . The court held that even where an assembly is unlawful or prohibitory orders are in force, police action must satisfy the constitutional test of necessity and proportionality. The objective of force is to restore public order—not to punish protesters. The State, the court underlined, cannot use force that is excessive or disproportionate to the threat faced .

The judgment highlighted that police authorities are expected to attempt peaceful dispersal before resorting to coercive measures, issue adequate warnings through public address systems wherever circumstances permit, and employ only the minimum force reasonably necessary to achieve the lawful objective. Excessive force, the court held, may amount to an infringement of Article 21, which guarantees protection of life and personal liberty .

The Standards Governing Police Action

The National Human Rights Commission’s Manual on Human Rights for Police Officers emphasises that effective policing and respect for human rights are complementary rather than conflicting objectives. It states that “a democratic country like India needs democratic policing, which is based on the idea of the police as protectors of the rights of citizens and the rule of law, while ensuring the safety and security of all equally” . The manual also notes that human rights violations by police can erode public confidence, bring institutions into disrepute, and even escalate civil unrest .

These principles are consistent with the UN Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms, which require force to be lawful, necessary, and proportionate . The Code of Conduct for the Police in India states that police should, as far as practicable, “use the methods of persuasion, advice and warning. When the application of force becomes inevitable, only the irreducible minimum force required in the circumstances should be used” .

Accountability and Identification of Personnel

One of the recurring criticisms following the July 20 protest has been the difficulty in identifying individual police personnel allegedly involved in acts of excessive force. Videos appeared to show some personnel without visible name tags or with their faces covered . While the BNSS requires every police officer making an arrest to bear an accurate, visible, and clear identification of his or her name, it contains no corresponding requirement for police personnel engaged in crowd-control or the dispersal of assemblies .

Similarly, neither the BNSS nor the BNS contains any provision mandating body-worn cameras or compulsory videography of crowd-control operations. Videography today is governed largely through executive instructions, police manuals, and administrative standard operating procedures, which vary across states and police forces . These gaps often complicate efforts to establish individual accountability when allegations of excessive force arise .

The Supreme Court’s Evolving Jurisprudence

The Supreme Court’s response to the July 20 protest has been notable. A day after the clashes, a lawyer urged the Supreme Court to take suo motu cognisance of the alleged police excesses. Chief Justice of India Surya Kant orally declined the request, saying, “We are not interested in videos… Don’t waste our time, and don’t waste your time” .

Over the years, however, the Supreme Court has repeatedly laid down principles governing both the right to protest and the limits of police action. In Himat Lal K. Shah v. Commissioner of Police (1973), it held that while the State may regulate assemblies on public streets, it cannot impose arbitrary restrictions that effectively extinguish the right to protest . In Anita Thakur v. State of Jammu & Kashmir (2016), it held that the use of excessive force violates fundamental rights and awarded compensation to injured protesters . More recently, in Amit Sahni v. Commissioner of Police (2020), it affirmed that dissent is a constitutional right but cannot result in the indefinite occupation of public spaces .

The Road Ahead

The recent allegations arising from the Delhi protests are likely to be tested against the constitutional standards repeatedly articulated by the Supreme Court. The questions before the Delhi High Court, which is now seized of petitions alleging police brutality, are unlikely to be whether the police possessed the power to disperse the gathering. Rather, they will centre on whether the protest had become unlawful; whether prohibitory orders were validly in force; whether warnings were issued before coercive action; whether force was proportionate to the threat perceived; whether less intrusive alternatives were available; and whether the available video and documentary evidence supports or contradicts the allegations of brutality .

In many ways, the controversy also revives a larger policy debate. India continues to lack a uniform statutory framework governing police use of force during public demonstrations. Meanwhile, concepts such as “minimum necessary force,” graduated escalation, mandatory recording of crowd-control operations, visible identification of officers, and uniform national standards continue to derive primarily from constitutional jurisprudence and administrative practices . The need for a comprehensive framework that balances the right to protest with the state’s duty to maintain public order has never been more urgent.

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Q&A Section

1. What are the constitutional provisions that protect the right to protest in India?

The right to protest is protected under Article 19(1)(a) (freedom of speech and expression) and Article 19(1)(b) (right to assemble peaceably and without arms) of the Constitution. However, these rights are subject to “reasonable restrictions” under Articles 19(2) and 19(3) in the interests of public order, the sovereignty and integrity of India, and other constitutionally recognised grounds .

2. What legal framework governs police intervention in protests?

The primary statutory framework is the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita (BNSS), 2023. Section 163 empowers an executive magistrate to issue prohibitory orders in urgent cases to prevent obstruction or disturbance of public tranquility. Sections 148 to 151 empower the police to command an unlawful assembly to disperse and, if disobeyed, to use force to disperse it . State police laws and local laws further authorise the police to regulate public meetings and processions .

3. What standards govern the police use of force during protests?

Police use of force must satisfy the constitutional test of necessity and proportionality. The Supreme Court in Ramlila Maidan Incident v. Home Secretary, Union of India (2012) held that the objective of force is to restore public order—not to punish protesters—and that the State cannot use force that is excessive or disproportionate to the threat faced . The Code of Conduct for the Police in India states that only the “irreducible minimum force required in the circumstances should be used” .

4. What did the Supreme Court say in Amit Sahni v. Commissioner of Police (2020) about protests?

The Supreme Court affirmed that dissent is a constitutional right but cannot result in the indefinite occupation of public spaces. It held that public ways and roads cannot be occupied indefinitely, as they cause hardship to the general public, and that the rights of protestors must be balanced against the rights of other citizens .

5. What were the key legal issues raised by the July 20 CJP protest?

The protest raised questions about whether the march was unlawful, whether the police gave adequate warnings before using force, whether the force used was proportionate to the threat, and whether police personnel could be held accountable for alleged excesses. It also highlighted the lack of a uniform statutory framework governing police use of force during public demonstrations and the absence of mandatory identification of personnel and videography of crowd-control operations .

Are Smartphones Becoming Smarter with the Rise of On-Device AI?

By Haider Ali Khan
New Delhi, July 24, 2026

The transition of Artificial Intelligence (AI) from the cloud to the local device, often called on-device AI, is arguably the most significant shift in the smartphone industry since the inception of the app ecosystem [citation:original text]. For over a decade, consumer AI has been synonymous with the cloud: when you asked a question to an assistant, your data travelled across the globe to a massive data centre, was processed, and then sent back to your device. Now, users are witnessing a seismic shift. Intelligence is moving from remote servers to the silicon residing in their handheld devices [citation:original text].

In 2026, this is no longer a fringe feature; it is becoming the foundation of how premium smartphones function. Whether it is real-time language translation, advanced computational photography, or proactive system optimisation, on-device AI handles these tasks locally. The implications for the user experience are profound: faster response times, enhanced privacy, and crucially, the ability to function without an internet connection [citation:original text].

The Hardware Revolution: The Rise of the NPU

The shift to on-device AI has been fuelled by rapid advances in specialised hardware, particularly the Neural Processing Unit (NPU). Unlike general-purpose CPUs or graphics-heavy GPUs, NPUs are purpose-built to handle the mathematical heavy lifting required by neural networks [citation:original text].

The NPU is fast becoming one of the clearest indicators of how seriously brands and chipmakers are taking edge AI. In 2025, flagship smartphone SoC vendors were quoting between 35 and 85 TOPS (Trillion Operations Per Second) of NPU performance, with some newer platforms pushing towards 100 TOPS . This has made generative AI features that were previously thought to be impossible to run on a mobile phone—such as live voice-to-voice translation or generative photo editing—now running natively [citation:original text].

In recent years, breakthroughs in semiconductor technology have allowed for the integration of these powerful chips into mainstream hardware. As a result, generative AI features that were previously thought to be impossible to run on a mobile phone, such as live voice-to-voice translation or generative photo editing, are now running natively [citation:original text]. This has made the smartphone an intelligent, proactive companion, as the device is now capable of system-wide integration, where the AI can understand the user’s workflow, analyse intent and act on their behalf across different applications [citation:original text].

The Privacy Advantage: A Black Box of Personal Intelligence

Perhaps the greatest advances of on-device AI are the easing of tension between personalisation and privacy. To provide a customised experience, AI often requires access to financial and health metrics, calendar schedules and behavioural patterns [citation:original text].

Under a cloud-only model, users are understandably hesitant to share their most intimate details that will be processed on remote servers. On-device AI solves this by turning the smartphone into a black box of personal intelligence. Because data never leaves the hardware, user confidence grows. The device learns from the user locally, creating a bespoke experience that improves with every interaction, without ever compromising the individual’s digital footprint [citation:original text]. This is the holy grail of user experience: having a phone that understands you intimately while keeping that understanding entirely to yourself [citation:original text].

This local processing is crucial for sensitive user input. As the Android Developers Blog highlighted, features like summarising trip itineraries from personal data or managing expenses from receipts are prime candidates for on-device AI, as users can be confident that private information will be processed locally . Similarly, Google’s Gemini Nano 4 has improved model capabilities for multimodality, especially for image understanding tasks like OCR and visual data extraction, making it a great solution for extracting information from receipts on-device .

The Hybrid Future: Cloud and Edge Working in Tandem

Despite the rapid infusion of powerful hardware, a significant gap remains between a device’s capabilities and a user’s adoption. Industry analysts suggest that while flagship smartphones offer an impressive suite of tools like proactive writing assistance, intelligent summarisation and real-time call translation, these features have yet to trigger a super-cycle of upgrades [citation:original text].

For most consumers, current AI features are perceived as nice-to-have enhancements rather than essential utilities. While AI is shaping product design and upgrade decisions, with 9% of consumers buying phones for AI-driven performance improvements, it is not yet the primary purchase driver . This reveals a critical challenge for manufacturers as they must move beyond marketing standalone AI features and integrate the technology so deeply into the system’s workflow that the smartphone becomes truly indispensable [citation:original text].

Furthermore, there is a technical limitation. While on-device AI is incredibly efficient, it has physical constraints. It cannot yet match the sheer scale and raw power of cloud-based large language models. Small Language Models (SLMs) on devices excel at specific tasks, but they lack the advanced capabilities and reasoning of their larger counterparts . The industry is therefore converging on a hybrid application model. In this ecosystem, the heavy lifting, such as processing massive, multi-modal datasets, remains in the cloud, while sensitive and time-critical tasks migrate to the edge [citation:original text].

Academic research supports this hybrid approach. A study on the efficiency of LLM applications on mobile devices found that only small-size LLMs (under 4B parameters) can run successfully on powerful mobile devices, and they often exhibit quality limitations compared to larger models . Furthermore, the latency to run LLMs on mobile devices with meaningful output is significant (over 30 seconds), while cloud services demonstrate better time efficiency (under 10 seconds) . Edge deployments offer intermediate tradeoffs between latency and model capabilities . This is where the “model router” concept comes in. In a super agent system, the router dynamically selects between local and cloud models based on task complexity, directing Olympic math problems to large reasoning models, daily coding tasks to medium-sized models, and text summarization to lightweight models .

The Future: From Features to Agents

The smartphone industry is undergoing an identity shift. The focus has shifted from physical specifications, like the dimensions of a bezel or the pixel count of a camera, to the sophistication of the AI models powering the device [citation:original text].

The game is now in smartphones that are powered by AI with deep, system-wide integration, that allows agents to navigate multiple applications, understand context and achieve goals on behalf of the user. As hardware becomes increasingly homogenised across brands, the soul of the smartphone will be defined by its intelligence [citation:original text].

The bridge to that future is on-device AI, transforming a generic piece of glass and silicon into a truly personal, private, and proactive companion. The challenge for the coming year will be to see if these devices can move from being impressive technical demonstrators to essential assistants that the average user relies on every single day [citation:original text]. As Counterpoint Research notes, smartphones are entering the agentic AI era, where users expect AI not only to answer questions but also to understand intent, execute tasks and act on their behalf . With around 1.5 billion smartphones shipped worldwide in 2025, the category provides an enormous installed base for AI-enabled experiences .

Q&A Section

1. What is on-device AI, and how does it differ from cloud-based AI?

On-device AI refers to the processing of machine learning algorithms and generative AI models directly on a smartphone’s local hardware, using dedicated silicon like Neural Processing Units (NPUs). This contrasts with cloud-based AI, where data is sent to remote servers for processing. On-device AI offers faster response times, enhanced privacy, and the ability to function without an internet connection, while cloud-based AI can handle more complex tasks due to access to larger models and more computational power [citation:original text].

2. What role does the Neural Processing Unit (NPU) play in on-device AI?

The NPU is a specialized processor designed to efficiently handle the mathematical computations required by neural networks. Unlike general-purpose CPUs or graphics-heavy GPUs, NPUs are purpose-built for AI workloads, enabling generative AI features like live translation or generative photo editing to run directly on a smartphone. In 2025, flagship smartphone NPUs were achieving 35-100 TOPS (Trillion Operations Per Second) of performance, making them a key differentiator in premium devices [citation:original text].

3. What are the privacy benefits of on-device AI?

On-device AI addresses privacy concerns by processing personal data locally on the device, rather than sending it to remote servers. This means sensitive information like financial metrics, health data, and behavioural patterns never leave the hardware. The device learns from the user locally, creating a personalised experience without compromising the individual’s digital footprint. This is particularly important for handling sensitive inputs like personal receipts or private conversations [citation:original text].

4. Why are smartphones moving toward a hybrid AI model?

While on-device AI offers speed and privacy, it has physical constraints in terms of memory and processing power. It cannot yet match the scale and capability of cloud-based large language models. The industry is therefore converging on a hybrid model, where time-critical and sensitive tasks are handled on-device, while more complex, multi-modal processing (like advanced research or reasoning) is handled in the cloud. This balances performance, cost, and privacy [citation:original text].

5. What is “agentic AI,” and how is it shaping the future of smartphones?

Agentic AI refers to systems that can understand context, anticipate needs, and autonomously execute multi-step tasks across applications and services without per-step user confirmation. Smartphones are moving from being app-centric to intent-driven, where users express goals in natural language and agents coordinate actions across services. This shift is expected to become a defining feature of next-generation smartphones, differentiating devices not just on hardware, but on how effectively they can serve as personal agents .

Houthi Attacks Drive Brent Past $100: India’s Energy Security at a Crossroads

By M. Kalyanaraman
New Delhi, July 24, 2026

In a significant escalation of the West Asian conflict, Iran-backed Houthi forces in Yemen announced on July 23 that they had attacked two Saudi Arabia-flagged oil tankers in the Red Sea, part of a maritime blockade against Saudi shipping [citation:original text]. The attacks on the Encelia and the Layla have driven global oil prices above the $100 per barrel mark for the first time in two months , adding a dangerous new dimension to an already volatile energy market and threatening to further destabilize the global economy.

The Red Sea Attacks: A “Tit-for-Tat” Escalation

The attack on the two Saudi tankers occurred on the evening of July 22, with the Houthis claiming to have used ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, and drones in the assault . The Saudi-flagged oil tanker Encelia was reportedly struck approximately 70 nautical miles southwest of the Saudi coastal area of Al-Shuqaiq, causing a fire on board . While Saudi authorities confirmed the attack on the Encelia and stated the crew was safe and the vessel secured, they did not comment on the Layla . The Houthis also claimed to have forced about ten other ships to change course after issuing warnings not to travel to Saudi Arabian ports .

The attack was a direct consequence of the Houthi declaration on July 20 of a maritime ban on Saudi shipping in the Red Sea . The Houthis framed the move as a “tit-for-tat” response to what they see as Saudi Arabia’s blockade of areas under their control . The declaration followed a sharp escalation triggered by a dispute over Sanaa International Airport, where the Yemeni government struck the runway to prevent an Iranian aircraft carrying a senior Houthi delegation from landing . The Houthis blamed Saudi Arabia and launched missiles and drones toward the kingdom, warning that key Saudi oil facilities could become targets.

The Double Blockade: A Perfect Storm for Energy Markets

The Houthi attacks have effectively created a double blockade of two of the world’s most critical energy chokepoints. While the Strait of Hormuz is already at a near standstill due to the ongoing US-Iran conflict , the Red Sea has become the primary alternative route for Saudi Arabia’s oil exports . Saudi Arabia has invested heavily in the East-West Pipeline, which carries crude oil from its eastern fields to the Red Sea port of Yanbu, allowing it to bypass the Strait of Hormuz . This workaround has allowed the kingdom to export some three-quarters of its pre-war crude levels .

This alternative is now under direct threat. The Red Sea route via the Bab el-Mandeb Strait has become critical; Red Sea terminals now handle 78% of Saudi tanker traffic, up from 43% before the conflict . Traffic through Bab el-Mandeb has climbed to 15.1 tankers a day, up from 11.4 in 2025, as Saudi crude has taken this route . The combined impact is severe: the Strait of Hormuz and the Bab el-Mandeb Strait currently carry the equivalent of about 25% of total global oil supply . If both are effectively closed, the consequences would be catastrophic. Oxford Economics fears that in such a scenario, the price of oil could eventually pass $160 a barrel.

The Economic Ramifications for India

For India, the world’s third-largest oil importer, the stakes could not be higher. The country imports approximately 5 million barrels per day, and any disruption to its supply chains is a matter of national security.

Supply Diversification: A Limited Shield

India has responded to the crisis by diversifying its crude sources. In June, India’s imports of Russian crude surged to a record high of 2.64 million barrels per day (mbpd), up nearly 37.4% from May, accounting for half of India’s overall 5.24 mbpd crude imports . Russian crude accounted for more than 50% of India’s total oil imports in June, reinforcing Moscow’s position as India’s largest crude supplier . Indian refiners have also increased imports from Brazil, Venezuela, and Angola during the quarter to compensate for the shortfall from the Gulf caused by the blockade of the key waterway . India’s oil imports from the Middle East declined by about 27% to 1.55 million barrels per day between April and June .

However, this diversification is a limited shield. India still imported 403,000 bpd of oil from Saudi Arabia in June, mainly supplied through the Yanbu port on the Red Sea . If the Houthi blockade holds, these shipments will be disrupted. Indian sources have indicated that an option would be to import Saudi oil using a longer shipping route via the Cape of Good Hope, which will be more costly . In sailing-time terms, the detour through the Suez Canal and around Africa stretches the Yanbu-to-India (west coast) voyage from about eight days to nearly 39 days.

The Cost of War: Economic Headwinds

The immediate impact on India’s economy is already visible. The Indian crude basket jumped $8.07 a barrel in ten days, from $68.21 on July 3 to $76.28 on July 13 . With Brent now above $100, the pressure on India’s import bill is immense. Every $10-a-barrel increase translates into roughly $42 million a day in additional crude import costs for India . For every $10/bbl rise in crude, India’s subsidy bill grows by roughly $13-15 billion, widening the current account deficit .

Higher fuel prices are also likely to slow fuel demand growth. Analysts at Kpler and Rystad Energy have slashed their gasoline and diesel demand growth estimates for this year by between 30% and 90% . Fuel-conservation policies and rising fuel prices amid the crisis are expected to drag demand growth materially lower . The retail fuel price cuts that were expected after the ceasefire in June are now off the table .

Conclusion: A Geopolitical Risk Premium

The global energy market is now pricing in a significant geopolitical risk premium. Goldman Sachs forecasts that Brent crude prices could surpass $120 per barrel in the fourth quarter and average $100 per barrel next year if the Strait of Hormuz remains disrupted until the end of 2027, with further upside if the Bab el-Mandeb strait and Suez Canal also suffer persistent disruption . The Houthi attacks have effectively opened a new front in the energy war, threatening to create a “double blockade” of two vital shipping lanes. For India, the crisis underscores the fundamental vulnerability of its energy security and the critical need for a more diversified energy mix and accelerated investments in domestic energy production.

Q&A Section

1. What triggered the Houthi attacks on the two Saudi oil tankers?
The Houthi attacks were a direct consequence of their declaration of a maritime blockade against Saudi Arabia on July 20, 2026 . The Houthis framed the move as a “tit-for-tat” response to what they see as Saudi Arabia’s blockade of areas under their control . The immediate trigger for the escalation was a dispute over Sanaa International Airport, where the Yemeni government struck the runway to prevent an Iranian aircraft carrying a senior Houthi delegation from landing .

2. How have the attacks impacted global oil prices?
The attacks drove Brent crude above $100 per barrel for the first time in two months . At the close of trading on July 23, Brent rose by 7% to settle at $100.66 per barrel, while West Texas Intermediate (WTI) crude also surged 6.3% to $92.28 per barrel . Goldman Sachs forecasts that Brent could surpass $120 per barrel in the fourth quarter if the Strait of Hormuz remains disrupted, with further upside if the Bab el-Mandeb strait and Suez Canal also suffer persistent disruption .

3. What is the significance of the Red Sea as an alternative to the Strait of Hormuz?
Saudi Arabia has invested heavily in the East-West Pipeline, which carries crude oil from its eastern fields to the Red Sea port of Yanbu, allowing it to bypass the Strait of Hormuz . This workaround has allowed the kingdom to export some three-quarters of its pre-war crude levels. Red Sea terminals now handle 78% of Saudi tanker traffic, up from 43% before the conflict . The Houthi attacks have now threatened this alternative route, raising the risk of a “double blockade” of both the Strait of Hormuz and the Bab el-Mandeb Strait .

4. How has India responded to the energy supply disruptions?
India has responded by diversifying its crude sources. In June, India’s imports of Russian crude surged to a record high of 2.64 million barrels per day (mbpd), accounting for half of India’s overall 5.24 mbpd crude imports . Indian refiners have also increased imports from Brazil, Venezuela, and Angola to compensate for the shortfall from the Gulf . However, India still imported 403,000 bpd of oil from Saudi Arabia in June, mainly supplied through the Yanbu port on the Red Sea, which is now under threat .

5. What are the potential economic consequences for India from this escalation?
Every $10-a-barrel increase in crude prices translates into roughly $42 million a day in additional crude import costs for India . For every $10/bbl rise in crude, India’s subsidy bill grows by roughly $13-15 billion, widening the current account deficit . The retail fuel price cuts that were expected after the ceasefire are now off the table . Analysts have also slashed their gasoline and diesel demand growth estimates for this year by between 30% and 90% .

Digital Dawn: UMEED Portal Crosses 6.17 Lakh Approved Waqf Properties, Yet the Journey is Far from Over

By Ishita Mishra
New Delhi, July 24, 2026

In a significant step towards bringing transparency and accountability to the administration of Waqf properties, the Ministry of Minority Affairs informed the Lok Sabha on Wednesday that more than 6.17 lakh Waqf properties have been successfully validated and approved on the UMEED Central Portal-2025 [citation:original text]. This milestone is part of the government’s ongoing initiative to digitise and streamline Waqf property records across the country [citation:original text].

Responding to an unstarred question raised by Trinamool Congress MP Sajda Ahmed, Union Minority Affairs Minister Kiran Rijiju stated that 7,99,978 Waqf properties had been initiated for uploading to the UMEED portal as of July 17, 2026 [citation:original text]. According to the Ministry, 6,17,102 properties have been validated and approved, while 91,623 properties remain at various stages of the uploading process. Another 91,253 properties were rejected during the verification process [citation:original text].

The UMEED Portal: A Paradigm Shift in Waqf Governance

The UMEED Central Portal-2025, launched by Union Minister Shri Kiren Rijiju on 6 June 2025, is a statutory portal developed under the provisions of the UMEED Act, 1995 . The platform is designed to manage the complete lifecycle of Waqf properties, including registration, verification, survey by the Collector, mutation, annual account audits, and related administrative processes [citation:original text].

The portal is part of a broader effort to bring about a paradigm shift in how Waqf assets are administered across India by introducing greater transparency, accountability, and public participation . Its key features include the creation of a comprehensive digital inventory with geo-tagging of all Waqf properties, an online grievance redressal mechanism, transparent leasing and usage tracking, integration with GIS mapping and other e-Governance tools, and public access to verified records and reports .

The Journey So Far: From Slow Start to Digital Transformation

The road to 6.17 lakh approved properties has been a transformative one. The UMEED portal was launched with a six-month window for uploading existing Waqf properties, which officially closed on 6 December 2025 . However, the initial response from Waqf Boards was sluggish, with only 11 uploads in June, 50 in July, 822 in August, and 4,327 in September . The Ministry held numerous review meetings, training workshops, and high-level interventions, and released nearly ₹10 crore in capacity-building funds to States and Waqf Boards .

The real surge came in November and December, as the deadline approached, with over 2.42 lakh properties initiated in November and another 2.43 lakh in the first six days of December . The portal handled this sudden spike smoothly, demonstrating its robustness and the Ministry’s commitment to ensuring the process was completed . To further strengthen financial governance, the Ministry launched the Accounts & Audit Module on the UMEED Portal in March 2026, enabling systematic recording of income and expenditure of Waqf institutions .

The Challenge of Rejections: 91,253 Properties Still Awaiting Clarity

Despite the success, a significant challenge remains: 91,253 properties were rejected during the verification process [citation:original text]. The government has attributed the rejection percentage to several reasons, including the quality of land records, awareness, and differences in the volume of Waqf properties in different states . As of July 2026, Uttar Pradesh had the highest number of rejections at 31,783 (accounting for 36% of the total nationwide rejections), followed by West Bengal with 14,134 (16%), and Rajasthan with 12,080 (13%) .

The process for getting a Waqf property registered on the portal has three layers – initiation by the maker (mutawalli or caretaker), a check by the “checker” (a designated district-level official or state waqf board official), and approval by the “approver” (senior waqf board officials in the state) . The rejection of a property application leaves caretakers and Boards in a state of uncertainty, as there is currently no clear roadmap for what happens to properties that have been rejected .

The Road Ahead: The UMEED Vision

While the 6.17 lakh approved properties represent a major achievement, the UMEED portal’s journey is far from over. The portal is expected to continue to evolve as a comprehensive digital platform for the effective administration and management of Waqf assets in the country . With the launch of additional modules like Survey Module and Waqf Property Lease Module in January 2026 , and the Accounts & Audit Module in March 2026 , the Ministry is steadily building a robust digital ecosystem for Waqf governance.

The Ministry is working closely with States/UTs and State Waqf Boards to ensure the efficient management of Waqf properties across the country . As the system matures, it is expected to provide a transparent, accountable, and technology-driven system for the management of Waqf properties . The ultimate goal is to ensure that Waqf assets contribute meaningfully to education, healthcare, livelihood generation and social welfare, especially for underprivileged sections within the Muslim community .

Q&A Section

1. What is the UMEED Central Portal and when was it launched?
The UMEED (Unified Waqf Management, Empowerment, Efficiency and Development) Central Portal is a centralized digital platform launched by the Ministry of Minority Affairs on June 6, 2025. It is designed for real-time uploading, verification, and monitoring of Waqf properties across India, under the provisions of the UMEED Act, 1995 .

2. What is the current status of Waqf property registrations on the UMEED portal?
As of July 17, 2026, 7,99,978 Waqf properties had been initiated for uploading. Of these, 6,17,102 properties have been successfully validated and approved, while 91,623 properties remain in the pipeline and 91,253 properties were rejected during the verification process [citation:original text].

3. What was the original deadline for uploading Waqf properties, and what happens if properties were not registered?
The original six-month upload window closed on December 6, 2025 . However, the UMEED Act provides a remedial mechanism: those who could not upload their properties may approach their respective Waqf Tribunals for resolution and extensions . The government has since reopened the portal for States and Boards that have received such extensions .

4. Which states have seen the highest number of Waqf property registrations?
While the Ministry has not released state-wise data for the July 2026 figures, earlier data from December 2025 showed that Karnataka had registered the highest number of properties at 52,917 (81%), followed by Jammu & Kashmir (25,046, 77%), Punjab (24,969, 90%), and Gujarat (24,133, 61%) .

5. What are the key features of the UMEED Central Portal?
The portal offers several key features: creation of a comprehensive digital inventory with geo-tagging of all Waqf properties, an online grievance redressal system, transparent leasing and usage tracking, integration with GIS mapping and other e-Governance tools, and public access to verified records and reports . Additional modules have been launched for surveys, lease management, and accounts and audits .

The Delimitation Dilemma: Southern Voices and the Unfinished Agenda of Women’s Reservation

By The Hindu Bureau
New Delhi, July 24, 2026

The debate over India’s electoral map has intensified, with a former Madras High Court judge adding a significant voice to the chorus of concern from southern states. Justice D. Hariparanthaman (retd.) has argued that the current freeze on the delimitation of Lok Sabha constituencies should continue, and that the long-awaited women’s reservation should be implemented immediately, delinked from both the delimitation exercise and the Census [citation:original text].

Releasing the book The Delimitation Debate: The Union and its Units, published by The Hindu Group, the former judge cautioned that an increase in the number of Lok Sabha seats would hamper meaningful deliberations in the House. “The problem of raising the numbers is that deliberations cannot take place,” he said [citation:original text].

The Core of the North-South Divide

At the heart of the controversy is a simple but explosive question: Should political representation be based strictly on population, or should states that successfully controlled population growth be protected from losing influence ?

Justice Hariparanthaman argued that if the increase in seats is based on population, southern States will stand to lose adequate representation in the Lok Sabha. This will amount to penalising the southern States for having implemented the national population policy well [citation:original text].

This concern is grounded in a long-standing constitutional freeze. Since the 1970s, parliamentary constituencies have been frozen based on the 1971 Census, a measure intended to encourage population control efforts by ensuring states that aggressively implemented family planning would not be penalized . However, the demographic reality has changed dramatically. Southern states like Tamil Nadu, Kerala, and Karnataka have achieved sharp declines in fertility rates, while northern states like Uttar Pradesh and Bihar have seen their populations grow much faster .

The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace reports that applying 2026 population projections would see thirty-six seats change hands among states. Bihar, Uttar Pradesh, and Rajasthan would collectively gain twenty-six seats, while Kerala, Tamil Nadu, and Andhra Pradesh would lose twenty-one . Such a shift would not only alter the political influence of individual states but also the balance of power among parties, potentially benefiting the BJP and its allies .

The Women’s Reservation Conundrum

The debate has become even more intense because it intersects with the Women’s Reservation Act. The Constitution (One Hundred and Sixth Amendment) Act, 2023, which reserves one-third of seats in Parliament and state legislatures for women, was passed with the crucial caveat that it would only come into effect after a census and subsequent delimitation exercise .

Justice Hariparanthaman’s call for implementing women’s reservation without delimitation challenges the government’s current legislative package. The government introduced three bills in a special session of Parliament to operationalize the quota by linking it to a fresh delimitation exercise based on the “latest Census” (the 2011 Census) . The government argues that the 2023 law was tied to a future census process that could delay implementation indefinitely, and the new measure is intended to make the quota operational in time for the next parliamentary election .

However, critics like Kerala Chief Minister Pinarayi Vijayan have argued that this is “nothing but a ploy to mask the real objectives behind this entire exercise” . They contend that the government is using a popular reform to push through a politically loaded redrawing of constituencies that could shift greater weight to faster-growing northern States and dilute the influence of the south .

A Federal Dialogue: The Rajya Sabha Model

Justice Hariparanthaman further batted for equitable representation of all States in the Rajya Sabha, much like the U.S. Senate model [citation:original text]. This suggestion echoes a broader argument that India’s federal balance could be preserved by strengthening the upper house.

In the U.S. Senate, each state, regardless of population, has two senators, ensuring that smaller states have an equal voice. Currently, the Rajya Sabha is the least malapportioned federal upper chamber in the world , but its members are elected by state legislatures, and its powers are limited compared to the Lok Sabha. Recasting the Rajya Sabha on the lines of the U.S. Senate would require significant constitutional changes, but it represents one possible path to addressing the anxieties of the southern states.

The Path Forward

The delimitation debate is ultimately about more than seats and statistics. It is a test of how India balances democracy with federalism . Southern states argue that they contribute a disproportionate share of India’s tax revenue, manufacturing output, and services exports, and that a purely population-based formula would shift policy priorities away from their economic realities .

The government, however, argues that the principle of “one person, one vote” demands that every citizen’s vote carry equal weight, and that the population cannot be ignored indefinitely . While some BJP leaders have offered political assurances that southern states will not lose out in absolute numbers , these are not seen as ironclad guarantees .

As the Monsoon Session of Parliament begins, the debate is far from over. The constitutional amendment bills require a two-thirds majority in both Houses and ratification by at least half of the state legislatures . The ruling alliance does not, by itself, have the required strength, making the support of regional players crucial . The outcome of this debate will shape not just the next election, but the very nature of India’s federal compact for decades to come.

Q&A Section

1. Why did former Madras High Court judge D. Hariparanthaman call for the continuation of the delimitation freeze?

Justice Hariparanthaman argued that increasing the number of Lok Sabha seats would hamper meaningful deliberations in the House. He also cautioned that a population-based increase would penalise southern States for having implemented the national population policy well, reducing their adequate representation in the Lok Sabha [citation:original text].

2. What is the core “North-South” political battle regarding delimitation?

Southern states like Tamil Nadu, Kerala, and Karnataka, which successfully controlled population growth, fear that a delimitation based on current population figures would reduce their parliamentary seats in favour of more populous northern states like Uttar Pradesh and Bihar . This would diminish their political influence despite their stronger economic contributions .

3. How is the Delimitation Bill linked to the Women’s Reservation Act?

The Constitution (106th Amendment) Act, 2023, which reserves one-third of seats for women, stipulated that its implementation would only take effect after a census and a subsequent delimitation exercise . The government argues that a new delimitation is necessary to operationalize the women’s quota in time for the next elections .

4. What is the “tyranny of demographic majority” warned by Shashi Tharoor?

Congress MP Shashi Tharoor warned that delimitation could lead to a “tyranny of demographic majority,” where states that failed to curb population growth are rewarded with greater political weight, while states that achieved governance excellence become politically irrelevant . He suggested this would tear the fabric of federalism and marginalise states that provide resources to the country.

5. What did the government assure southern states regarding their representation?

Union Home Minister Amit Shah assured the House that the five southern States together would see their tally rise from 129 seats to 195, preserving their aggregate share while enlarging representation nationally . However, critics like Shashi Tharoor dismissed this as a “precarious political assurance and not a legislative certainty” that could be easily altered by a simple parliamentary majority .

Trump’s Nuclear Gamble: The US-Saudi Deal, the Abraham Accords Hinge, and the Spectre of a Middle East Arms Race

By Aditi Nayar
New Delhi, July 24, 2026

In a move that has sent shockwaves through the Middle East and drawn sharp criticism from nuclear non-proliferation experts, the United States and Saudi Arabia announced a landmark civilian nuclear cooperation agreement on July 22, 2026 . The pact, formally signed by US Energy Secretary Chris Wright and Saudi Energy Minister Prince Abdulaziz bin Salman, establishes a 30-year framework for cooperation on the peaceful use of nuclear energy, positioning American companies to play a leading role in developing Saudi Arabia’s nuclear energy infrastructure .

However, within hours of the announcement, President Donald Trump introduced a significant condition that could prove to be a deal-breaker: he declared that the agreement would only be approved if Saudi Arabia formally recognizes the State of Israel and joins the Abraham Accords . This new demand, which was not mentioned in the initial announcement, has placed the Saudi government in an awkward position, as it has long insisted that normalising relations with Israel is contingent on the creation of a pathway toward a Palestinian state .

The Nuclear Agreement: A Departure from the “Gold Standard”

While the US has signed civilian nuclear cooperation agreements with over 50 countries, the Saudi deal has broken new ground by reportedly granting Riyadh the future option to enrich uranium domestically, potentially without adopting the most intrusive international inspections . This represents a significant departure from the “gold standard” established by the 2009 US-UAE agreement, where Abu Dhabi permanently renounced domestic uranium enrichment and plutonium reprocessing, and agreed to adopt the International Atomic Energy Agency’s (IAEA) Additional Protocol for more extensive monitoring and inspections .

Under the Saudi deal, the US and the kingdom would first conduct a joint feasibility study to determine if domestic enrichment is economically viable . If they deem it acceptable, enrichment could take place under a “black box” arrangement designed to prevent the transfer of sensitive technology to Saudi personnel . This arrangement has sparked alarm that Saudi Arabia, which possesses uranium ore reserves, could eventually produce weapons-grade material if the enrichment infrastructure is ever turned to military purposes .

The Abraham Accords Hinge: A Stumbling Block or a Negotiating Tactic?

President Trump’s decision to tie the nuclear deal to Saudi-Israeli normalisation represents a reversal of the administration’s earlier position . Under the Biden administration, nuclear cooperation was discussed as part of a broader package that would include normalisation and stronger US security guarantees . However, Trump separated the nuclear negotiations from the normalisation requirement as it became clearer that the Saudi-Israeli deal was more complicated in the aftermath of the Gaza war .

By reinstating the condition after the deal was signed, Trump has added a major new layer of complexity. Saudi Arabia has made it clear it will not recognise Israel without a clear pathway toward Palestinian statehood—a prospect that Israel’s current government under Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has firmly rejected . For the Saudi Crown Prince, Mohammed bin Salman, agreeing to normalisation without such a commitment would be a politically toxic move that could jeopardise his legitimacy at home .

Israeli leaders, while expressing concerns about the nuclear deal’s proliferation risks, have welcomed the prospect of Saudi Arabia joining the Abraham Accords . Netanyahu’s office called it a “historic leap forward for peace in the Middle East” . However, analysts have questioned whether Trump’s demand is more of a face-saving distraction than a serious condition, given the long odds of Saudi normalisation with the current Israeli government . The agreement’s text has not been made public, and Trump has a history of using social media posts as a negotiating tool even after deals are sealed .

The Regional Fallout: Fuel for a Nuclear Arms Race

The deal has raised fears that it could trigger a nuclear arms race in the Middle East . US Senator Chris Murphy (D-Conn.) warned that “everything that happens in Riyadh has a reaction in Tehran,” suggesting that the deal could push Iran closer to a nuclear weapon . Iran’s leaders have seized on the agreement’s apparent double standard: the US has gone to war with Iran, in part, to force it to end uranium enrichment, yet it is now considering allowing its close ally to enrich nuclear fuel .

The “gold standard” UAE agreement also contains a clause that could allow Abu Dhabi to renegotiate its deal if a neighbouring state receives better terms . This could prompt other regional powers, including Turkey and Egypt, to demand similar enrichment rights . Turkey has already warned that if Iran acquires a nuclear weapon, Ankara “may inevitably be forced to join the same race” .

Saudi Arabia has its own nuclear ambitions, and its de facto ruler, Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, has previously stated that the kingdom would “follow suit as soon as possible” if Iran developed a nuclear bomb . The Saudi-Pakistani mutual defence pact signed in September 2025 further complicates matters, as officials have publicly hinted that Pakistan’s nuclear capabilities could be “made available” to Riyadh if needed .

Conclusion

The US-Saudi nuclear deal represents a high-stakes gamble by the Trump administration, trading long-standing non-proliferation principles for short-term commercial and diplomatic gains. By potentially allowing Saudi Arabia to enrich uranium while fighting a war to prevent Iran from doing the same, Washington has opened itself up to accusations of hypocrisy and double standards. The deal’s future is now uncertain, given President Trump’s unexpected demand for Saudi-Israeli normalisation, which the kingdom is unlikely to accept without significant Israeli concessions on Palestinian statehood. The coming weeks and months will reveal whether this is a genuine breakthrough or a diplomatic disaster in the making. As the Middle East already burns, this latest move threatens to pour fuel on the fire of a regional arms race.

Building Resilience to Protect the Elderly from Climate Stressors: India’s Intersecting Crises

By Ramya Kannan
New Delhi, July 24, 2026

In its sweep, climate change is not an equitable overlord, and while it does create havoc, it is true that this impacts some people more than others. There are, now, studies to show that vulnerable groups of people are affected far more than others and the factors that determine how badly you are affected include economic ability, age and gender. A recent study by HelpAge India further highlights the fact that senior citizens form a vulnerable group and are right in the pathway of harm left in the trail of climate change.

There are two ways in which climate change affects older adults – sudden shocks and slow-onset stresses. The report says rising temperatures, erratic rainfall, drought, flooding, coastal erosion, water scarcity, poor ventilation, indoor heat stress, dampness, and environmental degradation can worsen chronic illness, raise mortality risk, reduce mobility, and increase care needs for senior citizens. For them it could manifest as a number of things – heat-related stress, respiratory problems, reduced mobility, mental distress, sleep disruption, and disruption in access to medicines and healthcare during climatic events. In addition changing socio-cultural norms and migration patterns indicate that older people can become isolated, leading to an impact on their mental health as well .

The Demographic Tsunami: India’s Ageing Population

This is particularly relevant to India, where the portion of senior citizens as a part of the overall population is constantly growing. As the nation is steadily moving towards the greys, the older population is projected to rise to about 347 million by 2050 (from 149 million in 2022) . Naturally, climate stress will make a larger share of the country vulnerable to physical and mental health challenges .

The Intersectional Nature of Vulnerability

The report identifies several factors that sharply reduce resilience: living alone, poor physical or mental health, impairment, advanced age, poverty, financial dependence, weak institutional support, insecure housing, and residence in hazard-prone locations. These disadvantages often overlap, which is why the study uses an “Intersectional Place Perspective” to show that risk is shaped by the interaction of age, gender, widowhood, disability, poverty, social isolation, and local environmental conditions. For example, an uneducated, unskilled older widow with no pension, was at a relatively greater risk from a cyclone, than an able-bodied older man who lived with his family .

The study by HelpAge India—‘Climate Resilient Ageing – Ensuring Care, Dignity & Agency’—surveyed 2,224 elderly persons across 20 districts in 10 states, including Karnataka. It found that 78% of respondents had experienced at least one climate-related hazard in the last three years, with heatwave (45%), flood (27%) and drought (20%) being the most commonly reported events .

Anupama Datta, Head, Policy Research & Advocacy, HelpAge India, who led this research study, said the focus was on districts impacted by slow onset climate hazards. “Older persons bring unique strengths as well as vulnerabilities that shape how they experience and respond to climate hazards. Repeated episodes of climate hazards weaken their ability to recover and build resilience” . More than one-third of those exposed reported moderate to severe impacts. The risks were especially acute for older persons living alone, widows, people aged 80 and above, and those with cognitive, communication or mental health difficulties . The study found that 90% of older persons affected by heatwaves stayed indoors and 81% increased water intake, yet 74% reported illness, 44% said existing health conditions worsened and 33% struggled to access healthcare .

The Challenge of Care and Support

Family remains the main source of care for most older persons, with 73% living with children or relatives and 94% of those needing care receiving it from family. However, the report found that support systems are increasingly strained by migration, with 18% of households reporting a family member moving away for work, mostly sons . For older persons living alone, care arrangements are fragile; 38% depend on neighbours, 20% on distant family and 16% receive no care .

This care deficit is compounded by economic insecurity. 55% have no agricultural land, pensions are the main income for nearly half (49%), yet many continue working in self-cultivation (25%), agricultural labour (13%) or non-agricultural labour (12%). Alarmingly, 16% have neither work nor income, and as age increases, active participation in farming and wage labour declines, while the proportion with no work and no income rises from 11% among those aged 60–69 to 21% among those aged 80+ .

Awareness of government welfare schemes is high, particularly PDS (93%), pensions (71%), subsidised healthcare (67%) and housing support (62%), with 65% finding access easy and most of them receiving benefits regularly. However, access is particularly challenging for older persons with poor health (30%), those severely affected by climate-related shocks (30%), with no formal education (22%), and from lower socio-economic groups (22%). Additional challenges include long waiting times and delays (25%), digital access difficulties (15%), and lack of support during the application process (10%), highlighting the need for more age-friendly service delivery .

A Multi-Pronged Way Forward

The Helpage report points to a layered response to grow resilience: At the household level, storing food and water, improving shelter, saving money, planning ahead for disasters, and diversifying livelihoods. At the community level, family support, neighbour check-ins, volunteer networks, and community shelter or relocation support are recommended coping strategies. It also recommends age-inclusive early warning systems, community monitoring, and stronger local care networks, especially for those living alone or with impairments . In terms of policy recommendations, it calls for climate-resilient healthcare for elders, expanded social protection and livelihood support, and targeted support for the groups at highest risk of being affected .

The strongest policy priorities in the document are: climate-resilient healthcare for older persons, expanded social protection and livelihood support, better disaster preparedness and early warning systems, climate-resilient housing, environmental health interventions, and stronger community-based care networks. It also calls for targeted support for the highest-risk groups: those living alone, widows, persons with impairments, the oldest-old, and financially insecure households .

For India, the report’s conclusions are very clear: shift from ‘hazard-centred’ responses to ‘people-centred’ systems to connect climate adaptation, healthy ageing, social protection, and disaster risk reduction. That involves harnessing One Health, generating and using better data, establishing stronger institutional coordination, and services that are designed factoring in older persons’ actual barriers to access .

Q&A Section

1. What did the HelpAge India study reveal about the impact of climate change on the elderly?
The study found that 78% of older respondents faced at least one climate-related hazard in the past three years, with heatwaves (45%), floods (27%), and droughts (20%) being the most common. The risks were especially acute for those living alone, widows, and those over 80 .

2. How does the “Intersectional Place Perspective” help understand elderly vulnerability?
The framework shows that climate vulnerability is not determined by age alone but by overlapping factors like gender, widowhood, disability, poverty, and local environmental conditions. For example, an uneducated, unskilled older widow with no pension is at much greater risk from a cyclone than an able-bodied older man living with family .

3. What are the main barriers to healthcare access for the elderly during climate events?
During heatwaves, 74% reported illness, 44% saw existing conditions worsen, and 33% struggled to access healthcare. Permanent barriers include difficulty travelling to facilities (49%), treatment costs (41%), and facilities being far away (38%) .

4. How is family-based care for the elderly being affected by migration?
While 94% of those needing care receive it from family, support systems are strained by migration: 18% of households reported a family member moving away for work, mostly sons. For elderly living alone, care arrangements are fragile—38% depend on neighbours and 16% receive no care at all .

5. What policy priorities are recommended to build climate resilience among the elderly?
Recommendations include climate-resilient healthcare, expanded social protection, better disaster preparedness and early warning systems, climate-resilient housing, and stronger community-based care networks. The report calls for shifting from ‘hazard-centred’ to ‘people-centred’ responses, with targeted support for the most vulnerable—those living alone, widows, persons with impairments, and the oldest-old .