Daily Current Affairs 22-07-2026

Colombia’s Answer to Donald Trump

By Mary Anastasia O’Grady
New Delhi, July 22, 2026

Unfortunately President Trump, who won’t acknowledge that he lost the 2020 U.S. election, isn’t much help because at the heart of the matter is another election denier, Colombian President Gustavo Petro [citation:original text].

Because Mr. Petro was constitutionally barred from running for a consecutive second term, his Pacto Histórico party put up Sen. Iván Cepeda as its presidential candidate. In the June runoff election, according to Colombia’s electoral authority, Mr. Cepeda lost to lawyer and businessman Abelardo de la Espriella. Mr. Petro refuses to recognize the president-elect [citation:original text]. The inauguration is set for Aug. 7, and it’s doubtful that Mr. Petro believes he can keep Mr. de la Espriella from taking office. But that isn’t the point. The president’s objective is to delegitimize the new government and make it difficult for Mr. de la Espriella to do his job [citation:original text].

After four years of mediocre economic performance and growing public insecurity, Colombia can ill afford the political instability that Mr. Petro’s intransigence is likely to cause. But then this isn’t about the well-being of the nation. It’s about an obsession with power [citation:original text].

The Petro Playbook: From “Total Peace” to Electoral Denial

When Mr. Petro was elected in 2022, his ideological allies likely thought they were in the presidential Casa Nariño for the long haul. After all, Venezuela’s Hugo Chávez was democratically elected in 1998 and by the early 2000s had destroyed many of the institutional checks that might have blocked his one-man rule [citation:original text]. Chávez died of cancer in 2013. Today, six months after his successor, Nicolás Maduro, was removed by the U.S. military, chavismo continues to rule the country. Nicaragua’s Daniel Ortega managed a similar takeover of that frail Central American democracy. El Salvador’s Nayib Bukele began his political career as a member of the guerrilla-group-cum-political-party known as the FMLN. He was elected in 2019 as an outsider leading his own movement. He has pacified a country overrun with gang violence. But he also has destroyed its weak democratic institutions. Next year he will run for his third term, now extended to six years [citation:original text].

Colombians had a front-row seat for the dismantling of the Venezuelan democracy, and that’s one explanation for Mr. Cepeda’s defeat. Many voters feared that a second Pacto Histórico president would succeed in rewriting the constitution and cancel republican government [citation:original text].

Mr. Petro had lots of ways to put a thumb on the electoral scales from the executive office—and he used them. Colombian law prohibits presidential involvement in an election to avoid the use of state resources to favor one side. Mr. Petro meddled anyway, in speeches and on social media [citation:original text].

Mr. Cepeda came much closer to winning than polls predicted, perhaps because he benefited from Mr. Petro’s over-the-top populism. A presidential decree sent the minimum wage up 23% in January. The Petro economy grew a measly 0.6% in 2023 and only 1.6% in 2024, according to the International Monetary Fund. But last year a public-spending blitz led to a 2.6% economic expansion. Colombians went to the polls feeling better about their pocketbooks [citation:original text].

The Security Factor: A Country Overrun by Criminality

Yet Mr. Cepeda was also running on Mr. Petro’s dismal security record. Colombian security began to decline in subtle ways after then-President Juan Manuel Santos signed an amnesty agreement with the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia in Havana in 2016. Things deteriorated further under Mr. Petro. The increased presence across the country of illegal armed groups engaged in coca growing, extortion, kidnapping and murder was a top campaign issue. Mr. de la Espriella’s pledge to restore peace by confronting criminality head-on was a big vote-getter [citation:original text].

The failure of Petro’s “Total Peace” policy was stark: the number of active fighters more than doubled, from roughly 13,000 in 2022 to about 27,000 by the end of 2025, according to the Colombian think-tank Ideas for Peace Foundation . De la Espriella capitalized on this frustration, proposing a Bukele-style crackdown that includes building 10 mega-prisons in remote jungle locations and granting himself extraordinary powers to lock up criminals .

The Fraud Allegation: A Desperate Gambit

On election night the initial tally was close. Messrs. Petro and Cepeda immediately called for the count to be scrutinized. They still came up short. Now Mr. Petro alleges electoral fraud by the Israelis, who he says manipulated the voting machine software. It’s an indication of how desperate he is to undermine the credibility of the new government. Lawfare against Mr. de la Espriella can’t be far off [citation:original text].

Petro has insisted that “Abelardo no ganó las elecciones” . He has claimed that the software used in the scrutiny “utilizaron algoritmos que variaron la votación sustancialmente a favor de Abelardo” . In his final public address on July 20, he went further, claiming that the “pueblo de Colombia eligió como presidente a Iván Cepeda” . He has named the Israeli firm Black Cube and Colombia’s Thomas Greg & Sons, contracted by the Registry for the election’s technological logistics, as actors in the alleged fraud . None of these claims has been substantiated .

On July 21, Petro escalated his challenge by presenting a formal legal demand to annul the presidential election. The demand claims “inverificabilidad estructural” and “manipulación algorítmica” in the voting process. It seeks to have the election declared null, a new scrutiny ordered, and a judicial inspection of the systems used in the election . This is lawfare in its most literal form—using the courts to overturn a democratic result.

All local and international observation missions, including the European Union and The Carter Center, have validated the election’s transparency . Cepeda himself has accepted his defeat and taken his seat in the Senate .

The Inauguration Standoff: A Constitutional Crisis Brewing

Mr. de la Espriella wants to make Colombia a destination for investment. The country needs decentralization, and the new president will need to build a governing coalition. Working with regional politicians outside the capital can deliver both. His plan to hold his inauguration at a military garrison in the south of the country rather than at the traditional Plaza de Bolívar in Bogotá seems a good start [citation:original text].

The new Congress, which will be sworn in on July 20, will need to approve the change in venue. Whatever it decides, with Mr. Petro in a meltdown over Mr. Cepeda’s loss, it falls to lawmakers, the courts and military to uphold the rule of law. Americans are likely to understand that [citation:original text].

Petro has responded by ordering that no military or police installation be used for the inauguration. “The military and police barracks are under my orders until the moment the new president is sworn in, and until then I am the supreme commander of the armed forces,” he wrote on X . De la Espriella has vowed to proceed anyway. “Despite the opposition of the disastrous and delusional outgoing government, Colombians can rest assured that I will fulfill my promise: I am going to be sworn in in the southern part of the country at a military garrison to pay a solemn tribute to the heroes of our nation,” he declared .

The legal question remains disputed. The incoming interior minister argues that the legislature may sit anywhere if it so decides . The outgoing ruling bloc counters that Congress has no authority over spaces administered by the executive .

The International Dimension: “Escudo de las Américas” Weighs In

The United States and Latin American countries that have joined the “Escudo de las Américas” initiative have called for the official electoral result to be respected. “Hacemos un llamado firme a todas las autoridades colombianas para que actúen con estricto apego a la Constitución, la ley y los principios democráticos,” they stated in a joint declaration . Countries including Argentina, Bolivia, Ecuador, Panama, Paraguay, and El Salvador signed the declaration .

Petro, however, has framed the election as a foreign intervention, claiming that Donald Trump and Marco Rubio “se encargaron” of ensuring De la Espriella’s victory and that Israel also interfered . He has called on Colombians to engage in “resistencia pacífica” and “desobediencia civil” against what he calls an illegitimate government . He has even compared the situation to the colonial era, claiming that Colombia has gone “del estatus de República al estatus de Virreinato” .

The international community’s position is clear: the election was free and fair, and a peaceful, orderly transition of power must take place. The United States and its “Escudo de las Américas” partners are standing firm against Petro’s efforts to undermine the democratic process.

Q&A Section

1. Why has Colombian President Gustavo Petro refused to recognize the election results?

Petro has alleged electoral fraud, claiming that the voting software was manipulated to favor Abelardo de la Espriella. He has specifically named Israeli firm Black Cube and Colombia’s Thomas Greg & Sons as actors in the alleged fraud. However, he has not provided evidence to support these claims, and all local and international observation missions have validated the election’s transparency .

2. What is the “Escudo de las Américas” initiative and what is its position on the Colombian election?

The “Escudo de las Américas” is an initiative launched by U.S. President Donald Trump with Latin American countries to unite forces in the fight against drug cartels. The countries in this initiative, including the United States, Argentina, Bolivia, Ecuador, Panama, Paraguay, and El Salvador, have issued a joint declaration calling for the official electoral result in Colombia to be respected and for a peaceful, orderly transition of power .

3. What is the nature of the standoff over the inauguration ceremony?

President-elect De la Espriella has announced his intention to be sworn in at a military garrison in southern Colombia, breaking with the tradition of holding the ceremony at the Capitol building. President Petro, as the current commander of the armed forces, has ordered that no military or police installation be used for the inauguration. De la Espriella has vowed to proceed with his plan anyway .

4. What legal challenges has Petro initiated to overturn the election?

On July 21, Petro formally filed a legal demand to annul the presidential election. The demand claims “structural unverifiability” and “algorithmic manipulation” in the voting process. It seeks to have the election declared null, a new scrutiny ordered, and a judicial inspection of the systems used in the election. This is an effort to use the courts to overturn a democratic result .

5. What are the implications of this political crisis for Colombia?

The crisis threatens to undermine Colombia’s democratic institutions and political stability. Petro’s refusal to recognize the election results could lead to a difficult transition of power, with the new government facing a hostile opposition and a polarized society. The standoff over the inauguration and the suspension of the transition process further complicate the situation. The international community, including the U.S. and the “Escudo de las Américas” countries, has called for the rule of law to be upheld .

From Battlefields to Soccer Fields: The Wartime Odyssey That Made Coca-Cola a Global Icon

By Aditi Nayar
New Delhi, July 22, 2026

A few years ago, a thought occurred to me as I shared an elevator with corporate executives in a New York hotel. The men and women of Coke—one of the longest-standing World Cup corporate partners—had come to New York as part of the company’s multicontinental marketing effort during the tournament [citation:original text]. As we chatted on our way to and from the lobby, I thought about a long-ago Coke business trip—a wartime journey to North Africa—that eventually led to the company’s planetary dominance [citation:original text].

Today, Coca-Cola sells more than 1.9 billion of its beverages each day, and the firm has about 70,000 employees worldwide [citation:original text]. Its logo at the 2026 World Cup was recognized instantly by just about everyone who encountered it, wherever their home countries might be [citation:original text]. But this global dominance was not a foregone conclusion. It was forged in the crucible of World War II, a time when a soft drink became a lifeline for homesick soldiers, and a corporate president made a promise that would change the world [citation:original text].

The Wartime Promise: “Every Man in Uniform”

It began during World War II, when Coca-Cola Co. President Robert Woodruff vowed that for the sake of the morale of homesick soldiers, “every man in uniform” should be able to have Cokes for a nickel, “wherever he is and whatever it costs the company” [citation:original text]. This was not just a marketing slogan; it was a personal commitment that would require an unprecedented logistical effort.

At the time, Coca-Cola was a national brand with a reputation, but it lacked a truly international presence . The war would change that. The U.S. government initially resisted the idea, arguing that shipping soft drinks overseas would take up precious cargo space needed for war materials. Coca-Cola, however, had a powerful ally: the American soldier. The drink had become a symbol of home, and its absence was a blow to morale.

The company successfully convinced top military leaders, including Generals George Marshall and Dwight Eisenhower, that Coca-Cola was an “essential wartime product” . Eisenhower, a known fan of the drink, became a key advocate. On June 29, 1943, his North African headquarters sent an urgent cablegram requesting shipment of materials and equipment for 10 bottling plants, 3 million filled bottles, and supplies to produce the same quantity twice monthly . The message was clear: Coke was a necessity.

The “Coca-Cola Colonels”: Building a Global Supply Chain

To execute this ambitious plan, Coca-Cola sent its own employees, designated as “Technical Observers,” to the front lines . These men, sometimes called “Coca-Cola colonels,” were given the rank of technical observer and issued army uniforms, allowing them to operate in war zones . Their mission was to construct and operate bottling plants as close to the combat areas as possible .

The logistics were staggering. The company had to navigate wartime supply chains, overcome sugar rationing (through an exemption for products shipped to the military), and build plants from scratch in some of the most hostile environments on Earth . By the end of the war, the “colonels” had built 64 bottling plants overseas and dispensed over 5 billion bottles to Allied personnel . It was a logistical miracle that not only lifted the spirits of the troops but also laid the foundation for Coca-Cola’s global footprint .

The Propaganda of Friendship: From Prison Camps to the World Stage

The wartime effort was also a powerful piece of soft power. As the Allies advanced, the presence of Coca-Cola became a symbol of American values: friendship, generosity, and hope . According to contemporaneous accounts, German prisoners of war in U.S. camps were sometimes offered Cokes at the commissary. The intended message from the Americans to their detained enemies was: We’re the good guys [citation:original text].

Even the enemy recognized the power of the brand. The infamous Axis propagandist “Tokyo Rose” teased American soldiers over the airwaves, asking, “Wouldn’t it be nice to have an ice-cold Coca-Cola? Can’t you just hear the ice tinkling in the glass?”  This was a backhanded compliment to the drink’s power. As one soldier put it in a letter home: “If anyone were to ask us what we are fighting for, we think half of us would answer, the right to buy Coca-Cola again” .

The Odd Tale of “White Coke”: A Cold War Commodity

The war’s end did not end Coca-Cola’s strategic role. As the Iron Curtain descended, relations between the U.S. and the Soviet Union quickly soured, leading to a complete ban on Western goods, including Coca-Cola. This created a peculiar problem for one of the Soviet Union’s most revered military leaders, Marshal Georgy Zhukov . Zhukov had acquired a taste for Coke during meetings with Eisenhower after the war, but he could not consume it at home without facing punishment .

In 1946, Zhukov approached his American counterparts with an unusual request: Could a clear version of Coca-Cola be made? If the drink were delivered without its distinctive caramel color, it could possibly be passed off as vodka . The request was passed up the chain of command, eventually reaching President Harry Truman, who contacted the chairman of the Coca-Cola Export Corporation .

Coca-Cola rose to the challenge. A company chemist created a clear version of the drink by removing the caramel. The beverage was put in unmarked, straight-edged bottles with white caps featuring a red star—a communist-friendly appearance . Fifty crates of this “white Coke” were delivered to the Soviets in Vienna . While all other goods entering the Soviet zone were inspected, Coca-Cola was able to deliver the crates without interference . It was a rare moment of connection across the Iron Curtain, albeit a personal favor between wartime colleagues that did little to alter the course of the Cold War .

From Battlefields to Soccer Fields: The Legacy Lives On

The wartime investment in a global supply chain and the brand’s association with the American way of life paid off handsomely. From the mid-1940s until 1960, the number of countries with bottling operations nearly doubled . A desire for the soft drink by people who had sampled it in far-flung places near the war-zone plants fueled an unprecedented international expansion [citation:original text].

This expansion is evident in the company’s marketing today. Coca-Cola’s presence at the FIFA World Cup™ began in 1950 with pitch-side signs in Brazil . It became the official beverage sponsor of the World Cup in 1978, a title it has held ever since . In 2026, with the tournament spanning 48 teams and 16 venues across North America, Coca-Cola’s activation is designed to match the global scale . The company isn’t just selling a drink; it’s selling a shared experience. Its campaign, “Feel It All,” invites fans to experience the “joy, tension, heartbreak, euphoria” of the tournament together .

Conclusion

The story of Coca-Cola’s global dominance is not just about a clever marketing formula. It is a testament to the power of logistics, the genius of wartime propaganda, and the enduring appeal of a product that, for a century, has been more than just a drink. It is a piece of home, a symbol of friendship, and a witness to history. As we watch the World Cup, or simply enjoy a cold beverage on a hot day, we are experiencing the legacy of a company that followed the troops, navigated the Cold War, and built a global empire, one bottle at a time.

Q&A Section

1. What was Robert Woodruff’s wartime promise to American soldiers?
In 1941, Coca-Cola President Robert Woodruff issued an order “to see that every man in uniform gets a bottle of Coca-Cola for 5 cents, wherever he is and whatever it costs the Company.” This commitment was a morale booster and a strategic decision that led to the construction of bottling plants in war zones and helped turn Coca-Cola into a global brand .

2. How did Coca-Cola manage to get its product to soldiers during World War II?
Coca-Cola sent employees known as “Technical Observers” or “Coca-Cola colonels” to the front lines to build and operate bottling plants in war zones. They were given military rank to facilitate their work. These efforts resulted in 64 bottling plants and over 5 billion bottles of Coke being delivered to Allied personnel by the end of the war .

3. What was the “White Coke” and why was it created?
“White Coke” was a clear version of Coca-Cola created after WWII for Soviet Marshal Georgy Zhukov. Because Coca-Cola was banned in the Soviet Union, Zhukov requested a clear version that could be passed off as vodka. Coca-Cola removed the caramel coloring, packaged it in unmarked bottles, and sent 50 crates to him in Vienna .

4. How did World War II contribute to Coca-Cola’s global presence?
The bottling plants built during the war did not disappear when peace returned. They became the foundation for the company’s global expansion. Additionally, millions of people from different countries tried Coca-Cola for the first time during the war, creating a global demand that the company was poised to fill .

5. What is the history of Coca-Cola’s partnership with the FIFA World Cup?
Coca-Cola’s presence at the FIFA World Cup began in 1950 with pitch-side signs in Brazil. It became the official beverage sponsor in 1978, a partnership that remains one of the longest-standing in sports history. Today, Coca-Cola is a key partner for the FIFA World Cup, running global marketing campaigns and activating the Trophy Tour .

Trump, Iran’s Assassins, and John Bolton: A Reckoning with Raw Vindictiveness

By Aditi Nayar
New Delhi, July 22, 2026

President Trump is taking Iran’s threats to assassinate him seriously, as well he should. He reportedly switched Air Force One from the new Qatar version on his return from the recent NATO summit on the advice of the Secret Service. How about a little concern, then, about Iran’s threats to kill his former national security adviser, John Bolton? [citation:original text]

The White House hasn’t confirmed the Air Force One switch, but it hasn’t denied the story either. Notably, the Justice Department has subpoenaed New York Times writers who reported the story to disclose their sources. That’s harassment against the press that won’t make the U.S. safer. The story arguably did Mr. Trump a favor by reminding the public that Iran’s regime hasn’t turned over a “new leaf” to borrow Vice President JD Vance’s term [citation:original text].

” They want to take out the U.S. leader—me,” Mr. Trump told reporters in Turkey. “I’m on every list. I saw this morning, I’m on every single one of their lists. And so far, I guess I’ve been a little bit lucky, but that maybe doesn’t last very long” [citation:original text].

Mr. Trump has given orders for a massive military assault on Iran if he is assassinated. The Justice Department has been prosecuting Mr. Bolton, and the Wall Street Journal editorial board has raised the alarm that a prison sentence could put his life at further risk from Iran’s assassins.

The Soleimani Legacy: A Target on Their Backs

The roots of the current crisis lie in the January 2020 US drone strike that killed Qassem Soleimani, the head of Iran’s Quds Force. Soleimani was the architect of Iran’s network of terror proxies, and his death was a major blow to the regime’s regional ambitions. However, it also created a lasting vendetta [citation:original text].

Iran has long wanted to kill American officials, as well as anti-regime exiles in the U.S. It targeted Brooklyn-based Iranian dissident Masih Alinejad, according to a federal case against would-be assassins [citation:original text]. The Justice Department charged an Iranian national with attempting to hire a hitman to kill Bolton in 2022 [citation:original text]. The threat against Bolton, as well as other former Trump administration officials like Mike Pompeo and Brian Hook, is directly linked to the Soleimani strike [citation:original text].

The Biden administration was concerned enough that it provided these officials with protection details. But after taking office a second time, Mr. Trump pulled that protection from all three. The Wall Street Journal editorial board described this as “raw vindictiveness,” noting that Iran has not given up on killing them [citation:original text].

Trump’s rationale, when asked about revoking Bolton’s security detail in January 2025, was dismissive: “Because I think that was enough time. We’re not going to have security on people for the rest of their lives” . This justification ignores the fact that the threat is not based on Bolton’s status as a former official, but on his direct involvement in a decision that made him a permanent enemy of the Iranian state. The administration’s move was widely seen as a petty act of revenge against a longtime critic .

Prosecution and the Prison Risk

The danger for Mr. Bolton has increased because the Trump Administration is prosecuting him for mishandling classified documents. Mr. Bolton pleaded guilty last month to avoid the threat of additional charges against him or his family. The plea deal stipulates a fine of $2.25 million, which is an effort to strip Mr. Bolton of the income from his 2020 book that was critical of Mr. Trump [citation:original text].

But far worse, the Justice Department has insisted on seeking a prison term of up to five years. This is a penalty far beyond what other officials have received for similar or greater classification offenses. John Deutch, David Petraeus and Sandy Berger never served jail time and none pleaded guilty to felonies. Mr. Bolton was treated more harshly [citation:original text].

Federal Judge Theodore Chuang has scheduled sentencing for Mr. Bolton for Oct. 28. But a jail term of any length runs the risk of assassination. It wouldn’t take much for Iranians to bribe an inmate, or threaten relatives of an inmate or guard, to have Mr. Bolton killed while he’s in custody. Prisons are notoriously insecure [citation:original text].

The Wall Street Journal editorial board has directly warned that if Mr. Bolton is killed in prison, the president and his Justice Department will be partly responsible . This is a stark indictment of the administration’s actions.

The Iranian Threat Network

The Iranian threat against American officials is not limited to Bolton. In 2022, the Justice Department charged Shahram Poursafi, an Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps member, with attempting to arrange Bolton’s murder for $300,000 .

There were also several plots against Trump himself. In 2024, the FBI arrested a Pakistani national with ties to Iran who was trying to arrange a murder-for-hire scheme targeting the president . The Justice Department has also unsealed charges against an “Iranian asset” and two Americans in a separate murder-for-hire scheme .

The threat remains ongoing. In July 2026, it was reported that Israel had shared new intelligence with the United States indicating a fresh Iranian plan to kill Trump . This has forced the Secret Service to take extraordinary precautions, including reportedly firing at a drone they feared was an Iranian attack vehicle .

A Pattern of Exploitation

The Trump administration’s actions appear to exploit the Iranian threat for personal and political gain. While the president himself receives extensive protection, he has stripped protection from his former advisers, leaving them vulnerable . He has also used the Justice Department to prosecute Bolton, a move that not only punishes him but also potentially puts his life at further risk.

The Wall Street Journal, a publication typically aligned with conservative interests, has been scathing in its criticism of Trump’s actions . This suggests that the administration’s behavior is viewed as excessive even within its own political base.

Conclusion

The situation surrounding John Bolton is a stark illustration of the intersection of national security, personal vendetta, and the abuse of power. The Iran threat is real and persistent. The president’s response to that threat has been to protect himself, while exposing his former advisers to danger. This is not just vindictive; it is a dereliction of duty. The administration’s actions, if they result in harm to Bolton, will be a stain on its record and a warning to other public servants who might cross the president.

Q&A Section

1. Why is John Bolton still under threat from Iran, and why does he need protection?

Bolton is under threat from Iran due to his role in the Trump administration’s “maximum pressure” campaign against Iran and specifically due to the January 2020 drone strike that killed Iranian General Qassem Soleimani. The Justice Department has charged an Iranian national with attempting to hire a hitman to kill Bolton, and the threat is considered ongoing [citation:original text].

2. What did Trump do regarding Bolton’s security detail, and what was the reaction?

On his first day back in office in January 2025, President Trump terminated the Secret Service protection that had been provided to Bolton and other former officials under the Biden administration. Bolton said he was “disappointed but not surprised,” and the Wall Street Journal editorial board called the decision “raw vindictiveness” .

3. How has Trump’s Justice Department treated Bolton?

The Justice Department has prosecuted Bolton for mishandling classified documents. Bolton pleaded guilty and faces a $2.25 million fine and a potential prison sentence of up to five years. Critics argue this is an unusually harsh penalty, far beyond what has been given to other officials for similar offenses, and appears to be an act of revenge [citation:original text].

4. What is the specific concern about Bolton going to prison?

There is a concern that if Bolton is sent to prison, he would be vulnerable to assassination by Iran. The Wall Street Journal warned that “it wouldn’t take much for Iranians to bribe an inmate, or threaten relatives of an inmate or guard, to have Mr. Bolton killed while he’s in custody” [citation:original text].

5. What is the broader pattern of Iran’s assassination threats?

Iran has been plotting to assassinate current and former American officials, including President Trump, in retaliation for the Soleimani killing. There have been several foiled plots, including a 2024 scheme to kill Trump and a 2022 plot to kill Bolton. The Iranian regime has a history of targeting its enemies overseas, and the threat to American officials is considered persistent and credible.

Europe’s Air Conditioning Rebellion and the Climate Coup at the National Academies

By Aditi Nayar
New Delhi, July 22, 2026

In Europe’s air conditioning wars, the hoi polloi are beating the climate scolds. The public is putting comfort and public health above green dictates [citation:original text]. A survey published last week by the price-comparison business Verivox found that 23% of German households now have AC—”five percentage points more than a year ago”—and another 25% plan to get it. In Belgium the share of energy used for household cooling has increased 167% since 2022, the Brussels Times reports [citation:original text].

In France the government has pestered the public to wet their skin, drink cold soup and block windows with cardboard to beat the heat—anything to avoid resorting to AC. Yet France’s Agency for Ecological Transition says AC ownership rose to 24% of households last year from 18% in 2023 [citation:original text]. The retailer Carrefour sold 30,000 AC units in a day amid a heat wave last month—”a thousand times more than on a normal day,” CEO Alexandre Bompard told the Agence France-Presse. Scuffles have broken out over the limited retail supply, and some French restaurants are advertising that they have AC [citation:original text].

In Britain the co-founder of Aircon Services, an air conditioning specialist in Tamworth, told the BBC he’s seen a 300% increase in domestic inquiries in six years. Aervue Air Conditioning in Birmingham now has employees working seven days a week to meet demand, and it’s booked through August [citation:original text].

Chinese exports of AC units to the European Union have increased more than 43% in the first half of 2026 compared to the same period last year, the state-run media reports. The Chinese appliance company Midea expanded production capacity to meet demand and recently shipped 20,000 air conditioners to France in a week, the South China Morning Post says [citation:original text].

The Rebellion of the Common Man

Europe’s soaring demand for home cooling is another example of citizens revolting against the mandates and moralizing of government and progressive elites [citation:original text]. The climate scolds have been telling Europeans to “sweat it out” for years, but the public has had enough. The recent heat waves have made air conditioning a necessity, not a luxury. People are choosing their comfort and health over the dictates of politicians and activists.

In Paris, where temperatures have recently reached 40°C, AC is no longer a luxury. As one European Parliament member put it, “The sun is beating down on us. Air conditioning is no longer a luxury, it’s a matter of health and survival” . The French government’s efforts to discourage AC have been met with resistance, and even the mayor of Paris has refused to ban it . The Dutch government’s “AC-free” campaign was similarly unsuccessful .

The Role of China: Meeting the Demand

China has stepped in to meet this demand, selling a record number of air conditioners to the European Union in the first half of 2026. The state-run media says Chinese exports of AC units to the EU have increased more than 43% . Midea, a major Chinese appliance company, even expanded its production capacity to meet the demand, with a shipment of 20,000 air conditioners to France in a week .

This is a clear example of how market forces are responding to consumer needs, regardless of government directives. The Chinese manufacturers are making a fortune while European governments are scrambling to discourage their own citizens from using AC. It is a classic case of unintended consequences, where the policy to reduce carbon emissions is actually benefiting Chinese industry.

A Climate Coup at the National Academies

Public confidence in scientific institutions has declined as they’ve become more political. A textbook case is the National Academies of Sciences, Engineering and Medicine, which on Thursday released a report that explicitly lays out a plan to address climate change [citation:original text]. The 253-page report examines the purported scientific advances in quantifying the extent to which CO2 emissions contribute to natural disasters and extreme weather [citation:original text].

The National Academies’ 2016 report found that this area of research wasn’t well-developed . Yet this year’s report claims a sea change in the science [citation:original text]. “Major advancements” in climate methodology and modeling now “allow for more robust assessments,” the report says. Scientists can now attribute particular extreme weather and rainfall events with a high degree of confidence to man-caused climate change, and wildfires, droughts and tropical cyclones with moderate confidence [citation:original text].

Why is this important? The Academies claims its report is “relevant to policy and legal decisions pertaining to climate change and liability for losses sustained as a result of extreme weather and climate events.” Translation: It could be useful in shaking down fossil-fuel producers [citation:original text].

Dozens of state and local governments have sued fossil-fuel companies for purported damage resulting from climate change and natural disasters. The report says its research can help such plaintiffs show they have legal standing to bring lawsuits, which requires a concrete injury that is “fairly traceable to the challenged action of the defendant” [citation:original text].

The report also says this research could help “inform” policies like a law in Vermont, which empowers the government to assess the “financial impact on the state of fossil fuel related-greenhouse gas pollution” and “demand payments from fossil fuel companies to fund adaptation projects.” The point is to put a scientific gloss on a coercive power [citation:original text].

Such research, the report tells us, “may also be relevant in challenges to permitting decisions or to the adequacy of environmental impact assessments” of projects. Sierra Club, have at it [citation:original text]. What the report glosses over is that CO2 emissions are global, and the contributions to climate change of any one company or project are minuscule [citation:original text].

The Conflict of Interest

That’s not the report’s only oversight. The Academies notes that Michael Burger, the executive director of Columbia Law School’s Sabin Center for Climate Change Law, assisted with the report and cites one of his papers. Yet the report omits that Mr. Burger is a counsel at the law firm Sher Edling, which has led the litigation raid on fossil-fuel producers [citation:original text].

The Wall Street Journal has previously reported that a climate chapter for the Fourth Edition of its Reference Manual on Scientific Evidence—published by the Federal Judicial Center and National Academies—largely drew from Mr. Burger’s work without proper attribution [citation:original text]. The FJC, which is the education arm of the federal judiciary, later retracted the chapter [citation:original text].

Mr. Burger’s fingerprints are all over last week’s report, which was partly funded by the U.S. government. Congress established the National Academies in 1863 to advise on science—e.g., fixing the weights and measures of currency and methods for protecting ship hulls from saltwater corrosion [citation:original text]. The Academies undermines its credibility when it makes itself a tool of legal advocacy and a political agenda [citation:original text].

The Cost of Cooling: A Global Challenge

The demand for air conditioning is not just a European phenomenon; it is a global trend. According to the International Energy Agency (IEA), the number of air conditioners worldwide is set to grow from 2.3 billion to 5.5 billion by 2050, driven by rising incomes and temperatures . This is a major challenge for the environment, as ACs consume massive amounts of electricity and use refrigerants that are potent greenhouse gases.

The IEA has warned that without aggressive action on efficiency, the energy demand from ACs could triple by 2050, requiring the equivalent of all the electricity generated by China and India today . This has led to a debate about how to meet this demand. Some argue for a shift to more efficient cooling technologies, while others argue for behavioral changes to reduce the need for AC.

Conclusion

The air conditioning rebellion in Europe is a clear signal that the public is not willing to sacrifice their comfort for the sake of climate dictates. The National Academies’ report is a reminder that scientific institutions are increasingly being used as tools for political advocacy, which erodes public trust in science. The challenge of meeting the demand for cooling while protecting the environment is a complex one, and it will require a balanced and pragmatic approach that takes into account both the needs of the public and the imperatives of climate change.

Q&A Section

1. What is the “air conditioning rebellion” in Europe?

The “air conditioning rebellion” refers to the growing public demand for air conditioning in Europe, despite government efforts to discourage its use. The public is prioritizing comfort and health over green dictates, leading to a surge in AC ownership and sales across the continent. In Germany, AC ownership rose to 23%; in France, it rose to 24%; and China’s exports of AC units to the EU have increased by 43% [citation:original text].

2. Why are Europeans buying more air conditioners?

Europeans are buying more air conditioners due to the increasing frequency and intensity of heatwaves. The recent heatwaves have made AC a necessity rather than a luxury, especially for vulnerable populations. The public is choosing comfort and health over the dictates of politicians and activists who have been urging them to “sweat it out” [citation:original text].

3. What is the role of Chinese manufacturers in meeting the demand?

Chinese manufacturers, such as Midea, have stepped in to meet the soaring demand for air conditioners in Europe. Chinese exports of AC units to the EU have increased by more than 43% in the first half of 2026. Midea even expanded production capacity to meet the demand, shipping 20,000 air conditioners to France in a single week [citation:original text].

4. What is the controversy surrounding the National Academies’ report on climate change?

The National Academies’ report has been criticized for being a tool for legal advocacy. The report claims that scientists can now attribute extreme weather events to climate change with high confidence, which could be used to support lawsuits against fossil-fuel companies. The report was assisted by Michael Burger, a counsel at a law firm that has led litigation against fossil-fuel producers, raising concerns about bias and conflict of interest [citation:original text].

5. What are the environmental implications of the growing demand for air conditioning?

The growing demand for air conditioning poses a significant environmental challenge. ACs consume massive amounts of electricity and use refrigerants that are potent greenhouse gases. The IEA warns that without aggressive action on efficiency, the energy demand from ACs could triple by 2050, requiring the equivalent of all the electricity generated by China and India today . This is a major challenge for global climate goals.

How Training AI Gives Some Workers an Edge

By Sarah O’Connor
New Delhi, July 22, 2026

In the early 20th century, a gifted engineer called Frederick Winslow Taylor embarked on an ambitious task: to extract knowledge from inside the heads of workers on America’s factory floors [citation:original text]. In the eyes of Taylor, who would go on to become one of the world’s first management consultants, factory workers possessed a “mass of rule-of-thumb or traditional knowledge” which had been “handed down from man to man by word of mouth” or “almost unconsciously learnt through personal observation”. Taylor thought it was about time this knowledge was “codified or systematically analysed or described”. To that end, he sent managers with stopwatches and notebooks on to shop floors to observe, time and record every stage of every job [citation:original text].

More than a century later, employers of white-collar professionals are beginning to confront a similar challenge. It is becoming increasingly clear that the knowledge required to make AI models genuinely powerful in a swath of workplaces is currently locked inside employees’ heads [citation:original text]. This isn’t true in every workplace. AI models have transformed the software profession, for example, because the task of writing code is testable and rules-based and there were vast teams of training data publicly available, thanks to online forums like Stack Overflow [citation:original text].

The Problem of Tacit Knowledge

For many other jobs, that sort of data just does not exist on the web. Indeed, some subtle but important skills are very hard to codify at all, which is why they are often learnt through experience and osmosis. This sort of tacit knowledge was famously summed up by the scientist and philosopher Michael Polanyi with the phrase: “we can know more than we can tell” [citation:original text].

As a result, general-purpose AI models are simply not very good at many specific tasks which require both domain and institutional knowledge. Investment firm Bridgewater Associates recently experimented, for example, with using LLMs to do something their human professionals do all the time: parsing reams of news stories and financial documents for information that might be relevant to their investment decisions. While this could be a useful timesaver, Bridgewater found that variants of Gemini, Claude and GPT only tended to get it right about 50 per cent of the time [citation:original text].

Writing better prompts didn’t work either – something that wouldn’t have surprised Polanyi. “An explicit prompt can only convey the intuition an expert is able to put into words, while the judgments that matter most are often the hardest to articulate,” the Bridgewater team wrote. Instead, they used their own experts and data to help to fine-tune a smaller, cheaper model, so that “rather than controlling the expert’s intuition into a static prompt”, they trained the model to “develop its own judgment”. This bespoke model achieved about 85 per cent accuracy – a vast improvement [citation:original text].

The same story can be seen in other sectors, too. When Ford rehired veteran engineers because its automated quality systems weren’t performing well enough, many saw it as a victory of humans over machines. But the “grey beards” weren’t there to replace the machines – they were there to train them to get better [citation:original text].

The Employee’s Dilemma: To Train or Not to Train

Getting your employees to train bespoke AI systems requires their consent and active collaboration. You can’t just send people with stopwatches on to the factory floor, as Taylor once did. Which raises the question: is it in employees’ interests to collaborate? What would they stand to gain or lose? [citation:original text]

On the positive side, workers might gain the ability to shape AI tools, so that they are genuinely useful to them in their work. If these tools help to boost productivity or unlock new markets for the company, that might lead to more interesting roles, more new models to train, new skills to learn and higher pay [citation:original text]. On the other hand, workers might fear that if they download their hard-won tacit knowledge into an AI model, their employer will use that system to replace them. Isn’t it safer to get your employer to continue to pay you by the hour to access what is inside your head? [citation:original text]

History suggests there could be more subtle dangers, too. Taylor’s knowledge grab, for example, was really a power grab. Under his new system of “scientific management”, every worker was told “not only what is to be done but how it is to be done and the exact time to be allowed for doing it”. Workers hated this loss of autonomy and discretion. Strikes began to break out in workplaces where Taylor’s methods were introduced [citation:original text].

The Implications for Workers and Workplaces

If the next phase of AI does involve companies fine-tuning their systems and models with the help of employees, there will be two implications. The first is that many workers – those who have had time to develop tacit knowledge about hard-to-codify jobs – are going to find themselves with a lot more leverage in the next few years than they might expect. Indeed, the most tech-savvy people in the trade union movement have already clocked this and are discussing how to make the most of it [citation:original text].

The second implication is that workplaces characterised by an atmosphere of mistrust are going to struggle. So too are those companies in which workers do not believe they will secure a share of any AI-powered gains [citation:original text].

“Workplace relations” is one of those dreary terms that usually sends the emails dropping. “Industrial relations” is even worse. But they might just prove key to the next phase of the AI race [citation:original text].

Conclusion

The AI revolution is not just about technology; it is about people. The success of AI in many workplaces will depend on the ability of companies to tap into the tacit knowledge of their employees. This requires a fundamental shift in the relationship between employers and employees, one based on trust and collaboration rather than control and surveillance. The companies that succeed in this new era will be those that treat their employees as partners in innovation, not as obstacles to be overcome.

Q&A Section

1. What is “tacit knowledge” and why is it important for AI?

Tacit knowledge is the kind of knowledge that is difficult to transfer to another person by writing it down or verbalizing it. It is often learned through experience and is rooted in context. This knowledge is important for AI because general-purpose models often lack the domain-specific and institutional knowledge needed to perform specific tasks effectively. To build powerful AI systems, companies need to capture the tacit knowledge of their employees .

2. What did Bridgewater Associates’ experiment with AI reveal?

Bridgewater Associates experimented with using LLMs to parse news and financial documents for investment decisions. They found that general-purpose models like Gemini, Claude, and GPT only got it right about 50% of the time. However, when they fine-tuned a smaller model using their own experts and data, the accuracy improved to 85%. This illustrates the importance of using domain-specific knowledge to train AI for specific tasks .

3. Why might employees be reluctant to help train AI systems?

Employees may be reluctant to help train AI systems for several reasons. They might fear that if they download their hard-won tacit knowledge into an AI model, their employer will use that system to replace them. They may also be concerned about losing their autonomy and discretion, as happened with Taylor’s scientific management. Workers may prefer to be paid for their knowledge rather than giving it away to a machine .

4. What is the historical parallel between Taylor’s scientific management and today’s AI training?

Taylor’s scientific management involved extracting knowledge from workers on factory floors to improve efficiency, but it was also a power grab that reduced workers’ autonomy and led to strikes. Today’s AI training involves extracting tacit knowledge from employees, which could similarly lead to a loss of autonomy if not managed carefully. The success of AI will depend on whether employees see it as a collaboration or a threat .

5. What are the implications of this trend for the future of work?

The trend of training AI with employee knowledge has two key implications. First, workers with valuable tacit knowledge will gain leverage in the workplace, as they are essential to building effective AI systems. Second, companies with poor workplace relations and mistrust will struggle, as employees will be reluctant to share their knowledge. The future of AI depends on building trust and collaboration between employers and employees .

Hong Kong’s Chance to Redefine Its Competitive Strengths

By Cheng Xianyue
New Delhi, July 22, 2026

Hong Kong’s decision to introduce its first five-year plan has prompted questions: greater government intervention at the expense of the free market? Will it make Hong Kong’s development model more similar to that of the mainland? Could it overlap with the annual policy address and budget? And without detailed key performance indicators, might it become little more than a symbolic document? These concerns deserve a serious response.

For Hong Kong, the purpose of a five-year plan is not to remake an open international city in the image of another development model. Rather, within the framework of “one country, two systems”, it is to place Hong Kong’s strengths, national strategic opportunities and local challenges within a coherent road map .

Hong Kong’s past success rested on an open and flexible market, its free-port status and extensive links to global capital. Yet these advantages have been expressed mainly through its capacity to connect and allocate resources, rather than to create new economic structures. When land remains scarce, the industrial base is narrow and research outcomes struggle to reach the market, flexibility alone does not produce a new growth curve.

This reflects what economist Douglass North described as path dependence. The more efficient a system becomes at performing its functions, the more its participants are incentivised to optimise them for short-term gain. Over time, the system can become locked into an established model, limiting its willingness to explore alternatives.

Unless Hong Kong’s traditional strengths are placed within a longer-term policy framework, government initiatives may fail to generate cumulative impact in the face of a flexible but impatient market. International capital values free flows, but also predictability. Talented people look not only at current opportunities but also at prospects. New industries require coordination across land, research, education, finance and institutions.

A five-year plan should therefore be understood as an instrument of long-term governance and a means of overcoming path dependence. The deeper purpose of planning is to create policy continuity and institutional momentum .

The Shift from Connector to Value-Adder

Hong Kong can no longer rely solely on its traditional advantages to sustain growth. Innovation and technology, international tertiary education, the Northern Metropolis and the Hong Kong-Shenzhen Innovation and Technology Park within it are major initiatives. Unless they are integrated into a coherent strategy, policies will remain fragmented and the public will struggle to understand where Hong Kong is heading.

This shift requires a clearer understanding of the relationship between an effective government and an efficient market. The plan should bring them into closer alignment. Markets are good at identifying opportunities, allocating capital and encouraging innovation. But when Hong Kong faces long-term bottlenecks in housing, industrial land and infrastructure, market adjustments are unlikely to be enough. The government’s role is to reduce uncertainty through strategic direction, institutional coordination and infrastructure investment.

Chief Executive John Lee has highlighted that the city’s first five-year plan would tackle major livelihood issues and social development in the coming five years and boost the city’s competitive edge . The plan’s consultation document, launched on June 15, 2026, is a “historic step with profound significance” that will provide a “forward-looking, strategic and operable guiding document” for Hong Kong’s development .

The plan’s timing is critical. As China’s National 15th Five-Year Plan takes effect this year, Hong Kong is following its lead to “better align ourselves with and serve national development, as well as seize the new opportunities” . The city is positioning itself not merely as a “super connector” between China and the world, but as a “super value-adder” that can create new economic value .

The Northern Metropolis: A New Engine for Growth

At the centre of this transformation is the Northern Metropolis. If Central represents Hong Kong’s traditional model of finance-led growth, the Northern Metropolis should represent industry-led growth based on land, research, talent and cross-boundary collaboration.

Hong Kong’s imbalance is that its financial centre is highly developed while its industrial hinterland remains weak. Without space for emerging industries, finance will eventually run short of compelling local growth stories. The Northern Metropolis is expected to deliver more than 70,000 housing units and 1 million square metres of economic floor space over the next five years . The deeper significance lies in bringing housing, employment, education and healthcare into a single strategy, addressing a weakness in Hong Kong governance: many individual policies, but insufficient systemic coordination.

The Northern Metropolis is being positioned as a flagship cross‑border innovation zone. The Hong Kong Park of the Hetao Shenzhen-Hong Kong Science and Technology Innovation Co‑operation Zone, a major cooperation platform under the National 14th Five-Year Plan, officially opened in December 2025 . Over 60 institutions and enterprises had already begun moving into the Park’s wet laboratory buildings by early 2026 .

The University Town: Bridging Research and Industry

The proposed university town is another crucial component. Hong Kong has five universities ranked among the world’s top 100, yet their impact on the local industrial structure remains limited. The important question is whether they can translate academic excellence into industrial strength.

The strategic value of the university town is in connecting universities, research institutions, industrial estates, start-ups and residential communities, forming an integrated platform for talent development, research and commercialisation. The Government has earmarked around 90 hectares of land for the Northern Metropolis University Town across three development areas . Within the Ngau Tam Mei New Development Area alone, 52 hectares—40% of the area—will be allocated for university facilities, including a third medical school . An additional 10 hectares are reserved for an integrated hospital .

The development of the Northern Metropolis University Town will “break away from traditional models,” achieving “synergistic and deeply integrated development between education and industry” . It will not only provide development room for the post-secondary education sector but also serve as a “key engine” to advance the integrated development of Hong Kong’s academic excellence and industry, promoting industrial development through education .

Finance Plus: Diversifying the Economic Base

Hong Kong’s financial sector remains its crown jewel, but the plan envisions a more diversified and resilient economy. The “Finance plus” strategy aims to integrate financial services with high-growth sectors such as artificial intelligence and green energy . Hong Kong will work to deepen connectivity with the mainland and the world, further consolidating its status as an international financial centre and a hub for global trade .

The city’s stock market had one of the world’s best-performing stock markets in 2025, with average daily turnover nearing 250 billion Hong Kong dollars, up 90 per cent compared to 2024 . Chinese mainland-related stocks make up some 80 per cent of the stock market . The plan aims to attract more high-quality companies from Southeast Asia, the Middle East, the Global South and beyond to list in Hong Kong, while accelerating the development of fixed income and currency markets, green finance, fintech, and commodities trading .

The Governance Challenge

Ultimately, debate over the plan should focus on whether it can help the city break free from short-termism, departmental fragmentation and policy inertia. For Hong Kong, this is a test of its governing capacity. Can it preserve its international character while strengthening strategic execution? Can it define its role within the national 15th five-year plan, address structural problems and create a stronger basis for development?

CY Leung, former Chief Executive and now Vice-Chairman of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference, has addressed concerns that Hong Kong’s five-year plan would make it “the same as provinces and cities on the mainland”. He noted that the National People’s Congress is deliberating a National Development Planning Law that “states that the country upholds the policy of One Country, Two Systems and supports the two SARs in proactively aligning with, integrating into and serving the overall national development framework” .

The plan’s success will depend on execution. The Government has launched a two-month public consultation, running until August 14, with multiple consultation sessions to gather input from Legislative Council members, sectoral representatives and the general public . The official blueprint is expected to be published in the third quarter of 2026 .

A Test of Governing Capacity

Hong Kong can no longer rely solely on its traditional advantages to sustain growth. If the plan can help Hong Kong move from passively connecting the world to actively shaping new sources of growth, it will mark the beginning of an era in which the city redefines its competitive strengths.

The five-year plan is not about abandoning Hong Kong’s open, free-market character. It is about giving that character a long-term direction that can overcome the limitations of short-termism, create policy continuity, and build the institutional momentum needed to compete in a rapidly changing world. For a city that has always prided itself on its ability to adapt, this may be its most important adaptation yet.

Q&A Section

1. What is the purpose of Hong Kong’s first five-year plan?

The plan aims to provide a forward-looking, strategic and operable guiding document for Hong Kong’s development during 2026-2030. It will enable Hong Kong to proactively align with the national 15th Five-Year Plan, supporting the city’s high-quality development and helping it better integrate into and serve national development . It covers key areas including economy, industries, spatial planning, infrastructure, green transformation, healthcare, education, housing, welfare and elderly care .

2. What is the “path dependence” challenge Hong Kong faces?

Path dependence refers to the tendency of a system to become locked into an established model, limiting its willingness to explore alternatives. Hong Kong’s traditional strengths—its open market, free-port status, and global connections—have been highly effective at connecting and allocating resources. But this very success can create inertia, making it difficult to develop new economic structures. The five-year plan is intended to break this path dependence by providing a long-term framework for strategic change.

3. What is the significance of the Northern Metropolis?

The Northern Metropolis represents a fundamental shift in Hong Kong’s development model. If Central represents the city’s traditional finance-led growth, the Northern Metropolis is intended to be industry-led growth based on land, research, talent and cross-boundary collaboration. It will provide space for emerging industries and help rebalance Hong Kong’s economy. Over the next five years, it is expected to deliver more than 70,000 housing units and 1 million square metres of economic floor space .

4. How does the plan address Hong Kong’s research-commercialisation gap?

The plan focuses on the Northern Metropolis University Town, which will connect universities, research institutions, industrial estates, start-ups and residential communities. Around 90 hectares of land have been earmarked across three development areas . The University Town aims to achieve “synergistic and deeply integrated development between education and industry,” helping to translate Hong Kong’s academic excellence into industrial strength .

5. Does the five-year plan mean Hong Kong is abandoning its free-market character?

No. The plan is designed to preserve Hong Kong’s international character while strengthening strategic execution. It is not about remaking Hong Kong in the image of another development model. Rather, within the “one country, two systems” framework, it places Hong Kong’s traditional strengths within a longer-term policy framework to create policy continuity and institutional momentum . The goal is to make the city more competitive, not to reduce its openness or flexibility.

Population Spectres Do Harm: Managing Demographic Change is the Challenge

By Aditi Nayar
New Delhi, July 22, 2026

Visions of population explosion or implosion seem to provoke strong passions. Three centuries ago, Malthus argued that population growth would outpace the food supply, leading to famine and disease. Today, the focus seems to have shifted to concerns about underpopulation in India and globally. Elon Musk even claims that population collapse poses a much greater risk than global warming [citation:original text].

This is a strange turnaround. In the 1800s, the world population was a billion, and life expectancy was less than 30 years. Despite the population growing to over 8 billion, Malthus’s doomsday predictions have not materialised, and life expectancy now exceeds 70. Are fears of a shrinking workforce equally flimsy? Just as improvements in agriculture and the Green Revolution have continued to feed the world, it seems highly likely that AI and other technological advances will cope with a smaller workforce [citation:original text].

However, the harm to the social fabric from these overblown claims may be incalculable. Discussions of population devolve into debates about childbearing and ultimately centre on women’s bodies. Malthus advocated chastity for women to reduce fertility. Modern global discourse emphasises a return to traditional ways of life, controlling access to contraception, and sometimes criminalises abortion. The Indian discourse echoes the global disconnect, with some unique twists, leaving fear and dissension in its wake. Hence, it is important to address some of these fears directly [citation:original text].

Is India on the Verge of Depopulation?

First, is India on the verge of depopulation, as a recent article suggests? If we accept the United Nations projections using their medium variant, the Indian population will grow to 1.7 billion and then decline by the end of the 21st century, returning to the present level of about 1.4 billion. However, projections from the Seattle-based Institute for Health Metrics (IHME) suggest it will dip below 1 billion. Unfortunately, IHME projections assume that future college graduates will follow the same path to low fertility as current graduates and that increasing education will further reduce fertility. But between 2015-16 and 2019-21, the Total Fertility Rate (TFR) for women with 12 or more years of education held steady at 1.7, while that for women with lower levels of education dropped. A narrowing gap between educated and less-educated women has been observed in many countries, undermining confidence in the IHME methodology [citation:original text].

India’s TFR has already declined below replacement level. The National Family Health Survey (NFHS) 2019-21 showed India’s TFR at 2.0, below the replacement level of 2.1. This has led to speculation about population decline, with one recent article claiming India could face “depopulation”. However, the UN projects that India’s population will peak at around 1.7 billion in the 2060s, before gradually declining. The decline, if it happens, will be a slow process over many decades.

The IHME projections are often cited by those who fear a rapid population collapse. However, their methodology is flawed. They assume that increased education will lead to further fertility decline, but the evidence does not support this. The narrowing gap in fertility between educated and less-educated women in India suggests that the fertility decline is becoming universal and not driven solely by education. This reduces the likelihood of a further sharp decline.

Will India Face a Worker Shortage?

Second, with an ageing population, will India face a worker shortage? Projections from the Population Foundation of India indicate that the share of the population aged 60 and older will rise from 11 per cent to 28 per cent between 2021 and 2051. However, this will be offset by a decline in the child population, and the working-age population will decline only slightly from 66 per cent to 64 per cent. With an AI-led increase in productivity and the potential to recruit women workers who are largely outside the formal labour force, even this decline should pose no problem [citation:original text].

India’s working-age population is projected to remain large, and the country will continue to have a “demographic dividend” for some time. Even if the working-age population share declines slightly, in absolute terms it will still be massive. The bigger challenge is not a shortage of workers, but a shortage of quality jobs. India needs to invest in education and skill development to ensure that its large working-age population is employable.

Will North India Overtake South India in Population and Power?

Third, is the population in north India growing faster than in south India, and if so, will it diminish the power of southern states in the Indian Union? South India experienced a fertility decline earlier than the north. For example, in 1971, Tamil Nadu accounted for 7.5 per cent of India’s population; by 2011, it had dropped to 6 per cent, and it is likely to have declined further by 2026. Consequently, if electoral seat allocation is based on population share in 2026 rather than 1971, the southern states will lose. But it is also important to remember that higher economic growth, driven by low population growth and increased investment in children, has increased productivity in states like Tamil Nadu. Sanjeev Sanyal has argued that Tamil Nadu’s share of GDP grew from 7.1 per cent in the 1990s to 8.9 per cent in 2023-24. Balancing economic and demographic power and ensuring adequate representation of geographic minorities is a challenge that will need to be addressed in the coming years [citation:original text].

The issue of delimitation has caused significant political tension, with southern states protesting the proposed reallocation of seats based on population. They argue that their successful population control has been an asset to the nation and should not be penalized. The challenge for the government will be to find a compromise that is acceptable to all states.

Will the Muslim Population Overtake the Hindu Population?

Fourth, is the Muslim population in India likely to overtake the Hindu population? Muslim fertility is slightly higher than Hindu fertility, but across the three waves of the National Family Health Survey between 2005 and 2021, both communities have seen a similar decline in TFR of about 0.7, leaving the Hindu-Muslim fertility gap unchanged. Rudimentary calculations suggest that even after 50 years, this fertility differential, if unchanged, would result in a small increase in the share of the Muslim population in India from about 15 per cent to 19 per cent. It seems more likely that Muslim fertility will follow a path similar to that of Hindus, and the increase will be smaller [citation:original text].

The idea of a “Muslim population bomb” is a recurring theme in Indian political discourse. However, the data shows that the fertility gap between Hindus and Muslims is narrowing. The TFR for Muslims has declined from 4.4 in the 1990s to 2.4 in 2019-21. It is projected to reach replacement level by 2031. The growth of the Muslim population is slowing, and there is no demographic threat to the Hindu majority.

A Cautious and Balanced Approach

The above discussion suggests the need for a cautious, balanced approach to adapting to population change and for avoiding aggressive rhetoric that does more harm than good. Consider the discourse on declining fertility, which has led to political calls for a return to traditional values and for deprioritising contraception and child bonuses.

India stands in stark contrast to countries like Japan. Faced with an inflexible gender culture and work-family constraints, nearly 30 per cent of Japanese women remain unmarried into their 30s. In contrast, marriage and family remain the linchpin of Indian family life. The NFHS shows that 97 per cent of women are married by age 30. Yet the very importance of family also leads to smaller families. My research with Alaka Basu shows that parents often choose to have a single child so they can invest more in that child’s education. Reducing educational costs, improving the quality of education, and easing the burden on parents to supervise homework may do more to increase fertility than a call for higher fertility [citation:original text].

Population debates in India are often polarized and politicized. A more balanced and evidence-based approach is needed. The government should focus on policies that support families, such as affordable childcare, quality education, and healthcare. It should also invest in the health and education of the population to ensure a productive and prosperous future.

Q&A Section

1. What is the current debate about India’s population?

The debate revolves around whether India is on the verge of depopulation or facing a population explosion. Some fear a rapid population collapse due to declining fertility rates, while others worry about the economic and political implications of an ageing population and the relative growth of different demographic groups. The article argues that these fears are overblown and that a balanced, evidence-based approach is needed .

2. What are the key differences between the UN and IHME population projections for India?

The UN projects that India’s population will grow to 1.7 billion and then decline by the end of the 21st century. The IHME projects a more rapid decline, dipping below 1 billion. The difference is due to assumptions about fertility: the IHME assumes that increased education will lead to further fertility decline, but the evidence shows that the fertility gap between educated and less-educated women is narrowing, undermining the IHME’s methodology .

3. Will India face a worker shortage due to an ageing population?

India’s working-age population is projected to decline only slightly from 66% to 64% by 2051. This decline is offset by a decrease in the child population. With AI-led productivity gains and the potential to bring more women into the workforce, India is unlikely to face a worker shortage. The bigger challenge is creating quality jobs, not the supply of workers .

4. What is the issue of delimitation and its impact on southern states?

If electoral seat allocation is based on population share in 2026 rather than 1971, southern states that have successfully controlled their population growth will lose seats. This has created political tension, with southern states arguing that their efforts should not be penalized. The challenge is to balance economic and demographic power while ensuring adequate representation for all regions .

5. Will the Muslim population overtake the Hindu population in India?

The data shows that the fertility gap between Hindus and Muslims is narrowing. Both communities have seen a similar decline in fertility, and the Muslim TFR is projected to reach replacement level by 2031. Rudimentary calculations suggest that even after 50 years, the Muslim population share would increase only slightly, from 15% to 19%. There is no demographic threat to the Hindu majority.

On Indo-Pacific, Delhi Must Match Words With Actions

By Aditi Nayar
New Delhi, July 22, 2026

Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s six-day tour of Indonesia, Australia and New Zealand came amid uncertainty over US President Donald Trump’s commitment to a balanced Asian order, his talk of a possible US-China “G-2”, and the Pentagon’s decision to drop the Indo-Pacific label. It underlines Delhi’s intent to strengthen its independent role in Asia and its Indo-Pacific waters. It also marks a new phase in India’s post-Cold War engagement with the East. The celebrated “Look East” and “Act East” policies broadened India’s ties with Southeast and East Asia over the last three decades. Yet India has fallen well short of realising the full potential of these relationships. Consider ASEAN. India’s trade with the grouping rose from about $7 billion in 2000 to around $125 billion in 2025. During the same period, China’s trade with ASEAN expanded from roughly $40 billion to nearly $1 trillion. The gap is equally visible in connectivity, technology partnerships and defence cooperation .

The three-nation tour was an effort to narrow that gap by combining economic, strategic and security cooperation. In Indonesia, the decision to accelerate development of Sabang port could strengthen logistics, maritime domain awareness and naval cooperation. Expanded defence cooperation, including the sale of BrahMos missiles, highlights India’s growing potential as a defence exporter in Southeast Asia. In Australia, the decision to begin talks on a comprehensive FTA builds on recent trade liberalisation, while the completion of administrative arrangements for Australian uranium exports supports India’s ambitious plans for expanding nuclear power generation. Beyond uranium, Australia’s vast reserves of critical minerals and energy resources can become an important foundation for India’s long-term industrial growth. Enhanced maritime cooperation in the eastern Indian Ocean is an equally important strategic gain. Modi’s visit to New Zealand ends a prolonged period of diplomatic neglect. The recently concluded FTA and expanded maritime cooperation provide a platform for greater engagement with the South Pacific, where China’s growing strategic presence is attracting attention .

The Sabang-Andaman Corridor: A Strategic Maritime Link

The most significant outcome of the Indonesia leg was the agreement to accelerate the development of Sabang port, located on Weh Island in Aceh, as a strategic maritime link with India’s Andaman and Nicobar Islands . Geographically, Sabang lies about 700 kilometres southeast of the Andaman and Nicobar Islands, and both locations overlook the northern entrance to the Strait of Malacca—one of the world’s busiest maritime chokepoints through which a substantial share of global trade and energy shipments passes .

Indonesian President Prabowo Subianto expressed his support for the development of ports in the Andaman and Nicobar Islands, as well as the development and expansion of Sabang Port, as a strategic link between the two countries . The project is expected to cover cruise and marine-tourism facilities, maritime industries like shipbuilding and ship-repair, and shore-based services that support offshore energy activities in the Andaman Sea . Officials from both nations have been directed to work out the scope, modalities, and financing of the project in a time-bound manner .

Beyond port development, both nations affirmed to intensify efforts to improve regional connectivity, with the 3rd Joint Task Force Meeting on Andaman-Aceh Connectivity scheduled for the second half of 2026 to implement an action plan . The partnership also saw major breakthroughs in digital cooperation, including the launch of the Indonesia Open Network (ION) using India’s ONDC architecture, and progress on Cross-Border QR Payment Linkage to enhance transaction efficiency .

Australia: The Uranium Breakthrough and the Missing Trade Deal

In Australia, the 3rd India-Australia Annual Summit in Melbourne produced 18 outcomes across defence, energy, critical minerals, technology and education . The most significant deliverable was the finalisation of the administrative arrangement for the 2014 India-Australia Civil Nuclear Agreement, enabling long-term Australian uranium exports to India for exclusively peaceful purposes and under IAEA safeguards .

India’s foreign secretary Vikram Misri noted that resolving the impasse required “very intense discussions” over two years to agree on reporting and accounting protocols . Until 2026, only a single test shipment had moved between the two countries in 2017 . The uranium deal is a strategic priority for India, which aims to expand its nuclear capacity from roughly 8 gigawatts (GW) to 100 GW by 2047 . For Australia, it demonstrates its value as a reliable Indo-Pacific partner while diversifying its export relationships .

India and Australia also launched a Partnership for Cyber, Critical Technologies, Supply Chains (PACTS) to support national and regional security, promote collaboration to make critical supply chains more resilient, and strengthen collaboration in critical technologies and cyber security . A joint declaration on defence and security cooperation and a maritime security collaboration roadmap were also signed .

However, what the summit did not produce was a trade deal. The Comprehensive Economic Cooperation Agreement (CECA)—launched in May 2011, suspended in 2016, and relaunched in 2021—was again promised early conclusion yet remains unsigned . This pattern reflects a structural issue: the security dimension of the relationship has yielded concrete outcomes at every major meeting, while the economic side has lagged . The CECA has stalled because the domestic political costs of concession on dairy, wine and migration remain higher than the perceived cost of delay .

New Zealand: A Historic Reset After 40 Years

Modi’s visit to New Zealand was the first by an Indian Prime Minister in 40 years, ending a prolonged period of diplomatic neglect . The visit resulted in 16 declarations and the elevation of the bilateral relationship to a Strategic Partnership, spanning cooperation across economy, trade, defence, security, people-to-people links, science, climate change, and natural disaster resilience .

The India-New Zealand Free Trade Agreement, negotiated in just nine months, has passed its first reading vote in the New Zealand Parliament by 93 votes to 26 and is expected to come into effect before the end of the year . Under the agreement, India will receive zero-tariff access to New Zealand for its exports on day one, while 90-95 per cent of New Zealand’s exports to India will become tariff-free or see significant tariff reductions over the next seven to eight years . The pact establishes a priority desk for New Zealand investment in India to expedite approvals .

Collaborative efforts are underway between Air India and Air New Zealand to secure permissions for direct flights, which are expected to commence within the next one to two years . The FTA sets a target of achieving NZ 7 billion (approximately ₹35,000 crore) in bilateral trade by 2030 .

The Implementation Deficit: A Recurring Challenge

Taken together, the three visits point to a broader Indo-Pacific strategy that links maritime security, defence production, trade, technology and resilient supply chains. Yet, India’s principal constraint has not been the lack of diplomatic initiatives. It lies in the failure to implement them. The discussions on Sabang port and Australian uranium began nearly a decade ago. There is too much celebration of the PM’s foreign tours and too little attention to what happens afterwards. The significance of his Pacific tour will depend less on the intent behind the agreements than on the actions on the domestic front that facilitate their implementation .

India’s performance in the Indo-Pacific relative to China is a case in point. India’s trade with ASEAN rose to $125 billion in 2025, but China’s trade with ASEAN expanded to nearly $1 trillion—a gap that reflects deeper structural issues . The comparisons of India’s regional performance with Beijing are inevitable, but China’s economy at $20 trillion is nearly five times larger than India’s at about $4 trillion . India’s decision in 2019 to walk away from the RCEP negotiations was a culmination of growing concern at mounting trade deficits with China and the region .

The sharpening tensions between India and China since the mid-2010s and the simultaneous intensification of the US-China rivalry have begun to create new divergences between New Delhi and the ASEAN region . The natural inclination for India and ASEAN is to avoid being drawn into zero-sum competition, but New Delhi’s traditional preference for nonalignment has been complicated by a rapidly deteriorating relationship with Beijing .

Conclusion

India’s Indo-Pacific strategy is at a crossroads. The diplomatic initiatives launched during the three-nation tour are significant, but their success will depend on sustained follow-through. The uranium deal with Australia cleared because it was treated as a security imperative; the trade deal with Australia has stalled because the domestic political costs of concession remain too high . This pattern reveals a structural tension: India is willing to make progress on security when the strategic logic is clear, but economic integration lags behind due to domestic political constraints.

The challenge for India is to convert its diplomatic momentum into tangible economic and strategic outcomes. The implementation deficit is not a new problem, but it is a persistent one. If India cannot translate its vision into action, it risks remaining a strategic partner valued for its potential rather than its performance. The significance of the Pacific tour will depend less on the intent behind the agreements than on the actions on the domestic front that facilitate their implementation .

Q&A Section

1. What is the significance of the Sabang-Andaman port corridor?

The Sabang-Andaman port corridor is a strategic maritime link between Indonesia’s Sabang Port in Aceh and India’s Andaman and Nicobar Islands. Geographically, both locations overlook the northern entrance to the Strait of Malacca, one of the world’s busiest maritime chokepoints through which a substantial share of global trade and energy shipments passes . The project is expected to cover cruise and marine-tourism facilities, maritime industries like shipbuilding and ship-repair, and shore-based services that support offshore energy activities .

2. What was the outcome of the India-Australia summit regarding uranium exports?

India and Australia finalised the administrative arrangement for the 2014 Civil Nuclear Agreement, enabling long-term Australian uranium exports to India for exclusively peaceful purposes and under IAEA safeguards . The issue had been stuck for nearly 12 years due to disagreements on reporting and accounting protocols. India aims to expand its nuclear capacity from roughly 8 GW to 100 GW by 2047, making the uranium deal a strategic priority .

3. Why has the India-Australia Comprehensive Economic Cooperation Agreement (CECA) remained unsigned for so long?

The CECA was launched in May 2011 but remains unsigned despite repeated promises at successive summits . The agreement has stalled because the domestic political costs of concession on dairy, wine and migration remain higher than the perceived cost of delay. In contrast, the security dimension of the relationship has yielded concrete outcomes at every major meeting .

4. What are the key features of the India-New Zealand Free Trade Agreement?

The FTA, negotiated in just nine months, is expected to come into effect before the end of 2026 . India will receive zero-tariff access to New Zealand for its exports on day one, while 90-95 per cent of New Zealand’s exports to India will become tariff-free or see significant tariff reductions over the next seven to eight years . The agreement establishes a priority desk for New Zealand investment in India and sets a target of achieving NZ 7 billion in bilateral trade by 2030 .

5. What is the “implementation deficit” in India’s Indo-Pacific strategy?

The implementation deficit refers to India’s consistent failure to follow through on diplomatic initiatives. Discussions on Sabang port and Australian uranium began nearly a decade ago, yet concrete progress has been slow. The article argues that there is too much celebration of the PM’s foreign tours and too little attention to what happens afterwards. The significance of diplomatic engagements depends less on the intent behind the agreements than on the actions on the domestic front that facilitate their implementation .

Price of Water is Not About Economics, But Justice

By Gurudas Nulkar
New Delhi, July 22, 2026

The Moody’s water management ratings, published in June, place India in the highest water-risk category. With 18 per cent of the world population, India has access to only about 4 per cent of global freshwater resources . In 2024, the Ministry of Jal Shakti announced that India’s per capita freshwater availability is shrinking over the decades. Urban demand, driven by population growth, commercial expansion, and changing lifestyles, continues to outpace supply. Yet one of the most powerful levers for influencing water reuse sits neglected: The water tariff. The low price of water in Indian cities is disconnected from the true cost of supply .

At the Centre for Sustainable Development, with the Pune International Centre and Pune Knowledge Cluster, we studied the economics of urban water. The Jal Mulya project delved into the costs and prices of urban water supply and examined consumers’ willingness to pay for assured quality of drinking water . The results emphasise the role of tariffs in regulating water use .

The Paradox of Cheap Freshwater

Consider this paradox: Grey water, or domestic wastewater from washing, bathing, and kitchen use, can be treated and reused for toilet flushing, construction, gardening and other non-potable applications. However, freshwater is priced much less when compared to the cost of treating grey water. Why would someone invest in grey-water plumbing and recycling when fresh water is cheap? 

This is a fundamental flaw in India’s urban water economy. Urban India turns nearly 80 per cent of its daily water into sewage . A rational water economy would treat grey water as an asset: collect it separately, treat it to appropriate standards, and price it for non-potable uses that reflect its cost and value. This has a double effect of lowering freshwater demand and reducing the sewage that is released. But for grey water markets to be viable, freshwater pricing must be rational .

Hyderabad recently announced plans to launch India’s first greywater bank, with the capacity to hold 2,000 million litres of water per day, to be distributed to industries and data centres for non-potable needs . The treated water will be priced at less than half the cost of potable water supplied by the board . This is a step in the right direction. However, for such initiatives to scale, the pricing of freshwater must reflect its true scarcity and cost. If freshwater remains artificially cheap, the economics of greywater reuse will never work.

The Data Deficit: A Conversation Without Credibility

Our research corroborates what is already known — water tariffs in cities are set, not on the basis of actual costs of abstraction, treatment, storage and distribution of good-quality water, but on the basis of what is politically tolerable . Part of the problem is ignorance, both among the public and the urban local bodies (ULB). Few, if any, ULBs undertake a full-cost accounting of their water operations. Non-revenue water (NRW), that is treated and supplied but lost to leakage or theft, routinely exceeds 30 per cent of total supply in many cities. This is water that has been paid for in terms of energy, chemicals, and infrastructure, but generates no revenue. When NRW remains invisible in accounts, there is no incentive to address it. A conversation about rational water pricing is nearly impossible because of the lack of credible data .

A study by the Water and Sanitation Program (WSP) of 23 urban local bodies in 2008 found that tariffs generally fall far short of recovering costs, and even where they attempt to do so, the common practice is one of operational cost recovery, without taking into account capital costs . More recent data from www.cityfinance.in (FY 2022-23) shows that for every Rs 100 spent on water by Indian cities, they get back just Rs 37 through user charges . This leaves utilities struggling to keep systems running, with little money left for repairs or upgrades. Ageing pipes go unreplaced, pumps break down, and treatment plants are poorly maintained. Over time, the system weakens—and the quality of water services quietly declines .

The Willingness to Pay: A Refuted Argument

Our study refuted a recurring argument: Raising water tariffs will face consumer resistance . Consumers are willing to pay more for water, provided they are assured of its quality. This is not surprising. Those who buy bottled water for their homes and restaurants already show a willingness to pay more for assured quality . But in many cities, urban water utilities have forfeited the trust of their consumers by failing to deliver potable water on tap. The low tariff and the poor quality are mutually reinforcing: ULBs cannot raise the tariff without improving the service, and vice versa . As a result, households and offices resort to domestic water purifiers. Citizens end up paying twice: Through water tariffs and in the purchase and maintenance of equipment .

But this cost is not borne equally. Our research showed that the lower economic classes either consume from the tap, risking their health, or spend a disproportionate part of their income in buying water. Moreover, we noted that higher-income groups consume substantially more water than lower-income households . This is a regressive outcome. As Sunita Narain of the Centre for Science and Environment has argued, the rich, and not the poor, are subsidized in urban India . Flat tariffs mean everyone pays the same — yet ironically, the benefits are unequally distributed. The implicit subsidy flows overwhelmingly upward .

The Economic and Fiscal Risks

Moody’s has warned that water reliability is becoming an increasingly important determinant of economic resilience . India faces very high credit exposure to water-management risks because of fragmented governance, ageing infrastructure and excessive groundwater depletion . The report noted that India’s physical climate risk category score of 4 reflects high credit exposure to heat stress, flooding and monsoon variability, while its water management category score of 5 indicates very high credit exposure, driven by ageing water infrastructure, excessive groundwater depletion and a population that represents about 18 per cent of the global total but has access to only 4 per cent of the world’s freshwater resources .

The Moody’s report also warns that rapidly growing demand from data centres, driven by the expansion of cloud computing and artificial intelligence, is adding a further source of water-intensive industrial pressure that governments and utilities will increasingly need to accommodate . India’s fragmented water governance structure, highly subsidised pricing and slow reallocation among sectors can result in water shortage and higher risk of sustained fiscal pressure .

The Political Economy of Water

The fact is no municipality can do what economists preach—raise prices to reflect the full costs. Instead, they spend money on supply and as costs go up, they have to increase the subsidy to the users or supply less to most . On average, Indian cities charge between Rs 2-3 per kilolitre (kl), when they should be charging Rs 8-10/kl. And if their distribution losses are taken into account, charge between Rs 10-14/kl. If we add sewage costs, then the bill increases by roughly 5 times the cost of water supply. In this case, the family, which pays Rs 2-3/kl will have to pay Rs 40-50/kl. How feasible is this? 

The political logic is familiar. Leaders hesitate to raise rates for voters who have long been told that water is a “free right.” Without periodic tariff revisions or metering, utilities lack the funds to maintain systems. Citizens then spend privately on tankers and water filters, effectively paying twice, while municipal utilities sink further into debt . A 2023 Janaagraha study found that 13 of 17 states do not mandate periodic tariff revisions in their municipal Acts and Rules .

The Way Forward

ULBs must undertake and publish full-cost accounting of their water operations, so that the embedded subsidy is visible and accountable . Equity goals must underpin tariff structures. Lifeline quantities per capita have to remain subsidised for all, while progressive pricing should discourage frivolous consumption .

Cities can chart a path toward fiscal sustainability. It requires transparency: every city should publish its cost of supplying water — electricity, labour, treatment, and pipeline maintenance — in its annual budget and even on consumer bills . It requires indexing tariffs to costs: states should formulate comprehensive Water Supply Rules, outlining the methodology for tariff setting and mandating periodic revision of water tariffs to ensure at least 70 per cent-80 per cent recovery of O&M costs . It requires linking incentives to performance: Central and State Finance Commissions can play a catalytic role by rewarding ULGs that achieve sustainable cost recovery and expand metered coverage .

A monsoon-based country like India cannot overcome water stress without getting the price of water right. The opportunity to build a circular urban water economy is here already. The price of water is not an economic question. In a water-scarce country, it is a question of justice .

Q&A Section

1. Why is India categorized as facing “very high” water-management risk by Moody’s?

Moody’s assigned India a water-management category score of 5 on its five-point environmental risk scale, indicating very high credit exposure. This is driven by fragmented governance across states, ageing water infrastructure, excessive groundwater depletion, and the fact that India has 18% of the world’s population but only 4% of its freshwater resources . The agency also noted that water reliability is becoming an increasingly important determinant of economic resilience .

2. What is the “Jal Mulya” project and what did it find?

The Jal Mulya project was a collaborative research initiative of the Pune International Centre, Pune Knowledge Cluster, and the Centre for Sustainable Development at the Gokhale Institute of Politics and Economics . It examined the economics of urban water in Pune, studying the costs and prices of water supply and consumers’ willingness to pay for assured quality. The research found that water tariffs are set based on political tolerability rather than actual costs, and that consumers are willing to pay more if they are assured of quality .

3. What is the “paradox” of cheap freshwater and grey water reuse?

Urban India turns nearly 80% of its daily water into sewage. Treated grey water can be reused for non-potable applications like toilet flushing, construction, and gardening. However, freshwater is priced much lower than the cost of treating grey water. This makes it economically irrational for households or businesses to invest in grey-water plumbing and recycling. For grey water markets to be viable, freshwater pricing must be rational .

4. How does the current water pricing system affect the poor differently?

Higher-income groups consume substantially more water than lower-income households, but flat tariffs mean everyone pays the same. This means the implicit subsidy flows overwhelmingly upward—the rich are subsidized, not the poor. Low-income households either consume from the tap risking their health, or spend a disproportionate part of their income on buying water. In Mumbai, tanker water can cost up to 52 times the price of subsidized piped water .

5. What steps can cities take to achieve fiscal sustainability in water services?

Cities should publish full-cost accounting of water operations, including electricity, labour, and maintenance costs . States should formulate Water Supply Rules that mandate periodic tariff revision to ensure at least 70-80% recovery of O&M costs. Central and State Finance Commissions should reward urban local bodies that achieve sustainable cost recovery and expand metered coverage. Cities should also look at wastewater as revenue, not waste—selling treated water to industries can create a self-financing loop .

State Refuses to Recognise Its Own People: This Is Nihilism, No Way to Govern

By R.S. Sharma
New Delhi, July 22, 2026

Consider a 60-year-old farm labourer in a village in eastern Uttar Pradesh, born at home in the 1960s, who has voted in every election of his life. During the Special Intensive Revision (SIR) of the electoral rolls, an official asks him to prove his date of birth, his residence and his citizenship. He has no birth certificate, because no one registered his birth. His ration card, he is told, is not proof of residence. His Aadhaar — posted years ago to his very door — proves neither his age, address, nor his citizenship. He never held a passport and never finished school. He stands before the state with empty hands, and the burden is on him to prove that he is not a foreigner [citation:original text].

It is the predictable result of three failures of the state, each of its own making. None of this is the failing of any one government or party. It is the cumulative result of decades of collective neglect — of unglamorous, unfashionable tasks such as registering every birth, which never commanded political attention — for which the system as a whole, across successive governments, bears responsibility [citation:original text].

The Three Failures of the State

First, the failure to register births. The Registration of Births and Deaths Act has required, since 1969, that every birth be registered within 21 days; running that system was the state’s job, and for decades it did not. Among children under five, only 41 per cent of births were registered as recently as 2005-06, and before the mid-2000s most Indians were born at home — institutional deliveries were under 39 per cent nationally. The reassuring figure that 98 per cent of births are now registered describes today’s newborns; it says nothing about the adults already on the rolls [citation:original text]. Registration is also not a certificate in hand — these are two separate acts in law, and for decades, the second often did not happen. If the strictest view is right, that only a birth certificate issued at the time of birth is genuine proof of date of birth, then perhaps one voter in eight holds one; some 85 crore do not. A test that the overwhelming majority of citizens cannot pass is not a test of eligibility. It is a machine for exclusion [citation:original text].

Second, the failure to issue a citizenship document. There is no citizenship card in India. The passport — held by under 8 per cent of Indians — was clarified this June by the Ministry of External Affairs to be only a travel document, not a proof of citizenship [citation:original text]. Aadhaar, by its own statute, is not citizenship, nor are the voter ID or PAN. This is not an oversight: Every attempt to build a citizens’ register has failed — the MNIC pilot abandoned, the Assam NRC excluded 19 lakh people and resolved nothing, the idea finally diluted into the National Population Register, a register of residents and not citizens, because the Home Ministry found a field test of citizenship impractical. The citizen is asked to prove a status the state has never certified [citation:original text]. As one legal expert noted, “If the state has issued someone a passport or enrolled them as a voter after official verification, these documents should be treated as conclusive proof of citizenship… The burden should shift to the government to prove otherwise, except in cases of fraud” .

Third, the failure to recognise our own documents. A petition pending in the Supreme Court asks that Aadhaar be treated only as proof of identity — not of age, address or citizenship . On residence the law itself makes the point: A voter must be ordinarily resident, and the Representation of the People Act says that owning a house does not establish it and that temporary absence does not end it. Every document in circulation is partial or disowned — the ration card the government itself says is not residence proof, the utility bill in another’s name, the rent agreement easily faked. Aadhaar alone was physically delivered to the holder’s door, through Speed Post with acknowledgement due — a deliberate and costly choice that shows the letter was meant to evidence residence — and that is exactly the document the state now says is not proof of address [citation:original text].

Add the three failures together and the citizen is defenceless: The state recognises neither his age, nor his residence, nor his citizenship, and the Foreigners Act still puts the burden on him to prove he is not a foreigner. Any official can brand almost any citizen a suspected illegal immigrant, certain that he cannot produce papers the state never let him have. There is a name for rejecting every record — including those the state itself created — and so being unable to recognise one’s own people: It is nihilism, and it is no way to govern [citation:original text].

The SIR Exercise: A Machine for Exclusion

This is exactly the injustice the Election Commission’s SIR now inflicts on crores of ordinary voters — an old, document-heavy, house-to-house method revived, in the digital India age, to solve a problem the country has already solved [citation:original text]. The SIR is an exercise to update electoral rolls, remove duplicate, deceased, shifted and foreign voters, and ensure eligible citizens are enrolled . But its implementation has raised serious concerns about wrongful exclusion . The burden of eligibility lies primarily, and unfairly, on the citizen .

In West Bengal, ‘logical discrepancies’ were detected in 27 lakh cases, depriving affected people of their voting rights, with appellate tribunals yet to decide 99 per cent of exclusion cases . The term ‘logical discrepancy’ was invented specifically for the SIR in West Bengal, with no mention in earlier exercises in other states . A particularly illogical rule mandated that all cases where more than five voters had the same father were to be included, disregarding the fact that larger families were the norm in the last century . Software which did not factor in cultural nuances was used to identify logical discrepancies . Even a retired High Court Judge and several BLOs did not make it to the voter list . Around 90 lakh people were affected in West Bengal, and 89 lakh in Telangana, with the majority from Dalit, Muslim and backward communities .

The government has made the issue worse. The Home Minister declared in the Lok Sabha that the SIR test would be used to “detect, delete and deport” aliens . The UN Special Rapporteurs have raised concerns over the SIR, alleging the process lacks transparency, noting “the large-scale removal of millions of names from electoral rolls through an SIR process led by the ECI, particularly affecting members of minority groups” .

What I Learned Building Aadhaar

I can speak about this from experience. In Aadhaar’s early years, which I led as UIDAI’s founding director general, we found that a great many residents simply did not know their date of birth. We recorded it as verified where a document existed, and as declared or approximate where none did; in the villages, the majority fell in the latter categories. People would fix their age by an event — the year the great drought happened. It is why so many Indians carry January 1 as their birthday: the date the system assigns when only a year is known. To demand a precise, documented date of birth from such people is not rigour; it is exclusion [citation:original text].

The Pragmatic Solution

The honest question is not Aadhaar versus a perfect document, but Aadhaar versus what people actually hold . On age, we need only one binary fact — is the person 18 or older? Aadhaar answers it without the date at all. Since a child’s biometrics are not captured below the age of five, anyone whose biometrics were taken around 2013 or earlier was at least five then and is 18 now [citation:original text]. On residence, ask which document is stronger than the address Aadhaar posted to the door, and how many hold that stronger document. On citizenship, let Aadhaar establish identity, analytics flag the few genuine outliers, and the Home Ministry decide them, as the Supreme Court has held.

India has a precedent because building digital public infrastructure the world now studies . It would be perverse to declare, at the end of it, that none of it can be trusted — and to send officials door to door demanding old papers we never gave, from people the state itself never documented. A republic that takes its duties seriously does not make its people prove, again and again, that they belong to it. It recognises them. We already have the means. We should use them [citation:original text].

Q&A Section

1. What are the “three failures of the state” identified in the article?
The three failures are: (1) the state’s failure to register births for decades, leaving millions of adults without birth certificates; (2) the state’s failure to provide a single universally accepted citizenship document; and (3) the state’s practice of disowning the documents it itself issued, such as Aadhaar, for purposes like proving residence or citizenship [citation:original text].

2. Why is the SIR exercise described as a “machine for exclusion”?
The SIR places an unreasonable burden on ordinary citizens to prove their identity, date of birth, residence and citizenship using documents the state itself did not provide. Since only an estimated one in eight voters holds a proper birth certificate, and most other documents are disowned by the state as proof of citizenship, the test cannot be passed by the overwhelming majority of citizens [citation:original text]. In West Bengal, this resulted in millions of exclusions and a former High Court judge being removed from the rolls .

3. What is the legal status of Aadhaar as a proof document?
Section 9 of the Aadhaar Act explicitly states that Aadhaar is not evidence of citizenship or domicile. The UIDAI has also clarified that Aadhaar is proof of identity, not citizenship, address, or date of birth. A pending Supreme Court petition seeks to restrict Aadhaar strictly to identity verification . However, the article argues that in practice, Aadhaar is more reliable than documents the state refuses to recognise .

4. What did the Ministry of External Affairs clarify about the Indian passport?
In June 2026, the Ministry of External Affairs clarified that the Indian passport is primarily a travel document, not a conclusive proof of citizenship . Legally, this distinction is not new, as only the Ministry of Home Affairs has the authority to determine citizenship. However, the timing of the clarification, coinciding with the SIR, has fueled public anxiety .

5. What is the pragmatic solution proposed by the former UIDAI chief?
The solution is to use Aadhaar pragmatically: for age, verify only whether a person is over 18; for residence, accept Aadhaar’s postal delivery as proof; and for citizenship, use Aadhaar for identity and let analytics flag genuine outliers for the Home Ministry to decide. The author argues that a republic should not make its people prove their belonging repeatedly, and should instead use the digital infrastructure it has built [citation:original text].

For Many Young Indians, Marriage Is Compliance

By Aditi Nayar
New Delhi, July 22, 2026

“You won’t get a 100 per cent match. If 60-70 per cent of your criteria are met, you should proceed.” For years, this has been one of the most repeated pieces of advice from a famous “alliance consultant” on the Netflix reality show, Indian Matchmaking. To many, it is realistic. Marriage, after all, demands compromise. But compromise is meaningful only when there is a genuine choice [citation:original text].

India is today shaken by a series of cases tied to marriage and impending marriages, from the alleged dowry death of a model and actor in Bhopal to the Lohagad Fort murder case. We consume these stories as isolated crimes or evidence of a “changing generation”. Instead of asking what happened inside these relationships, we should ask what happens before they begin [citation:original text].

During consultations, I kept hearing versions of the same sentence: “I’m scared my parents will get me married if I don’t secure a placement.” “My parents said they’ll let me continue studying only if I focus on academics. If I get into a college romance, they’ll marry me off.” “My parents want me married by 25, so I have to settle before then.” Marriage, in these conversations, wasn’t spoken about as companionship or compatibility. It sounded like a deadline, sometimes even a punishment [citation:original text].

India has built an entire economy around this belief—marriage bureaus, matrimonial websites, horoscope consultants, and premium matchmaking services. Millions of arranged marriages are no doubt consensual and deeply fulfilling. The problem is when choice is replaced with compliance [citation:original text].

The Psychology of Compliance: Learned Helplessness and External Locus of Control

In Martin Seligman’s learned helplessness experiments during the late 1960s, animals repeatedly exposed to situations where they had no control eventually stopped trying to escape even when escape became possible. Human beings are infinitely more complex than laboratory experiments. But decades of research have shown similar patterns in people exposed to environments where personal agency is repeatedly undermined. When individuals repeatedly experience situations where saying “no” has no effect, where disagreement is discouraged or treated as disrespect, they may begin to believe that exercising choice is futile [citation:original text].

Many Indian children don’t choose their career, whom they date and when they are ready for marriage. Every major life decision is framed as a family decision. Defiance is interpreted as selfishness [citation:original text].

This is where Julian Rotter’s concept of an external locus of control becomes relevant. People with an external locus of control increasingly perceive that important outcomes in life are determined by forces outside themselves — parents, fate, society or luck. In many households, this worldview is carefully cultivated. Children are taught that elders know best, that family honour outweighs personal preference and that difficult decisions are someone else’s responsibility [citation:original text].

The freedom to say no, to make decisions for themselves, should be the ultimate proof of good parenting. If children grow into adults who can set boundaries, and make informed choices, isn’t that evidence that they were raised well? Why then, is hearing a “no” from one’s child increasingly seen as a threat to parenting rather than a reflection of it? Perhaps this is why so many conversations around marriage begin with a familiar sentence, “You’ll understand after you’re married” [citation:original text].

The Pressure to Marry: Deadlines, Punishments, and Ultimatums

By the time marriage enters the conversation, many young adults have spent two decades practising compliance rather than decision-making [citation:original text]. The result is a generation of young people who are well-versed in following instructions but ill-equipped to make autonomous life choices. The marriage market reflects this: it operates on a system of deadlines, ultimatums, and family-imposed timelines that are often arbitrary.

The pressure to marry is not uniform across genders. Women are subjected to a “biological clock” narrative that places their fertility at the centre of family planning, while men are expected to achieve professional and financial stability before they can even be considered “ready” for marriage. This gendered pressure is reinforced by the marriage economy, which often demands higher qualifications and earning potential from men, while placing a premium on youth and physical attributes in women.

For many young women, marriage is a deadline they cannot escape. They are told that their value diminishes with age, and that they must settle before they are “left on the shelf.” For men, marriage is often tied to career milestones: they must have a job, a house, and a car before they are considered “eligible.” This creates a system where personal fulfilment is secondary to external validation.

The Economic Dimension: The Marriage Economy

India’s arranged marriage industry is a multi-billion dollar economy. Matrimonial websites, dating apps, and premium matchmaking services cater to millions of families seeking to find the “perfect match.” The industry capitalises on anxiety: parents are terrified that their children will be “left behind,” while young adults are convinced that they must settle before it’s “too late.”

The economics of marriage extend beyond the services themselves. The dowry system, though illegal, remains prevalent in many parts of India. It is a transaction that places a financial burden on the bride’s family and reinforces the idea that a woman is a “burden” that must be “settled.” The Lohagad Fort murder case and other incidents are extreme examples of what can happen when the pressure to marry collides with financial demands.

The Legacy of Learned Helplessness

The concept of learned helplessness is relevant to understanding why many young Indians comply with parental expectations rather than forging their own paths. Seligman’s experiments showed that when animals were repeatedly subjected to an aversive stimulus from which they could not escape, they eventually gave up trying to escape, even when the opportunity arose. This is a powerful metaphor for what happens when young people are consistently denied agency in their lives.

When children are raised in households where their opinions are dismissed, their choices are overridden, and their autonomy is restricted, they learn that their actions have little impact on their lives. They internalise the belief that they are powerless and that their fate is determined by others. This is not a conscious decision; it is a coping mechanism. They learn to comply, because compliance is less painful than resistance.

The Role of Parenting

The freedom to say no, to make decisions for themselves, should be the ultimate proof of good parenting. If children grow into adults who can set boundaries, and make informed choices, isn’t that evidence that they were raised well? Why then, is hearing a “no” from one’s child increasingly seen as a threat to parenting rather than a reflection of it? [citation:original text]

The answer lies in a cultural context where filial piety is paramount, and the ideal child is one who defers to their parents. In this framework, a child’s “no” is not a sign of healthy autonomy but an act of rebellion. This is a distorted view of parenting. The goal of parenting should not be to create children who never challenge authority, but to raise adults who are capable of making their own decisions.

Conclusion

None of this suggests that love marriages are inherently healthier or arranged marriages inherently abusive. The distinction is actually between consensual choice and conditioned compliance. Maybe the better question is whether people were ever allowed to understand themselves before they were expected to understand another person. Compatibility isn’t merely finding someone who checks 70 per cent of a list. It is also having spent a lifetime believing that your 30 per cent matters as much [citation:original text].

The pressure to marry, the deadlines, the ultimatums, and the compliance that precedes them, are not just personal issues. They are a symptom of a broader cultural malaise. If we want to address the problems that emerge from arranged marriages, we must address the problems that lead to them: a culture of compliance, a denial of autonomy, and a belief that the “no” of a child is a failure of parenting rather than a sign of strength.

Q&A Section

1. What is the main argument of the article about marriage in India?

The article argues that for many young Indians, marriage is an act of compliance rather than a genuine choice. It suggests that a lifetime of being conditioned to obey parental authority, rather than make autonomous decisions, leaves young adults ill-equipped to make meaningful choices about marriage. The problem is not arranged marriage per se, but the culture of compliance that precedes it .

2. What is “learned helplessness” and how does it apply to this context?

Learned helplessness is a psychological condition where individuals exposed to situations beyond their control stop trying to escape even when escape is possible. The article applies this to Indian children who are raised in households where their autonomy is repeatedly undermined, teaching them to believe that exercising choice is futile. This creates a generation of adults who are well-versed in compliance but struggle with decision-making .

3. What is an “external locus of control” and how is it cultivated in Indian families?

An external locus of control is a belief that important outcomes in life are determined by external forces—parents, fate, society, or luck. In many Indian households, this is cultivated by teaching children that elders know best, that family honour outweighs personal preference, and that difficult decisions are not their responsibility .

4. What role does gender play in the pressure to marry?

Women are subjected to a “biological clock” narrative that places their fertility at the centre of family planning, often making marriage feel like a deadline they cannot escape. Men are expected to achieve professional and financial stability before they are considered “ready” for marriage. The marriage economy reinforces these gendered expectations .

5. What is the distinction between “consensual choice” and “conditioned compliance”?

Consensual choice refers to decisions made freely, after careful consideration, and with a genuine ability to say no. Conditioned compliance refers to decisions made because one has been conditioned to believe that saying no is futile or selfish. The article argues that the distinction matters more than the difference between love and arranged marriages .

In Europe, on Migration, Far Right Is Mainstream: The Rise of ‘Remigration’ and Its Implications for India

By Aditi Nayar
New Delhi, July 22, 2026

On the southern shores of Europe, familiar scenes still recur: overcrowded dinghies drifting across the Mediterranean, border guards intercepting them, asylum seekers waiting behind razor wire fences, and political leaders promising to “take back control” . Migration has been a constant political undercurrent in Europe. But the story this summer is much more than a border crisis—it signals the emergence of a new political vocabulary: remigration. What once dominated the European far-right has now entered the political mainstream, indicating a structural and systemic transformation in how Europe understands ideas of migration, citizenship, and belonging .

On June 12, 2026, the European Union’s Migration and Asylum Pact came into force, introducing stricter returns procedures . Its more significant change is political rather than legal. Across Europe, remigration, once confined to fringe politics, is now debated in parliaments, on television, and in election campaigns .

This shift has profound implications for India, which has steadily expanded cooperation with the EU on legal migration and mobility. Even as ageing populations and labour shortages increase the demand for skilled workers in Europe, the continent’s political discourse is increasingly being framed around security and cultural identity. Indian migrants may not be the immediate targets, but a more restrictive political climate could shape future visa policies, labour mobility, and the everyday experiences of immigrant communities .

Understanding “Remigration”: From Fringe Conspiracy to Mainstream Buzzword

Traditionally, remigration referred to migrants voluntarily returning to their countries of origin. In recent years, however, the term has acquired a very different meaning . It has been adopted by the far right to advocate the removal of migrants and, in some cases, even naturalised citizens considered culturally incompatible with the nation. Much of this thinking draws on the “Great Replacement” theory advanced by French author Renaud Camus and later promoted by Austrian activist Martin Sellner . Critics argue that it shifts the basis of belonging from legal citizenship to ethnicity and cultural identity .

The appeal of remigration lies in its ambiguity. Unlike terms like “mass deportation”, which carry immediate legal and moral implications, remigration can refer to anything from stricter enforcement of immigration laws to the removal of migrants and even naturalised citizens deemed insufficiently integrated . That ambiguity has helped move the term from the political fringe into the mainstream .

The Identitarian Movement, which emerged in Europe around 2012, has been a key driver of this ideology. The movement propagates the Great Replacement conspiracy theory and has made “remigration” its central demand . In 2019, Germany formally classified the Identitarian Movement as extremist. Yet by 2026, the movement’s ideals have become standard mainstream politics . The movement is now undergoing a process of “face-washing,” presenting its leaders with clean, disciplined, and respectable public images, and using initiatives such as the Institute for Remigration to present its arguments in an academic format .

The EU’s Migration and Asylum Pact: A Securitised Turn

The EU’s new Migration and Asylum Pact, which entered into force on June 12, 2026, reflects this changing political mood . It replaces the Dublin Regulation and introduces a series of reforms including:

• Mandatory solidarity mechanism: At least 30,000 asylum seekers will be redistributed from countries under pressure to those receiving fewer applications. Member states can either accept their allocated share, pay €20,000 for each person they decline to relocate, or provide equivalent operational support .

• Mandatory border screening: All irregular arrivals at EU external borders must undergo identity, health, security, and vulnerability checks within seven days .

• Asylum border procedure: Some asylum seekers will have their claims processed through a fast-track border procedure under a “legal fiction of non-entry,” allowing authorities to restrict certain rights and detain individuals for up to 12 weeks .

• Border return procedure: Those refused protection at the border will be detained for an additional 12 weeks pending return .

• Expanded Eurodac: The biometric database will be expanded to include more people and collect more data points, allowing it to track individual applicants rather than just applications .

Researchers argue that the Pact prioritises deterrence and border control over protection rights, particularly the asylum border procedure that involves detention, including families and children . The European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights (FRA) has flagged several fundamental rights concerns, including deaths at sea, rescue at sea, rights violations at borders, and displaced people from Ukraine .

The Remigration Agenda Gains Momentum

The far right is not stopping at the Pact. The European People’s Party (EPP), the dominant centre-right political family in Europe, has adopted a resolution calling for much tougher measures to crack down on irregular migration, including an “explicit right” for countries to reject asylum claims where migrants are being “instrumentalised” at external borders, and support for controversial return hubs . The political context is important: Germany is heading into key regional elections in which the CDU will be under pressure from the far-right AfD, which takes a much tougher line on migration, calling for remigration .

In Germany, the AfD is now the country’s main opposition party and is on course to get 40% of the vote in some state elections . It has forced more moderate politicians to ramp up their rhetoric. Chancellor Friedrich Merz has talked about “large scale deportations” of migrants . In October 2025, the Trump administration proposed setting up an “Office of Remigration” as part of a revamped U.S. State Department, giving the idea global validation .

The pan-European Identitarian Movement organised the second “Remigration Summit” in Porto, Portugal, in late May 2026, bringing together more than 500 people, including representatives of leading political parties and movements from across Europe and the United States . The summit focused on how to advance the cause of remigration, which by most definitions means deporting not just illegal immigrants but all people judged to be unassimilated in Western society, including citizens and the children of non-white immigrants . Critics say it is essentially a sanitised way of describing state-sanctioned ethnic cleansing .

The Economic and Moral Bankruptcy of Remigration

Beyond its evident threat to fundamental rights, the concept of remigration also fails on economic grounds . Take the case of Italy, where the first blueprint for European offshore hubs was established. The centres Italy built in Albania cost nearly double the initial budget, and the average daily cost per bed in these structures is around €79 . Despite this expenditure, the centres currently stand empty .

The EU seems to be fully caught up in what has been defined as the “deterrence trap”: a full focus on restrictive measures that might offer short-term political relief but will prove ineffective in the long run, providing extremist movements the tools to erode the political centre . By gambling on legally ambiguous measures to gain short-term results, the EU is endangering its own values, while placing thousands of people in more dangerous situations with the risk of not even achieving concrete results .

Implications for India: A Growing Diaspora in a Restrictive Environment

For India, this debate is not a distant concern. Europe is home to a growing Indian diaspora of students, professionals, and entrepreneurs . India and the EU have steadily expanded cooperation on legal migration and mobility . During the recent India-EU summit in January 2026, a Memorandum of Understanding on a Comprehensive Framework of Cooperation on Mobility was signed, seeking to ensure safe and regulated migration pathways for highly skilled workers, students, researchers, and seasonal workers .

Yet Europe today faces a contradiction. Even as ageing populations and labour shortages increase the demand for skilled workers, political discourse has become more cautious about immigration, framed increasingly around security and cultural identity . Indian migrants may not be the immediate targets, but a more restrictive political climate could shape future visa policies, labour mobility, and the everyday experiences of immigrant communities .

Borders determine who may enter a country. Citizenship defines who enjoys legal rights. Political language, however, shapes who is imagined to belong. That is why the rise of remigration deserves attention. Governments and migration policies will change, but the political imaginary they cultivate often endures. The significance of Europe’s remigration debate lies not only in the reforms it produces today, but in the changing ideas of identity, citizenship, and belonging that it leaves behind .

Q&A Section

1. What is “remigration” and how has its meaning changed?

Traditionally, remigration referred to migrants voluntarily returning to their countries of origin. Today, it has been adopted by the far right to advocate the removal of migrants and, in some cases, even naturalised citizens considered culturally incompatible with the nation. Critics argue it shifts belonging from legal citizenship to ethnicity and cultural identity .

2. What is the “Great Replacement” theory?

The Great Replacement is a conspiracy theory, advanced by French author Renaud Camus, which claims that there are hidden powers planning to replace the white, Christian population with non-white peoples of other cultures, religions, and traditions, especially Muslims. This theory underpins the far-right’s call for remigration .

3. What is the EU’s new Migration and Asylum Pact?

The Pact, which came into force on 12 June 2026, introduces stricter returns procedures, mandatory border screening, a fast-track asylum border procedure, and a mandatory solidarity mechanism for redistributing asylum seekers. Researchers argue it prioritises deterrence and border control over protection rights .

4. Why is the rise of remigration significant for India?

Europe is home to a growing Indian diaspora of students, professionals, and entrepreneurs. India and the EU have expanded cooperation on legal migration. A more restrictive political climate, framed around security and cultural identity, could shape future visa policies, labour mobility, and the everyday experiences of Indian immigrant communities .

5. What are the criticisms of the remigration agenda?

Critics argue that remigration is a sanitised term for state-sanctioned ethnic cleansing . Beyond the threat to fundamental rights, it is also economically bankrupt: offshore return hubs have proven to be vastly over budget and ineffective . The EU is caught in a “deterrence trap” of restrictive measures that offer short-term political relief but are ineffective in the long run .

Bishnoi Indictment: The Long Road to Extradition

By Deeptiman Tiwary
New Delhi, July 22, 2026

Days after indicting gangster Lawrence Bishnoi in a series of crimes, including the killing of Canada-based Khalistan separatist Hardeep Singh Nijjar, the US Department of Justice (DoJ) has confirmed to The Indian Express that it will seek his extradition [citation:original text].

Last week, the US DoJ had charged 37 people, also including Punjab Police SHO Gurinderjit Singh Nagra, in the indictment as part of its Operation Hardball — a coordinated action by law enforcement from the US, Canada and Europe which led to the arrest of 24 people linked to three Indian crime syndicates with transnational networks. The charges included racketeering conspiracy, murder and extortion [citation:original text].

When the US does formally submit its extradition request, what legal process will be triggered? Do the charges qualify for extradition under the India-US Treaty? Can India refuse to hand over Bishnoi — lodged in a jail in Gujarat — or at least delay his surrender? The answers lie in the India-US Extradition Treaty, India’s Extradition Act, 1962, and a legal process in which Indian courts and the Union government both play distinct roles [citation:original text].

What Governs Extradition Between India and the US?

Extradition between India and the US is governed by the bilateral Extradition Treaty signed in 1997 and India’s Extradition Act, 1962. At the heart of the treaty is the principle of dual criminality — an offence is extraditable if it is punishable with imprisonment of more than one year in both countries [citation:original text].

The treaty bars extradition for political offences, although offences such as murder, hostage-taking, terrorism and drug trafficking are specifically excluded from that exception. Nor can extradition be refused merely because the person sought is an Indian citizen. Another safeguard is the rule of speciality, under which an extradited person can ordinarily be tried only for the offences for which extradition was granted [citation:original text].

Do the Charges Against Bishnoi Make Him Extraditable?

On the face of it, the charges levelled by US prosecutors appear to satisfy the treaty’s principal legal requirements [citation:original text].

Although the indictment invokes US laws such as the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) Act, the treaty makes it clear that under the principle of dual criminality, the laws of the two countries need not describe offences in identical terms or place them under the same category [citation:original text]. What matters is whether the underlying conduct constitutes a serious criminal offence in both jurisdictions. Murder, criminal conspiracy, extortion, drug trafficking and firearms offences are all punishable under Indian laws as well [citation:original text].

The Tahawwur Rana extradition proceedings illustrate how this principle operates. US prosecutors did not proceed on some offences invoked by India, such as conspiracy to wage war, because they did not satisfy dual criminality. However, they successfully argued that the remaining offences did so because the underlying conduct constituted crimes in both countries. US courts accepted this reasoning and eventually cleared Rana’s extradition [citation:original text].

What Happens if Washington Sends an Extradition Request?

Typically, an extradition request would be prepared by the US DoJ and transmitted by the State Department to India’s Ministry of External Affairs (MEA). The MEA, in consultation with the Ministry of Home Affairs and agencies such as the CBI, would examine whether the request conforms to the treaty and the Extradition Act [citation:original text].

If the Centre decides the request merits consideration, it is placed before an Indian court, which examines whether the treaty requirements are satisfied and whether the material produced by the US would justify a criminal conviction. The MEA, however, is not required to do so [citation:original text].

If satisfied, the court certifies the accused as extraditable and forwards its findings to the Central government. The final decision on surrender nevertheless rests with the Union government, which may impose conditions or seek diplomatic assurances before approving extradition. Any order can then be challenged before the High Court and the Supreme Court, making extradition proceedings inherently lengthy [citation:original text].

Rana’s case illustrates this well. India’s request, made in 2019, was followed by proceedings before a US magistrate judge, habeas corpus proceedings before a district court, appeals before the Ninth Circuit and petitions before the US Supreme Court before his extradition was finally approved. Even a priority terrorism case took a year to conclude [citation:original text].

The US DoJ has itself acknowledged the length of the process. Ciaran McEvoy, Public Affairs Officer at the US Attorney’s Office, told The Indian Express: “Bishnoi himself remains incarcerated in India. We intend to seek his extradition to the United States. (Extradition is a lengthy legal process and often takes years to complete.)” 

Can India Refuse or Delay Extradition?

Even if the treaty requirements are satisfied, extradition is not automatic. Meeting the treaty’s conditions merely enables the process; it does not compel India to immediately surrender the accused [citation:original text].

For Bishnoi in particular, the most significant legal consideration is that he is already in judicial custody and faces numerous criminal prosecutions across India [citation:original text]. He is currently implicated in dozens of high-profile cases across multiple Indian states, including murder, large-scale extortion, and anti-terror operations . Most notably, he was named the prime conspirator in the May 2022 murder of Punjabi singer Sidhu Moose Wala .

Article 14 of the treaty says the requested state “may” temporarily surrender the accused for trial before requiring his return. But read with Section 31 of the Extraction Act, which permits India to postpone surrender while domestic proceedings are pending, it gives New Delhi considerable discretion over the timing of any extradition [citation:original text].

This means India could legally argue that Bishnoi must first face trial — and, if convicted, serve any sentence — in the numerous murder, extortion and organised crime cases pending against him before any extradition takes place [citation:original text].

The Political and Diplomatic Dimension

The final decision on extradition does not rest entirely with the judiciary; it is inherently political. Even if an Indian magistrate clears the legal parameters for an extradition request, the Union Ministry of External Affairs holds the absolute executive discretion to grant or deny the final surrender warrant based on national security, sovereignty, and diplomatic considerations .

The treaty also provides other grounds for refusal. These include cases where the offence is regarded as political, where there is a risk of torture or an unfair trial, or where the request does not meet the dual criminality requirement . Indian courts routinely examine whether extradition would violate the fugitive’s fundamental rights under Article 21 of the Constitution .

Legal experts believe that any extradition request would be handled under the treaty rather than becoming a diplomatic dispute. Honouring treaty obligations could strengthen cooperation between the two countries. The US administration also understands that India is sensitive about such matters .

Conclusion

The US indictment of Lawrence Bishnoi marks a significant legal development in international efforts to combat transnational organised crime. However, the path to extradition is long and fraught with legal complexities. Even if Washington formally submits a request, India has multiple valid legal grounds to refuse or indefinitely delay handing over the gangster.

Given the sheer volume of domestic cases currently pending against him, Indian courts retain the primary right to prosecute crimes committed on domestic soil before allowing a foreign nation to take custody. The legal battle is just beginning, and the road ahead is likely to be long .

Q&A Section

1. What is the basis for the US seeking Lawrence Bishnoi’s extradition?

The US has charged Bishnoi under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) Act with running a transnational criminal enterprise involved in murder, extortion, drug trafficking, and the killing of Hardeep Singh Nijjar in Canada. The charges stem from allegations that Bishnoi directed these operations from Indian prisons using contraband phones .

2. What is the principle of “dual criminality” in the India-US extradition treaty?

Dual criminality means an offence is extraditable only if it is punishable with imprisonment of more than one year in both countries. The laws need not describe offences in identical terms; what matters is whether the underlying conduct constitutes a serious criminal offence in both jurisdictions .

3. Can India refuse to extradite Bishnoi on the grounds that he is an Indian citizen?

No. The India-US Extradition Treaty explicitly states that extradition cannot be refused merely because the person sought is a citizen of the requested state .

4. What is the “rule of speciality” in extradition law?

The rule of speciality means that an extradited person can ordinarily be tried only for the offences for which extradition was granted. They cannot be prosecuted for additional offences without the consent of the country that surrendered them .

5. What is India’s strongest legal argument to delay Bishnoi’s extradition?

India’s strongest legal argument is that Bishnoi is already facing numerous criminal prosecutions across India, including the murder of Sidhu Moose Wala. Under Article 14 of the treaty and Section 31 of the Extradition Act, India can postpone extradition until these domestic proceedings are concluded and any sentence is served .

China’s Long March in Space Tech Continues with Reusable Rocket

By Arav Shah
New Delhi, July 22, 2026

China on Friday successfully landed a reusable rocket for the first time — a milestone for the country’s space programme that will challenge American companies’ dominance in the technology [citation:original text].

The Long March 10B rocket — which can carry a payload of up to 16 metric tons to low Earth orbit — lifted off from the Wenchang Commercial Space Launch Site in Hainan. Low Earth orbit is a region between 160 km and 2,000 km above the Earth [citation:original text]. Six minutes after liftoff, the rocket’s booster — the part that houses the engine and provides the initial thrust — separated from its upper stage and began a controlled descent to a floating platform on the sea. There, it was caught by a net [citation:original text].

Before China, only Elon Musk’s SpaceX and Jeff Bezos’s Blue Origin demonstrated the ability to launch and land rockets [citation:original text].

The Mechanics of Re-entry: A Novel Approach

All rockets lift off in the same way. Multiple segments, beginning with the first stage, power its ascent one by one before being discarded and destroyed. A reusable rocket, however, is one that can land on Earth after lifting off, thus allowing its valuable booster to be used again. This substantially reduces the cost of a launch and, by extension, space exploration [citation:original text]. Traditional reusable rockets rely on hydraulic landing “legs” to touch down on a ground pad or floating platforms on the sea. SpaceX has demonstrated this with its Falcon 9 boosters, which have landed over 600 times . SpaceX also pulled off a major feat in 2024 when it used giant mechanical arms — termed “chopsticks” — to catch its Starship rocket booster out of the air [citation:original text].

The Long March 10B, however, uses a different system. Its onboard computer coordinates with a maritime landing vessel, which, in turn, aligns a suspended wire net directly below the descending rocket. The rocket is equipped with “landing hooks” that catch the net as the engines shut down [citation:original text]. This sea-based net recovery system is a world first.

This innovation has several advantages. “Net-based recovery simplifies the onboard structure, reduces weight, and boosts payload capacity. It also demonstrates strong adaptability to landing deviations, effectively ‘enlarging’ the capture window through coordinated net operations,” said Chen Muye of the China Aerospace Science and Technology Corporation (CASC) . By removing the heavy hydraulic landing legs in favour of the landing hooks, China has reduced the rocket’s mass and thus increased its payload margin.

Why This Test Matters

Space exploration is expensive. Reusable rockets make this process economical. China went a step further by removing the hydraulic landing legs in favour of the landing hooks — reducing the rocket’s mass and thus increasing its payload margin [citation:original text]. Anushka Saxena, Research Analyst at the Takshashila Institution’s Geostrategy programme told The Indian Express: “The technological and commercial base in China is faring very well despite having been shaken up by internal wrangling and corruption in the past” [citation:original text].

The Long March 10B’s success has several strategic implications:

The Lunar Race: The Long March 10 series of rockets is central to China’s plans to put astronauts on the moon by 2030. This timeline directly competes with the American Artemis program, escalating the stakes of the race to secure real estate at the Moon’s South Pole. This is where permanently shadowed craters contain billions of tonnes of ice water that can be used to create rocket propellant — making them key for any future deep space exploration [citation:original text].

Low-Earth Orbit Missions: Low Earth orbit missions are important for Earth observation and communication. China plans to deploy thousands of communications satellites. Deploying such large numbers through traditional rockets is economically infeasible. The Long March 10B’s success (and its 16-tonne payload) provides the cost-effectiveness required to challenge Western rivals such as SpaceX [citation:original text].

“SpaceX and the Chinese are competing on two fronts — the frequency of launches and the capacity to fill the lower-earth orbit. The Chinese have demonstrated that they can do whatever the Americans can and are actively bridging the gap that SpaceX had created a decade ago,” Saxena said, adding, “For other space-faring nations like India, it might take a long time before they can conclusively enter this circle” [citation:original text].

China’s Broader Space Ambitions

China’s reusable rocket breakthrough is part of a broader, sustained national strategy to become a leading space power. Since opening its space sector to commercial investment in 2014, Beijing has supported new space companies, prioritized reusable rockets, begun deploying large low-Earth-orbit communications constellations, and expanded commercial satellite manufacturing and launch infrastructure . Several Chinese private companies, such as LandSpace, Space Pioneer, and Deep Blue Aerospace, are actively conducting similar experiments .

China also plans to launch three pioneer satellites for the Wuyang Constellation, its first low-latitude remote sensing and communication integrated satellite network, around 2026 . Additionally, in July 2026, Shanghai Xingshu Tiansuan Space Technology and Fudan University unveiled the initial constellation for the Xingshu Plan, China’s first commercial space-based computing network .

India’s Reusable Rocket Ambitions

India is also moving in this direction. The recent successful maiden orbital flight of Vikram-1, the country’s first privately developed orbital launch vehicle, underscores the rapid growth of India’s launch ecosystem, while ISRO’s Reusable Launch Vehicle (RLV) programme and the development of the Next Generation Launch Vehicle (NGLV) signal the country’s long-term commitment to reusable space transportation . However, India’s reusable launch ambitions depend on advances in propulsion, heat protection, upper-stage recovery and rapid booster reuse to reduce launch costs . ISRO is developing a semi-cryogenic engine, which is expected to deliver greater thrust and performance while laying the foundation for future reusable boosters . The NGLV is planned as a partially reusable launch vehicle capable of carrying up to 30 tonnes to Low Earth Orbit .

Q&A Section

1. What made the Long March 10B’s reusable landing different from SpaceX’s approach?
Unlike SpaceX’s Falcon 9, which uses hydraulic landing legs to touch down on a ground pad or drone ship, the Long March 10B uses a sea-based net recovery system. The rocket is equipped with “landing hooks” that catch a suspended wire net on a maritime landing vessel [citation:original text]. This approach eliminates heavy landing gear, reducing the rocket’s mass and increasing its payload capacity.

2. Why is reusable rocket technology so important for space exploration?
Reusable rockets significantly reduce the cost of launching payloads into space because the most expensive part of the rocket—the first-stage booster—can be recovered and used again for multiple missions. Traditional rockets are expendable, meaning their segments are discarded and destroyed during ascent. By reusing boosters, the cost per launch decreases dramatically, enabling more frequent and economically feasible missions, such as deploying large satellite constellations or supporting crewed lunar landings.

3. How does China’s reusable rocket breakthrough affect the global space race?
China’s success with the Long March 10B places it in direct competition with the United States, particularly SpaceX and Blue Origin, in the field of reusable launch technology . It signals that China can challenge America’s dominance in this area, potentially narrowing the launch capability gap and creating a new competitive dynamic in the commercial space market. It also supports China’s ambitious plans for a crewed lunar landing by 2030 and the deployment of massive satellite constellations.

4. What are the strategic implications of the Long March 10B’s success for China’s space programme?
The Long March 10B’s success is central to China’s plans to put astronauts on the moon by 2030, directly competing with the American Artemis program [citation:original text]. It also makes it economically feasible to deploy thousands of communications satellites in Low Earth Orbit for Earth observation and communication [citation:original text]. This could provide China with a strategic advantage in space-based services and military applications.

5. What is India’s progress in developing reusable rocket technology?
India is also working on reusable rocket technology. ISRO’s Reusable Launch Vehicle (RLV) programme and the development of the Next Generation Launch Vehicle (NGLV) signal India’s long-term commitment to reusable space transportation. The NGLV is planned as a partially reusable launch vehicle capable of carrying up to 30 tonnes to Low Earth Orbit, with ISRO developing a semi-cryogenic engine to enable reusability .

The Global Trade Paradox: When Economic Nationalism Meets the Realities of a Small Market

By Aditi Nayar
New Delhi, July 22, 2026

According to a recent IMF publication, the belief that trade and national security are separate domains has now been severely dented. The article is by a former member of the White House Council of Economic Advisers who says “the world is now reevaluating the role of economic interconnectedness in global affairs, mindful that more interconnection means more dependencies that adversarial nations can leverage to get their way in other areas of international relations” [citation:original text]. Other US officials have also said this. Unbridled trade is now a thing of the past because China plays a beggar thy neighbour game [citation:original text].

In other words, it is trade versus national security now. The more you trade, the more at risk your national security is. Ergo, countries have to choose a trade-off between the two [citation:original text].

The Dilemma of Small Markets

But can they? Aren’t these trade-offs available only to large manufacturing economies whose domestic markets are also very large? So if you don’t have a large domestic market, you willy-nilly have to trade or provide financial services to the rest of the world, revenues from which offset the disadvantages of small market size [citation:original text].

Of the global GDP of $126 trillion, the US is at $33 trillion, the EU is at $23 trillion and China is at $21 trillion [citation:original text]. These three belong to the first category. Their domestic markets are large, as are their economic capabilities. Switzerland and Singapore belong to the second category — very small domestic market but massive suppliers of financial services globally [citation:original text]. All other countries are neither here nor there. They have small domestic markets and/or their economies are not large enough to provide for their own needs. They don’t have a choice. Or rather they do have the choice of trading amongst themselves, which leaves them worse off in a large variety of ways [citation:original text].

The Currency Conundrum

And that brings up another problem: in what currency do they settle their bills? At present the preferred currency is the dollar which, in terms of deterrence, has become the financial equivalent of a nuclear weapon. In a few decades some other currency may replace the dollar and will enjoy the same advantages and benefits [citation:original text]. Thus if you are small either in market size or producing capacities, you are screwed. The country that supplies the reserve currency can deprive you of it. Ask Iran and Russia [citation:original text].

And this raises another difficulty for them. How will they earn enough dollars if they increase the proportion of trade among themselves? Every thought of that? [citation:original text]

This is not a new problem, however. Sixty years ago everyone had been ecstatic over the dollar alternative for smaller economies, the Special Drawing Rights. But that was a stillborn initiative [citation:original text]. The SDR, a supplementary foreign exchange reserve asset defined and maintained by the IMF, was created in 1969 as a potential alternative to the dollar. Yet it never achieved the status of a dominant international currency, remaining a marginal player in the global financial system .

The US Dilemma: The Exorbitant Privilege and Its Cost

But while there’s no real alternative to the dollar yet, the US, which is the only producer of dollars, also has a circle to square: if it wants the dollar to remain the global reserve currency (so that it can threaten other countries), it must agree to run massive trade deficits. It can’t have trade surpluses and still be the provider of a global reserve currency [citation:original text]. This is the precise problem that China faces today. It wants the renminbi to displace the dollar and still run trade surpluses. But as the Bengalis say, hobe na, dada. Either shut down your factories or forget about using finance as a tool of coercion [citation:original text].

India: A Category by Itself

India, the jolly old darling, is in a category by itself. It is a large country with a small market which isn’t supplied very much by a large industrial base. Nor does it allow the export of financial services by importing money the way Switzerland and Singapore do [citation:original text]. But it needs the US for technology and China for goods. However, it’s very reluctant to open up the way China did from 1980 to 2015. We want our cake and eat it too [citation:original text].

That reluctance would have mattered if the US and China cared, which they don’t. India’s small market makes it irrelevant. Even if India banned all trade with these two countries it would make no difference to them but we would be in serious trouble [citation:original text].

This is the situation in which India is. It will not be the first time. We have always had a low level equilibrium of the sort that had prevailed, hold your breath, for around 1,500 years. Low growth, low profits, low wages, low rents, low inflation, low aspirations, everything low. This is what we seem to love [citation:original text].

India’s Economic Vulnerabilities

India’s trade deficit is a persistent problem. India’s merchandise trade deficit widened to $28.21 billion in May 2026, with imports surging by 31% to $70.84 billion . In June 2026, the deficit further widened to $30.43 billion, above market expectations . India’s heavy reliance on Gulf shipping routes makes it particularly vulnerable to disruptions and rising costs from the ongoing conflict in West Asia, a vulnerability that is not shared by more resilient export-driven economies .

Q&A Section

1. Why is the world reevaluating the role of economic interconnectedness?

According to a former member of the White House Council of Economic Advisers, the world is reevaluating economic interconnectedness because more interconnection means more dependencies that adversarial nations can leverage to get their way in other areas of international relations. The more you trade, the more at risk your national security is [citation:original text].

2. What are the three categories of countries in terms of trade and national security?

The three categories are: (1) Large manufacturing economies with large domestic markets, such as the US, EU, and China; (2) Very small domestic markets but massive suppliers of financial services globally, such as Switzerland and Singapore; and (3) Countries that are neither here nor there, with small domestic markets and/or economies that are not large enough to provide for their own needs, leaving them with no real choice [citation:original text].

3. What is the problem with the US dollar as the global reserve currency?

The US must run massive trade deficits to provide the global reserve currency. It cannot have trade surpluses and still be the provider of the dollar. This is a structural dilemma: the country that supplies the reserve currency can deprive others of it, as seen with Iran and Russia [citation:original text].

4. Why is India in a unique category?

India is a large country with a small market that isn’t supplied very much by a large industrial base. Nor does it allow the export of financial services by importing money the way Switzerland and Singapore do. It needs the US for technology and China for goods but is reluctant to open up its economy. India’s small market makes it irrelevant to the US and China; even if India banned all trade with them, it would make no difference to them but would put India in serious trouble [citation:original text].

5. What is the historical pattern of India’s economic equilibrium?

India has always had a low level equilibrium for around 1,500 years: low growth, low profits, low wages, low rents, low inflation, low aspirations, everything low. This is what India seems to love [citation:original text]. India’s current trade deficit of over $30 billion in June 2026 underscores this persistent vulnerability, driven by import dependence on energy and the need for technology .

Lessons from SBI’s Presence in the Mutual Funds Business

By S. Adikesavan
New Delhi, July 22, 2026

The listing of SBI Mutual Fund this week is much more than another capital market event. It offers an opportunity for policymakers to reflect on how a public sector subsidiary, built on a strategic vision nearly four decades ago, has evolved into the country’s largest asset management company. Further, it underlines an important instance in institution-building in India’s financial sector [citation:original text].

Though India’s economic reforms formally began only in 1991, a few significant institutional initiatives had preceded them. Among these was the decision by State Bank of India to enter the mutual fund business in 1987, when Unit Trust of India enjoyed a virtual monopoly in the sector [citation:original text].

Therefore even as market participants focus understandably on the entity’s assets under management, profitability, valuation and future growth prospects, equally relevant are three broader lessons that emerge from this journey [citation:original text].

Lesson One: A Public Sector Institution Can Compete and Win

The first is the ability of a public sector institution to compete successfully in a highly competitive financial market, functioning within the constraints of public ownership. The SBI Fund steadily built scale and credibility, aided initially by partners such as Societe Generale and later Amundi of France. It has retained its leadership position despite the entry of several multinational asset managers and strong domestic competitors. Business leaders who have headed the Fund and contributed to its growth are our usual neighbourhood people [citation:original text].

Its rise has coincided with the remarkable expansion of India’s mutual fund industry, driven by increasing financialisation of household savings, investor awareness, wide distribution networks and sustained inflows through Systematic Investment Plans. The industry today has over six crore unique investors, with participation extending well beyond metropolitan centres into Tier II and Tier III cities and even rural India. The spread of mutual funds has become an important instrument for the democratisation of household participation in India’s corporate sector [citation:original text].

SBI Mutual Fund’s growth is a testament to the power of sustained institutional vision. From assets under management of around ₹1,00,000 crore in 2014, the fund crossed the ₹10 lakh crore milestone within a decade [citation:original text]. This remarkable growth was not an accident. It was the result of professional management, policy continuity, and a commitment to building a long-term institution.

Lesson Two: Responding to Market Stress with Resilience

The second lesson is that Indian financial institutions have demonstrated their ability to respond effectively during periods of market stress. This was evident in 2020 when Franklin Templeton (US-owned) wound up six debt schemes following severe liquidity pressures. Pursuant to directions of the Supreme Court, SBI Mutual Fund oversaw the orderly liquidation process of these schemes. The exercise ultimately enabled investors to recover more than their invested capital, reinforcing confidence in the resilience and capabilities of domestic institutions [citation:original text].

This was not just a technical exercise. It was a matter of public trust. Investors who had put their money into Franklin Templeton’s debt schemes were in a state of panic. SBI Mutual Fund’s role in overseeing the liquidation was a demonstration of the strength and stability of India’s domestic financial institutions. It reinforced the idea that even in times of crisis, there is a safety net provided by well-managed public sector entities.

Lesson Three: The Importance of Strategic Vision in Public Policy

The third, and perhaps the most enduring, lesson relates to the importance of strategic thinking in public policy. SBI’s entry into the mutual fund business was not an isolated business decision but the outcome of institutional vision [citation:original text].

That vision came from DN Ghosh, who became SBI Chairman in 1986 after a distinguished career in government. Nearly two decades earlier, as a 40-year-old civil servant, Ghosh had been among the select officials who worked through the night to prepare the ordinance that enabled the nationalisation of 14 major banks in July 1969. As Chairman of SBI, he would once again leave a lasting imprint by spearheading the creation of SBI Mutual Fund after first establishing SBI Capital Markets [citation:original text].

The birth of SBI MF deserves some detailing. In his autobiography No Regrets, Ghosh recounts how he secured then Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi’s approval for the proposal within minutes after explaining that competition to the monopoly control of UTI would deepen India’s savings market and broaden investment opportunities. The episode illustrates how timely political support, combined with institutional leadership, can shape the long-term evolution of financial markets [citation:original text].

Ghosh writes in his book: “I met Sarla Grewal, who was then secretary to the PM. She was good enough to have an appointment with the PM smuggled in on the same day, adding that I had a slot of just five minutes. I was meeting him for the first time… after a few pleasantries, I came straight to the point, ‘SBI has set up a new subsidiary for capital market operations. I would like it to float a mutual fund that could sell capital market-related savings instruments. Today these kinds of instruments are sold only by UTI. It has become a monopolistic monolith. Entry of a new player would activate the market.'” [citation:original text]

Rajiv Gandhi nodded in agreement and asked, “What prevents you from going ahead?” Ghosh explained that the holders of the new instruments had to be given tax exemption on the same scale as in the UTI. The prime minister’s response was quick, “Why not put it in the budget? You leave a note with Sarla.” The approval for SBI to float a Mutual Fund subsidiary took less than 10 minutes [citation:original text].

This anecdote is a powerful illustration of how visionary leadership, combined with quick and decisive political support, can create transformative institutions. It also highlights the importance of having leaders who understand the intricacies of policy and are able to articulate a compelling vision.

The Broader Context: India’s Mutual Fund Industry

The listing of SBI Mutual Fund is also a moment to reflect on the remarkable growth of India’s mutual fund industry. The industry has grown from a single player, UTI, in the 1980s to a vibrant and competitive market with over 40 asset management companies. The number of unique investors has crossed six crore, and the industry’s assets under management have grown to over ₹50 lakh crore.

The growth of the mutual fund industry has been a key driver of financial inclusion in India. Systematic Investment Plans (SIPs) have made it possible for ordinary investors to participate in the growth of the corporate sector with small, regular investments. The industry has also played a crucial role in channeling household savings into productive investments, supporting the country’s economic growth.

The Future

The listing of SBI Mutual Fund is, therefore, not merely the public offering of a successful asset management company. It is also the culmination of an institutional journey that demonstrates how visionary public sector initiatives, supported by professional management and policy continuity, can create enduring national financial institutions capable of competing with the very best in the world [citation:original text].

SBI Mutual Fund’s journey offers a compelling case study for policymakers. It shows that public sector institutions can thrive in competitive markets if they are given the right leadership, the right policy framework, and the autonomy to operate professionally. It also underscores the importance of strategic vision in shaping the long-term evolution of financial markets.

Q&A Section

1. What is the significance of SBI Mutual Fund’s listing?

The listing of SBI Mutual Fund is much more than a capital market event. It is the culmination of an institutional journey that demonstrates how visionary public sector initiatives, supported by professional management and policy continuity, can create enduring national financial institutions capable of competing with the very best in the world. It offers an opportunity for policymakers to reflect on the lessons from this journey [citation:original text].

2. What was the market context when SBI decided to enter the mutual fund business?

When SBI decided to enter the mutual fund business in 1987, Unit Trust of India (UTI) enjoyed a virtual monopoly in the sector. SBI’s entry was a bold move to introduce competition and deepen India’s savings market. The approval for SBI to float a Mutual Fund subsidiary took less than 10 minutes from then Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi [citation:original text].

3. What are the three broader lessons from SBI Mutual Fund’s journey?

The three broader lessons are: (1) A public sector institution can compete successfully in a highly competitive financial market, functioning within the constraints of public ownership; (2) Indian financial institutions have demonstrated their ability to respond effectively during periods of market stress; and (3) Strategic thinking in public policy, supported by visionary leadership and timely political support, can shape the long-term evolution of financial markets [citation:original text].

4. How did SBI Mutual Fund respond to the Franklin Templeton crisis?

In 2020, Franklin Templeton wound up six debt schemes following severe liquidity pressures. Pursuant to directions of the Supreme Court, SBI Mutual Fund oversaw the orderly liquidation process of these schemes. The exercise ultimately enabled investors to recover more than their invested capital, reinforcing confidence in the resilience and capabilities of domestic institutions [citation:original text].

5. How did DN Ghosh’s vision lead to the creation of SBI Mutual Fund?

DN Ghosh, as Chairman of SBI, spearheaded the creation of SBI Mutual Fund after first establishing SBI Capital Markets. He secured Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi’s approval for the proposal within minutes by explaining that competition to UTI’s monopoly would deepen India’s savings market and broaden investment opportunities. The episode illustrates how timely political support, combined with institutional leadership, can shape the long-term evolution of financial markets [citation:original text].

Business Lessons from the Top of the World: Binod Chaudhary’s ‘Made in Nepal’ and the Art of Building Beyond Boundaries

By Atul K. Thakur
New Delhi, July 22, 2026

There are countries where a business grows on the back of systems. And then there are places where it grows despite their absence. Binod Chaudhary’s book, Made in Nepal: Lessons in Business Building from the Land of Everest, belongs firmly to the latter category [citation:original text].

It is a story that does not begin with scale or capital, but with circumstance. A trading family in Kathmandu. A modest commercial base. A society negotiating its way out of monarchy into a more open, but unsettled, political order. As the narrative unfolds, what gives it weight is not the drama of expansion, but the persistence of context. The ground beneath business in Nepal has rarely been steady [citation:original text].

This is not a memoir of arrival. It is, more accurately, a record of adjustment over time [citation:original text].

The Landscape of Instability: Nepal’s Political and Economic Terrain

To understand this book, one must first situate it within the longer economic and political history of Nepal. For much of the 20th century, Nepal remained inward-looking. The Rana oligarchy, followed by the new phase of monarchy under the Shah dynasty, preserved a controlled political and economic system. Industrialisation was limited. Infrastructure development lagged. Private enterprise existed, but without institutional backing or policy continuity.

Unlike India, which began building a mixed economy after independence, Nepal’s transition to a more open economic framework came later and in fragments. The 1980s saw early liberalisation efforts, and the democratic movement of 1990 created expectations of reform. However, the subsequent decades did not produce sustained stability. Coalition governments became the norm. Policy direction shifted frequently [citation:original text].

The Maoist insurgency between 1996 and 2006 further complicated the environment. It disrupted supply chains, affected investor confidence, and strained state institutions. Even after the formal end of the conflict, Nepal’s transition to a federal democratic republic remained incomplete in many ways. Business did not stop in this period. It recalibrated continuously [citation:original text]. As the search results note, Nepal’s policy fragmentation and weak institutional coherence have hindered economic progress .

This is the landscape in which Binod Chaudhary operates. Every decision, whether expansion or consolidation, appears shaped by an awareness that stability cannot be assumed [citation:original text]. The book’s relevance extends to economies where political uncertainty and institutional gaps shape business decisions [citation:original text].

From Trading to Manufacturing: Scaling from Constraints

The origins of the Chaudhary Group lie in trading, a familiar starting point for many South Asian business families. What marks a turning point is the decision by Binod Chaudhary to move into manufacturing [citation:original text]. Born into a Marwari family in Kathmandu—his grandfather had migrated from Rajasthan—his father opened Nepal’s first departmental store . Though Chaudhary initially aspired to become a chartered accountant in India, he returned to Nepal at 18 due to his father’s illness and entered the business .

In a country like Nepal, this transition carries significant implications. Manufacturing requires long-term commitment. It depends on infrastructure, logistics, labour relations, and policy predictability. None of these was fully reliable. Chaudhary’s decision establishes a willingness to anchor business within Nepal, rather than operate purely through cross-border trade [citation:original text].

The example of Wai Wai noodles illustrates this shift clearly. It is often cited as a successful consumer brand, but in the book, its importance lies in execution. The product’s journey from Nepal into India and beyond demonstrates that scale can be achieved even from constrained environments, provided systems are carefully built. The emphasis throughout is on discipline rather than disruption. In uncertain environments, ideas alone are insufficient. Systems sustain growth [citation:original text].

Wai Wai’s story is remarkable. Launched in 1984, the brand now operates in over 30 countries . In India, it is the third-largest instant noodle brand, reporting revenues of approximately ₹800 crore in FY24/FY25 with a target of ₹1,200 crore by FY26 . It commands a dominant #2 position nationally in instant noodles, with about 60% of its Indian revenue coming from the Northeast region . Its versatility—being edible straight from the pack, as a soup, or a snack base—sets it apart .

The book’s core thesis is both simple and powerful: geography need not define destiny. Entrepreneurs operating in small or politically volatile economies cannot afford to wait for ideal conditions. They must cultivate resilience, disciplined execution, and comfort with ambiguity. Nepal’s political instability and regulatory complexities are not portrayed as excuses but as proving grounds for managerial endurance .

Diversification as Risk Management: Spreading Across Sectors

As the group grows, it does not remain confined to a single sector. It diversifies into cement, hospitality, telecom, and financial services. This diversification is not presented as aggressive expansion but as risk management. Spreading investments across sectors reduces vulnerability [citation:original text]. Chaudhary’s business interests today span more than 200 companies across sectors including food, cement, hospitality, telecommunications, and banking, with operations extending across Asia, Europe, and Africa .

A key milestone was the acquisition of a controlling stake in Nabil Bank from the Dubai government in 1995, transforming it into Nepal’s leading bank . In hospitality, the Chaudhary Group manages 143 hotels, including luxury 5-star establishments in partnership with India’s Taj Hotels, spread across Nepal, India, and Sri Lanka . The group now has a portfolio of 178–200+ hotels across 12 countries .

Nepal’s economic structure, characterised by limited industrial depth and high external dependence, reinforces this approach. Sectors perform unevenly. Policy incentives shift. External factors, including relations with India and China, influence domestic markets. Chaudhary’s strategy reflects an understanding of these realities. Expansion is incremental and context driven. It does not attempt to outpace the environment. It adapts to it. This approach may appear cautious, but in Nepal’s context, it is pragmatic [citation:original text].

Professionalisation: Building Systems to Outlast Personalities

The Chaudhary Group remains, at its core, a family enterprise. This is consistent with broader South Asian business traditions. However, the book pays particular attention to the process of professionalisation. Chaudhary acknowledges the need to bring in external expertise, establish formal systems, and prepare for succession. These are critical steps in ensuring continuity beyond the founding generation [citation:original text].

In Nepal, where state institutions have often been inconsistent, businesses are required to build their own internal stability. Governance structures, decision-making processes, and accountability mechanisms within firms assume greater importance . Where Made in Nepal distinguishes itself from many founder memoirs is its emphasis on institutionalisation. Chaudhary repeatedly underscores the importance of professional management, governance structures, and succession planning. He cautions against overreliance on founder charisma, arguing that sustainable growth demands systems that outlast personalities .

Chaudhary has entrusted the leadership of the group to his three sons, each leading their respective verticals . The book does not suggest that this transition is complete. Rather, it presents it as an ongoing process. Balancing family control with professional management remains a challenge [citation:original text].

Broader Relevance: Lessons for the World

Binod Chaudhary’s story is rooted in Nepal, but its relevance extends beyond it. It speaks to other economies where political uncertainty, institutional gaps, and external dependencies shape business decisions. In that sense, Made in Nepal is less a conventional success story and more a study in endurance. It shows how businesses can persist, adapt, and grow even when the conditions for doing so remain uncertain [citation:original text].

For business leaders in larger economies, the book offers perspective. For entrepreneurs in emerging markets, it provides encouragement grounded in precedent. For policymakers, it underscores a recurring lesson: enabling enterprise may be one of the most reliable pathways to national resilience . It is a call to expand the map of global business possibility—and to recognise that ambition, when combined with hard work, discipline, resilience, and courage, can transcend even the most formidable constraints .

Q&A Section

1. What is the core thesis of Binod Chaudhary’s book “Made in Nepal”?

The book’s core thesis is that geography need not define destiny. Chaudhary argues that entrepreneurs operating in small or politically volatile economies cannot wait for ideal conditions; they must cultivate resilience, disciplined execution, and comfort with ambiguity. Nepal’s political instability and regulatory complexities are portrayed as proving grounds for managerial endurance, not excuses for failure [citation:original text].

2. How did Binod Chaudhary transition from a trading family to building a manufacturing business?

Chaudhary transitioned from trading to manufacturing by taking the risk to anchor business within Nepal, rather than operating purely through cross-border trade. The launch of Wai Wai noodles in 1984 marked a pivotal shift, requiring long-term commitment to infrastructure, logistics, labour relations, and policy predictability—none of which were fully reliable in Nepal at the time [citation:original text].

3. Why is Wai Wai noodles considered the commercial centrepiece of Chaudhary’s success?

Wai Wai noodles represent the group’s entry into scalable manufacturing and consumer branding. Launched in 1984, the brand’s versatility (edible as a snack, soup, or meal) and consistency in execution helped it expand beyond Nepal to 30+ countries. In India, it is now the third-largest instant noodle brand, with revenues of ₹800 crore and a target of ₹1,200 crore by FY26 .

4. How has the Chaudhary Group diversified its business across sectors?

The group has diversified into cement, hospitality, telecom, and financial services as a risk management strategy. Key ventures include a controlling stake in Nabil Bank (1995), a hospitality portfolio of 143 hotels (including partnerships with Taj Hotels), and over 200 companies spanning 32 countries. This spread across sectors reduces vulnerability to policy shifts and economic volatility in any single industry [citation:original text].

5. What lessons does the book offer for entrepreneurs in emerging economies?

The book offers three key lessons: (1) scale can be achieved from constrained environments if systems are carefully built; (2) diversification is a form of risk management, not just aggressive expansion; and (3) professionalisation and succession planning are essential for institutions to outlast their founders. It argues that ambition, combined with discipline, resilience, and hard work, can transcend even the most formidable constraints [citation:original text].

The Poor’s Savings: The Next Frontier for NPCI and the RBI Innovation Hub

By Aditi Nayar
New Delhi, July 22, 2026

On the checklist of innovations, a point without a checkmark is savings. Traditionally, both policymakers and markets have looked at the poor as borrowers, to be rescued from the moneylender. The policy discourse focused on institutional credit — priority-sector targets, refinancing, and specialised institutions like cooperatives and regional rural banks. Irrespective of the supply-side push, the credit market for poor women was cracked in the late 1990s with microcredit .

In the past two decades, we have seen interesting developments in remittances, which have benefited inclusive customers. This was because of technology rather than policy priority. The rollout of core banking solutions, the interoperable switch-making ATMs (automated teller machines) working across banks, the spread of the internet and mobile telephony, the setting up of National Payments Corporation of India (NPCI) — all these created an ecosystem for payments and remittances. The poor were collateral beneficiaries of this architecture. The policy of not loading user charges helped in the speedy adoption of Unified Payments Interface (UPI). While this is still not ubiquitous in deep rural areas and with women, the impact it has on easier, simpler and seamless remittances can be seen .

We have no such story for savings. The myth is that the poor — being poor — cannot save. The very same poor borrow and repay instalments with interest. If we look at savings and loans as a cash-flow continuum, the difference between loans (frontloading an expenditure/investment) and savings (backloading it) is not significant. In the iconic book The Poor and their Money, Stuart Rutherford termed this “saving up and saving down” .

The Myth and the Reality of the Poor’s Savings

The regularity with which the poor are scammed with savings as bait shows two things: There is an appetite for savings, and there is no dearth of imagination and innovation. But this happens under the radar. Ponzi schemes, chit funds and even lightly regulated residuary non-banking finance companies like Sahara which were shut down demonstrate that the poor have an appetite to save. Other innovations in this space skirt the regulations. At one time, experiments by the Kshetriya Grameen Financial Services in Odisha and Tamil Nadu offered money-market mutual funds to the poor. The logic was that those were liquid and flexible, and had a positive return and mimicked an accumulating savings account. While being relatively safe instruments, those were not without market risks and had no insurance cover, and therefore were not to be offered to the poor .

The poor save not only in the form of stashing away cash and informal deposits, but also putting money in different asset classes — goats, backyard poultry, gold, silver, and utensils (to be pawned). It is possible for the financial system to mimic the liquidity (or illiquidity), return, flexibility and safety by offering financial products that address the requirements of the poor .

The concept of “saving up” refers to the process of accumulating savings bit by bit until a lump sum is amassed for a specific expenditure need. “Saving down” is the opposite—taking a loan and repaying it in installments, frontloading the expense. “Saving through” combines both, where a household receives a lump sum at some point during their savings process, such as insurance coverage . These three frameworks illustrate the complex financial strategies low-income households employ to manage their cash flows.

The Barriers to Innovation: Why Legacy Banks Can’t Lead

Apart from the myth, we have other restrictions. For savings, the risk of default or malfeasance is borne by the vulnerable customer and, therefore, the regulator is cautious in allowing any latitude in experiments with savings products .

High costs of frequent small-ticket transactions cannot be passed on to the poor customer by way of lower interest. In the case of loans, the lender controls cash flows by specifying a repayment schedule. In structuring a flexible savings product, factoring in volatile cash flows of the poor is complex. Bankers do not like such products because they do not fit into their cash management. Therefore, legacy institutions do not innovate on savings .

Is it fair to expect banks to innovate? No, unless the regulator thinks out of the box to license a few digital-only banks. Legacy banks have too much on their hands, and their technology focus may be on investing in artificial intelligence-enabled call centres to do customer service and investment in cyber security . The banking system is built for stability, not for experimentation. This is why the regulatory restrictions provide the privilege of savings exclusively to banks, making it a space where innovation has been stifled .

The Technology Infrastructure: A Foundation Waiting to Be Built Upon

With the rollout of technology for small payments done, savings in the regulated space are waiting for innovation. But who will bell the cat? 

Let us look at UPI: All innovation in the payments space happened outside the banking system — with players like Paytm, PhonePe, BharatPe and BHIM. The banking system provided the interface and co-opted these payment gateways. All digital-lending innovation is also happening outside the banking ecosystem with fintechs leading the franchise. The banks are backstopping by colending or lending to NBFCs operating as front lenders .

This model has worked well for payments and lending. But savings is different. The regulatory restrictions make it a bank-only domain. The best candidates to think out of the box are NPCI and the Reserve Bank Innovation Hub. Both have the ear of the regulator and leverage with the banking system. Are they willing to take up white-label savings products? As in the case of BHIM, will NPCI act as an interface with banks as a background engine? 

The Pradhan Mantri Jan Dhan Yojana (PMJDY) has created a massive foundation. With every family having a PMJDY account, with possible inflows from direct-benefit transfers, banks could build innovative products that justify the investment in both technology and the rollout of such accounts. PMJDY accounts could be the anchor accounts on which multiple savings products could be built . As of March 2025, there were 55.2 crore PMJDY accounts holding Rs 2.6 lakh crore in deposits, and 72.4 crore Basic Savings Bank Deposit Accounts with Rs 3.3 lakh crore in deposits . This scale represents an enormous opportunity to build innovative savings products.

Would this include women? That would be a greater challenge because smartphones are usually family-owned and women need agency and privacy to manage their finances. For women, an accumulating savings product to purchase a dream smartphone may be the first target . The PayNearby Saathi platform, which received NPCI approval in late 2025, is designed to address these gaps with assisted onboarding, localised digital access, and an in-built AI guide supporting users who are unfamiliar with digital financial tools . The platform is distributed through a network of over 15 lakh retail partners and Digital Naaris, offering UPI-linked savings accounts and a range of financial products .

The Opportunity: A Tech-Led Innovation in Regulated Savings

This space is crying to be occupied with tech-led innovation. Getting savings from microfinance customers will mute leverage-related stress if banks are able to capture the borrower’s assets into their books, even as they continue to lend .

The emergence of white-label solutions like those offered by Fixerra, which provides API/SDK infrastructure for banks and fintechs to launch fixed deposits, savings accounts, and neo-banking services, shows that the technology exists to build modular, scalable savings products . Similarly, platforms like Acru are democratizing wealth management by facilitating micro-savings starting from as little as ₹1, enabling investments in digital gold, silver, and mutual funds .

The question is whether NPCI and the RBI Innovation Hub will take the lead in this space. By offering white-label savings products, they could create a BHIM-like interface for savings, allowing banks to focus on their core business while NPCI handles the innovation and technology. This would be a game-changer for financial inclusion and would address one of the most persistent gaps in India’s financial services ecosystem. The PMJDY accounts, the UPI infrastructure, and the growing reach of digital financial services provide all the building blocks. The next step is to use them.

Q&A Section

1. Why has innovation in savings products lagged behind payments and remittances for low-income customers in India?

Innovation in savings has lagged because regulatory restrictions make savings a bank-only domain, and legacy banks are not designed for experimentation. The risk of default or malfeasance in savings products is borne by the vulnerable customer, making regulators cautious. Additionally, the high costs of frequent small-ticket transactions cannot be passed on to customers, and legacy banks focus their technology investments on areas like AI customer service and cyber security rather than product innovation .

2. What is the “saving up, saving down, and saving through” framework?

Stuart Rutherford’s framework describes three ways the poor manage their finances: “saving up” involves accumulating savings bit by bit for a lump-sum expenditure; “saving down” is taking a loan and repaying it in instalments; and “saving through” combines both, where a household receives a lump sum during their savings process, such as through insurance or group savings schemes. This shows that the poor are sophisticated financial managers, not passive recipients of credit .

3. How has technology already transformed payments and remittances for the poor?

The rollout of core banking solutions, interoperable ATMs, the spread of internet and mobile telephony, and the establishment of NPCI created an ecosystem for payments and remittances. The policy of not loading user charges on UPI helped its rapid adoption. The poor were collateral beneficiaries of this architecture, gaining access to easier, simpler, and seamless remittances, though this is still not ubiquitous in deep rural areas and with women .

4. What is the potential role of NPCI and the RBI Innovation Hub in transforming savings for the poor?

NPCI and the RBI Innovation Hub are the best candidates to think out of the box because they have the ear of the regulator and leverage with the banking system. They could create white-label savings products, acting as an interface with banks, similar to how BHIM and other payment gateways work. This would allow innovation in savings without expecting legacy banks to lead it .

5. How can the Pradhan Mantri Jan Dhan Yojana (PMJDY) serve as a foundation for savings innovation?

With every family having a PMJDY account and potential inflows from direct-benefit transfers, these accounts could serve as anchor accounts on which multiple savings products could be built. As of March 2025, there were 55.2 crore PMJDY accounts holding Rs 2.6 lakh crore in deposits, representing a massive foundation for building innovative, tech-led savings products tailored to the needs of low-income households .

Viksit Bharat’s Human Capital Paradox: Why Infrastructure Alone Cannot Build a Developed India

By Aditi Nayar
New Delhi, July 22, 2026

It is widely assumed that India will sustain a 7-8 per cent annual growth rate in gross domestic product (GDP) for the next few decades and will soon reach the upper-middle income country category and even the high-income country category (the Viksit Bharat dream). On the surface, the momentum looks impressive. Sleek new expressways slice through the countryside, gleaming airports open in Tier-II cities, and a world-class digital public infrastructure handles billions of real-time transactions. But India risks hitting a glass ceiling long before it crosses the threshold into the category of upper-middle-income economies. The reason is simple, stark, and under-addressed: A profound and systemic failure to develop something that is being recognised as the most important factor behind a country’s prosperity: Its human capital .

The Economic Theory: Why Human Capital Matters

Traditionally, classical economists viewed economic growth as a mechanical function of adding more workers, more land, and more machines. But when applied to the modern global economy, this breaks down. Physical investment, such as a factory, is subject to the unforgiving law of diminishing returns. A country can double its stock of tractors or computers, but it also needs to double its roll of technically capable workers to operate them . In 1992, economists Gregory Mankiw, David Romer and David Weil isolated human capital — the collective blend of education, health and specialised skills — as its own independent, standalone factor of production .

Human capital — not geography, culture or natural resources — now explains why some nations become wealthy while others remain stagnant. In the old models, a country that invested four times more heavily than another in physical machinery only ended up twice as rich. But the Mankiw-Romer-Weil model proves that when high physical-capital investment is multiplied by high human-capital investment, it creates a compounding impact, a 16-fold leap in wealth per worker . Furthermore, growth theorists Robert Lucas and Paul Romer demonstrated that human capital possesses a unique economic edge: It does not suffer from diminishing returns. An engineer who invents a better piece of software creates an asset that can be used by every computer in the world simultaneously. Human capital creates increasing returns to scale . Physical capital builds the floor of an economy, but human capital is the engine that pulls the ceiling upward.

The East Asian Blueprint: A Playbook Followed, Not a Myth

This is not just an academic construct. It is the fact behind the 20th century’s greatest economic miracles . In 1953, South Korea was a war-torn nation with an adult literacy rate of only 20 per cent. It possessed no oil, no minerals, and negligible physical wealth. The state treated education policy as its core industrial policy. It eliminated illiteracy to feed light manufacturing in the 1960s, expanded vocational technical schools to supply heavy industries in the 1970s, and flooded universities with science and technology resources in the 1980s . Today, it stands as a global innovation juggernaut.

Singapore faced an equally grim start upon its sudden independence in 1965. Lacking even domestic water supply, then Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew noted that the island’s only asset was its people. The city-state ruthlessly aligned its schooling system with the exact technical requirements of foreign multinationals. Later, it pioneered continuous, state-funded adult retraining . China followed a similar playbook. Decades of public investment had already secured widespread basic literacy and rural health care. When global supply chains arrived, they found not only cheap labour but also a highly disciplined, literate workforce. Beijing then executed the largest higher-education expansion in human history, graduating over 10 million students annually, heavily weighted towards engineering . These nations understood that policy-augmented human capital—human capital with a coherent roadmap—was the foundation of sustained growth . They proved that a backward economy could generate sustained growth by treating human capital as the driver of industrial policy and industrial diversification .

The Indian Paradox: A Tale of Two Indias

Here the trajectory has been the opposite. The country put the cart of higher education before the horse of secondary education, spawning a world-class educated elite. Its premier technical institutes and business schools supply the chief executive officers of Silicon Valley and the engineers powering sophisticated global capability centres in Bengaluru . India has successfully cultivated a brilliant, world-class elite. This elite layer allowed India to skip standard, mass-employment manufacturing and jump straight into high-end digital services .

But an economy of 1.4 billion people cannot ride to upper-middle-income status on the back of a few million tech professionals. While billions of dollars are being funnelled into physical infrastructure, basic foundational learning and public health languish . The data from the World Bank’s human capital index consistently highlights that children born in India today will grow up to be only half as productive as they could be in conditions of complete education and full health . The government has rejected the World Bank’s HCI findings, citing methodological weaknesses and data gaps , but the structural indicators are hard to dismiss.

The structural bottlenecks are painfully clear. Industry surveys consistently show that nearly half of India’s college graduates are unemployable straight out of college due to a lack of practical, market-aligned skills . Only about 4% of India’s total workforce has received formal vocational training . And chronic challenges like childhood stunting and malnutrition permanently impair cognitive development . As the OECD has noted, skill shortages limit firms’ ability to expand, adopt new technologies, and generate employment . The India Skills Report 2026 pegged overall graduate employability at 56.35%—meaning more than four out of every ten young Indians stepping out of a college are not considered ready for the workplace . In 2026, 82% of Indian employers reported difficulty in finding the talent they need, well above the global average of 72% .

The Demographic Window: A One-Time Opportunity

India’s demographic window is widely expected to peak between 2030 and 2040, after which the dependency ratio begins to rise, and the working-age cohort starts to shrink . Roughly two decades. That is the runway we have to convert a young population into a productive one. Miss it, and India will grow old before it grows rich . And the skills required are shifting rapidly. The World Economic Forum estimates that 39% of workers’ core skills will be transformed or rendered obsolete by 2030, and for the first time, AI literacy and AI model development have overtaken every other skill as the hardest for employers to find globally . India’s own Economic Survey frames the future of work around “augmented intelligence”—work that requires humans and machines to operate as one .

The Way Forward: From Degrees to Capability

If India is to transform its much-vaunted “demographic dividend” from a ticking time bomb into an economic engine, it must dramatically pivot. The diagnosis is uncomfortable but unavoidable: Our education system teaches students what to know. The economy is now built around people who know how to work. These are not the same thing .

First, work must move from the periphery of education to its core. Internships cannot remain a final-semester compliance ritual . Second, India must end the artificial war between degrees and skills. The real answer is the skill-integrated degree: a qualification that certifies disciplinary depth and demonstrable capability in the same transcript . Third, AI literacy must become universal, not departmental . Fourth, assessment must finally catch up with reality, moving beyond recall-based exams to portfolios, projects, and real-world performance .

The government’s Skill India Mission, with schemes like PMKVY and the Craftsman Training Scheme through Industrial Training Institutes (ITIs), represents a significant effort to address the skilling gap . The Skill India Digital Hub (SIDH) platform integrates skilling, education, employment, and entrepreneurship . Yet, the sheer scale of the challenge—and the pace of technological change—demands a more urgent and systemic shift. The time for patchwork is over. India can continue down its current path, celebrating headline-grabbing GDP figures driven by government spending on capital-intensive projects and elite service sectors. But until New Delhi closes the vast human-capital deficit, even moving into a higher-middle-income category will be a struggle .

Q&A Section

1. What is the “glass ceiling” India faces in its quest to become a developed nation?

The glass ceiling is the profound and systemic failure to develop human capital—the collective blend of education, health, and specialised skills. While India invests heavily in physical infrastructure and elite education, basic foundational learning and public health languish. Children born in India today will be only half as productive as they could be with complete education and full health. This skills deficit limits the ability to sustain high growth and transition to an upper-middle-income economy .

2. Why is human capital considered more important than physical capital for modern economic growth?

Physical capital is subject to diminishing returns. You can double your stock of computers, but you need to double the number of skilled workers to operate them. Human capital, however, creates increasing returns to scale. Knowledge is non-rival—an engineer who invents a better piece of software creates an asset that can be replicated across the entire economy simultaneously. This creates positive spillovers, raising the productivity of every factory, farm, and office worker .

3. How did East Asian economies like South Korea and Singapore use human capital to achieve rapid growth?

South Korea and Singapore treated education and skill development as their core industrial policy. South Korea eliminated illiteracy, expanded vocational schools, and invested in science education to feed its industrialisation. Singapore aligned its schooling system with the technical requirements of foreign multinationals and later pioneered continuous adult retraining. They understood that human capital—guided by a coherent policy roadmap—was the foundation of sustained growth .

4. What is the “Indian Paradox” in human capital development?

India has successfully cultivated a brilliant, world-class elite that supplies CEOs for Silicon Valley and engineers for global capability centres in Bengaluru. However, beneath this pinnacle lies a vast, neglected human capital landscape. Nearly half of college graduates are unemployable due to a lack of practical skills, only 4% of the workforce has formal vocational training, and malnutrition impairs cognitive development. An economy of 1.4 billion people cannot grow on the backs of a few million tech professionals .

5. What are the key reforms needed to address India’s human capital deficit?

India needs five honest shifts: (1) move work from the periphery of education to its core, with early internships and live projects; (2) end the war between degrees and skills by creating skill-integrated degrees; (3) make AI literacy universal, not just for computer science students; (4) redesign assessment to evaluate capability through portfolios and real-world performance, not just recall; and (5) shift from input-based financing to learning-adjusted financing that rewards actual learning outcomes .

The Invisible Race Behind AI: Why Infrastructure, Not Software, Will Define the Winners

By Rishi Raj
New Delhi, July 22, 2026

There is a striking similarity between the telecom boom of the late 1990s and the artificial intelligence (AI) race unfolding today. On the surface, the two appear unrelated. One connected people; the other connects machines. Yet, scratch beneath the headlines and the pattern looks remarkably familiar. The biggest winners may not be the companies building the most sophisticated applications but those owning the infrastructure that makes them possible .

Two decades ago, corporate and regulatory conversations revolved around telecom licences, spectrum auctions, and subscriber additions. The glamour belonged to handset makers and mobile operators. But as the industry matured, it became evident that the real strategic assets were less visible. Spectrum determined network quality. Fibre carried volumes of data. Towers became indispensable, giving rise to an entirely new industry of infrastructure providers .

For the moment, public attention is focused on chatbots, large language models, and the race between OpenAI, Google, Meta, and Anthropic. Yet behind the software lies an increasingly physical business. AI does not merely run on algorithms. It runs on electricity, land, fibre, cooling systems, and increasingly scarce computing capacity .

The New Physical Infrastructure: Land, Power, and Compute

Consider what companies are talking about today. Twenty years ago, telecom operators asked how much spectrum they owned or how many towers they needed to support growing subscriber numbers. AI companies are asking a different set of questions. Where can they secure another 200 MW of uninterrupted power? Which state can provide industrial land close to transmission infrastructure? Is there enough fibre capacity? Can cooling systems support hyperscale computing around the clock?

This shift explains why an entirely different set of companies has taken centre stage. The AI infrastructure race is no longer the preserve of software firms. Energy companies, telecom operators, infrastructure developers, and real estate owners are becoming equally important participants . Reliance Industries is combining telecom, digital services, and energy to build AI infrastructure. Adani Group’s investments span renewable energy, transmission and data centres. Bharti Airtel is leveraging its fibre and connectivity assets while expanding its data centre footprint. Tata Group is investing across semiconductors, cloud infrastructure, and data centres .

Google’s proposed $15-billion AI hub in Visakhapatnam, Reliance Industries’ AI infrastructure partnership with Meta, Adani Group’s plans to invest heavily in AI infrastructure, and Amazon Web Services’ continued expansion of cloud infrastructure in India all point to the same conclusion: the race is increasingly about building the physical backbone of AI rather than merely developing applications .

Electricity: The New Spectrum

Electricity has become a strategic business variable. For years, power was treated as a utility that technology companies simply consumed. Today it has become a competitive advantage. Every hyperscale data centre requires uninterrupted electricity, often running into hundreds of megawatts. Companies are signing long-term renewable power agreements, investing in captive generation, and choosing project locations as much for grid availability as for tax incentives. Power, in other words, has become the new spectrum .

Microsoft, for example, is investing more than $300 million to build and expand data centres in India, focusing on regions like Telangana, Tamil Nadu, and Maharashtra . NTT, a Japanese ICT company, is also investing Rs 1,000 crore in a data centre in Noida . These investments reflect the need for reliable power and connectivity. The India AI Mission’s push to create a national compute infrastructure acknowledges that access to GPUs and computing capacity is becoming as important as software innovation itself .

Fibre: The Arteries of the AI Economy

The parallel extends further. Fibre, which once transformed telecom economics, is once again emerging as a strategic asset. AI workloads involve moving large amounts of data between users, cloud platforms, and computing clusters. Data centres without high-capacity fibre are of limited value. Access to submarine cable landing stations is again becoming critical for international cloud connectivity. It is no coincidence that many of India’s proposed AI investments are clustered around coastal states with established digital infrastructure and reliable connectivity .

Land and Cooling: The Forgotten Constraints

Land, too, is acquiring a new significance. During the telecom expansion, the race was for tower locations. Today, the competition is for large industrial parcels capable of housing hyperscale campuses with access to power, water, and fibre .

Cooling systems are another critical component. Data centres generate massive amounts of heat, and cooling them requires significant energy and water resources. Innovative cooling solutions, such as liquid immersion cooling and free-air cooling, are becoming essential for reducing energy consumption and environmental impact . These are increasingly determining where data centres can be built, with water-scarce states like Rajasthan and Gujarat facing constraints .

The India AI Mission’s Compute Challenge

India has rightly focused on promoting semiconductor manufacturing, electronics production, and AI development. The India AI Mission’s push to create a national compute infrastructure acknowledges that access to GPUs and computing capacity is becoming as important as software innovation itself . Yet the country’s competitiveness in AI will depend just as much on whether it can build enough reliable power capacity, streamline land acquisition, strengthen transmission networks, and accelerate fibre deployment .

The India AI Mission has issued a Request for Proposal (RfP) to empanel a service provider for its GPU-as-a-Service model . This is a significant step toward democratising access to high-end compute for startups and researchers . However, the mission’s initial budget of ₹10,000 crore may be insufficient to meet the growing demand . Infrastructure players are stepping up to bridge this gap. The Adani Group, through its joint venture with Israel’s Tower Semiconductor and its hyperscale data centre plans, is positioning itself as a major infrastructure provider .

Lessons from History: The Infrastructure-Builders Win

History suggests this evolution is inevitable. Every technology revolution begins with consumer excitement but eventually becomes an infrastructure story. Railways reshaped steel and coal. The automobile transformed oil. The Internet created demand for fibre networks and mobile towers. AI is now doing the same to electricity grids, data centres, and digital connectivity . In the early years of telecom, many believed success would belong to whoever sold the most mobile phones. Instead, enduring value was created by those who built and controlled the underlying networks. The companies that owned spectrum, fibre, and towers shaped the digital economy far more profoundly than the handset brands that once dominated the headlines .

Conclusion: The Race for Physical Backbone

The same distinction may define the AI era. Consumers will continue to debate which chatbot is smarter or which model writes better code. But investors, businesses, and policymakers may need to pay closer attention to the infrastructure they own .

The winners in the AI race may not be the companies with the most sophisticated chatbots, but those who can build and control the physical backbone that makes them possible. This is the invisible race behind AI—and it is the one that truly matters.

Q&A Section

1. Why is the AI race compared to the telecom boom of the late 1990s?

Both technology revolutions began with consumer excitement but eventually became infrastructure stories. Telecom required spectrum, fibre, and towers, which became strategic assets. Similarly, AI requires electricity, land, fibre, cooling systems, and computing capacity. The biggest winners are those who own the underlying infrastructure, not just the applications.

2. What are the key physical infrastructure requirements for AI?

AI requires land for hyperscale data centres, electricity for uninterrupted power, fibre connectivity for high-speed data transfer, cooling systems to manage heat, and computing capacity (GPUs). These are becoming increasingly scarce and valuable.

3. Which Indian companies are investing in AI infrastructure?

Reliance Industries is combining telecom, digital services, and energy to build AI infrastructure. Adani Group is investing in renewable energy, transmission, and data centres. Bharti Airtel is leveraging its fibre and connectivity assets. Tata Group is investing in semiconductors and cloud infrastructure. Google, Meta, and Amazon are also investing heavily in India .

4. What is the India AI Mission’s role in addressing the compute gap?

The India AI Mission aims to create a national compute infrastructure by providing GPU-as-a-Service to startups and researchers. It has issued a Request for Proposal to empanel a service provider. However, its ₹10,000 crore budget may be insufficient to meet the growing demand .

5. What are the key policy challenges for India’s AI infrastructure build-out?

India must accelerate power capacity additions, streamline land acquisition, strengthen transmission networks, and accelerate fibre deployment. State-level policies also need to be coordinated to attract investment. Without these, India risks losing the AI infrastructure race .

The Missing Grammar of Land Governance

By Vivek Kumar Singh
New Delhi, July 22, 2026

India’s land reforms have entered a decisive phase where digitisation alone cannot resolve long-standing disputes over ownership, boundaries and possession. The real challenge lies in reconciling fragmented records, maps and ground realities through a common institutional framework that makes every land transaction transparent, accurate and legally reliable .

India’s land problem is not a shortage of laws, records or institutions. It is the absence of a shared grammar. The cadastral map, record of rights, mutation entry, registered deed, court order and actual possession often describe the same parcel differently. Citizens encounter these contradictions as delay, fraud or litigation. Administrators encounter them as files that refuse to match the field .

The next stage of land reform must go beyond computerisation. Its purpose is not to place old records on new screens, but to make the State’s memory of land reliable and current. An inaccurate paper entry remains inaccurate after scanning. Without cleansing, legal validation, audit trails, interoperability and continuous updating, digitisation merely gives inherited errors new authority .

A Land System in Layers

India’s land governance has passed through four broad phases. In the pre-colonial phase, land was tied to cultivation, sovereignty, custom and community. The colonial State made it administratively visible through surveys, settlements, cadastral maps, records of rights, registration, revenue courts, the Collector and acquisition law, principally for revenue and control. Post-Independence policy shifted towards abolition of intermediaries, tenancy reform, ceilings, consolidation, Bhoodan, tribal land protection, homestead security, settlement of public land and acquisition for planned development. The fourth phase is digitisation and integration, which aspires to connect textual records, maps, transactions, municipal databases, court orders and physical possession .

These phases have accumulated rather than replaced one another. Colonial records coexist with unfinished reform mandates and new digital platforms. The contemporary land agenda therefore extends beyond title and mutation to delayed acquisition and compensation, displacement and rehabilitation, landlessness and settlement, fragmented holdings and incomplete consolidation, tenancy and customary rights, public land and commons, and urban expansion that often outruns both maps and law .

The problem is acute in urban and metropolitan areas and urban fringes experiencing rapid urbanisation and leading to conversion of agricultural land to non-agricultural purposes. It is very difficult to establish ownership rights in respect of urban properties . In many north-eastern states, no land records or cadastral map exists and these areas continue to remain unsurveyed till today. In many parts of the schedule areas of southern and western Orissa, no land records exist for the tribal population living on the hilly slopes and practicing shifting cultivation .

The Record-Map-Possession Triangle: A Diagnostic Tool

The most useful field test is the Record-Map-Possession Triangle. Every serious matter should be examined through three questions: What does the record say? What does the map show? Who is in possession? When the three broadly agree, the claim is relatively stable. When they diverge, caution is essential. A record without possession may be contested or obsolete. Possession without record may be illegal, informal, customary or simply unregularised. A map without ground verification may not reflect subdivision, erosion, accretion, consolidation or urban change .

Record-Map-Possession Convergence is the administrative objective. It means reconciling the three through lawful verification and continuous updating until the record identifies the right, the map locates the parcel and possession is either validated or addressed through due process. Digitisation can make this convergence dynamic only if it moves beyond textual updating. Where States have created de novo digital maps through aerial photography, high-resolution satellite imagery or comparable geospatial methods, the next leap should be spatial mutation alongside textual mutation. A verified change arising from transfer, succession, partition, acquisition, subdivision or consolidation should, wherever legally and technically feasible, produce a corresponding spatial update .

The creation of a geo-referenced village map registry is essential to spatially identify and verify each land parcel boundary with geographic coordinates. This registry also supports digital crop surveys, precision advisory services, and evidence-based planning and research . The integration of digitized maps with the farmer registry will provide a comprehensive profile of a farmer’s land, as the ownership data and the geo-referenced boundaries of the land parcel will be mapped to it. Once these digitized maps are integrated with the state farmer registry, each farmer’s landholding will have a unified spatial-textual identity that combines ownership data from revenue records with exact digital boundaries captured through cadastral maps .

The Mutation Conundrum

One of the most persistent misconceptions in Indian land law concerns mutation. Courts frequently observe that mutation entries are meant only for fiscal purposes and do not confer title. Mutation is also quite often dismissed as mere evidence of possession, as though it reflects nothing more than physical occupation .

In practice, mutation cases are based on specific Acts and rules. Revenue authorities do not alter records casually; they do so after issuing notices, hearing parties, perusing records and passing orders only after an application for mutation is received. When a mutation is approved, the State formally recognises that ownership has changed. Governments do not collect land revenue from arbitrary occupants. Unlike electricity or water charges, which may be recovered from users irrespective of ownership, land revenue is assessed only against persons recognised as legitimate holders in official records .

Mutation, therefore, reflects legal possession grounded in recognised ownership. It is attained through a legally mandated best-claim principle, i.e., among competing claims for legal ownership of land, the claim validated and recorded through a quasi-judicial process enjoys presumptive legitimacy, unless further displaced through due process .

India already operates with two parallel but complementary systems: an archival Record of Rights created through settlement and a transactional Record of Rights continuously updated through mutation. The real problem is not the absence of records but the absence of doctrinal clarity about their legal status .

The Supreme Court’s Recent Intervention

In a landmark judgment, the Supreme Court struck down amendments to the Bihar Registration Rules that required sellers to furnish proof of mutation before registering a sale deed . The Court reaffirmed a core principle of property law: registration of a document is about recording transactions, not proving ownership. Mutation is an administrative act to update land records for revenue purposes, not a declaration of title .

The Court observed that the Registration Act governs the registration of documents, not the proof of title. Conditioning registration on mutation proof went far beyond the statutory scope. The Court noted the practical impossibility of complying with such a rule in Bihar, where land records are notoriously outdated. Many Jamabandis still stand in the names of ancestors, and the mutation process remains incomplete .

The Court labelled property transactions in India “traumatic,” observing that 66% of civil litigation involves land disputes. It criticized the complexity, uncertainty, and lack of reliability in current systems, noting how archaic laws lead to fraud, multiple registrations, and litigation. The judgment underscored that mere digitization perpetuates errors if original records are flawed .

The Court promoted blockchain’s “immutability, transparency, and traceability,” stating that it could revolutionize public trust in property ownership frameworks and directed the Law Commission to study and recommend how blockchain can be implemented nationwide for land records .

A Shared Grammar for Land Governance

India does not need an entirely new titling regime. It needs to recognise what already exists in practice: a dual structure consisting of a foundational title and a derived or current title, supported by two interconnected layers of Record of Rights .

Recognising a derived title based on updated revenue records would also help distinguish lawful possession from encroachment. When mutation records are given appropriate legal respect, they create a clear evidentiary line between bona fide holders and illegal occupants. Today’s ambiguity encourages litigation precisely because lawful possession is not institutionally trusted. Citizens approach civil courts merely to confirm what revenue records already acknowledge, turning litigation into a preventive strategy rather than a corrective mechanism .

The test of reform is not how many records have moved online, but whether the record identifies the right, the map locates the parcel and lawful possession is secured—or corrected through due process. India has begun building the digital infrastructure for that convergence. It must now make spatial mutation, reliable current records and coordinated remedies part of the ordinary machinery of the State, so that rights, reality and public purpose do not drift apart again .

Q&A Section

1. Why is digitisation alone insufficient to resolve India’s land governance problems?

Digitisation alone cannot resolve land disputes because an inaccurate paper record remains inaccurate after scanning. Without cleansing, legal validation, audit trails, interoperability and continuous updating, digitisation merely gives inherited errors new authority . India’s land records consist of fragmented maps, records, and ground realities that often describe the same parcel differently. The real challenge lies in reconciling these fragments through a common institutional framework .

2. What is the Record-Map-Possession Triangle and why is it important?

The Record-Map-Possession Triangle is a diagnostic tool that examines three questions: What does the record say? What does the map show? Who is in possession? When the three broadly agree, the claim is relatively stable. When they diverge, caution is essential . Record-Map-Possession Convergence is the administrative objective—reconciling the three through lawful verification and continuous updating until the record identifies the right, the map locates the parcel and possession is validated .

3. What is the difference between mutation and ownership in Indian land law?

Mutation is an administrative act to update land records for revenue purposes. It does not confer or extinguish ownership rights. Ownership is governed by the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, and decided by civil courts when disputed . However, mutation reflects legal possession grounded in recognised ownership. When a mutation is approved, the State formally recognises that ownership has changed. Governments collect land revenue only against persons recognised as legitimate holders in official records .

4. What did the Supreme Court rule in Samiullah v. State of Bihar (2025)?

The Supreme Court struck down amendments to the Bihar Registration Rules that required sellers to furnish proof of mutation before registering a sale deed . The Court reaffirmed that registration is about recording transactions, not proving ownership, and that mutation is not a prerequisite for registration. The Court observed that 66% of civil litigation involves land disputes and called for technological reforms, including blockchain-based land registration systems .

5. What is the distinction between foundational and derived title?

Foundational title arises from survey and settlement operations—cadastral surveys, boundary verification, public notices, and objection hearings that establish a legally authenticated baseline of ownership . Derived or current title is continuously updated through mutation records that reflect the present state of ownership. Recognising this distinction would align Indian land law with lived reality, providing stability without constructing an entirely new titling regime .