The Venezuela Playbook Will Not Work in Iran, Why Trump’s Coercive Diplomacy Meets Its Match in the Islamic Republic
Over the past week, the United States has positioned two aircraft carrier strike groups near Iran, and rumours abound that the US—either alone or in coordination with Israel—may launch a military attack against the regime in Tehran. President Donald Trump seeks to compel Iran to abandon its nuclear enrichment programme, curtail its ballistic missile production, and end its support for non-state actors such as Hezbollah in Lebanon, Hamas in the Palestinian territories, and various militias across the region. He also wants Iran to cease being a revolutionary state, in return for which he promises prosperity through trade and investment, particularly in Iran’s abundant oil and gas reserves.
The accompanying analysis by Bernard Haykel, a scholar of Near Eastern Studies at Princeton University, offers a sobering assessment of Trump’s strategy and its likely failure. It situates the current confrontation within the broader context of Iran’s domestic politics, its regional posture, and Trump’s distinctive worldview—a worldview shaped by the oil shocks of the 1970s and a conviction that control over hydrocarbon resources is the ultimate source of global power.
Negotiations between the US and Iran are ongoing, yet Tehran has made clear that any demand it views as a violation of its sovereignty—such as the denial of its right to nuclear enrichment—will be rejected outright. Such refusal may prompt Trump to resort to military action, raising critical questions about the nature of any attack and whether it could meaningfully alter Iran’s behaviour—or, more importantly, threaten the survival of the clerical regime itself. Would an attack accelerate revolutionary change, or would it further entrench the regime and allow it to weather the storm? All indications suggest that the regime is likely to survive. Indeed, this outcome may align with Trump’s preferences, as illustrated by the Venezuelan precedent: the kidnapping of President Nicolás Maduro left the regime intact, though under pressure to reform.
The Venezuelan Precedent: A Model That Does Not Translate
Trump’s approach to Iran appears modelled on his strategy in Venezuela, where the regime was left intact but subjected to sustained pressure through sanctions, diplomatic isolation, and targeted actions against its leadership. The kidnapping of Maduro sent a message that the regime was vulnerable, but it did not topple it. The hope, presumably, is that a combination of military threats, economic strangulation, and covert action will force the Iranian regime to change its behaviour or even to fracture from within.
But the Venezuelan model does not translate to Iran. The two countries are fundamentally different in their political structures, their regional positions, and their societal cohesion. Venezuela’s regime was already deeply unpopular and divided; Iran’s regime, while facing significant discontent, retains the loyalty of its core security forces and a substantial portion of the population. As Haykel notes, perhaps as much as 20 per cent of Iran’s population of roughly 90 million is willing to support and defend the regime. This creates a power imbalance between the state and the rest of society that allows dissent to be suppressed.
The December Protests: A Test of Regime Resilience
Iran was recently convulsed by violent demonstrations that began on December 28. Initially sparked by economic grievances following the dramatic devaluation of the rial, the protests rapidly spread nationwide and evolved into a broader indictment of regime misuse. They mobilised diverse social groups across all provinces, taking on a distinctly national character. The regime responded with a brutal crackdown, resulting in large numbers of deaths. Estimates vary widely, ranging from 5,000 to more than 30,000 killed, with most fatalities reportedly occurring over the two days of January 8 and 9. For now, the demonstrations appear to have subsided.
The most significant aspect of this episode, however, was not the scale of the protests but the regime’s capacity to survive them. Its core security forces remained unified throughout the crisis. The state successfully imposed an information blackout by shutting down the internet. The opposition, by contrast, was highly fragmented, lacking a clear leader, coherent ideology, or unified political movement capable of mobilising the country’s disaffected population. Calls during the protests for the return of the former Shah’s son, Reza Pahlavi, highlighted this vacuum of leadership and underscored both desperation and disunity. The Pahlavi dynasty is not a credible alternative to the current regime, despite its waning legitimacy in the eyes of many Iranians.
Trump’s Worldview: Oil, Power, and the 1970s Imagination
To understand Trump’s approach to Iran, one must understand his worldview. Haykel argues that Trump’s political formation and economic imagination were shaped in the 1970s, when successive oil shocks in 1973 and 1979 produced one of the most significant transfers of wealth in modern history—from oil-consuming to oil-producing states. In Trump’s worldview, the Arab sheikh and the Iranian shah epitomise global wealth and power, with oil as the ultimate source of military and economic strength. He has been remarkably candid about this logic, notably when he explained that US actions in Venezuela were fundamentally about controlling its vast oil reserves, with allegations of drug trafficking serving merely as a pretext.
Accordingly, when Trump surveys what he perceives as the axis of resistance to American hegemony—China, Russia, North Korea, Iran, Venezuela, and Cuba—he identifies Iran and Venezuela as its weakest links. His strategy appears to be to pressure and separate them through military threats and economic sanctions. Normalising relations with Iran would unleash substantial oil and gas supplies onto global markets, driving down hydrocarbon prices. Trump believes this would stimulate the US economy, particularly ahead of this November’s midterm elections, which the Republicans risk losing. That such transformations are unlikely to occur on such an accelerated timeline seems not to weigh heavily in Trump’s calculations. Nonetheless, this logic appears to animate his approach.
The Limits of Military Action: What Can Trump Actually Achieve?
Given the resilience of the Iranian regime and Washington’s clear unwillingness to commit ground troops, can Trump realistically alter Tehran’s policies? The killing or abduction of Ayatollah Khamenei is virtually impossible. While US forces could destroy ballistic missile facilities, such actions would neither topple the regime nor fundamentally alter its behaviour. Trump’s remaining options appear limited.
One option is to strike a deal with elements of the regime—perhaps within the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC)—to remove Khamenei and install a more pliant leadership, following the Venezuelan model. This would require identifying and cultivating dissidents within the regime willing to break with the Supreme Leader. It would also require convincing them that the US is a reliable partner and that they would survive any backlash. This is a high-risk, low-probability strategy.
Another option is to impose a maritime blockade to halt Iran’s oil exports, hoping to force capitulation through economic strangulation. This would be an act of war, and it would have severe consequences for global oil markets. It would also require the cooperation of other nations, which is far from assured. China and India, Iran’s largest oil customers, have no interest in such a blockade and would likely resist it.
Arab Gulf states have publicly signalled their unwillingness to support a US attack on Iran, fearing retaliation. This further constrains Trump’s options. Any military action would likely be a US-only affair, with limited regional support and significant global opposition.
The Nationalist Reaction: How Pressure Backfires
Haykel’s most important observation may be that external pressure of the kind Washington seeks to apply tends to reinforce Iranian nationalism. Across social divides, many Iranians remain convinced that their country’s weakness stems primarily from imperial intervention rather than internal misgovernance. When the US threatens Iran, it plays into this narrative, allowing the regime to rally the population around the flag.
This dynamic has played out repeatedly in Iran’s modern history. The 1953 CIA-backed coup that overthrew Prime Minister Mohammad Mossadegh created deep and enduring suspicion of American intentions. The Iran-Iraq war, in which the US tilted toward Iraq, reinforced the sense of victimhood. The Trump administration’s maximum pressure campaign has already caused immense economic suffering, but it has not produced the desired political change. If anything, it has strengthened hardliners and weakened reformers who argued for engagement with the West.
Conclusion: The Playbook That Won’t Work
Trump’s Venezuela playbook will not work in Iran. The two countries are too different, the regime is too resilient, and the nationalist reaction to external pressure is too powerful. Military action could destroy facilities and kill people, but it would not topple the regime or fundamentally alter its behaviour. A maritime blockade would be an act of war with unpredictable consequences. A deal with regime dissidents is a fantasy.
The coming days and weeks will be critical as this drama unfolds and Trump attempts to replicate in Iran what he claims to have achieved in Venezuela. Haykel’s advice is clear: do not wager on Iranian capitulation. The regime has weathered far worse storms than anything Trump can throw at it. It survived an eight-year war with Iraq, decades of sanctions, and the loss of its main regional ally, Saddam Hussein. It will survive this pressure campaign as well.
The question is not whether the regime will fall, but whether the US will stumble into a conflict that serves no one’s interests. The stakes are high, and the margin for error is slim.
Q&A Section
Q1: What is the “Venezuela playbook” referenced in the analysis, and why does the author argue it will not work in Iran?
A1: The “Venezuela playbook” refers to Trump’s strategy of applying sustained pressure through sanctions, diplomatic isolation, and targeted actions against regime leadership—exemplified by the kidnapping of President Nicolás Maduro—while leaving the regime intact but under pressure to reform. The author argues this will not work in Iran for several reasons. First, structural differences: Venezuela’s regime was already deeply unpopular and divided; Iran’s regime retains the loyalty of its core security forces and a substantial portion of the population (perhaps 20 per cent). Second, nationalist reaction: External pressure tends to reinforce Iranian nationalism, allowing the regime to rally the population around the flag and portray itself as defending the nation against imperial intervention. Third, historical precedent: Iran has survived far worse—an eight-year war with Iraq, decades of sanctions, and the loss of regional allies. The regime is deeply entrenched and has demonstrated remarkable resilience.
Q2: What did the December 2025 protests reveal about the resilience of the Iranian regime and the weakness of the opposition?
A2: The protests, sparked by economic grievances following the devaluation of the rial, rapidly spread nationwide and took on a distinctly national character. The regime responded with a brutal crackdown, with estimated deaths ranging from 5,000 to over 30,000, mostly concentrated on January 8-9. The protests eventually subsided. The episode revealed two critical facts. First, regime resilience: core security forces remained unified throughout the crisis, and the state successfully imposed an information blackout by shutting down the internet. Second, opposition weakness: the opposition was highly fragmented, lacking a clear leader, coherent ideology, or unified political movement. Calls for the return of Reza Pahlavi, the former Shah’s son, highlighted both desperation and disunity. The Pahlavi dynasty is not a credible alternative to the current regime. The protests demonstrated that while discontent is widespread, the opposition lacks the capacity to translate that discontent into political change.
Q3: How does the author characterise Trump’s worldview, and how does it shape his approach to Iran?
A3: The author argues that Trump’s worldview was shaped by the oil shocks of the 1970s, which produced one of the most significant transfers of wealth in modern history—from oil-consuming to oil-producing states. In Trump’s imagination, the Arab sheikh and the Iranian shah epitomise global wealth and power, with oil as the ultimate source of military and economic strength. He has been candid about this logic, explaining that US actions in Venezuela were fundamentally about controlling its vast oil reserves, with allegations of drug trafficking serving as a pretext. Applied to Iran, this worldview leads Trump to see the regime as a weak link in the “axis of resistance” (China, Russia, North Korea, Iran, Venezuela, Cuba) and to believe that normalising relations would unleash oil and gas supplies, driving down prices and stimulating the US economy—particularly ahead of midterm elections. That such transformations are unlikely on an accelerated timeline does not seem to weigh heavily in his calculations.
Q4: What are the limited options available to Trump for altering Iran’s behaviour, and what obstacles does each face?
A4: The author identifies three limited options. First, a deal with regime elements: Trump could attempt to strike a deal with dissidents within the regime—perhaps in the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps—to remove Khamenei and install a more pliant leadership. This faces enormous obstacles: identifying willing partners, convincing them of US reliability, and ensuring they survive any backlash. Second, maritime blockade: imposing a blockade to halt Iran’s oil exports would be an act of war with severe consequences for global oil markets. It would require cooperation from other nations (especially China and India, Iran’s largest oil customers) that is far from assured. Third, military strikes: while US forces could destroy ballistic missile facilities, such actions would neither topple the regime nor fundamentally alter its behaviour. The killing or abduction of Khamenei is virtually impossible. Arab Gulf states have signalled unwillingness to support military action, further constraining options. All options carry high risks and low probabilities of success.
Q5: Why does the author argue that external pressure tends to reinforce Iranian nationalism, and what are the implications of this dynamic for US strategy?
A5: The author argues that external pressure reinforces Iranian nationalism because many Iranians, across social divides, remain convinced that their country’s weakness stems primarily from imperial intervention rather than internal misgovernance. This narrative is deeply rooted in historical events like the 1953 CIA-backed coup that overthrew Mossadegh and the US tilt toward Iraq during the Iran-Iraq war. When the US threatens Iran, it plays into this narrative, allowing the regime to rally the population around the flag and portray itself as defending the nation against foreign aggression. The implications for US strategy are profound: maximum pressure campaigns may strengthen hardliners, weaken reformers who argued for engagement, and make the regime more, not less, resistant to change. The dynamic suggests that military threats and economic strangulation are counterproductive if the goal is to alter Iran’s behaviour or encourage internal reform. A different approach—one that addresses legitimate Iranian grievances and offers a path to reintegration—might be more effective, but it is not the path Trump has chosen.<｜end▁of▁thinking｜>Here is a comprehensive current affairs piece based on the provided text, expanding its themes into a broader analysis of US-Iran tensions, the limits of coercive diplomacy, the resilience of the Iranian regime, and the strategic miscalculations of the Trump administration, complete with a Q&A section.
