The Cracks Beneath the Peddled Story of India’s Growth

Introduction

For over a decade, the Narendra Modi government has projected India as the world’s fastest-growing major economy, an emerging manufacturing hub, a Vishvaguru, a global power, a preferred destination for global capital, and a Viksit Bharat on track for 2047. Yet, behind this carefully crafted narrative lies a more troubling reality. The economy faces multiple external shocks while carrying deep structural weaknesses that threaten its long-term prospects .

The warning signs are unmistakable. But instead of addressing them, the ruling establishment appears more focused on manufactured controversies, communal polarisation and divisive politics. As television studios debate temples, mosques, medieval rulers and invented enemies, the economy’s foundations continue to weaken .

Imported Energy, Growing Risks

The Vulnerability of Dependence

The most immediate challenge is India’s growing vulnerability to external shocks. The country imports nearly 90% of its crude oil and about half of its natural gas requirements. Every rise in global energy prices is quickly transmitted to the domestic economy. The recent rise in fuel prices underscores a stark reality: despite the rhetoric of renewable energy, self-reliance and global leadership, India remains heavily dependent on imported energy .

Before the West Asia war, around 40% of crude imports passed through the Strait of Hormuz. The exposure was greater for gas. India imports approximately 60% of the LPG it consumes, with 90% of those imports travelling through Hormuz. So, over half of domestic consumption was stuck at the chokepoint. Similarly, Hormuz accounted for around 55-60% of India’s LNG imports, on which several fertiliser plants, city-gas networks and industrial consumers depend .

The Cost of Dependency

The consequences are severe. Rising oil and liquefied natural gas prices widen the trade deficit, weaken the rupee and raise production costs across the economy. In FY2025-26, the Reserve Bank of India sold over $53 billion in the foreign exchange market to support the rupee — its largest intervention in more than a decade . Foreign exchange reserves have fallen from over $720 billion to around $681 billion . An economy with strong fundamentals should not have to spend such vast sums merely to slow its currency’s decline .

The rupee has fallen to a historic low of about ₹95 against the U.S. dollar . The speed of rupee depreciation has been unusually sharp, with the rupee taking only 152 days to depreciate from ₹90 to ₹95. According to SBI Research, the current depreciation is higher than what India’s underlying economic conditions would warrant . The rupee touched a record low of 96.96 against the dollar during the peak of the crisis .

The Fertiliser Challenge

Compounding the problem is the uncertainty surrounding fertilizers and agriculture. India’s apparent strength in manufacturing fertilisers masks a dangerous vulnerability. Domestic urea production depends heavily on imported LNG. Almost all the fertilisers India produces are linked to heavy imports such as LNG and potash. Any disruption in global gas supplies, any sharp increase in LNG prices or supply chain disruption immediately threatens fertilizer availability and affordability .

The challenge is compounded by the monsoon outlook. A weak monsoon affects far more than agriculture. Lower crop yields reduce rural incomes, weaken consumption, fuel food inflation. They also increase the need for government spending on relief, procurement and subsidies, which is unlikely under the Bharatiya Janata Party’s rule. These risks reinforce one another. Rising fuel costs, expensive fertilizers and a weak monsoon together create a vicious cycle that suppresses demand when the economy needs stronger domestic consumption .

The Energy Security Deficit

Strategic Petroleum Reserves

India’s current strategic petroleum reserves are equivalent to just about 9-10 days of the country’s net crude imports, far below other major import-dependent countries. Countries that rely heavily on crude imports—such as Japan and South Korea—maintain reserves sufficient for over 200 days .

Over 85 per cent of India’s crude oil imports come from just six countries, including Russia and key West Asian suppliers, limiting flexibility during supply shocks . For gas, India imports nearly half its supply as LNG but has no dedicated strategic gas storage facilities, leaving fertiliser plants and city gas networks exposed .

The Crisis Impact

These vulnerabilities were laid bare by the Hormuz crisis. India’s crude imports fell 13% between February and March 2026, while crude inventories declined about 15% after the war began. April crude-import volumes were 4.3% lower year-on-year, but the amount paid for them surged 52.3%. This captures the peculiar burden of an oil shock that leads to stagflation .

Gas supplies proved harder to replace. LPG imports fell to nearly half their February level, while domestic LPG production declined around 10% from its March peak. LNG imports contracted 29.6% year-on-year in April. Qatar, which had supplied India with an average of 1 million tonnes of LNG each month in 2025, supplied virtually nothing during March and April .

The merchandise trade deficit widened from $20.7 billion in March 2026 to $28.38 billion in April . Rising oil and LNG prices widen the trade deficit, weaken the rupee and raise production costs across the economy .

Weakening Rural Safety Nets

The MGNREGA Question

A responsible government would respond to economic pressures by strengthening employment guarantees and social protection. Instead, the Modi government abolished the Planning Commission and has steadily weakened MGNREGA, one of the country’s most effective rural safety nets. As a result, millions of rural households now face greater economic uncertainty with fewer protections than they had a decade ago .

The transition from a fully Centrally funded wage guarantee to a 60:40 Centre-state cost-sharing model under the new VB-GRAMG scheme has triggered unease across states . Even BJP-ruled Bihar and Madhya Pradesh have flagged the increased wage burden under the new framework. For states with constrained fiscal space, the obligation to shoulder 40% of the wage expenditure can sideline other welfare priorities, especially in rural development .

The Centralisation Debate

Senior CPI(M) leader Brinda Karat has called for the withdrawal of the draft rules framed under the VB-GRAMG Act, alleging that they erode workers’ rights, centralise decision-making, weaken India’s federal structure and jeopardise the employment guarantee previously provided under MGNREGA . She argued that the rules represent “extreme concentration of all decision making in the hands of the union government” and amount to “an assault on the federal nature of the Constitution” .

The Congress has accused the Centre of pushing the reform without adequate consultation and weakening the rights-based character of rural employment. The party’s government in Telangana is planning to move the Supreme Court against VB-GRAMG . Jairam Ramesh alleged that BJP-ruled states including Madhya Pradesh, Bihar and Uttarakhand have objected to the “huge additional expenditure burden” the new scheme would impose on state governments .

The debate raises fundamental questions: is the right to work to be held hostage to the efficiency or inefficiency of state governments as decided by the union government? And what does the replacement of a rights-based guarantee with a centrally-managed scheme say about the government’s commitment to rural welfare? .

The External Sector: A Precarious Balance

Remittances and the Services Model

Beyond these immediate pressures lies a deeper structural concern. India’s external sector remains heavily dependent on services exports and remittances. The record $135 billion in remittances received in FY2024-25 has been a key factor in financing the current account deficit .

Even this strength carries a warning. Increasingly, India’s remittances come not from migrant workers in West Asia but from highly skilled professionals in the United States, the United Kingdom and other advanced economies. The rise of right-wing politics and anti-immigration sentiment—championed by leaders such as U.S. President Donald Trump—poses a growing threat to this model. At the same time, artificial intelligence (AI) is transforming software, data processing and other professional services in which Indian workers have traditionally excelled .

The danger is not that remittances will disappear overnight, but that one of the pillars supporting India’s external balance could gradually weaken. If remittance growth slows while energy imports remain high, pressure on the current account and the rupee will intensify .

Foreign Investment Concerns

International investors are already turning cautious. Foreign portfolio investors have withdrawn over ₹2.2 lakh crore from Indian equities this year, while India has slipped from sixth to seventh in global market-capitalisation rankings . Foreign exchange reserves have fallen to around $681 billion from a record high of $728.49 billion in February 2026 .

Net FDI has declined from $28 billion in 2022-23 to just $7.7 billion in the year that ended in March 2026 . Dhiraj Nim, an economist at Australia & New Zealand Banking Group, pointed to a number of factors that have combined to keep net FDI in India subdued. India is not a big player in the major tech sectors currently in vogue with foreign investors, such as chip manufacturing, electric vehicles or AI. At the same time, the growth of AI is posing a threat to India’s long-vaunted services sector, dampening investment .

The Middle-Income Trap

A Structural Diagnosis

Economists point to the widening gap between India’s foreign inflows and outflows as a structural factor that’s weighed on the currency and growth . India’s economy is suffering from schizophrenia, accentuated by external economic shock. Growth is high, consumer inflation low. But domestic investors are playing coy, and foreign investors are scrambling to exit. The stock market is in decline. Fresh graduates from our best institutions are taking entry-level jobs that aren’t paying enough for them to be eligible to pay income-tax .

The world’s 4th-largest economy has, in a few months, shrunk to being the 6th-largest. Global investors are fixated on two growth areas: AI, and commodities. India is not a player in either .

The Productivity Challenge

India’s predictable slide into economic mediocrity follows a well-trodden path into a middle-income trap. Countries from Brazil to Egypt to Thailand to the Philippines have trodden this path. The road to the middle-income trap is marked by episodes of high growth and low inflation, even in the face of structural weakness. Foreign investors talk up an economy as the next big thing—only to dump it when a crisis exposes underlying weaknesses, which are always the same: a structural demand problem and persistently low productivity .

When a developing country becomes prosperous, growth results in positive structural change: value of output increases, as does share of the formal sector and manufacturing. This has not happened in India. Share of manufacturing in GDP has fallen to the lowest level this century. As the IT sector has stalled with the rise of AI, informal services—personal and intermediate services—have been the backbone of growth. As a result, employment has stagnated .

The Jobs Crisis

India is facing an acute jobs and wages crisis. Young people have disproportionately felt the impact. Just 7% of the population is now prosperous enough to pay income tax, and no young person entering the job market, even with professional or postgraduate qualifications, is paid enough to be in even the lowest tax bracket. A top blue-collar job in Samsung or Apple pays less than ₹25,000 a month, one-fourth of the income tax threshold .

So, demand in the economy is weak. Once companies have soaked demand of the rich, even small changes in price result in excess supply, as airlines and automobile and FMCG companies have recently learned. Low investment means low demand for capital goods. Loan-fuelled consumption—as opposed to wage-fuelled consumption—means extreme price sensitivity with respect to discretionary purchases. Add to that low demand for food, and you end up with low inflation. But this signals economic weakness, not strength .

The Technology Gap

Missing the Next Economic Cycle

The 21st century will be defined by AI, semiconductors, advanced manufacturing, robotics and frontier science. Yet, India remains largely absent from these strategic sectors. Although the country has a vibrant startup ecosystem, much of it is concentrated in digital intermediation rather than technological innovation. Food delivery, ride-hailing and quick-commerce platforms may create high valuations, but they do not build technological sovereignty. Many of India’s celebrated startups still depend on organising abundant low-cost labour through digital platforms rather than developing globally competitive technologies .

The contrast with global leaders is striking. Taiwan dominates advanced semiconductor manufacturing through TSMC. South Korea commands critical positions through Samsung. The U.S. and China lead in AI, advanced chips and foundational technologies. India possesses immense engineering talent but remains heavily dependent on imported semiconductors, imported technology and imported capital equipment. Despite years of slogans about innovation and self-reliance, the country remains a marginal player in the industries that will define the future .

The Capital Concentration Threat

The blockbuster listing of SpaceX highlights a growing tendency for global risk capital to concentrate in large US technology firms. Expected listings by OpenAI and Anthropic may deepen this trend by drawing benchmark-driven investment into American markets and reinforcing a self-sustaining cycle of capital concentration. For emerging economies, this raises concerns beyond monetary spillovers and may constrain funding for domestic innovation. India’s equity markets remain weighted towards established sectors, limiting exposure to future growth industries. Without stronger support for technology champions, local markets risk becoming detached from the next economic cycle .

The Economics of Polarisation

Distraction from Real Issues

Perhaps the most serious indictment of the Modi decade is that the promised manufacturing revolution has not materialised. The demographic dividend remains unutilised. Millions of young people continue to confront precarious employment, stagnant wages and shrinking opportunities .

Every failure has been passed on to ordinary people with a dose of hyper-nationalism. Wealth and opportunity continue to concentrate in fewer hands. The burden is socialised; the benefits are privatised .

Electoral victories should not be mistaken for economic success. A government can win elections while pursuing policies that weaken the long-term foundations of economic development .

The tragedy of contemporary India is that while the economy sends increasingly urgent distress signals, public attention is repeatedly diverted towards communal polarisation and manufactured controversies. Citizens are encouraged to fear one another rather than question policies that affect their livelihoods .

The Policy Trilemma

The crisis confronted the RBI with an uncomfortable policy trilemma. Raising interest rates to contain imported inflation would have weakened domestic demand and jeopardised India’s strong growth momentum. Defending the rupee through sustained dollar sales would have depleted foreign-exchange reserves. Yet inaction risked allowing higher energy, freight, and input costs to spread across the economy .

A durable reopening of the strait relaxes these constraints. Lower crude prices reduce India’s import bill and inflationary pressures, support the rupee, and give the RBI greater freedom for monetary policy. The episode, however, exposed how quickly a distant maritime disruption can constrain Indian economic policy .

The Need for a Different Path

Rebuilding the Foundations

India possesses the resources, talent and productive capacity to chart a different path. But doing so requires confronting the policies that have brought the country to this point. It requires defending public investment, strengthening social protection, rebuilding employment generation, investing in science and technology, reducing external dependence and restoring economic priorities to the centre of public life .

The report by the Council on Energy, Environment and Water argues that clean energy can reduce India’s exposure to continuously imported fossil fuels. However, clean energy can create a different kind of strategic dependence: on critical minerals, technologies, and industrial inputs. This dependence must be managed through domestic manufacturing, supply-chain diversification, recycling, and strategic international partnerships .

The Long-Term Imperative

Stronger and more durable solutions lie in attracting higher gross foreign direct investment, boosting exports, reassessing tariff policy, and reviewing currency management in a more uncertain global environment . Periods of lower energy prices should enable reform, not delay it .

Above all, what is required is a resolute and united struggle against policies that enrich a few corporates while burdening millions with poverty. The choice before the country is stark: continue down the present path of division and economic fragility, or build a broad democratic movement with left-of-centre economics, capable of defending livelihoods, jobs and the future itself. The time to wake up is now, before it is too late .

Q&A

Q1: What are India’s key energy security vulnerabilities exposed by the Hormuz crisis?

India imports nearly 90% of its crude oil and about half of its natural gas requirements . Its strategic petroleum reserves cover only 9-10 days of imports, compared to over 200 days for Japan and South Korea . Over 85% of crude imports come from just six countries . Before the war, around 40% of crude imports and 90% of LPG imports passed through the Strait of Hormuz, making India extremely vulnerable to chokepoint disruptions . India also has no dedicated strategic gas storage facilities, leaving fertiliser plants and city gas networks exposed .

Q2: How did the government respond to the currency crisis, and what were the consequences?

The RBI sold over $53 billion in the foreign exchange market in FY2025-26 to support the rupee—its largest intervention in more than a decade . Foreign exchange reserves fell from over $720 billion to around $681 billion . The rupee touched a historic low of 96.96 against the dollar . The government also coordinated with RBI to attract foreign inflows through measures like cutting capital gains tax on bonds, with estimates suggesting up to $45-50 billion in possible inflows .

Q3: What are the main concerns about the transition from MGNREGA to VB-GRAMG?

The new scheme shifts from a fully Centrally funded wage guarantee to a 60:40 Centre-state cost-sharing model, placing significant financial burden on states . Even BJP-ruled states like Bihar and Madhya Pradesh have expressed concerns . Critics argue the draft rules represent “extreme concentration of decision making in the hands of the union government” and weaken the federal structure . The rights-based character of rural employment is being replaced with a centrally-managed scheme .

Q4: Why is India’s economic growth not translating into widespread prosperity?

India is facing an acute jobs and wages crisis. Just 7% of the population is prosperous enough to pay income tax, and no young person entering the job market, even with professional qualifications, is paid enough to be in the lowest tax bracket . High GDP growth has not resulted in positive structural change—the share of manufacturing in GDP has fallen to its lowest level this century, employment has stagnated, and growth has been driven by informal services . This pattern is characteristic of the middle-income trap, where economies grow without transforming structurally .

Q5: What policy changes are needed to address India’s economic vulnerabilities?

India needs to attract higher gross foreign direct investment, boost exports, reassess tariff policy, and review currency management . It must invest in science and technology and reduce external dependence . On energy, domestic crude and gas output should be raised, subsidies rationalised, fiscal space restored, and revenue losses reversed . Periods of lower energy prices should enable reform, not delay it . The CEEW report recommends optimising gas system utilisation, accelerating EV adoption, electrifying industry, and building resilient green technology supply chains .


Behind Asian Markets’ Tanking: Apple’s Price Hike and South Korea’s Tax Proposal

On June 26, 2026, Asian stock markets experienced a significant sell-off, with indices falling as much as 6% . The primary triggers were a combination of Apple’s decision to sharply raise prices on some of its product lines and a new proposal by the South Korean government to tax unrealised gains on equities . The sell-off was particularly pronounced in technology and chip-related stocks, sending shockwaves through the region’s semiconductor-heavy markets.

The ‘RAMageddon’ Shortage and Apple’s Price Hike

The catalyst for the market turmoil was Apple’s announcement on Thursday that it was raising prices across its iPad and MacBook offerings by as much as 20% . The tech giant also hiked prices on its TVs and HomePods . The company cited surging chip costs driven by the recent global AI boom as the reason for the increase . In a statement, Apple noted the extraordinary nature of the situation, saying, “We have never seen a component price increase this much, this quickly” .

This move by Apple, a company with significant financial resources, signaled to the market that the ongoing chip shortage is a far more serious and prolonged issue than previously anticipated . As one analyst observed, “Apple’s price hikes likely confirmed that the chip shortage is not likely to go away anytime soon. If a company like Apple with big balance sheets cannot absorb the high costs, the entire industry will be forced to keep increasing prices” .

The core of the problem lies in a phenomenon being termed the “RAMageddon” shortage . The global chip market is dominated by a few key players, including SK Hynix, Samsung, and Micron . These manufacturers have increasingly focused their production capacity on high-bandwidth memory (HBM) chips, which are used in AI data centers and offer higher profit margins . As a result, they have sharply curtailed production of other types of chips used in consumer devices such as smartphones, PCs, laptops, and other electronics . This strategic pivot has led to a significant shortage of consumer-grade chips, causing their prices to soar . The supply crunch has forced a host of companies across the world to raise prices, including HP, Dell, and ASUS . Hours after Apple’s announcement, gaming console maker Xbox also announced price hikes of up to 25%, marking its second such increase within a year .

The market’s reaction was swift and severe. Apple’s shares fell by over 6%, wiping about $250 billion off its market value . Competitors like Dell also saw their shares decline . The Nasdaq Composite index in the US lost 0.5% overnight . The sell-off was even more dramatic in Asia, where the market is heavily concentrated in chipmaking companies. Samsung and SK Hynix together account for over 50% of the weight on South Korea’s Kospi index . On Friday, shares of SK Hynix plunged over 8%, while Samsung and Taiwan’s TSMC (which constitutes about 40% of the Taiex index) fell between 2% and 5% . The ripple effect was felt across the region, with Japan’s Nikkei 225 index losing 4.2%, and major constituent Softbank tanking 12.5% .

South Korea’s Unrealised Gains Tax Proposal

Compounding the negative sentiment triggered by Apple’s price hike was the South Korean government’s new proposal to tax unrealised gains . Introduced on Tuesday, June 23, the proposal seeks to treat unrealised gains from assets such as stocks and real estate as actual taxable income . The proposal is rooted in a push for a “comprehensive taxation” system, shifting the basis from the form of income to an individual’s economic capacity, regardless of whether an asset has been sold .

The South Korean market had already tumbled 10% on Tuesday in what was dubbed “Bloody Tuesday,” reacting to the news . The proposal would significantly increase the tax burden on investors, particularly foreign institutional investors who have been heavily investing in the South Korean market . The sharp sell-off on Tuesday saw foreign institutional investors pulling out between $4 billion and $6 billion from South Korean equities . Analysts expressed deep concern over the practicality of such a tax. Sumit Pokharna, a vice president at Kotak Securities, stated, “People will start dumping (South Korean equities) the moment they realise they have to pay taxes on unrealised gains. It is not practically possible” . Investors with highly leveraged positions would be forced to sell holdings to cover tax liabilities, leading to a further sell-off . The proposal added to existing concerns that the AI rally had become overstretched, creating a perfect storm for a market correction .

Conclusion

The convergence of Apple’s price hike and South Korea’s tax proposal created a “double whammy” for Asian markets . Apple’s move served as a stark reality check for AI-related trades, raising questions about who will ultimately bear the escalating costs and whether consumer demand will be impacted . The South Korean tax proposal injected a wave of regulatory uncertainty, threatening to disrupt the investment landscape . The sharp declines on Friday highlight the interconnectedness of global supply chains, the influence of a few dominant companies, and the sensitivity of markets to both corporate and government policy decisions. As one analyst noted, the market is starting to price in the risk that a stronger memory cycle today could slow the broader AI trade tomorrow .

Q&A

Q1: What was the primary trigger for the Asian stock market sell-off on June 26, 2026?
The primary triggers were Apple’s announcement of significant price hikes on its products and the South Korean government’s proposal to tax unrealised gains on equities .

Q2: Why did Apple raise its prices, and what does this reveal about the market?
Apple raised prices, particularly on iPads and MacBooks, citing the surging costs of memory and storage chips driven by the AI boom . This move reveals the severity of the “RAMageddon” chip shortage , where focus on high-margin AI chips has cut production for consumer electronics, driving up component costs industry-wide .

Q3: How did the South Korean tax proposal affect the KOSPI index?
The proposal to tax unrealised gains led to a 10% drop on the day it was introduced, and contributed to further weakness . It caused foreign institutional investors to sell off between $4 billion and $6 billion in South Korean equities .

Q4: How did the sell-off affect major chip-making companies in Asia?
Shares of major Asian chipmakers plummeted. SK Hynix fell over 8%, while Samsung and TSMC fell 2-5% . In Japan, Softbank, a major investor in tech, tanked 12.5% .

Q5: What is the “RAMageddon” shortage mentioned in the article?
“RAMageddon” is a term for the current severe shortage of memory chips for consumer electronics . It’s caused by chipmakers prioritizing high-bandwidth memory (HBM) chips for profitable AI data centers, which has reduced production of chips for everyday devices .


The HDFC Bank Governance Controversy

1. Introduction: The Corporate Governance Storm

The Indian banking sector has recently witnessed a significant corporate governance flashpoint involving HDFC Bank, the largest private sector lender in the country. The controversy centers on the resignation of Atanu Chakraborty, the former part-time Chairman and Independent Director of the bank, and the subsequent “clean chit” issued by external law firms commissioned by the board. This incident has reignited debates about boardroom dynamics, the effectiveness of independent directors, transparency in corporate governance, and the procedural mechanisms available to address whistleblower complaints at the highest levels.

Chakraborty’s departure was abrupt and accompanied by a pointed statement suggesting that “certain happenings and practices” within the bank were incompatible with his “personal values and ethics.” This prompted a swift reaction from the bank’s board, which initiated a three-month legal review to examine the veracity of the claims. The report highlights a fundamental conflict between a director’s individual moral compass and the institutionalized processes of a major financial entity.

2. The Sequence of Events: A Timeline

  • March 18, 2026: Atanu Chakraborty resigns as part-time Chairman and Independent Director with immediate effect. His resignation letter references concerns regarding “certain happenings and practices.”

  • March 24, 2026: The HDFC Bank Board announces the appointment of external law firms—Wilson Sonsini Goodrich & Rosati, PC (International) and Wadia Ghandy & Co (Domestic)—to conduct a “thorough and objective review” of the points raised by Chakraborty.

  • June 26, 2026 (Date of Report): The law firms submit their findings to the board, concluding that Chakraborty’s “statement and its implications were not substantiated.” The report states that contemporaneous evidence contradicts his claims and that no basis for his concerns was identified.

3. The Investigation: Methodology and Key Findings

The legal review involved a rigorous examination of internal records and interviews with key stakeholders, which ultimately led to the exoneration of the bank’s practices.

  • Document Review: The law firms conducted an extensive review spanning three months. They examined thousands of documents, including minutes of board meetings and agenda materials from the relevant time period. A crucial finding was that the meeting minutes were the result of a “comprehensive drafting, review and approval process,” which offered Chakraborty the opportunity to formally record any of his objections regarding the practices he later cited.

  • Interviews: The investigation team interacted with Independent Directors (including chairpersons of relevant committees), the Managing Director & CEO, and senior management personnel heading control and assurance functions.

  • The “Dubai Matter”: The report specifically referenced a “Dubai matter” that Chakraborty mentioned in his post-resignation public statements. However, investigators found “no contemporaneous evidence” that he raised specific concerns about his values or disagreed with board decisions regarding this matter during the meetings.

  • The Missing Link: Non-Cooperation by Chakraborty: A significant procedural aspect of the review was the absence of Chakraborty’s participation. The bank and the law firms repeatedly requested an interview with him, but he declined to engage. This lack of cooperation weakens the evidentiary value of his claims as it denies the investigation the opportunity to probe the specific nuances of his allegations.

4. Implications for Corporate Governance in India

This incident raises several critical points regarding governance practices in the Indian banking sector.

  • The Role of Independent Directors: Independent directors are expected to be a check on the management and a voice for minority shareholders. Chakraborty’s decision to cite “personal values” rather than specific legal infractions blurs the lines between professional governance and personal ethics. The report’s findings suggest that procedural records did not reflect any dissent, which questions the propriety of making vague allegations post-resignation.

  • Whistleblower Mechanisms: The incident highlights the importance of formal whistleblower policies. While a director is entitled to ethical concerns, corporate governance frameworks typically mandate that such concerns be raised within the formal mechanisms—board minutes, audit committee meetings—to allow for a proper audit trail. The finding that Chakraborty did not object in minutes suggests that the external review process is crucial for validating claims.

  • Ex-Parte Investigations: The fact that Chakraborty refused to participate in the investigation created a one-sided narrative. While the law firms concluded that the evidence did not support his claims, the process remains incomplete without the accuser’s testimony. This suggests a need to strengthen rules regarding the cooperation of resigning directors to ensure a complete factual picture.

  • Impact on Institutional Integrity: HDFC Bank has sought to close the matter by citing the “clean chit” to restore investor confidence. The bank’s proactive move to appoint external, top-tier law firms signals its intent to maintain transparency. However, this incident has undoubtedly put the bank’s governance culture under a microscope.

5. Conclusion

The HDFC Bank episode is a testament to the complexities of modern corporate governance. While the legal review by Wilson Sonsini Goodrich & Rosati and Wadia Ghandy & Co has provided a procedural resolution—finding the allegations unsubstantiated—the absence of the original accuser leaves a gray area regarding the substance of the concerns. It serves as a reminder that the “optics” of governance are as important as the compliance itself. For stakeholders, the outcome reinforces the integrity of HDFC Bank’s processes, but for governance advocates, it highlights the need for greater clarity in the communication and investigation of director grievances to ensure that ethical concerns are not swept under the rug due to a lack of procedural cooperation.

5 Questions & Answers on the HDFC Bank Governance Controversy

Q1. What were the central allegations made by Atanu Chakraborty upon his resignation?
A: Upon his resignation on March 18, Atanu Chakraborty stated that “certain happenings and practices within the bank are not in congruence with my personal values and ethics.” He made a broad ethical critique of the internal environment without initially specifying specific transactions or individuals, though he later referenced a “Dubai matter” in public comments.

Q2. Who conducted the investigation, and what was their primary conclusion?
A: HDFC Bank’s board appointed two external law firms: Wilson Sonsini Goodrich & Rosati, PC (an international firm) and Wadia Ghandy & Co (a domestic firm). Their primary conclusion, announced on June 26, was that Chakraborty’s statement and its implications were “not substantiated” by the records and witness interviews they conducted.

Q3. Why was the investigation unable to validate Chakraborty’s concerns?
A: The investigation pointed to several procedural and evidentiary reasons. First, the board minutes of the meetings he attended, which were subject to a comprehensive review and approval process, did not contain any record of his objections. Second, witnesses interviewed (including independent directors and senior management) did not support his claims. Finally, Chakraborty declined to interact with the law firms, leaving his specific concerns untested by cross-examination.

Q4. What is the “Dubai matter,” and what was the finding related to it?
A: The “Dubai matter” refers to a specific issue mentioned by Chakraborty in his post-resignation public statements, suggesting it was a point of conflict regarding his ethical values. However, the legal review found no contemporaneous evidence (such as emails or meeting notes) that Chakraborty raised concerns about his “personal values and ethics” or that he disagreed with the board’s decisions in connection with this matter.

Q5. What are the broader corporate governance lessons from this incident?
A: This incident underscores the importance of formal dissent mechanisms. It highlights that procedural documentation (like meeting minutes) is the primary defense in governance disputes. It also demonstrates the challenges of investigating “ethics” versus “legal” violations and illustrates the procedural difficulties that arise when a resigning director refuses to cooperate with an appointed investigation body.


The Asian Market Meltdown – Apple, AI, and Tax Policy Collide

1. Introduction: A Perfect Storm in Asian Markets

The global financial ecosystem witnessed a significant tremor on June 26, 2026, as Asian stock markets experienced their sharpest decline in recent memory, with some indices plunging by as much as 6% in a single trading session. This sell-off, which sent shockwaves through the technology and semiconductor sectors, was triggered by a confluence of two seemingly unrelated but deeply interconnected events: Apple Inc.’s unprecedented decision to raise prices on its product lines by up to 25%, and the South Korean government’s controversial proposal to tax unrealised gains on equities.

The magnitude of the downturn—with South Korea’s Kospi index briefly triggering an 8% lower circuit, Japan’s Nikkei 225 shedding 4.2%, and Taiwan’s Taiex falling 3.6%—underscores the fragility of a global economy increasingly dependent on a handful of technology giants and the semiconductor supply chain. This analysis delves deep into the underlying causes, examines the ripple effects across global markets, and explores the broader implications for investors, policymakers, and the future of the artificial intelligence (AI) revolution.


2. The Anatomy of the Crash: Two Catalysts, One Trigger

2.1 Apple’s Price Hike: The Canary in the Coal Mine

American technology behemoth Apple Inc. sent shockwaves through global markets on Thursday, June 25, when it announced a sweeping price increase across its iPad and MacBook offerings by as much as 25%. The company also raised prices on its TVs and HomePods. In a rare and candid statement, Apple attributed this drastic measure to “surging chip costs due to the recent global AI surge.”

The significance of this announcement cannot be overstated. Apple, with its massive balance sheet, formidable supply chain negotiating power, and legendary profit margins, has historically absorbed cost increases to shield its customers from price volatility. The fact that even Apple—a company with nearly $200 billion in cash reserves—could no longer absorb the escalating costs of semiconductor components sent a terrifying signal to the market.

The Chip Shortage Context:
The global semiconductor industry has been grappling with unprecedented demand since the onset of the AI boom. The rise of generative AI, large language models, and advanced data processing has created an insatiable appetite for high-performance computing chips, particularly Graphics Processing Units (GPUs) and specialized AI accelerators. This demand has outstripped supply, leading to a surge in component prices that has now reached a tipping point.

Market Interpretation:
As one head of research at a domestic firm explained, Apple’s price hikes likely confirmed that the chip shortage is structural and not transitory. “If a company like Apple with big balance sheets cannot absorb the high costs, the entire industry will be forced to keep increasing prices,” he noted. This scenario presents a grim outlook:

  • Lower Margins: Companies across the tech supply chain will face margin compression as they pass on higher costs to consumers.

  • Subdued Volumes: Higher prices will inevitably price out a segment of the customer base, leading to reduced sales volumes.

  • Demand Destruction: The cycle of rising prices and falling demand could ultimately cool the very AI frenzy that is driving the chip shortage in the first place.

2.2 South Korea’s Tax Proposal: The Political Wildcard

While Apple’s price hike was the immediate trigger, many market participants believe that the South Korean market’s extreme reaction—a 10% plunge on “Bloody Tuesday” followed by a further 5.8% drop on Friday—was exacerbated by the government’s new tax proposal introduced earlier that week.

The proposal, unveiled on Tuesday, seeks to treat unrealised gains from assets such as stocks and real estate as actual taxable income. This radical departure from conventional tax policy—which typically taxes gains only upon realization—sent a wave of panic through the investment community.

Implications for Investors:

  • Increased Tax Burden: Investors would be required to pay taxes on paper profits even if they have not sold their holdings. This could force selling pressure as investors liquidate positions to meet tax liabilities.

  • Foreign Institutional Investors (FIIs): The proposal would disproportionately affect foreign institutional investors, who have been significant participants in the South Korean equity market. Higher costs for these investors could trigger a sustained capital outflow.

  • Market Volatility: The proposal introduces a new layer of uncertainty, potentially increasing market volatility as investors adjust their strategies.

Political Dimensions:
The tax proposal comes against the backdrop of South Korea’s broader economic strategy to leverage the AI boom for nationwide growth. President Lee Jae Myung’s administration has been pushing for balanced regional development, with a particular focus on the ruling party’s southwestern stronghold. Critics, including opposition lawmakers, have accused the government of using its influence to pressure companies like Samsung and SK Hynix to invest in politically favored regions.


3. The Ripple Effects: A Sector-Wide Meltdown

3.1 The Korean Carnage: Kospi’s Double Whammy

The Kospi index’s performance was the most dramatic, ending Friday 5.8% lower and briefly triggering an 8% lower circuit that halted trading. This was the second such halt in a single week, following a 10% loss on Tuesday. For the week, the index ended approximately 7% lower.

The heavy concentration of the Kospi in semiconductor stocks amplified the sell-off. Samsung Electronics and SK Hynix together account for over 50% of the index’s weight. Any negative sentiment toward these companies reverberates across the entire market.

SK Hynix: Shares of SK Hynix, a key supplier of memory chips to AI companies, plunged over 8% on Friday alone. The company’s heavy reliance on the AI-driven demand cycle makes it particularly vulnerable to any sign of demand slowdown.
Samsung Electronics: While Samsung’s decline was more modest at 2-5%, the company faces additional headwinds from the political pressure to invest heavily in domestic chip production facilities.

3.2 Japan’s Nikkei 225: Softbank’s Steep Fall

Japan’s Nikkei 225 index lost 4.2%, with the decline exacerbated by a massive 12.5% drop in Softbank Group. Softbank, a major investor in technology and AI startups through its Vision Fund, is highly sensitive to changes in the tech investment climate. The company’s founder, Masayoshi Son, has bet heavily on AI, making Softbank a barometer for investor sentiment in the sector.

The Nikkei’s composition, with a significant weighting towards chip-related companies and technology firms, means that any negative news from the US tech sector has an outsized impact.

3.3 Taiwan’s Taiex: The TSMC Effect

Taiwan’s Taiex index fell 3.6%, with Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company (TSMC) at the center of the decline. TSMC constitutes approximately 40% of the Taiex’s weight, making it the single most influential stock on the index. As the world’s largest contract chipmaker, TSMC is the primary supplier to Apple, NVIDIA, AMD, and other major tech companies.

The company’s shares fell as investors worried that Apple’s price hikes could signal a reduction in future orders or a slower pace of technological upgrades. Any disruption to TSMC’s revenue growth has far-reaching implications for the entire global tech supply chain.


4. Global Interconnectedness: The Domino Effect

4.1 The US Market Precedent

The Asian market sell-off was preceded by a negative session on Wall Street. The Nasdaq Composite, home to many of the world’s largest technology companies, lost 0.5% overnight after Apple’s announcement. Apple shares fell by over 6%, and competitor Dell fell 5.5%. Other big tech stocks also ended lower, reflecting a broad-based retreat from the sector.

This correlation underscores the deep interconnectedness of global financial markets. A policy announcement in South Korea and a pricing decision in California can have immediate and severe consequences for investors in Japan, Taiwan, and across Asia.

4.2 The India Exception

Indian markets were closed on Friday on the occasion of Muharram, insulating them from the immediate sell-off. However, Indian investors are not immune to the underlying trends. The Indian equity market, with its significant presence in IT services and technology outsourcing, remains vulnerable to any global downturn in tech spending.

4.3 Currency and Commodity Impacts

Beyond equities, the market turmoil has implications for currency markets and commodities. A flight from riskier assets typically strengthens safe-haven currencies like the US dollar and the Japanese yen. Commodities, particularly those related to industrial production, could face downward pressure if a global slowdown materializes.


5. The AI Boom: Blessing or Curse?

The current market turbulence raises a fundamental question: Is the AI boom a blessing or a curse for the global economy?

5.1 The Blessing: Unprecedented Growth

The AI revolution has been a powerful engine of economic growth, driving demand for semiconductors, data centers, cloud computing, and advanced manufacturing. Companies like NVIDIA, TSMC, and SK Hynix have seen their revenues and profits soar. Nations like South Korea and Taiwan have leveraged their semiconductor expertise to gain strategic economic advantages.

5.2 The Curse: Supply Chain Bottlenecks

The same boom has created severe supply chain bottlenecks. The cost of chip components has surged, leading to higher production costs for downstream companies like Apple. These costs are now being passed on to consumers, threatening to slow down the AI revolution itself through demand destruction.

5.3 The Dilemma of Overvaluation

The AI rally has also led to significant overvaluation in the tech sector. Investors have poured capital into AI-related stocks, driving valuations to unsustainable levels. The South Korean tax proposal has merely acted as a catalyst for a much-needed correction.


6. South Korea’s Strategic Response: The $648 Billion Gamble

Amid the market turmoil, South Korea is embarking on an ambitious strategic initiative to reshape its economy. Samsung Group, the country’s largest conglomerate, is set to pledge 1,000 trillion won ($648 billion) in domestic investment over the next decade.

6.1 The Investment Plan

According to media reports, Samsung’s investment will cover:

  • AI Data Centers: Building state-of-the-art facilities to support AI computing.

  • Batteries: Expanding production capacity for electric vehicle batteries and energy storage systems.

  • Displays: Investing in next-generation display technologies.

  • Chip Factories: A potential 300 trillion won push to build chip manufacturing facilities in the country’s southwest.

6.2 The Political Context

This investment initiative is deeply intertwined with South Korean politics. President Lee Jae Myung’s administration has been vocal about the need for balanced regional development, moving economic activity beyond the Seoul metropolitan area. The southwestern region of South Korea, a stronghold of the ruling party, is a focal point of this effort.

Top executives from Samsung Electronics and SK Hynix are scheduled to meet with President Lee to lay out their investment plans. However, the initiative has drawn criticism from opposition lawmakers, who argue that it is politically driven. They accuse the government of pressuring companies to invest in regions that would benefit the ruling party electorally.

6.3 Economic Challenges

Despite the ambitious investment plans, South Korea faces significant challenges:

  • Infrastructure Limits: The country’s infrastructure, particularly in regions outside Seoul, may not be sufficient to support massive industrial expansion.

  • Labor Shortages: The semiconductor industry faces a severe shortage of skilled labor. Meeting the demands of new chip factories will require substantial investment in education and training.

  • Global Competition: South Korea is not the only country vying for semiconductor supremacy. The United States, China, Taiwan, Japan, and the European Union are all investing heavily in their domestic chip industries.

6.4 Long-Term Implications

If successful, Samsung’s investment could transform South Korea’s economic geography and solidify the country’s position as a global leader in the AI-driven economy. However, the short-term market reaction suggests that investors are skeptical, fearing that political motivations may override economic rationality.


7. Global Policy Implications

7.1 The Taxation of Unrealized Gains

South Korea’s proposal to tax unrealized gains has reignited a global debate on wealth taxation. While proponents argue that such taxes are necessary to address inequality and generate revenue, critics warn that they could:

  • Discourage Investment: Investors may be less willing to take risks if they face tax liabilities on unrealized paper profits.

  • Increase Market Volatility: Forced selling to meet tax obligations could exacerbate market downturns.

  • Drive Capital Flight: High-net-worth individuals and institutional investors may relocate assets to more favorable tax jurisdictions.

7.2 Industrial Policy in the Age of AI

The South Korean approach—using government influence to steer private investment—represents a form of industrial policy that is gaining traction worldwide. The United States has its CHIPS Act, the European Union has its Chips Act, and China has its “Made in China 2025” initiative.

While industrial policy can be effective in promoting strategic industries, it carries risks:

  • Political Interference: Government involvement can lead to politically motivated decisions rather than economically optimal ones.

  • Subsidy Wars: Countries may engage in a race to offer subsidies, leading to inefficient resource allocation.

  • Protectionism: Industrial policy can lead to trade disputes and protectionist measures, undermining global cooperation.


8. Investor Takeaways: Navigating the Volatility

8.1 Short-Term Perspective

In the short term, Asian markets are likely to remain volatile. Investors should brace for:

  • Continued Pressure on Tech Stocks: The semiconductor sector remains vulnerable to negative news about the AI supply chain.

  • Uncertainty in South Korea: The tax proposal, if enacted, could lead to sustained outflows from the Korean market.

  • Inflation and Interest Rates: Central bank policies will play a crucial role in determining market direction.

8.2 Long-Term Perspective

Despite the short-term turmoil, the long-term outlook for the AI industry remains positive. The demand for AI-related chips and computing power is expected to continue growing for the foreseeable future. However, investors should be selective and focus on companies with strong fundamentals and sustainable business models.

8.3 Diversification Strategy

The current turmoil underscores the importance of diversification. Investors overly concentrated in the tech sector, particularly in semiconductor stocks, have been hit hard. A well-diversified portfolio can help mitigate the impact of sector-specific shocks.


9. Conclusion: A Defining Moment

The Asian market meltdown of June 26, 2026, is more than just a temporary correction. It is a defining moment that highlights the structural vulnerabilities of a world economy increasingly dependent on a complex and fragile tech supply chain. The twin catalysts—Apple’s price hike and South Korea’s tax proposal—have exposed the fault lines in the AI-driven growth narrative.

For policymakers, the challenge is to balance the imperatives of economic growth, innovation, and fairness. For investors, the challenge is to navigate an environment of heightened volatility and uncertainty. For the global economy, the challenge is to ensure that the AI revolution delivers sustainable, inclusive growth without igniting inflationary pressures or creating new sources of systemic risk.

As South Korea prepares to unleash a $648 billion investment wave, and as the world watches the unfolding AI drama, one thing is clear: the decisions made in the coming months will shape the economic landscape for decades to come.


5 Questions & Answers on the Asian Market Turmoil

Q1. What were the two primary triggers for the Asian stock market sell-off on June 26, 2026?

A: The sell-off was triggered by two major events: (1) Apple’s announcement that it would raise prices on its iPad and MacBook offerings by as much as 25% due to surging chip costs driven by the global AI boom, and (2) the South Korean government’s proposal to tax unrealised gains on equities, which raised concerns about increased tax burdens for investors and potential capital outflows.

Q2. Why did Apple’s price hike cause such a severe market reaction across Asia?

A: Apple’s price hike signaled that even a company with its enormous balance sheet and supply chain leverage could no longer absorb rising chip costs. This suggested that the chip shortage is structural and will force the entire technology industry to raise prices, leading to lower margins, reduced sales volumes, and potential demand destruction. Since Apple is a major customer for Asian semiconductor manufacturers, this raised concerns about future orders and revenue for companies like TSMC, Samsung, and SK Hynix.

Q3. How did South Korea’s tax proposal on unrealised gains affect the market?

A: The proposal to tax unrealised gains from stocks and real estate would require investors to pay taxes on paper profits even without selling their holdings. This would significantly increase the tax burden, particularly for foreign institutional investors, potentially triggering selling pressure and capital outflows. The proposal contributed to South Korea’s Kospi index falling 10% on Tuesday and an additional 5.8% on Friday.

Q4. What is Samsung’s $648 billion investment plan, and why is it controversial?

A: Samsung Group is planning to invest 1,000 trillion won ($648 billion) in South Korea over the next decade, focusing on AI data centers, batteries, displays, and chip factories. The plan is controversial because opposition lawmakers view it as politically motivated, arguing that the government is pressuring companies to invest in the ruling party’s southwestern stronghold to promote balanced regional development. Critics also point to infrastructure limits and labor shortages as significant challenges to the initiative.

Q5. What are the broader global implications of the Asian market turmoil?

A: The turmoil highlights the deep interconnectedness of global financial markets and the fragility of the AI-driven tech supply chain. It raises concerns about demand destruction in the technology sector, the sustainability of AI-related stock valuations, and the potential for protectionist trade policies. Additionally, South Korea’s tax proposal has reignited a global debate on the taxation of unrealized gains and the role of industrial policy in shaping economic growth.


India and Seychelles – A 250-Year Bond Forged in the Indian Ocean

1. Introduction: A Relationship Rooted in History, Strengthened by Strategy

When Prime Minister Narendra Modi embarked on a three-day state visit to Seychelles on June 27, 2026, he was not merely attending the Golden Jubilee celebrations of the island nation’s independence. He was reaffirming a bond that stretches back over 250 years, a connection that began not with diplomatic cables or bilateral summits, but with the arrival of five ordinary Indians on an uninhabited archipelago . This visit, coming 11 years after his first in 2015, marks a significant milestone in a relationship that has evolved from colonial-era migration to a cornerstone of India’s maritime and Global South strategy .

Seychelles, a nation of 115 islands scattered across the Western Indian Ocean, may have a population of only around 120,000, but its strategic location at the crossroads of Africa, the Middle East, and Asia makes it a critical partner for India . Today, persons of Indian origin (PIOs) comprise approximately 5% of the population, with around 6,000 PIOs holding Seychellois citizenship and over 9,000 non-resident Indians (NRIs) holding Gainful Employment Permits . This diaspora, predominantly of Gujarati and Tamil descent, alongside a significant Bihari community, forms a living bridge between the two nations .

As India and Seychelles celebrate 50 years of diplomatic relations, coinciding with Seychelles’ Golden Jubilee, PM Modi’s visit as the Guest of Honour symbolizes the deep trust and multifaceted cooperation that defines this unique partnership . This analysis delves into the historical roots, the strategic imperatives, the development partnership, and the cultural ties that make India-Seychelles relations a model for South-South cooperation.


2. Historical Foundations: From Indentured Labourers to a Vibrant Diaspora

The story of India-Seychelles relations begins long before the formal establishment of diplomatic ties in 1976. It is a narrative of migration, enterprise, and cultural integration.

2.1 The First Settlers: 1770

The recorded history of Seychelles’ permanent settlement begins in 1770, when a group of 27 individuals—comprising 15 French colonists, seven African slaves, and five Indians—arrived on the then-uninhabited islands . These five Indians, who came as plantation workers, were among the archipelago’s first inhabitants, establishing a connection that would endure for centuries .

2.2 Waves of Migration: 19th and 20th Centuries

Over the following centuries, successive waves of Indian migrants shaped the demographic and economic landscape of Seychelles. During the 19th century, migrants from the Bhojpuri-speaking regions of Bihar arrived under British colonial rule, adding a distinct North Indian influence to the community . The 20th century witnessed a more constant flow of Indians, predominantly from Tamil Nadu, Puducherry, and later Gujarat, who came as traders, labourers, and construction workers .

Interestingly, during the British colonial period, Seychelles was administered from the Bombay Presidency for a time, facilitating regular shipping and trade links between the islands and the Indian subcontinent. These commercial ties attracted Indian merchants seeking new opportunities beyond East Africa, where they had reached a saturation point .

2.3 The Bihar Connection

The Indian diaspora in Seychelles is remarkably diverse, representing different regions of India. The Bihari population, particularly from the Bhojpuri-speaking regions, constitutes the third-largest group among the Indian-origin community . This connection has even shaped Seychellois politics. Wavel Ramkalawan, who served as President of Seychelles until 2025, traces his roots back to Bihar. His great-grandfather left the village of Parsauni over 138 years ago, and Ramkalawan made an emotional journey to his ancestral village in 2018, underscoring the deep personal ties that bind the two nations .


3. Strategic Significance: Seychelles in India’s Maritime Vision

Seychelles’ strategic value for India cannot be overstated. Located near vital sea lines of communication (SLOCs) in the Western Indian Ocean, the island nation is a crucial partner in India’s efforts to ensure maritime security and counterbalance competing influences in the region .

3.1 The MAHASAGAR Vision

India’s maritime policy is encapsulated in the Vision MAHASAGAR (Mutual and Holistic Advancement for Security and Growth Across Regions), an expanded framework that builds on the earlier SAGAR (Security and Growth for All in the Region) vision . MAHASAGAR represents India’s commitment to a free, open, and secure Indian Ocean, emphasizing cooperation on trade, capacity building, and mutual security . Seychelles occupies a “special place” in this vision, as reaffirmed by Seychelles President Patrick Herminie during PM Modi’s visit .

3.2 Maritime Security Partnership

Given its vast Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) of over 1.3 million square kilometres, Seychelles faces significant challenges in maritime surveillance and security . India has emerged as its partner of first choice, providing critical support to counter piracy, drug trafficking, illegal fishing, and other transnational threats .

  • Capability Transfer: India has progressively expanded Seychelles’ maritime capabilities through the transfer of assets, including two Dornier aircraft, patrol boats, and the recent gifting of a Fast Patrol Vessel (FPV), PS Lespwar, manufactured by Goa Shipyard Limited .

  • Hydrographic Surveys: Indian Navy ships periodically conduct hydrographic surveys of Seychelles’ ports and surrounding waters, contributing to updated nautical charts and safer navigation .

  • Coastal Surveillance Radar Systems (CSRS): The establishment of CSRS across Seychelles enhances real-time monitoring of vessel movements, improving maritime domain awareness for both nations .

  • Exercise LAMITYE: The 11th edition of the bilateral joint military exercise LAMITYE, which has run continuously since 2001, was elevated to a tri-service level for the first time in 2026, reflecting the deepening defence partnership .

3.3 Geopolitical Context: Countering Influence and Ensuring Stability

The Western Indian Ocean has become a theatre of great power competition. China’s expanding influence through infrastructure investment, port construction, and defence agreements with regional states is a persistent concern for New Delhi . Seychelles’ strategic location makes it a vital counterweight and a key partner in maintaining a rules-based maritime order . The West Asia conflict that disrupted shipping through the Strait of Hormuz in 2025 highlighted the vulnerabilities of import-dependent nations like Seychelles and the value of a reliable partner like India, which promptly responded with essential supplies .


4. Development Partnership: A Comprehensive Approach

India’s engagement with Seychelles extends far beyond security cooperation, encompassing a broad spectrum of development initiatives that have earned it the status of one of the most trusted development partners for the island nation .

4.1 The Special Economic Package (SEP)

During PM Modi’s visit, a **Special Economic Package of $175 million** was announced, comprising a $125 million Line of Credit and $50 million in grant assistance . This is the largest single financial commitment India has made to Seychelles, aimed at supporting key development priorities:

  • Social Housing: 1,000 units of social housing to address the needs of Seychellois citizens .

  • Sustainable Transport: 250 electric buses along with charging infrastructure .

  • Skill Development: A vocational training centre to enhance employability .

  • Digital Infrastructure: An agreement to implement India’s Unified Payments Interface (UPI) for digital payments, extending India’s digital public infrastructure to Seychelles .

4.2 Capacity Building and Human Resource Development

India’s Indian Technical and Economic Cooperation (ITEC) programme has been a cornerstone of its development partnership. More than 1% of Seychelles’ total population has received professional training in India, one of the highest concentrations of ITEC alumni anywhere in the world .

4.3 Healthcare and Medical Tourism

India is a premier medical tourism destination for Seychelles, with institutional tie-ups connecting island hospitals with facilities in cities like Chennai . During the COVID-19 pandemic, Seychelles was among the first countries to receive Covishield vaccines under India’s Vaccine Maitri initiative in January 2021 . India has also supplied essential medicines, including 3.5 tonnes of medical supplies in 2025 .

4.4 High Impact Community Development Projects (HICDPs)

India has completed 28 HICDPs across Seychelles, with a second phase currently under implementation . These projects span infrastructure, healthcare, education, and public transport, including the supply of 131 buses for the Seychelles Public Transport Corporation, donation of ambulances and police vehicles, and ICT infrastructure for the University of Seychelles .


5. Cultural and People-to-People Ties

The cultural connection between India and Seychelles is vibrant and multifaceted, nurtured by the active Indian diaspora and regular exchanges of artists, performers, and community groups .

5.1 Mahatma Gandhi Statue

In June 2022, a statue of Mahatma Gandhi was erected at the Peace Park in Victoria, alongside statues of Nelson Mandela and Sir James Mancham, the founding President of Seychelles . This was a significant milestone, symbolizing the enduring values of peace and non-violence shared by both nations.

5.2 Cultural Festivals and Exchanges

The annual Seychelles-India Day celebrations have become a major cultural event, featuring cricket tournaments, chess championships, Indian classical performances, food festivals, and exhibitions showcasing India’s artistic traditions . The popularity of Yoga and the Indian film industry in Seychelles further reflects the deep cultural affinity between the two countries .

5.3 Recognition of the Diaspora

The Indian government has recognized the contributions of the diaspora through the Pravasi Bharatiya Samman Award. Justice D. Karunakaran of the Supreme Court of Seychelles was conferred the award in 2015, following V. Ramadoss in 2006 .


6. PM Modi’s Visit: Key Outcomes and Milestones

PM Modi’s three-day state visit from June 27-29, 2026, was a landmark event that produced 19 formal outcomes, further strengthening the India-Seychelles partnership .

  • Golden Jubilee Celebrations: PM Modi attended Seychelles’ Golden Jubilee National Day celebrations as the Guest of Honour, marking 50 years of independence from the United Kingdom . This echoed the participation of INS Nilgiri in the original independence celebrations in 1976 .

  • Address to National Assembly: PM Modi became the first Indian Prime Minister to address the National Assembly of Seychelles, emphasizing the shared vision of MAHASAGAR and the interconnected futures of the two nations .

  • Defence and Maritime Security: The handover of PS Lespwar, the Fast Patrol Vessel, and the gifting of six ambulances, 10 utility vehicles, and five laser radial boats underscored the commitment to enhancing Seychelles’ maritime capabilities .

  • Economic and Development Agreements: The announcement of the $175 million SEP, the signing of an Extradition Treaty, an agreement on cooperation in the peaceful uses of outer space, a UPI agreement, and an umbrella Line of Credit agreement with the Export-Import Bank of India represented significant deepening of bilateral cooperation .

  • Environmental Leadership: PM Modi was conferred with the “Guardian of the Blue Horizon” award by President Herminie in recognition of his environmental leadership and commitment to promoting the Blue Economy .


7. Challenges and the Road Ahead

Despite the robust relationship, certain challenges and complexities persist.

  • Geopolitical Balancing: Seychelles, like many small island states, navigates a complex web of relationships. President Herminie visited Moscow in April 2026 and is expected to visit Beijing in 2027, indicating a multi-aligned foreign policy . India must continue to offer partnership without prescriptions to maintain its unique position.

  • Infrastructure and Labour Constraints: South Korea’s challenges with infrastructure and labour shortages, as seen in the previous analysis, are mirrored in Seychelles. The ambitious development projects under the SEP will require careful planning to overcome local capacity constraints.

  • Sustainability: The Blue Economy is a strategic pillar of the relationship, but it must be balanced with environmental sustainability to protect Seychelles’ unique marine ecosystem.


8. Conclusion: A Partnership for the Future

PM Modi’s visit to Seychelles was not merely a diplomatic formality; it was a powerful reaffirmation of a relationship built on centuries of shared history, a vibrant diaspora, and converging strategic interests. In an increasingly contested Indian Ocean, Seychelles stands as a cornerstone of India’s maritime vision and a vital partner in its Global South strategy . The $175 million economic package, the deepening defence cooperation, and the enduring cultural bonds all point towards a future where the relationship between India and Seychelles, as PM Modi noted, will be defined by “innovation, sustainability, and shared prosperity” . As the two nations look towards the next 50 years, the trust and cooperation forged over the past 250 years will serve as a solid foundation for a partnership that benefits not only the two countries but the entire Indian Ocean region.


5 Questions & Answers on the India-Seychelles Relationship

Q1. What is the historical basis for the strong relationship between India and Seychelles?

A: The relationship began in 1770 when five Indians arrived as plantation workers alongside French colonists and African slaves, becoming among the first inhabitants of the archipelago . Over the following centuries, waves of migrants from Tamil Nadu, Puducherry, Gujarat, and Bihar (particularly Bhojpuri-speaking regions) established a vibrant Indian-origin community. The British colonial administration even governed Seychelles from the Bombay Presidency for a period, facilitating trade and migration. Today, persons of Indian origin comprise about 5% of the population .

Q2. What is India’s MAHASAGAR vision, and what role does Seychelles play in it?

A: MAHASAGAR stands for Mutual and Holistic Advancement for Security and Growth Across Regions. It is India’s expanded vision for the Indian Ocean and the Global South, building on the earlier SAGAR framework . Seychelles is described as a “cornerstone” and “critical maritime partner” in this vision . Its strategic location near vital sea lanes makes it essential for India’s efforts to counter piracy, drug trafficking, and illegal fishing, and to ensure a free, open, and secure Indian Ocean .

Q3. What were the key outcomes of PM Modi’s June 2026 visit to Seychelles?

A: The three-day visit produced 19 formal outcomes . Key outcomes included: the announcement of a $175 million Special Economic Package ($125 million Line of Credit + $50 million grant) ; the handing over of a Fast Patrol Vessel, PS Lespwar, to enhance maritime security ; an Extradition Treaty; an agreement on space cooperation; an agreement to implement India’s UPI for digital payments; and PM Modi becoming the first Indian PM to address the National Assembly of Seychelles .

Q4. How does India’s development partnership benefit Seychelles?

A: India has emerged as one of Seychelles’ most trusted development partners, supporting its economy and people . Key initiatives include the ITEC programme, under which over 1% of Seychelles’ population has received professional training in India ; the Special Economic Package supporting social housing, electric buses, and vocational training ; High Impact Community Development Projects covering healthcare and education; and institutional healthcare tie-ups making India a premier medical tourism destination for Seychelles .

Q5. Who is Wavel Ramkalawan, and what is his connection to India?

A: Wavel Ramkalawan served as the President of Seychelles until 2025 . His connection to India is deeply personal—he is of Indian origin, with his great-grandfather having left the Bhojpuri-speaking village of Parsauni in Bihar over 138 years ago . In 2018, while serving as an opposition MP, Ramkalawan made an “emotional” journey to his ancestral village in Bihar, highlighting the powerful personal links that bind the political leadership of Seychelles to India .


India and Seychelles – A 250-Year Bond Forged in the Indian Ocean

1. Introduction: A Relationship Rooted in History, Strengthened by Strategy

When Prime Minister Narendra Modi embarked on a three-day state visit to Seychelles beginning June 27, 2026, he was not merely attending the Golden Jubilee celebrations of the island nation’s independence. He was reaffirming a bond that stretches back over 250 years, a connection that began not with diplomatic cables or bilateral summits, but with the arrival of five ordinary Indians on an uninhabited archipelago . This visit, coming 11 years after his first in 2015, marks a significant milestone in a relationship that has evolved from colonial-era migration to a cornerstone of India’s maritime and Global South strategy .

Seychelles, a nation of 115 islands scattered across the Western Indian Ocean, may have a population of only around 120,000, but its strategic location at the crossroads of Africa, the Middle East, and Asia makes it a critical partner for India . Today, persons of Indian origin (PIOs) comprise approximately 5% of the population, with around 6,000 PIOs holding Seychellois citizenship and over 9,000 non-resident Indians (NRIs) holding Gainful Employment Permits . This diaspora, predominantly of Gujarati, Tamil, and Bihari descent, forms a living bridge between the two nations .

As India and Seychelles celebrate 50 years of diplomatic relations, coinciding with Seychelles’ Golden Jubilee, PM Modi’s visit as the Guest of Honour symbolizes the deep trust and multifaceted cooperation that defines this unique partnership . This analysis delves into the historical roots, the strategic imperatives, the development partnership, and the cultural ties that make India-Seychelles relations a model for South-South cooperation.


2. Historical Foundations: From Indentured Labourers to a Vibrant Diaspora

The story of India-Seychelles relations begins long before the formal establishment of diplomatic ties in 1976. It is a narrative of migration, enterprise, and cultural integration.

2.1 The First Settlers: 1770

The recorded history of Seychelles’ permanent settlement begins in 1770, when a group of 27 individuals—comprising 15 French colonists, seven African slaves, and five Indians—arrived on the then-uninhabited islands . These five Indians, who came as plantation workers, were among the archipelago’s first inhabitants, establishing a connection that would endure for centuries.

2.2 Waves of Migration: 19th and 20th Centuries

Over the following centuries, successive waves of Indian migrants shaped the demographic and economic landscape of Seychelles. During the 19th century, migrants from the Bhojpuri-speaking regions of Bihar arrived under British colonial rule, adding a distinct North Indian influence to the community . The 20th century witnessed a more constant flow of Indians, predominantly from Tamil Nadu, Puducherry, and later Gujarat, who came as traders, labourers, and construction workers .

Interestingly, during the British colonial period, Seychelles was administered from the Bombay Presidency for a time, facilitating regular shipping and trade links between the islands and the Indian subcontinent. These commercial ties attracted Indian merchants seeking new opportunities beyond East Africa, where they had reached a saturation point .

2.3 The Bihar Connection

The Indian diaspora in Seychelles is remarkably diverse, representing different regions of India. The Bihari population, particularly from the Bhojpuri-speaking regions, constitutes the third-largest group among the Indian-origin community . This connection has even shaped Seychellois politics. Wavel Ramkalawan, who served as President of Seychelles until 2025, traces his roots back to Bihar. His great-grandfather left the village of Parsauni over 138 years ago, and Ramkalawan made an emotional journey to his ancestral village in 2018, underscoring the deep personal ties that bind the two nations .


3. Strategic Significance: Seychelles in India’s Maritime Vision

Seychelles’ strategic value for India cannot be overstated. Located near vital sea lines of communication (SLOCs) in the Western Indian Ocean, the island nation is a crucial partner in India’s efforts to ensure maritime security and counterbalance competing influences in the region .

3.1 The MAHASAGAR Vision

India’s maritime policy is encapsulated in the Vision MAHASAGAR (Mutual and Holistic Advancement for Security and Growth Across Regions), an expanded framework that builds on the earlier SAGAR (Security and Growth for All in the Region) vision . MAHASAGAR represents India’s commitment to a free, open, and secure Indian Ocean, emphasizing cooperation on trade, capacity building, and mutual security. Seychelles occupies a “special place” in this vision, as reaffirmed by Seychelles President Patrick Herminie during PM Modi’s visit .

3.2 Maritime Security Partnership

Given its vast Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) of over 1.3 million square kilometres, Seychelles faces significant challenges in maritime surveillance and security . India has emerged as its partner of first choice, providing critical support to counter piracy, drug trafficking, illegal fishing, and other transnational threats.

  • Capability Transfer: India has progressively expanded Seychelles’ maritime capabilities through the transfer of assets, including two Dornier aircraft, patrol boats, and the recent gifting of a Fast Patrol Vessel (FPV), PS Lespwar, manufactured by Goa Shipyard Limited .

  • Hydrographic Surveys: Indian Navy ships periodically conduct hydrographic surveys of Seychelles’ ports and surrounding waters, contributing to updated nautical charts and safer navigation .

  • Exercise LAMITIYE: The 11th edition of the bilateral joint military exercise LAMITIYE, which has run continuously since 2001, was elevated to a tri-service level for the first time in 2026, reflecting the deepening defence partnership . “Lamitiye” means “friendship” in Creole, aptly reflecting the historic ties between the two nations .

3.3 Geopolitical Context: Countering Influence and Ensuring Stability

The Western Indian Ocean has become a theatre of great power competition. China’s expanding influence through infrastructure investment, port construction, and defence agreements with regional states is a persistent concern for New Delhi . Seychelles’ strategic location makes it a vital counterweight and a key partner in maintaining a rules-based maritime order.


4. Development Partnership: A Comprehensive Approach

India’s engagement with Seychelles extends far beyond security cooperation, encompassing a broad spectrum of development initiatives that have earned it the status of one of the most trusted development partners for the island nation .

4.1 The Special Economic Package (SEP)

During PM Modi’s visit, a **Special Economic Package of $175 million** was announced, comprising a $125 million Line of Credit and $50 million in grant assistance . This is the largest single financial commitment India has made to Seychelles, aimed at supporting key development priorities:

  • Social Housing: 1,000 units of social housing to address the needs of Seychellois citizens .

  • Sustainable Transport: 250 electric buses along with charging infrastructure .

  • Skill Development: A vocational training centre to enhance employability .

  • Digital Infrastructure: An agreement to implement India’s Unified Payments Interface (UPI) for digital payments, extending India’s digital public infrastructure to Seychelles .

4.2 Capacity Building and Human Resource Development

India’s Indian Technical and Economic Cooperation (ITEC) programme has been a cornerstone of its development partnership. More than 1% of Seychelles’ total population has received professional training in India, one of the highest concentrations of ITEC alumni anywhere in the world .

4.3 Healthcare and Medical Tourism

India is a premier medical tourism destination for Seychelles, with institutional tie-ups connecting island hospitals with facilities in cities like Chennai . During the COVID-19 pandemic, Seychelles was among the first countries to receive Covishield vaccines under India’s Vaccine Maitri initiative . An MoU on the ‘Jan Aushadhi’ initiative was also signed to provide quality and affordable medicines to Seychelles .

4.4 New Horizons: Cybersecurity, AI, and Space

The visit also unveiled new areas of cooperation, including cybersecurity, artificial intelligence, and space . An agreement on cooperation in the peaceful uses of outer space was signed, signaling a new dimension to the partnership .


5. Cultural and People-to-People Ties

The cultural connection between India and Seychelles is vibrant and multifaceted, nurtured by the active Indian diaspora and regular exchanges of artists, performers, and community groups .

5.1 Mahatma Gandhi Statue

In June 2022, a statue of Mahatma Gandhi was erected at the Peace Park in Victoria, alongside statues of Nelson Mandela and Sir James Mancham, the founding President of Seychelles . This was a significant milestone, symbolizing the enduring values of peace and non-violence shared by both nations.

5.2 Recognition of the Diaspora

The Indian government has recognized the contributions of the diaspora through the Pravasi Bharatiya Samman Award. Justice D. Karunakaran of the Supreme Court of Seychelles was conferred the award in 2015, following V. Ramadoss in 2006 .

5.3 The “Guardian of the Blue Horizon”

PM Modi was conferred with the “Guardian of the Blue Horizon” award by President Herminie in recognition of his environmental leadership and commitment to promoting the Blue Economy .


6. PM Modi’s Visit: Key Outcomes and Milestones

PM Modi’s three-day state visit from June 27-29, 2026, was a landmark event that produced 19 formal outcomes, further strengthening the India-Seychelles partnership .

  • Golden Jubilee Celebrations: PM Modi attended Seychelles’ Golden Jubilee National Day celebrations as the Guest of Honour, marking 50 years of independence from the United Kingdom . This echoed the participation of INS Nilgiri in the original independence celebrations in 1976 .

  • Address to National Assembly: PM Modi became the first Indian Prime Minister to address the National Assembly of Seychelles, emphasizing the shared vision of MAHASAGAR and the interconnected futures of the two nations .

  • Defence and Maritime Security: The handover of PS Lespwar, the Fast Patrol Vessel, and the gifting of six ambulances, 10 utility vehicles, and five laser radial boats underscored the commitment to enhancing Seychelles’ maritime capabilities .

  • Economic and Development Agreements: The announcement of the $175 million SEP, the signing of an Extradition Treaty, an agreement on cooperation in the peaceful uses of outer space, a UPI agreement, and an umbrella Line of Credit agreement with the Export-Import Bank of India represented significant deepening of bilateral cooperation .


7. Challenges and the Road Ahead

Despite the robust relationship, certain challenges and complexities persist.

  • Geopolitical Balancing: Seychelles, like many small island states, navigates a complex web of relationships. India must continue to offer partnership without prescriptions to maintain its unique position.

  • Connectivity: Foreign Secretary Vikram Misri acknowledged that greater connectivity, including dedicated shipping and aviation links, is a priority but depends on private commercial operators .

  • Assumption Island Project: Regarding the Assumption Island project, Misri clarified that India’s stance on such projects is guided by the priorities and interests of the host government. Any cooperation must be aligned with the desires of the people of Seychelles .


8. Conclusion: A Partnership for the Future

PM Modi’s visit to Seychelles was not merely a diplomatic formality; it was a powerful reaffirmation of a relationship built on centuries of shared history, a vibrant diaspora, and converging strategic interests. In an increasingly contested Indian Ocean, Seychelles stands as a cornerstone of India’s maritime vision and a vital partner in its Global South strategy . The $175 million economic package, the deepening defence cooperation, and the enduring cultural bonds all point towards a future where the relationship between India and Seychelles, as PM Modi noted, will be defined by “innovation, sustainability, and shared prosperity” . As the two nations look towards the next 50 years, the trust and cooperation forged over the past 250 years will serve as a solid foundation for a partnership that benefits not only the two countries but the entire Indian Ocean region.


5 Questions & Answers on the India-Seychelles Relationship

Q1. What is the historical basis for the strong relationship between India and Seychelles?

A: The relationship began in 1770 when five Indians arrived as plantation workers alongside French colonists and African slaves, becoming among the first inhabitants of the archipelago . Over the following centuries, waves of migrants from Tamil Nadu, Puducherry, Gujarat, and Bihar established a vibrant Indian-origin community. During British colonial rule, Seychelles was even administered from the Bombay Presidency for a period, facilitating trade and migration . Today, persons of Indian origin comprise about 5% of the population .

Q2. What is India’s MAHASAGAR vision, and what role does Seychelles play in it?

A: MAHASAGAR stands for Mutual and Holistic Advancement for Security and Growth Across Regions. It is India’s expanded vision for the Indian Ocean and the Global South, building on the earlier SAGAR framework . Seychelles is described as a “cornerstone” and “critical maritime partner” in this vision . Its strategic location near vital sea lanes makes it essential for India’s efforts to counter piracy, drug trafficking, and illegal fishing, and to ensure a free, open, and secure Indian Ocean.

Q3. What were the key outcomes of PM Modi’s June 2026 visit to Seychelles?

A: The three-day visit produced 19 formal outcomes . Key outcomes included: the announcement of a $175 million Special Economic Package ($125 million Line of Credit + $50 million grant) ; the handing over of a Fast Patrol Vessel, PS Lespwar, to enhance maritime security ; an Extradition Treaty; an agreement on space cooperation; an agreement to implement India’s UPI for digital payments; and PM Modi becoming the first Indian PM to address the National Assembly of Seychelles .

Q4. How does India’s development partnership benefit Seychelles?

A: India has emerged as one of Seychelles’ most trusted development partners . Key initiatives include the ITEC programme, under which over 1% of Seychelles’ population has received professional training in India ; the Special Economic Package supporting social housing, electric buses, and vocational training ; institutional healthcare tie-ups making India a premier medical tourism destination; and the Jan Aushadhi initiative for affordable medicines .

Q5. Who is Wavel Ramkalawan, and what is his connection to India?

A: Wavel Ramkalawan served as the President of Seychelles until 2025 . His connection to India is deeply personal—he is of Indian origin, with his great-grandfather having left the Bhojpuri-speaking village of Parsauni in Bihar over 138 years ago . In 2018, while serving as an opposition MP, Ramkalawan made an “emotional” journey to his ancestral village in Bihar, highlighting the powerful personal links that bind the political leadership of Seychelles to India.


MSMEs and Cooperatives – The Twin Engines of Viksit Bharat @ 2047

1. Introduction: A Defining Moment for India’s Economic Backbone

June 27 marks a significant occasion in India’s economic calendar—International MSME Day—a day dedicated to recognizing the pivotal role of Micro, Small, and Medium Enterprises in driving economic growth, innovation, and inclusive development . This year, the occasion carries even greater weight as India observes the sixth anniversary of the establishment of the Ministry of Cooperation . Together, these two milestones represent a powerful recognition that India’s journey toward becoming a developed nation by 2047, or Viksit Bharat @ 2047, will be powered not just by large corporations but by the millions of grassroots enterprises and community-owned institutions that form the backbone of the Indian economy .

MSMEs and cooperatives, often described as the “twin engines” of inclusive growth, share a fundamental characteristic: they are rooted in local enterprise, community participation, and collective entrepreneurship. While MSMEs bring the dynamism of private enterprise, cooperatives embody the Indian ethos of collective progress through “Sahkar-se-Samriddhi” (prosperity through cooperation) . This analysis examines the current state of these two vital sectors, the transformative initiatives launched on MSME Day 2026, the strategic vision outlined in the National Cooperation Policy 2025, and the road ahead for realizing their full potential.


2. The MSME Sector: Scale, Significance, and Strategic Imperatives

2.1 The Backbone of the Indian Economy

The MSME sector’s contribution to India’s economic fabric is nothing short of monumental. As of June 2026, the sector comprises over 7.47 crore formal enterprises, sustaining more than 32.82 crore livelihoods across the country . This positions India as the third-largest MSME ecosystem globally, trailing only the United States and China . The sector contributes 31.1% to India’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP), 35.4% to manufacturing Gross Value Added (GVA), and nearly 48.6% to total exports . These figures underscore the sector’s critical role as the country’s second-largest employer after agriculture.

The rapid expansion of the formal MSME ecosystem has been driven by digital integration through platforms like Udyam and Udyam Assist, which have systematically reduced the informal shadow economy and integrated millions of micro-entrepreneurs into the structured financial ecosystem . According to the MSME database, there are 8,979 crore registered MSMEs, along with 50,557 cooperative entities and more than 5.46 lakh self-help groups, highlighting the vast untapped potential for collective enterprises [citation:original].

2.2 The Strategic Imperative for Viksit Bharat

While India’s MSME base is vast, the comparison with advanced manufacturing-led economies such as Germany (where MSMEs contribute around 55% of economic output), Japan (52%), and South Korea (47%) clearly indicates India’s untapped potential at 31.1% . The next leap towards Viksit Bharat @ 2047 will depend on transforming this base into a more productive, technology-driven, export-oriented, and globally competitive sector. The strategic levers for this transformation include:

  • Job-Rich Industrialization: MSMEs are uniquely positioned to absorb surplus labour from agriculture and create employment in rural and semi-urban areas.

  • Deepening Participation in Global Value Chains (GVCs): Enhancing the competitiveness of MSMEs to integrate into global supply chains.

  • Diversifying the Export Profile: Moving beyond traditional exports to include value-added manufactured goods and services.

  • Transitioning from Scale to Sophistication: Encouraging micro-enterprises to evolve into small and medium enterprises, and small enterprises to become globally competitive champions .

2.3 MSME Day 2026: A Transformative Digital Leap

The MSME Day 2026 celebrations, presided over by Vice President Shri C. P. Radhakrishnan, marked a significant milestone in the government’s commitment to building a resilient, technology-driven, and future-ready MSME ecosystem . On this occasion, the Vice President launched a suite of transformative digital platforms, which represent a quantum leap in empowering MSMEs across India .

1. PMEGP 2.0 Portal: The revamped Prime Minister’s Employment Generation Programme portal introduces a range of citizen-centric, technology-driven features designed to simplify the entire lifecycle of a beneficiary . A key highlight is its integration with the Jan Samarth Portal, enabling real-time exchange of information with participating banks for loan processing, sanction, and disbursement. This represents a transformative shift towards a fully digital, transparent, and accountable ecosystem for enterprise promotion .

2. SAMADHAAN 2.0 Portal: The dedicated platform for reporting and tracking outstanding dues owed to MSMEs by Central Ministries, Departments, and Public Sector Enterprises is a significant step toward addressing the chronic issue of delayed payments . It provides an online functionality for mandatory reporting of pending dues, enhancing transparency and ensuring timely payments to MSMEs .

3. Procurement and Marketing Support (PMS) Portal: This integrated digital platform connects Micro and Small Enterprises (MSEs) with trade fairs and exhibitions . Linked with Udyam Registration, the portal makes the entire process—including application submission, participation, and reimbursement claims—online, paperless, and transparent .

4. MSME Global Mart 2.0 Portal: This next-generation national digital commerce and trade facilitation platform is integrated with the Open Network for Digital Commerce (ONDC) ecosystem . It enables MSMEs from every corner of the country to connect with new business opportunities both nationally and globally, democratizing access to markets .

5. MSME Testing Portal: This initiative digitizes testing activities carried out by MSME Testing Centres across the country . The portal allows customers to book samples, make payments, track status, and download test reports digitally, significantly improving the efficiency and accessibility of testing services .

6. MSME Idea Hackathon 6.0: Under the MSME Champions Scheme, Hackathon 6.0 aims to promote innovation and the adoption of advanced technologies among MSMEs . Innovators can submit ideas across multiple themes, with financial support of up to Rs. 15 lakh per idea, fostering a culture of innovation aligned with the Aatmanirbhar Bharat vision .

In addition to these portal launches, e-books commemorating three years of the PM Vishwakarma Scheme and the Self-Reliant India (SRI) Fund were also released .


3. The Cooperative Sector: Collective Entrepreneurship and Community Empowerment

3.1 The Legacy and Scale of India’s Cooperative Movement

The history of India’s cooperative movement illustrates the power of collective entrepreneurship. What began with the Cooperative Credit Societies Act of 1904 as an effort to address rural credit constraints evolved into a key pillar of post-Independence development policy [citation:original]. Cooperatives built enduring business institutions such as Amul in dairy, IFFCO and KRIBHCO in fertilizers, and NAFED in agri-marketing, proving that community-owned enterprises can achieve scale and commercial success [citation:original].

As of 2025, India is home to over 8.44 lakh cooperatives, comprising 2 lakh credit cooperatives and 6 lakh non-credit cooperatives spanning housing, dairy, fisheries, and more . With over 30 crore members, cooperatives remain a key socio-economic driver, especially in rural India. In fact, India has more than one-fourth of the world’s cooperatives .

The establishment of the Ministry of Cooperation in 2021 marked a watershed moment, infusing new energy, direction, and momentum into the cooperative sector . As Bihar Legislative Assembly Speaker Prem Kumar noted, “Cooperation is not merely an administrative system but an Indian ethos of collective progress” . The ministry has played a key role in strengthening cooperative institutions, promoting transparency, encouraging the adoption of digital technologies, and enhancing farmers’ incomes .

3.2 The National Cooperation Policy 2025: A Strategic Roadmap

The National Cooperation Policy (NCP) 2025, dedicated to the nation on July 24, 2025, marks a strategic roadmap for revitalizing India’s cooperative sector . Rooted in the ethos of Sahkar-se-Samriddhi, this policy aims to build on the unique strengths of India’s cooperative tradition, promote economic democratization, and uplift rural economies through collective participation . The NCP is structured around six mission pillars:

1. Strengthening the Foundation: Legal reforms, better governance, access to finance, and digitalization. This includes encouraging states to amend cooperative laws to enhance transparency, promote digitalization of registrar offices, and revive sick cooperatives .

2. Promoting Vibrancy: Creating business ecosystems, expanding exports, and developing rural clusters. The policy proposes model cooperative villages with multipurpose PACS as growth engines, developing rural economic clusters, and supporting branding under the ‘Bharat’ brand .

3. Making Cooperatives Future-Ready: Technology integration, professional management, and the development of a national ‘Cooperative Stack’ integrating with Agri-stack and databases . The NCP also promotes integration with ONDC and GeM platforms .

4. Promoting Inclusivity and Deepening Reach: Promoting cooperative-led inclusive development and cooperatives as a people’s movement. This includes active participation of youth, women, SC/STs, and differently-abled persons .

5. Entering New and Emerging Sectors: Biogas, clean energy, warehousing, healthcare, mobile-based aggregator services (e.g., for plumbers, taxi drivers), organic and natural farming, and drone services .

6. Shaping Young Generation for Cooperative Growth: Developing cooperative-focused courses in higher education institutions, building a national digital cooperative employment exchange, and promoting financial and digital literacy among youth .

3.3 Recent Initiatives: Digitization and Expansion

The cooperative sector is witnessing a significant digital push. The government-backed e-commerce marketplace DigiHaat, built on the ONDC network, launched a nationwide ‘Sahkar Se Samriddhi’ campaign from June 29 to July 6, 2026, to promote cooperative products and expand their reach among consumers . The campaign showcases products from cooperative societies, Farmer Producer Organisations (FPOs), Self-Help Groups (SHGs), and artisan collectives, bringing them onto a single digital platform accessible to consumers nationwide .

In a landmark initiative, the cooperative mobility platform Bharat Taxi was launched, with plans to expand to more than 500 cities and towns within the next two years . The platform has already enrolled around 7 lakh driver-members who are shareholders in the cooperative, exemplifying the model where drivers become co-owners rather than independent contractors .

3.4 The PM Vishwakarma Scheme: Honouring Heritage, Powering Progress

Launched on September 17, 2023, the PM Vishwakarma Scheme is a transformative initiative that bridges the gap between traditional artisans and modern enterprise . With a financial outlay of ₹13,000 crore over five years, the scheme aims to strengthen the livelihoods of traditional artisans and craftspeople by combining heritage preservation with modern enterprise support .

Scale and Reach: As of September 2025, around 30 lakh artisans and craftsmen had registered under the scheme, with over 26 lakh completing skill verification . Raajmistri (mason), tailor, and garland maker are among the most registered trades . The scheme covers 18 family-based traditional trades, including carpenters, potters, blacksmiths, goldsmiths, and cobblers [citation:original].

Key Components:

  • Recognition: Artisans are provided with a PM Vishwakarma certificate and ID card .

  • Skill Upgradation: Skill training with a stipend of ₹500 per day .

  • Toolkit Incentive: Financial incentive of ₹15,000 in the form of an e-voucher for modern tools .

  • Credit Support: Collateral-free ‘Enterprise Development Loans’ at a concessional interest rate of 5% (with 8% government subvention) . Over 4.7 lakh loans worth ₹41,188 crore have been approved .

  • Incentive for Digital Transactions: Re.1 per digital transaction, up to 100 transactions monthly .

  • Marketing Support: Quality certification, market linkages, branding, and onboarding on e-commerce platforms .

The scheme’s impact can be amplified through cluster-based cooperative models that promote collective action, economies of scale, and stronger integration with value chains [citation:original]. Cooperatives can help Vishwakarma beneficiaries transform individual skills into sustainable enterprises by pooling resources and leveraging the scheme’s support for finance, branding, and market access [citation:original].


4. Convergence: Cooperative MSMEs as the Way Forward

The next phase of India’s growth story must be built on institutions that are both economically viable and socially inclusive. Cooperative MSMEs embody this balance by combining the dynamism of enterprise with the strength of collective ownership [citation:original]. Bringing cooperative entities and self-help groups into the mainstream of MSME policy through tailored support and scheme convergence can unlock new avenues for employment, enterprise growth, and value creation [citation:original].

The Union Budget FY 2026-27 reinforces this growth framework by positioning MSMEs and cooperatives as key pillars of India’s competitiveness and manufacturing resilience . Key initiatives include:

  • ₹10,000 crore SME Growth Fund: To provide equity support to MSMEs .

  • Additional ₹2,000 crore infusion into the SRI Fund: To strengthen enterprise growth and employment generation .

  • Strengthened credit guarantee support through CGTMSE: To improve access to collateral-free finance for micro and small enterprises .


5. Challenges and the Road Ahead

Despite the significant progress, several challenges remain:

  • Formalization: A significant portion of MSMEs remains informal. The government’s efforts through Udyam registration and other digital platforms must continue to bring more enterprises into the formal fold .

  • Access to Finance: While credit guarantee schemes have improved access, many micro and small enterprises still face challenges in obtaining timely and affordable credit .

  • Technology Adoption: The digital divide remains a barrier for many MSMEs, particularly in rural areas. Continuous efforts are needed to bridge this gap .

  • Regulatory Ease: Simplifying compliance and reducing the regulatory burden on MSMEs and cooperatives is essential for their growth .

  • Infrastructure Limits: In the cooperative sector, infrastructure limits and labour shortages continue to pose challenges to expansion, as seen in the context of Bharat Taxi’s national rollout .


6. Conclusion: A People-Centric Growth Model

The convergence of MSME Day 2026 and the sixth anniversary of the Ministry of Cooperation represents a defining moment for India’s inclusive growth journey. MSMEs and cooperatives, once considered peripheral to the formal economy, are now recognized as central to the vision of Viksit Bharat @ 2047. The digital transformation of the MSME ecosystem, the strategic vision of the National Cooperation Policy 2025, and the transformative impact of schemes like PM Vishwakarma all point toward a future where grassroots enterprise and collective ownership power India’s economic ascent. As Vice President Radhakrishnan aptly noted, MSMEs embody the courage of first-generation entrepreneurs, the aspirations of youth, the determination of women entrepreneurs, and the resilience of millions of small businesses . By unlocking the full potential of these sectors through enterprise formalization, regulatory ease, and equity finance, India can ensure that prosperity travels into its villages, small towns, and emerging enterprise clusters, building a developed, prosperous, and inclusive nation by 2047 .

5 Questions & Answers on MSMEs, Cooperatives, and Viksit Bharat

Q1. What is the significance of MSME Day 2026, and what major initiatives were launched on this occasion?

A: MSME Day 2026, celebrated on June 27, provided an opportunity to recognize the vital role of MSMEs in driving economic growth, innovation, and inclusive development . On this occasion, Vice President Shri C. P. Radhakrishnan launched a suite of transformative digital platforms, including PMEGP 2.0 Portal, SAMADHAAN 2.0 Portal, Procurement and Marketing Support (PMS) Portal, MSME Global Mart 2.0 Portal, MSME Testing Portal, and MSME Idea Hackathon 6.0 . These platforms aim to simplify beneficiary lifecycle management, enable reporting of pending MSME dues, connect MSMEs with trade fairs and exhibitions, and promote innovation and technology adoption among MSMEs .

Q2. What is the National Cooperation Policy (NCP) 2025, and what are its key strategic pillars?

A: The NCP 2025, dedicated to the nation on July 24, 2025, is a strategic roadmap for revitalizing India’s cooperative sector to meet the goal of Viksit Bharat @ 2047 . Rooted in the ethos of Sahkar-se-Samriddhi (prosperity through cooperation), the policy is structured around six mission pillars: (1) Strengthening the Foundation through legal reforms and digitalization, (2) Promoting Vibrancy by creating business ecosystems, (3) Making Cooperatives Future-Ready through technology integration, (4) Promoting Inclusivity and deepening reach, (5) Entering New and Emerging Sectors such as clean energy and aggregator services, and (6) Shaping the Young Generation for cooperative growth through education and training . The policy aims to transform cooperatives into professionally managed, technology-enabled, and vibrant economic entities .

Q3. What is the PM Vishwakarma Scheme, and what are its key achievements?

A: Launched on September 17, 2023, the PM Vishwakarma Scheme aims to strengthen the livelihoods of traditional artisans and craftspeople by combining heritage preservation with modern enterprise support . With a financial outlay of ₹13,000 crore, the scheme provides skill development, credit, toolkit incentives, and market linkages to artisans . As of September 2025, around 30 lakh artisans had registered under the scheme, with over 4.7 lakh loans worth ₹41,188 crore approved . The scheme covers 18 family-based traditional trades, with raajmistri (mason) being the most registered trade .

Q4. How is the cooperative sector being digitally transformed in India?

A: The cooperative sector is experiencing a significant digital transformation through various initiatives. The DigiHaat e-commerce marketplace, built on the ONDC network, launched a ‘Sahkar Se Samriddhi’ campaign to promote cooperative products online . The Bharat Taxi cooperative mobility platform has enrolled around 7 lakh driver-members and plans to expand to more than 500 cities . The National Cooperation Policy 2025 also envisions the development of a national ‘Cooperative Stack’ integrating with Agri-stack and databases, and promoting integration with ONDC and GeM platforms .

Q5. What challenges must be addressed to unlock the full potential of MSMEs and cooperatives in India?

A: Several challenges remain to be addressed to unlock the full potential of MSMEs and cooperatives. These include: (1) Formalization—a significant portion of MSMEs remains informal, and efforts to bring them into the formal fold must continue , (2) Access to Finance—many micro and small enterprises still face challenges in obtaining timely and affordable credit , (3) Technology Adoption—the digital divide remains a barrier, particularly in rural areas , (4) Regulatory Ease—simplifying compliance and reducing the regulatory burden is essential , and (5) Infrastructure Limits—in the cooperative sector, infrastructure constraints and labour shortages pose challenges to expansion .


Stress in State Finances – The Growing Challenge of Fiscal Consolidation

1. Introduction: The Return of Fiscal Stress

The recent assembly elections in Kerala, Tamil Nadu, and West Bengal have brought state finances back into sharp focus. New governments in the first two states have tabled white papers on “State Finances” to place on record the challenges they have inherited. This is not merely a political exercise—it is a sobering acknowledgment that India’s states, the engines of welfare delivery and infrastructure investment, are facing mounting fiscal pressure . The need for fiscal consolidation, which took a backseat during the pandemic years, is now firmly back on the table.

The white papers reveal a troubling picture of rising debt levels, high committed expenditure, and a slowdown in own tax revenues . But the pressing question is whether these challenges are specific to Kerala and Tamil Nadu, or symptomatic of a more widespread phenomenon . This analysis examines the fiscal stress across Indian states, the structural factors driving it, and the policy options available to restore fiscal health.


2. The White Papers: A Tale of Two States

2.1 Kerala: The Structural Crisis

Kerala’s white paper, presented by Chief Minister V D Satheesan, paints a grim picture of structural fiscal imbalance. The state’s outstanding debt is estimated at approximately ₹5.07 trillion, or around 35.5% of Gross State Domestic Product (GSDP)—one of the highest among Indian states .

The most alarming metric is the share of committed expenditure. Salaries, pensions, retirement benefits, and interest payments together absorb around 77-80% of revenue receipts . This leaves barely one-fifth of revenues available for all other spending, including healthcare, education, agriculture, local governments, and capital projects . Kerala’s capital expenditure is estimated at just 1.3% of GSDP, among the lowest in the country .

Interest payments alone account for 20.9% of revenue receipts, nearly double the national average of 12.2% . Salaries and pensions also exceed peer state levels, with salaries at 30.1% of revenue receipts in 2025-26 .

The white paper also flags the burden of accumulated payment arrears: ₹21,670 crore for dearness allowance and ₹14,387 crore under dearness relief. Together with other deferred payments, the total inherited liability is around ₹48,733 crore, almost as large as Kerala’s net annual borrowing .

The report recommends several hard political decisions:

  • Raising the retirement age from 56 to 60 years (in line with the Centre) to save approximately ₹6,000 crore for each year of increase 

  • Limiting pay commissions to once every ten years as in the central government 

  • Bringing KIIFB under budgetary control and subjecting it to performance audit 

  • Creating conditions for massive private investment due to acute resource shortages 

2.2 Tamil Nadu: The Collapse of Own-Tax Effort

Tamil Nadu’s white paper, presented by Finance Minister N. Marie Wilson, describes what analysts have termed a “collapse” of the state’s own-tax effort . The State’s Own Tax Revenue (SOTR) to GSDP ratio fell from 5.93% in 2021-22 to a historic low of 5.45% in 2025-26—the steepest decline among peer states . This is a sharp fall from the historical peak of 8.94% recorded in 2006-07 .

The cumulative drop from this peak means approximately ₹1.23 lakh crore in annual revenue has been foregone, representing roughly 90% of the provisional fiscal deficit for 2025-26 .

The white paper attributes the decline to “leakages and systemic corruption” within revenue-collecting departments rather than external economic forces . The decline is spread across all major tax heads—GST, VAT on petroleum, State Excise, Stamp Duty, and Motor Vehicle Tax .

The state’s outstanding debt stands at ₹13.18 trillion, around 28.3% of GSDP, above the 25% threshold under the fiscal responsibility framework . This compares with Gujarat at 17.6%, Maharashtra at 19.7%, and Karnataka at 23.4% .

Committed expenditure—including salaries, pensions, and interest—rose from ₹1.25 trillion to ₹1.89 trillion, lifting its share of revenue receipts from about 60% to 64% . Interest payments as a share of SOTR escalated from 33.83% in 2021-22 to a provisional 34.83% in 2025-26 . More than one-third of every rupee raised through internal taxation now goes directly to servicing past debt .


3. A Widespread Phenomenon: The National Picture

The fiscal challenges highlighted in the Kerala and Tamil Nadu white papers are not isolated cases. There is clear evidence of increasing fiscal stress across states .

3.1 Slowdown in Revenue Growth

The pre-Covid period witnessed an average annual growth rate in revenue receipts of over 10% for all states taken together. During 2019-21, it dropped close to zero. In the next two years, there was a sharp increase—25% in 2021-22 and 13% in 2022-23—followed by a clear slowdown: 8% in 2023-24 and 6.8% in 2024-25 .

States’ own tax revenues show a similar trend: growth over 10% in the pre-Covid period, compression during Covid, a surge for two years, and then moderation—13% in 2023-24, 4% in 2024-25, and 5% in 2025-26 .

With nominal GDP growth of 9% in the last two years, the ratio of own tax revenues to GDP for states has registered a decline . According to a CAG report, 12 out of 18 major states have seen their SOTR-to-GSDP ratio fall between 2015-16 and 2024-25 . Bihar recorded the steepest fall, followed by Tamil Nadu .

3.2 Rising Revenue Deficits

The number of major states reporting a revenue surplus increased to nine in 2022-23, but has since declined—eight in 2023-24, six in 2024-25, and five in 2025-26 . In FY26, as per estimates, nine of the 18 major states are running revenue deficits . These include Himachal Pradesh (-2.4%), Punjab (-2.2%), Kerala (-2.1%), Andhra Pradesh (-1.1%), and others .

The number of major states using more than 50% of the fiscal deficit to finance the revenue deficit has increased from four in 2023-24 to six in 2024-25 and eight in 2025-26 . This indicates that borrowing is increasingly being used to fund consumption rather than asset creation—a violation of the “golden rule” of fiscal financing .

3.3 Debt and Interest Burden

As per the Economic Survey, state government debt to GDP stood at 28.1% in FY25, and interest payments to revenue receipts at 12.6% . However, there is considerable variation among states, with debt levels ranging from over 55% of GSDP to less than 20% .

Punjab faces the highest stress, spending 22.8% of its revenue receipts on interest payments . Kerala, Karnataka, and Maharashtra also spend more than 15% of their revenue receipts on interest payments .


4. Structural Factors Driving Fiscal Stress

4.1 Demographic Shifts and Ageing Populations

The Reserve Bank of India has noted that by 2026, Kerala and Tamil Nadu are expected to enter the “ageing category” with more than 15% of their population above age 60 . Ageing states face high old-age dependency ratios and rising social sector expenditure obligations . This demographic transition adds structural pressure to state finances.

4.2 The GST Impact and Revenue Autonomy

States have lost some fiscal autonomy after the roll-out of GST . However, GST accounts for just 43.4% of states’ own tax revenue . States retain policy autonomy over other tax heads like stamp duty, motor vehicle taxes, and excise duties on alcohol. The variation in performance across these tax heads suggests that poor revenue performance cannot be entirely blamed on GST .

The end of GST compensation and revenue deficit grants from the Centre, coupled with stricter fiscal deficit targets, have further worsened the situation for many states .

4.3 Rising Populist Expenditure

The Economic Survey has flagged the rising popularity of unconditional cash transfers among state governments as a risk to expenditure quality . These cash transfers are mostly targeted at women and are estimated at ₹1.7 lakh crore in FY26 (0.5% of GDP), ranging from 0.2% to as high as 1.25% of GSDP across states .

The survey highlighted that these schemes are not associated with a sunset clause, adding to the burden of committed expenditure . A Hindustan Times analysis notes that populist schemes have become a necessary condition to win elections, leading to a situation where even good performers on the revenue front, such as Maharashtra, have seen their fiscal health worsen .

4.4 Off-Budget Borrowing and Contingent Liabilities

Both Kerala and Tamil Nadu white papers flag concerns about liabilities on account of public-sector enterprises and off-budget borrowing vehicles like KIIFB in Kerala . These parallel financial structures deplete resources and create additional liabilities without being captured in headline debt figures .


5. The Outliers: States with Revenue Surpluses

Despite the general trend of fiscal stress, some states have been able to consistently maintain revenue surpluses. These include Gujarat, Jharkhand, Madhya Pradesh, Odisha, and Uttar Pradesh . They represent a mix of high-income and middle-income states, mineral-rich states, and states dependent on the agricultural sector . For FY26-27, states projecting revenue surpluses include Odisha (3%), Jharkhand (2.5%), Uttar Pradesh (1.6%), Goa (1.3%), Gujarat (0.8%), Telangana (0.3%), and Bihar (0.1%) .

What explains this divergence? Revenue surplus states are aided by lower interest payments, providing them with resources for higher capital outlay . In Telangana, interest payments as a percentage of revenue receipts are pegged at 8.8%, while it is in double digits in stressed states like Maharashtra (11.4%) and Karnataka (16.9%) .

Some states like Odisha demonstrate that a high fiscal deficit (3.5% of GSDP) can coexist with a revenue surplus (3%) when the deficit is driven by deliberate capital outlay (6.5% of GSDP) rather than consumption expenditure .


6. The Policy Options: Restoring Fiscal Health

The path to fiscal consolidation requires action on both sides of the ledger—augmenting revenues and restructuring expenditures .

6.1 Augmenting Revenues
  • Improving Tax Administration: The Tamil Nadu white paper’s finding that revenue decline is linked to “leakages and systemic corruption” points to the potential gains from improved tax administration . Digitization and transparency can help plug leakages.

  • Rationalizing GST: The proposed GST rate rationalisation may impact state revenues in the short term, but a more stable and efficient tax structure could improve collections in the long run .

  • Diversifying Revenue Streams: States need to strengthen collections from non-GST tax heads like stamp duty, excise, and motor vehicle taxes through policy reforms and digitization .

  • Natural Resource Taxation: Mineral-rich states can leverage mining revenues, but there is scope for a more coherent natural resource taxation policy .

6.2 Restructuring Expenditures
  • Controlling Committed Expenditure: Kerala’s proposal to raise the retirement age and limit pay commissions are examples of hard decisions needed to control salary and pension burdens .

  • Rationalizing Subsidies and Welfare Schemes: The Economic Survey’s call for sunset clauses on unconditional cash transfers is a step toward ensuring that welfare schemes do not become permanent fiscal burdens .

  • Prioritizing Capital Expenditure: States need to protect capex budgets, as infrastructure investment has high fiscal multipliers and generates long-term growth .

  • Improving Efficiency of Public Sector Enterprises: The white papers’ focus on liabilities of public-sector enterprises underscores the need for performance improvement and potential restructuring.

6.3 The Federal Dimension
  • Fiscal Deficit Flexibility: Some economists argue that states require greater flexibility under fiscal responsibility norms, particularly for productive capital expenditure . The Centre has provided 50-year interest-free loans for capital investment, but states need more sustainable fiscal space .

  • Performance-Based Transfers: The 16th Finance Commission has introduced compliance-driven grants (20% performance-based). States should focus on reforms to unlock these funds .

  • Timely Data Dissemination: The Economic Survey recommends timely, granular, and standardized dissemination of state-level fiscal data, including off-budget liabilities, to enable better market assessment and accountability .


7. Conclusion: A Defining Moment for Fiscal Federalism

The fiscal stress in state finances is not merely a Kerala or Tamil Nadu problem—it is a national challenge that requires urgent attention. The slowdown in revenue growth, the rising burden of committed expenditure, and the proliferation of populist schemes are squeezing fiscal space across states .

The white papers from Kerala and Tamil Nadu serve as important diagnostic tools, identifying the challenges as the first step toward mitigation . But diagnosis must be followed by action—both at the state level, through expenditure restructuring and revenue augmentation, and at the federal level, through a more balanced fiscal framework that recognizes the varying needs and capacities of states.

The “golden rule” of fiscal financing—that borrowing should fund investment, not consumption—remains a crucial benchmark . States that violate this rule are not only undermining their own fiscal health but also risking higher sovereign borrowing costs for the entire country .

As the author of the original analysis notes, one emerging concern—the fiscal cost of expanded welfare programmes in the context of jobless growth—has been missed in the white papers . This is a question that will need to be addressed in any comprehensive framework for expenditure restructuring. The path to Viksit Bharat requires fiscal consolidation, and that journey must begin now.

5 Questions & Answers on State Finances and Fiscal Stress

Q1. What are the key findings of the Kerala and Tamil Nadu white papers on state finances?

A: The Kerala white paper reveals a structural fiscal imbalance with committed expenditure (salaries, pensions, interest) absorbing about 77-80% of revenue receipts, leaving limited space for capital expenditure at just 1.3% of GSDP . The state’s outstanding debt is ₹5.07 trillion (35.5% of GSDP) . The Tamil Nadu white paper highlights a “collapse” of the state’s own-tax effort, with the SOTR-to-GSDP ratio falling to a historic low of 5.45% in 2025-26 . The state’s debt stands at ₹13.18 trillion (28.3% of GSDP), and committed expenditure has risen to 64% of revenue receipts .

Q2. Is the fiscal stress limited to Kerala and Tamil Nadu, or is it more widespread?

A: The fiscal stress is widespread. According to a CAG report, 12 out of 18 major states have seen their SOTR-to-GSDP ratio decline between 2015-16 and 2024-25 . The number of states reporting revenue surpluses has declined from nine in 2022-23 to five in 2025-26, while the number using more than 50% of fiscal deficit to finance revenue deficits has increased from four to eight in the same period . Nine of the 18 major states are projected to run revenue deficits in FY26 .

Q3. What is the “golden rule” of fiscal financing, and why does it matter?

A: The “golden rule” states that a government should borrow only to invest in capital projects, not to fund day-to-day consumption spending . This ensures intergenerational equity (future generations who benefit from infrastructure also help repay the debt), promotes economic growth (infrastructure investment has high fiscal multipliers), and enforces fiscal discipline . When states run revenue deficits, they are borrowing to fund salaries, subsidies, and other consumption, violating this rule .

Q4. What structural factors are driving fiscal stress in Indian states?

A: Key factors include: (1) Demographic ageing in states like Kerala and Tamil Nadu, raising social sector expenditure ; (2) Loss of fiscal autonomy after GST rollout, though GST accounts for only 43.4% of SOTR ; (3) Rising populist expenditure on unconditional cash transfers, estimated at ₹1.7 lakh crore in FY26 ; (4) Off-budget borrowings and liabilities of public-sector enterprises ; and (5) The end of GST compensation and revenue deficit grants from the Centre .

Q5. What policy options are available to address state fiscal stress?

A: Options include: (1) Augmenting revenues through improved tax administration, rationalizing GST, and strengthening non-GST tax collections ; (2) Restructuring expenditures by controlling committed expenditure (e.g., raising retirement age), rationalizing welfare schemes with sunset clauses, and prioritizing capital expenditure ; (3) At the federal level, providing greater fiscal flexibility for productive capex, implementing performance-based transfers as recommended by the 16th Finance Commission, and ensuring timely dissemination of fiscal data .


Stress in State Finances – The Growing Challenge of Fiscal Consolidation


1. Introduction: The Return of Fiscal Stress

The recent assembly elections in Kerala, Tamil Nadu, and West Bengal have brought state finances back into sharp focus. New governments in the first two states have tabled white papers on “State Finances” to place on record the challenges they have inherited. This is not merely a political exercise—it is a sobering acknowledgment that India’s states, the engines of welfare delivery and infrastructure investment, are facing mounting fiscal pressure. The need for fiscal consolidation, which took a backseat during the pandemic years, is now firmly back on the table.

The white papers reveal a troubling picture of rising debt levels, high committed expenditure, and a slowdown in own tax revenues. But the pressing question is whether these challenges are specific to Kerala and Tamil Nadu, or symptomatic of a more widespread phenomenon. This analysis examines the fiscal stress across Indian states, the structural factors driving it, and the policy options available to restore fiscal health.


2. The White Papers: A Tale of Two States

2.1 Kerala: The Structural Crisis

Kerala’s white paper, presented by Chief Minister V D Satheesan, paints a grim picture of structural fiscal imbalance. The state’s outstanding debt is estimated at approximately ₹5.07 trillion, or around 35.5% of Gross State Domestic Product (GSDP)—one of the highest among Indian states.

The most alarming metric is the share of committed expenditure. Salaries, pensions, retirement benefits, and interest payments together absorb around 77-80% of revenue receipts. This leaves barely one-fifth of revenues available for all other spending, including healthcare, education, agriculture, local governments, and capital projects. Kerala’s capital expenditure is estimated at just 1.3% of GSDP, among the lowest in the country.

Interest payments alone account for 20.9% of revenue receipts, nearly double the national average of 12.2%. Salaries and pensions also exceed peer state levels, with salaries at 30.1% of revenue receipts in 2025-26.

The white paper also flags the burden of accumulated payment arrears: ₹21,670 crore for dearness allowance and ₹14,387 crore under dearness relief. Together with other deferred payments, the total inherited liability is around ₹48,733 crore, almost as large as Kerala’s net annual borrowing.

The report recommends several hard political decisions:

  • Raising the retirement age from 56 to 60 years (in line with the Centre) to save approximately ₹6,000 crore for each year of increase

  • Limiting pay commissions to once every ten years as in the central government

  • Bringing KIIFB under budgetary control and subjecting it to performance audit

  • Creating conditions for massive private investment due to acute resource shortages

2.2 Tamil Nadu: The Collapse of Own-Tax Effort

Tamil Nadu’s white paper, presented by Finance Minister N. Marie Wilson, describes what analysts have termed a “collapse” of the state’s own-tax effort. The State’s Own Tax Revenue (SOTR) to GSDP ratio fell from 5.93% in 2021-22 to a historic low of 5.45% in 2025-26—the steepest decline among peer states. This is a sharp fall from the historical peak of 8.94% recorded in 2006-07.

The cumulative drop from this peak means approximately ₹1.23 lakh crore in annual revenue has been foregone, representing roughly 90% of the provisional fiscal deficit for 2025-26.

The white paper attributes the decline to “leakages and systemic corruption” within revenue-collecting departments rather than external economic forces. The decline is spread across all major tax heads—GST, VAT on petroleum, State Excise, Stamp Duty, and Motor Vehicle Tax.

The state’s outstanding debt stands at ₹13.18 trillion, around 28.3% of GSDP, above the 25% threshold under the fiscal responsibility framework. This compares with Gujarat at 17.6%, Maharashtra at 19.7%, and Karnataka at 23.4%.

Committed expenditure—including salaries, pensions, and interest—rose from ₹1.25 trillion to ₹1.89 trillion, lifting its share of revenue receipts from about 60% to 64%. Interest payments as a share of SOTR escalated from 33.83% in 2021-22 to a provisional 34.83% in 2025-26. More than one-third of every rupee raised through internal taxation now goes directly to servicing past debt.


3. A Widespread Phenomenon: The National Picture

The fiscal challenges highlighted in the Kerala and Tamil Nadu white papers are not isolated cases. There is clear evidence of increasing fiscal stress across states.

3.1 Slowdown in Revenue Growth

The pre-Covid period witnessed an average annual growth rate in revenue receipts of over 10% for all states taken together. During 2019-21, it dropped close to zero. In the next two years, there was a sharp increase—25% in 2021-22 and 13% in 2022-23—followed by a clear slowdown: 8% in 2023-24 and 6.8% in 2024-25.

States’ own tax revenues show a similar trend: growth over 10% in the pre-Covid period, compression during Covid, a surge for two years, and then moderation—13% in 2023-24, 4% in 2024-25, and 5% in 2025-26.

With nominal GDP growth of 9% in the last two years, the ratio of own tax revenues to GDP for states has registered a decline. According to a CAG report, 12 out of 18 major states have seen their SOTR-to-GSDP ratio fall between 2015-16 and 2024-25. Bihar recorded the steepest fall, followed by Tamil Nadu.

3.2 Rising Revenue Deficits

The number of major states reporting a revenue surplus increased to nine in 2022-23, but has since declined—eight in 2023-24, six in 2024-25, and five in 2025-26. In FY26, as per estimates, nine of the 18 major states are running revenue deficits. These include Himachal Pradesh (-2.4%), Punjab (-2.2%), Kerala (-2.1%), Andhra Pradesh (-1.1%), and others.

The number of major states using more than 50% of the fiscal deficit to finance the revenue deficit has increased from four in 2023-24 to six in 2024-25 and eight in 2025-26. This indicates that borrowing is increasingly being used to fund consumption rather than asset creation—a violation of the “golden rule” of fiscal financing.

3.3 Debt and Interest Burden

As per the Economic Survey, state government debt to GDP stood at 28.1% in FY25, and interest payments to revenue receipts at 12.6%. However, there is considerable variation among states, with debt levels ranging from over 55% of GSDP to less than 20%.

Punjab faces the highest stress, spending 22.8% of its revenue receipts on interest payments. Kerala, Karnataka, and Maharashtra also spend more than 15% of their revenue receipts on interest payments.


4. Structural Factors Driving Fiscal Stress

4.1 Demographic Shifts and Ageing Populations

The Reserve Bank of India has noted that by 2026, Kerala and Tamil Nadu are expected to enter the “ageing category” with more than 15% of their population above age 60. Ageing states face high old-age dependency ratios and rising social sector expenditure obligations. This demographic transition adds structural pressure to state finances.

4.2 The GST Impact and Revenue Autonomy

States have lost some fiscal autonomy after the roll-out of GST. However, GST accounts for just 43.4% of states’ own tax revenue. States retain policy autonomy over other tax heads like stamp duty, motor vehicle taxes, and excise duties on alcohol. The variation in performance across these tax heads suggests that poor revenue performance cannot be entirely blamed on GST.

The end of GST compensation and revenue deficit grants from the Centre, coupled with stricter fiscal deficit targets, have further worsened the situation for many states.

4.3 Rising Populist Expenditure

The Economic Survey has flagged the rising popularity of unconditional cash transfers among state governments as a risk to expenditure quality. These cash transfers are mostly targeted at women and are estimated at ₹1.7 lakh crore in FY26 (0.5% of GDP), ranging from 0.2% to as high as 1.25% of GSDP across states.

The survey highlighted that these schemes are not associated with a sunset clause, adding to the burden of committed expenditure. A Hindustan Times analysis notes that populist schemes have become a necessary condition to win elections, leading to a situation where even good performers on the revenue front, such as Maharashtra, have seen their fiscal health worsen.

4.4 Off-Budget Borrowing and Contingent Liabilities

Both Kerala and Tamil Nadu white papers flag concerns about liabilities on account of public-sector enterprises and off-budget borrowing vehicles like KIIFB in Kerala. These parallel financial structures deplete resources and create additional liabilities without being captured in headline debt figures.


5. The Outliers: States with Revenue Surpluses

Despite the general trend of fiscal stress, some states have been able to consistently maintain revenue surpluses. These include Gujarat, Jharkhand, Madhya Pradesh, Odisha, and Uttar Pradesh. They represent a mix of high-income and middle-income states, mineral-rich states, and states dependent on the agricultural sector. For FY26-27, states projecting revenue surpluses include Odisha (3%), Jharkhand (2.5%), Uttar Pradesh (1.6%), Goa (1.3%), Gujarat (0.8%), Telangana (0.3%), and Bihar (0.1%).

What explains this divergence? Revenue surplus states are aided by lower interest payments, providing them with resources for higher capital outlay. In Telangana, interest payments as a percentage of revenue receipts are pegged at 8.8%, while it is in double digits in stressed states like Maharashtra (11.4%) and Karnataka (16.9%).

Some states like Odisha demonstrate that a high fiscal deficit (3.5% of GSDP) can coexist with a revenue surplus (3%) when the deficit is driven by deliberate capital outlay (6.5% of GSDP) rather than consumption expenditure.


6. The Policy Options: Restoring Fiscal Health

The path to fiscal consolidation requires action on both sides of the ledger—augmenting revenues and restructuring expenditures.

6.1 Augmenting Revenues
  • Improving Tax Administration: The Tamil Nadu white paper’s finding that revenue decline is linked to “leakages and systemic corruption” points to the potential gains from improved tax administration. Digitization and transparency can help plug leakages.

  • Rationalizing GST: The proposed GST rate rationalisation may impact state revenues in the short term, but a more stable and efficient tax structure could improve collections in the long run.

  • Diversifying Revenue Streams: States need to strengthen collections from non-GST tax heads like stamp duty, excise, and motor vehicle taxes through policy reforms and digitization.

  • Natural Resource Taxation: Mineral-rich states can leverage mining revenues, but there is scope for a more coherent natural resource taxation policy.

6.2 Restructuring Expenditures
  • Controlling Committed Expenditure: Kerala’s proposal to raise the retirement age and limit pay commissions are examples of hard decisions needed to control salary and pension burdens.

  • Rationalizing Subsidies and Welfare Schemes: The Economic Survey’s call for sunset clauses on unconditional cash transfers is a step toward ensuring that welfare schemes do not become permanent fiscal burdens.

  • Prioritizing Capital Expenditure: States need to protect capex budgets, as infrastructure investment has high fiscal multipliers and generates long-term growth.

  • Improving Efficiency of Public Sector Enterprises: The white papers’ focus on liabilities of public-sector enterprises underscores the need for performance improvement and potential restructuring.

6.3 The Federal Dimension
  • Fiscal Deficit Flexibility: Some economists argue that states require greater flexibility under fiscal responsibility norms, particularly for productive capital expenditure. The Centre has provided 50-year interest-free loans for capital investment, but states need more sustainable fiscal space.

  • Performance-Based Transfers: The 16th Finance Commission has introduced compliance-driven grants (20% performance-based). States should focus on reforms to unlock these funds.

  • Timely Data Dissemination: The Economic Survey recommends timely, granular, and standardized dissemination of state-level fiscal data, including off-budget liabilities, to enable better market assessment and accountability.


7. The Missing Concern: Welfare Expenditure and Jobless Growth

While the big-picture questions on state finances have been flagged in the white papers, one emerging concern seems to have been missed. Macroeconomic conditions in the economy are raising certain concerns, the foremost among them being the challenge in generating an adequate number of productive jobs. Technological change seems to suggest a further exacerbation of this challenge.

In this context, there is a shift in policy in favour of expanded welfare programmes. These range from income supplements, to free food, to free electricity and transport as well as health care. While each of these is a worthy cause in and of itself, these initiatives imply a fiscal cost. One question that could have been asked is whether there could and/or should be a framework on the scale and composition of such schemes. This could be an important element in any proposed restructuring of expenditures.

The Economic Survey has already flagged this concern, noting that the rising popularity of unconditional cash transfers among state governments poses a risk to expenditure quality. Without a clear sunset clause or a framework for rationalizing such schemes, they risk becoming permanent fiscal burdens that crowd out productive capital expenditure.


8. Conclusion: A Defining Moment for Fiscal Federalism

The fiscal stress in state finances is not merely a Kerala or Tamil Nadu problem—it is a national challenge that requires urgent attention. The slowdown in revenue growth, the rising burden of committed expenditure, and the proliferation of populist schemes are squeezing fiscal space across states.

The white papers from Kerala and Tamil Nadu serve as important diagnostic tools, identifying the challenges as the first step toward mitigation. But diagnosis must be followed by action—both at the state level, through expenditure restructuring and revenue augmentation, and at the federal level, through a more balanced fiscal framework that recognizes the varying needs and capacities of states.

The “golden rule” of fiscal financing—that borrowing should fund investment, not consumption—remains a crucial benchmark. States that violate this rule are not only undermining their own fiscal health but also risking higher sovereign borrowing costs for the entire country.

As the author of the original analysis notes, one emerging concern—the fiscal cost of expanded welfare programmes in the context of jobless growth—has been missed in the white papers. This is a question that will need to be addressed in any comprehensive framework for expenditure restructuring. The path to Viksit Bharat requires fiscal consolidation, and that journey must begin now.

5 Questions & Answers on State Finances and Fiscal Stress

Q1. What are the key findings of the Kerala and Tamil Nadu white papers on state finances?

A: The Kerala white paper reveals a structural fiscal imbalance with committed expenditure (salaries, pensions, interest) absorbing about 77-80% of revenue receipts, leaving limited space for capital expenditure at just 1.3% of GSDP. The state’s outstanding debt is ₹5.07 trillion (35.5% of GSDP). The Tamil Nadu white paper highlights a “collapse” of the state’s own-tax effort, with the SOTR-to-GSDP ratio falling to a historic low of 5.45% in 2025-26. The state’s debt stands at ₹13.18 trillion (28.3% of GSDP), and committed expenditure has risen to 64% of revenue receipts.

Q2. Is the fiscal stress limited to Kerala and Tamil Nadu, or is it more widespread?

A: The fiscal stress is widespread. According to a CAG report, 12 out of 18 major states have seen their SOTR-to-GSDP ratio decline between 2015-16 and 2024-25. The number of states reporting revenue surpluses has declined from nine in 2022-23 to five in 2025-26, while the number using more than 50% of fiscal deficit to finance revenue deficits has increased from four to eight in the same period. Nine of the 18 major states are projected to run revenue deficits in FY26.

Q3. What is the “golden rule” of fiscal financing, and why does it matter?

A: The “golden rule” states that a government should borrow only to invest in capital projects, not to fund day-to-day consumption spending. This ensures intergenerational equity (future generations who benefit from infrastructure also help repay the debt), promotes economic growth (infrastructure investment has high fiscal multipliers), and enforces fiscal discipline. When states run revenue deficits, they are borrowing to fund salaries, subsidies, and other consumption, violating this rule.

Q4. What structural factors are driving fiscal stress in Indian states?

A: Key factors include: (1) Demographic ageing in states like Kerala and Tamil Nadu, raising social sector expenditure; (2) Loss of fiscal autonomy after GST rollout, though GST accounts for only 43.4% of SOTR; (3) Rising populist expenditure on unconditional cash transfers, estimated at ₹1.7 lakh crore in FY26; (4) Off-budget borrowings and liabilities of public-sector enterprises; and (5) The end of GST compensation and revenue deficit grants from the Centre.

Q5. What policy options are available to address state fiscal stress?

A: Options include: (1) Augmenting revenues through improved tax administration, rationalizing GST, and strengthening non-GST tax collections; (2) Restructuring expenditures by controlling committed expenditure (e.g., raising retirement age), rationalizing welfare schemes with sunset clauses, and prioritizing capital expenditure; (3) At the federal level, providing greater fiscal flexibility for productive capex, implementing performance-based transfers as recommended by the 16th Finance Commission, and ensuring timely dissemination of fiscal data.


Trump’s Un-American Capitalism – The Erosion of a Free Market

The specter of “crony capitalism” has long haunted developing economies, but a recent Nobel laureate’s critique suggests it is now becoming a defining feature of American governance under President Donald Trump. The argument, which frames the current administration’s approach as a departure from American ideals and a convergence with Chinese or Russian models, is built on the claim that rule-based markets are being replaced by “thuggish capitalism” driven by political favoritism.

The central accusation is that the U.S. is moving away from “strict private ownership” and impersonal regulation toward a system where government intervention is wielded to serve political interests and extract concessions from corporations. While some intervention in nascent industries, particularly AI, may be warranted, the author argues that the Trump administration’s methods lack institutional guardrails, representing a fundamental threat to American prosperity and democracy.

The Case Against “Thuggish Capitalism”

The critique, as presented, can be broken down into several key pillars:

  1. Convergence with Authoritarian Models: The author asserts a “convergence” of the U.S. economic model with that of China or Russia. In these countries, the government often holds sway over private firms through opaque or coercive arrangements. While a U.S. administration engaging in such practices is framed as an anomaly, the critique argues that the Trump model has normalized this approach.

  2. Erosion of Institutional Integrity: The author posits that the administration eschews “institutionalized, impersonal, transparent processes” in favor of ad hoc, opaque “self-dealing.” Examples cited include:

    • AI Share Cessions: Reports of the administration pushing AI firms like Anthropic to “voluntarily” cede shares to the government.

    • Nvidia and AMD Export Bans: The administration reportedly demanded a 15% cut of sales to China in exchange for lifting national security-driven export bans, suggesting a direct trade of geopolitical leverage for financial extortion.

  3. Undermining Corporate Taxation: The critique highlights that corporate tax revenues, which ensure shared benefits from economic activity, have halved as a share of GDP since the 1970s, even as corporate profits have soared. This, combined with the reported extortion of tech firms, is characterized as a betrayal of the social contract.

  4. AI Regulation as a Tool of Oligarchs: An executive order on AI regulation is framed as reflecting the influence of tech oligarchs, specifically avoiding mandatory licensing and thus failing to provide meaningful public safeguards.

  5. Threat to Democracy and Prosperity: The author draws on economic history to argue that “strong institutions, including the rule of law, are essential to achieve sustained improvements in living standards.” The administration’s brand of “oligarchic competition,” where success depends on “flattering the mad king” rather than innovation, is seen as undermining this foundation.

Implications for the U.S. and Global Economy

The critique raises several profound implications for the U.S. and the global order:

  • Undermining U.S. Leadership: The U.S. has historically championed the “rules-based market economy.” If it abandons this for a system of “crony capitalism,” it creates a vacuum in global economic governance. It risks signaling to other nations that rule of law is optional and that political loyalty is the path to success.

  • Shifting the Burden to Consumers: High corporate profits often rely on public goods like infrastructure and education. By cutting taxes, the government shifts the burden of maintaining these public goods onto households, potentially distorting the economy in favor of short-term private returns over long-term social investment.

  • Internal Erosion: The critique argues that such corruption undermines democracy from within, as businesses seeking favor invest more in “flattery” than in productive innovation, leading to resource misallocation.

Ultimately, the argument suggests that while the U.S. has a history of industrial policy and regulation, the Trump administration’s version is unique in its brazenness and lack of principle. It posits that the U.S. is at a crossroads: return to a foundation of robust institutional oversight, or succumb to a model where the economy is a plaything for the politically connected.

5 Questions & Answers on Trump’s Un-American Capitalism

Q1. What is the central thesis of the critique regarding Trump’s economic policies?
A: The critique argues that Trump’s economic policies represent a shift away from traditional American-style capitalism (characterized by private ownership and rule of law) toward a “thuggish capitalism” akin to China or Russia, marked by cronyism, extortion, and political favoritism.

Q2. What specific examples are cited to support the argument of “thuggish capitalism”?
A: The critique cites three main examples:

  1. Reports of the administration pushing AI firms to cede “shares to the government.”

  2. The reported demand for a 15% cut of Nvidia and AMD’s sales to China in exchange for lifting export bans.

  3. The claim that an executive order on AI reflects the influence of tech oligarchs rather than protecting the public.

Q3. How does the critique view corporate taxation in the context of Trump’s policies?
A: The critique contrasts the current trend with the 1970s when taxes on corporate profits generated 2.6% of GDP, while today corporate profits as a share of GDP have doubled, but tax revenues have halved. This, alongside the alleged extortion, is seen as undermining the principle that economic benefits should be shared.

Q4. Why does the critique argue that this approach threatens American democracy?
A: It argues that “rules-based capitalism” is essential for democracy and prosperity. The new “oligarchic competition” rewards “flattering the mad king” over innovation, undermining the rule of law and moving the U.S. closer to oligarchy, where resources are allocated based on political influence.

Q5. According to the author, what is the fundamental difference between legitimate government intervention and the current administration’s approach?
A: The author acknowledges that industrial policy and regulation are legitimate when they follow “institutionalised, impersonal, transparent processes.” The current administration is criticized for conducting its interventions through “opaque, ad hoc self-dealing,” which lacks oversight and institutional integrity.


The Iran Deal – A Clash of Kushnerism and Khomeiniism


1. Introduction: The Wicked Problem Returns

The recent preliminary agreement between the United States and Iran, brokered after a brief but intense military conflict, has sent shockwaves through the Middle East and beyond. The memorandum of understanding (MOU), signed on June 17, 2026, brought an end to a war that began on February 28, 2026, when the US and Israel launched military operations against Iran . Yet, far from being a decisive victory, the deal has been described by analysts as a strategic failure for both the US and Israel, and a significant victory for Tehran .

To understand the clash at the core of the Iran deal, one must look beyond the battlefield and into the contrasting worldviews that shaped it. Thomas L. Friedman, the renowned New York Times columnist, frames this as a fundamental conflict between “Kushnerism” and “Khomeiniism” . On one side is a transactional, deal-making approach that ignores history and grievance, personified by President Donald Trump and his son-in-law Jared Kushner. On the other is a revolutionary ideology, rooted in Shia Islam and anti-Americanism, that has defined the Islamic Republic of Iran since 1979 .

This analysis delves into the anatomy of the deal, its geopolitical implications, the domestic political calculus driving it, and the dangerous precedents it sets for the region.


2. The Anatomy of the Deal: A Ceasefire with Unresolved Issues

The MOU, while hailed by the Trump administration as a breakthrough, is essentially a 60-day ceasefire agreement with a possible 90-day extension . Its core provisions are:

  • Opening of the Strait of Hormuz: Iran agreed to use its “best efforts” for the “safe passage of commercial vessels with no charge for 60 days only” . This is a critical concession, as the Strait is a vital chokepoint for global oil shipments.

  • Ceasefire: An “immediate and permanent termination of military operations on all fronts, including in Lebanon” .

  • Future Negotiations: The deal postpones discussions on the most critical issues—Iran’s nuclear program, its ballistic missile development, and its support for regional proxies—to future negotiations .

This structure has drawn sharp criticism. The deal “puts off the question of the disposal of Iran’s near bomb-grade uranium to future negotiations,” notes Friedman, “negotiations in which the Trump administration has already given up its military leverage” . Furthermore, the agreement is silent on curbing Iran’s long-range missiles and support for proxies like Hezbollah and Hamas .

3. The Geopolitical Chessboard: Iran’s Strategic Victory

The MOU represents a significant geopolitical shift in the Gulf. Iran, having endured a devastating military campaign, has emerged not weakened but strengthened, with a newfound leverage over the region.

The Weapon of Mass Disruption: The war, intended to cripple Iran, inadvertently showcased its ability to weaponize the Strait of Hormuz. As Friedman writes, “Trump and Netanyahu inspired Iran to develop a weapon of mass disruption, a chokehold on the Strait of Hormuz, which it can use anytime it feels too much pressure from the United States or Israel” . Iran’s closure of the Strait in response to the attack caused global oil prices to soar, exposing the vulnerability of the global economy .

Leverage in Lebanon: The deal creates a dangerous linkage between the Strait of Hormuz and Lebanon, tying the fate of the entire agreement to the actions of Hezbollah, Iran’s proxy militia. Iran has effectively stated that if Israel continues to target Hezbollah, it will choke off the Strait . This gives Tehran an unprecedented ability to dictate terms regarding Israel’s security operations. The agreement “makes the 60-day negotiation on Iran’s nuclear future contingent on Israel’s halting its military operations in Lebanon,” a condition Friedman notes would have been unthinkable under the Obama administration .

A New Sheriff in Town: The message to America’s Gulf Arab allies—Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and others—is clear: the US is cutting and running . They are now left to make the best deals they can with Tehran. This represents the “biggest geopolitical power shift in the Gulf since the start of the Iran-Iraq war” .


4. The Domestic Political Calculus: Why Trump Sold Out Allies

Why would a US president, who began a war with the stated goal of “toppling the regime,” settle for such a deal? The answer, according to critics, lies in domestic politics.

The Midterms Imperative: Trump’s primary motivation was not peace in the Middle East but the survival of his Republican majority in the upcoming November midterm elections . The war had caused food inflation and high gasoline prices, creating a “prescription for a Republican wipeout” . “Trump knew that the food inflation and high gasoline prices triggered by this war were a prescription for a Republican wipeout in the midterms,” Friedman argues . If the Democrats took the House, he would face endless investigations and “possibly even impeachment” .

Selling Out Allies for Swing States: To achieve this goal, Trump reportedly sacrificed the interests of his allies, Israel and the Arab Gulf states . The deal is described as a “TACO trade” (Trump Always Chickens Out), where the US “sold out the State of Israel and the Arab Gulf states for the swing states of Michigan, Pennsylvania and Georgia” . The US gave up military and diplomatic leverage to secure a short-term ceasefire that would bring energy prices down in time for the elections .


5. The Clash of Worldviews: Kushnerism vs. Khomeiniism

Friedman’s framing of the conflict as a clash between “Kushnerism” and “Khomeiniism” provides a powerful lens for understanding the deal .

Kushnerism: This worldview, embodied by Jared Kushner, operates on the assumption that people primarily want “condos and hotels and beachfront property” . It dismisses history, ideology, and deep-seated grievances as irrelevant. Trump’s approach to the war reflected this: he believed that bombing Iran would trigger a popular uprising against the regime . He relied on the flawed intelligence from Israel’s Mossad, which, as Friedman notes, is excellent for assassinations but poor for understanding political and social trends, because it relies on spies who hate the regime and “exaggerate the weakness of the regime” .

Khomeiniism: In contrast, the ideology of the Iranian Revolution, named for its founder Ayatollah Khomeini, is driven by a deep-seated ideology. Khomeini famously declared, “We didn’t make this revolution to lower the price of melons” . The regime is committed to spreading its Islamist ideology and opposing the US and Israel. This clash, between a transactional, ignorant “Kushnerism” and a deeply ideological “Khomeiniism,” has now played out on the battlefield, with Khomeiniism emerging triumphant. As Iranian negotiator Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf stated, “The agreement is a record of U.S. failure” .


6. The Administration’s Internal Divisions: Vance vs. Rubio

The chaos of the Trump administration is further reflected in the public contradictions between its top officials. Vice President JD Vance and Secretary of State Marco Rubio have offered “very different takes” on the deal, particularly regarding Israel and the nature of Iran’s leadership .

  • On Iran’s Leadership: Trump and Vance have portrayed Iran’s leaders as “very rational people” and “not radicalized” . Vance has even suggested that Iranians are having “second thoughts about nearly five decades of anti-American foreign policy” . Rubio, however, doubled down on his past statements, labeling them “radical clerics” and “lunatics” .

  • On Israel and Lebanon: Vance criticized Israel’s operations in Beirut, suggesting they were undermining peace efforts . Rubio, on his tour of Gulf states, defended Israel’s campaign, describing its actions as a “justified response to Hezbollah attacks” .

These contradictory statements are not just minor disagreements but reflect a deep divide between the isolationist, “America First” wing of the Republican Party (represented by Vance) and the traditional hawkish, pro-Israel wing (represented by Rubio) . This chaos, according to Friedman, is indicative of an administration that lacks “the competence, the patience, the focus to actually do what Obama did, which is negotiate a detailed agreement and then deliver on it” .


7. The Dangerous Precedent: Protecting Proxies Through Diplomacy

Perhaps the most alarming implication of the deal is the precedent it sets. Iran has successfully used negotiations with the US to protect its proxy, Hezbollah . For decades, Hezbollah served as Iran’s strategic shield. Now, “Iran is increasingly using negotiations with Washington to protect Hezbollah” . This reversal could embolden other states to employ a similar strategy: use proxies to create a crisis, then use the threat of that crisis to extract concessions in negotiations. This is a fundamental threat to the “peace through strength” doctrine .


8. Conclusion: A Mess to Be Cleaned Up

The Iran deal, as it stands, is a testament to the failures of “Kushnerism.” It is a product of a president who operated on gut instinct, disregarded expertise, and sacrificed long-term strategic interests for short-term domestic political gain. The deal has left the region more unstable, Iran stronger, and the US weakened.

The outcome is reminiscent of the famous line from F. Scott Fitzgerald’s “The Great Gatsby”: “They were careless people, Tom and Daisy—they smashed up things and creatures and then retreated back into their money or their vast carelessness… and let other people clean up the mess they had made” . This is the mess that will now have to be cleaned up. As Friedman concludes, “It’s Chinatown” . The damage is done, and the consequences will be felt for years to come.

5 Questions & Answers on the Iran Deal Crisis

Q1. What was the core “wicked problem” of the Iran deal, and why did President Trump fail to solve it?

A: The core problem was the complex nature of Iran—a regime that is both repressive to its own people and a destabilizing force in the region. Trump’s approach, rooted in a “Kushnerism” worldview, assumed that bombing Iran would trigger a popular uprising and that the regime could be quickly toppled . He relied on the flawed intelligence of Israel’s Mossad, which exaggerated the regime’s weakness . In contrast, the Obama administration’s approach was to contain Iran through a stringent, verifiable deal, recognizing that regime change was a long-term goal that could not be achieved overnight .

Q2. Why did the Trump administration reportedly “sell out” Israel and the Arab Gulf states in the Iran deal?

A: The primary motivation was domestic politics, specifically the upcoming November midterm elections . High gasoline prices caused by the war were a threat to Trump’s Republican majority, which would have exposed him to potential impeachment. He prioritized bringing energy prices down for swing states like Pennsylvania, Georgia, and Michigan over the security interests of his allies .

Q3. What is the significance of the linkage between the Strait of Hormuz and Lebanon in the Iran deal?

A: The deal allows Iran to leverage the opening of the Strait of Hormuz to protect Hezbollah in Lebanon. Iran has threatened to choke off the Strait if Israel continues to target Hezbollah . This gives Iran unprecedented leverage over Israel’s security operations and represents a dangerous precedent where a state can use negotiations to shield its proxy militias . This “terrible linkage” is a major strategic victory for Tehran .

Q4. How did Vice President JD Vance and Secretary of State Marco Rubio differ in their public statements regarding the Iran deal?

A: The two officials offered contradictory narratives. Vance was optimistic, suggesting Iran’s leaders were reforming and criticized Israel’s military campaign . Rubio, on the other hand, labeled Iran’s leaders as “radical clerics,” defended Israel’s right to self-defense, and expressed more skepticism about Tehran’s intentions . These contradictions reflect a deep division within the Trump administration between isolationist and hawkish wings of the Republican Party .

Q5. What is the long-term strategic implication of the Iran deal, according to analysts?

A: The deal has shifted the balance of power in the Gulf, emboldening Iran and undermining the “peace through strength” doctrine . It has shown that Tehran can close a vital global chokepoint to extract concessions from the US. It has also created a framework where Iran can use negotiations to protect its proxies, potentially encouraging similar behavior from other adversaries . The regime has emerged “not weaker but strengthened,” leaving its neighbors and Israel more vulnerable to its whims .


The Unfinished Business of Brexit – England’s Constitutional Reckoning


1. Introduction: The Wrong Question

As Britain marks the tenth anniversary of the EU referendum, a familiar debate has resurfaced: should the UK rejoin the European Union? It is a question that dominates headlines, fuels political discourse, and divides opinion across the country. Yet, according to a compelling new analysis, it is fundamentally the wrong question to ask [citation:original].

The question that must come first is plainer, more profound, and deeply structural. How is the UK now governed, and how should the home nations hold together in a period of constitutional change? The deeper movement is not taking place in Brussels or Strasbourg—it is taking place in England, where the largest vote to leave the EU was cast in 2016 [citation:original]. This analysis examines the constitutional revolution unfolding within England itself, tracing the links between the Act of Union Bill, the English Devolution and Community Empowerment Act 2026, and the emergence of a new political class that could permanently reshape the British state.


2. The Constitutional Question: Why Brexit Was Never the End

The 2016 referendum was never simply about the UK’s relationship with the EU. It was, from the beginning, a symptom of a deeper constitutional malaise—a question about how the constituent parts of the United Kingdom relate to one another, and how England, the dominant partner, governs itself.

In my study of governance and constitutional change, the pattern repeats [citation:original]. A question is raised, falls quiet, then flares decades later in an altered form. This pattern was observed closely during work on a book chapter examining the UK’s relationship with the EU, co-authored with Baroness Gisela Stuart, who chaired Vote Leave and served as one of the two parliamentary representatives on the convention that drafted a constitution for the EU in the early 2000s [citation:original]. What surfaced then is surfacing again, and this time it is structural.

The West Lothian Question—the anomaly that Scottish, Welsh, and Northern Irish MPs could vote on English-only matters while English MPs could not vote on devolved matters—was a persistent irritant. English Votes for English Laws (EVEL), introduced to address this, created what critics described as “two classes of MP,” making Scots, Northern Irish, and Welsh members seem less welcome . Rather than solving the problem, EVEL exposed the fragility of the Union’s constitutional fabric .

The Constitution Reform Group (CRG), a cross-party organisation chaired by the Marquess of Salisbury, warned in 2016 that “the United Kingdom risks disintegration unless we have a new constitutional settlement” . The group, comprising former and practising politicians from all principal UK parties, academics, and former officials, argued that the constitutional arrangements were “unsatisfactory and trigger questions which undermine the stability of the UK” .


3. The Act of Union Bill: A Blueprint for a Federal Britain

On October 9, 2018, Lord Lisvane, a crossbench peer and former Clerk of the House of Commons, introduced the Act of Union Bill in the House of Lords . The Bill aimed to provide “a renewed constitutional form for the peoples of England, Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland” and to “affirm that the peoples of those nations and parts have chosen, subject to and in accordance with the provisions of this Act, to continue to pool their sovereignty for specified purposes” .

The Bill was a direct response to the pressures of Brexit. As Lord Hain noted during a debate in December 2018, “The Act of Union Bill addresses the main issues at stake, from finance to security… It turns the devolution settlement on its head by creating a new federal structure in which the constituent parts or nations voluntarily vest the sovereignty they choose at the centre—for example, for foreign, defence and security, taxation and pensions matters” .

The Bill set out nine “principal purposes” of the United Kingdom, including:

  • The rule of law and equality before the law

  • The protection of fundamental rights and freedoms

  • Defence of the realm and the conduct of foreign relations

  • Equality of opportunity

  • Protection of social and economic rights, including access to education and health services

  • Benefiting from shared history and culture 

Importantly, the Bill proposed a “bottom-up” rather than “top-down” arrangement, where each nation could choose to share functions that are more effectively exercised on a shared basis . This was a radical departure from the existing devolution settlement, which had been imposed from Westminster.

However, the Bill contained a fundamental tension. As Professor Michael Keating of the University of Aberdeen observed, while the Bill pointed to “a type of asymmetrical federal union,” it also included a clause providing that “nothing in the [bill] will affect the sovereignty of the UK Parliament,” which would retain the power to amend or repeal the Act of Union itself . This, Keating noted, was “in glaring contradiction with the commitment to the sovereignty of the nations on which the earlier part of the proposal is based” .

Nevertheless, the Bill represented an important “thought experiment and measure for any actual settlement” . It was an attempt to codify the unwritten British constitution and to place the Union on a more secure, consensual footing.


4. The English Devolution and Community Empowerment Act 2026: A New Dawn for England

While the Act of Union Bill proposed a constitutional settlement for the entire UK, a more immediate and transformative change was taking place in England. The English Devolution and Community Empowerment Act 2026 received Royal Assent and entered into law, bringing into effect what Angela Rayner MP described as a “new dawn of regional power” .

The Act marks “a meaningful change in how regeneration initiatives in England will be delivered in the coming months and years” . One-third of the Act is directed towards initiatives designed “to speed up, widen and deepen devolution” . It creates a three-tier framework of strategic authorities:

  • Foundation Strategic Authorities: The lowest tier, with access to fewer funds and powers, determined by formula-based mechanisms .

  • Mayoral Strategic Authorities (MSAs): All existing mayoral combined authorities automatically fall into this category, with funding determined through periodic spending reviews covering areas such as local growth, housing, and transport .

  • Established Mayoral Strategic Authorities (EMSAs): The highest tier, with the most extensive powers and funds, including over transport, housing, economic development, skills, health, and public safety . Seven organisations currently hold EMSA status: Greater Manchester, West Midlands, Liverpool City Region, North East, South Yorkshire, West Yorkshire, and Greater London .

The Act also introduces the “right to request” process under Section 53, allowing EMSAs to formally propose additional devolved powers on an annual basis . This reflects “an important shift by treating devolution as an ongoing and evolving process capable of gradual expansion over time rather than as a one-off negotiated settlement” .

Part 4 of the Act contains extensive provisions relating to auditing of strategic authorities, creating the Local Audit Office to oversee the audit of over 500 local public authorities . This ensures that in return for the transfer of new powers and funds, recipient authorities will sign up to an audit regime akin to that of central government .

Section 67 introduces a “community right to buy,” replacing the current community right to bid policy introduced in the Localism Act 2011. This creates a right of first refusal, granting community groups greater powers to purchase assets of community value . The Act also defines “sporting assets of community value,” offering opportunities for sports clubs and communities to protect locally important grounds and facilities .


5. Andy Burnham and the Rise of the “King of the North”

The constitutional changes in England are not happening in a vacuum. They are being shaped by—and in turn shaping—a new generation of political leaders who operate at the regional level. Andy Burnham, the Mayor of Greater Manchester, is the most prominent example.

Burnham’s political trajectory is remarkable. A former Labour MP for almost 16 years, he served as a minister in Gordon Brown’s government and stood unsuccessfully for the Labour leadership in 2015 . He resigned from Parliament in 2017 to run for Mayor of Greater Manchester, becoming the region’s first directly elected mayor, and won two further terms in 2021 and 2024 . In 2024, he won 63.4% of the vote, with 420,749 voters backing him in every borough of the city region .

In the June 2026 Makerfield by-election, Burnham won a “thumping victory” with 24,927 votes—55% of the total—increasing Labour’s vote share by 10 percentage points . Turnout was 58.8%, the first time since 1982 that a by-election turnout exceeded that of the previous general election .

Burnham’s campaign was unusual: he promised voters that if they elected him, he would try to oust the prime minister . The result has positioned him as a potential Labour leadership challenger, with some calling him the “king of the north” . He has already picked out a house: 10 Downing Street .

What makes Burnham’s rise significant is the platform it provides. As Mayor of Greater Manchester, he oversaw a £6bn health and social care budget, controlled transport budgets, introduced free travel for 16 to 19-year-olds, and took control of the region’s bus network under the integrated Bee Network brand . His experience as a regional leader gives him a perspective that is fundamentally different from Westminster-based politicians. As Burnham himself noted, it would not have been possible for Greater Manchester to achieve everything it could “without changes being made at a national level” .

The by-election automatically triggered an election for a new Mayor of Greater Manchester, with the most likely date being July 30, 2026—at an estimated cost of £4.7 million . This was one of the reasons Labour initially blocked Burnham’s bid to become its candidate in the Gorton and Denton by-election in February . The simultaneous shifts at the regional and national levels illustrate the intertwined nature of constitutional change and political leadership.


6. The English Question and the Future of the Union

These developments—the Act of Union Bill, the English Devolution and Community Empowerment Act 2026, and the rise of regional leaders like Burnham—are not separate stories. They are “the same question of England, asked through different doors” [citation:original].

The question is how England is now governed, and how the home nations should hold together in a period of constitutional change. England has received its “first consistent national model of devolved power” [citation:original], but the implications for the Union as a whole are only beginning to become clear.

The Act of Union Bill proposed a federal structure that would put Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland on a more equal footing. The English Devolution and Community Empowerment Act 2026 creates a tiered system of regional government within England. Together, they represent a fundamental shift in how the UK is governed.

The danger, as the CRG warned, is that without a new constitutional settlement, the UK risks disintegration . The “piecemeal constitutional changes over recent decades” have created an “unsatisfactory” arrangement that “trigger questions which undermine the stability of the UK” . The CRG argued that “the UK needs a new constitutional settlement if the Union is to be preserved and strengthened” .

The challenge is that England, the largest nation, has historically been the most resistant to thinking of itself as a distinct unit within a federal Union. England has no parliament of its own, no separate legal jurisdiction (other than for some aspects of Welsh law), and no clear constitutional identity. The devolution of power to English regions might begin to fill this gap, but it could also create new tensions—between regions, between England and the other nations, and between Westminster and the regions.


7. The Missing Piece: The West Lothian Question Revisited

The West Lothian Question—the anomaly of Scottish, Welsh, and Northern Irish MPs voting on English-only matters—was never fully resolved. English Votes for English Laws was a temporary fix, not a permanent solution. The new system of regional governance in England raises the question in a new form: if power is devolved to English regions, should English regional MPs have a say in UK-wide matters? And what happens when different regions have different views on national issues?

The Constitution Reform Group’s Act of Union Bill proposed a comprehensive answer to these questions, but the Bill was never enacted. The English Devolution and Community Empowerment Act 2026 provides a partial answer—but only for England. The constitutional settlement remains incomplete.

The current Labour leadership crisis, precipitated by Burnham’s victory, adds another layer of complexity. If Burnham were to succeed in ousting Keir Starmer, the UK would have a prime minister who comes from a regional governance background and who has promised to challenge the Westminster establishment. This would be unprecedented in modern British history [citation:original].


8. Conclusion: A New Settlement Forming

The United Kingdom is undergoing a constitutional transformation that is as profound as the devolution of the late 1990s, but one that is taking place with far less public debate. The English Devolution and Community Empowerment Act 2026 is creating a new level of governance within England. The Act of Union Bill, though not enacted, represents a blueprint for how the Union as a whole might be restructured. Andy Burnham’s rise from regional mayor to potential prime minister embodies the new political realities that this constitutional change is creating.

Before debating whether to rejoin the EU, Britain should look at the “new settlement forming inside England, at what it is doing to the constitutional fabric of the Union, and at the people it is shaping, consciously and unconsciously, through the way they are now governed” [citation:original]. The question of England—its governance, its identity, and its relationship to the other nations of the UK—is the question that will define British politics for the next decade. The EU referendum was a symptom; the constitutional question is the disease.

5 Questions & Answers on the UK’s Constitutional Debate

Q1. Why does the analysis argue that the question of rejoining the EU is the “wrong question”?

A: The analysis argues that the more fundamental question concerns how the UK is now governed, and how the home nations should hold together in a period of constitutional change [citation:original]. England cast the largest vote to leave the EU in 2016, and the deeper constitutional movement is now taking place within England itself. The question of EU membership is a distraction from the structural questions about the Union’s internal governance.

Q2. What was the Act of Union Bill introduced by Lord Lisvane in 2018, and what did it propose?

A: The Act of Union Bill, introduced in the House of Lords on October 9, 2018, sought to provide “a renewed constitutional form for the peoples of England, Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland” . It proposed a “bottom-up” federal structure where the constituent parts voluntarily pool sovereignty for specified purposes, while retaining autonomy in all other areas . The Bill set out nine principal purposes of the UK, including the rule of law, protection of rights, defence, and protection of social and economic rights .

Q3. What does the English Devolution and Community Empowerment Act 2026 do?

A: The Act received Royal Assent in 2026 and establishes a three-tier system of devolved governance in England: Foundation Strategic Authorities, Mayoral Strategic Authorities, and Established Mayoral Strategic Authorities . EMSAs have the most extensive powers, including over transport, housing, economic development, skills, health, and public safety . The Act also introduces a “right to request” process for EMSAs to seek additional powers, a community right to buy, and extensive auditing provisions .

Q4. What is the significance of Andy Burnham’s victory in the Makerfield by-election?

A: Burnham won the by-election with 55% of the vote on June 26, 2026, and has positioned himself to challenge Prime Minister Keir Starmer’s leadership . His campaign promised voters that if elected, he would try to oust the prime minister . Burnham is the first regional mayor to return to Parliament with a realistic path to 10 Downing Street, embodying the new political realities created by English devolution [citation:original].

Q5. What is the West Lothian Question, and why does it remain unresolved?

A: The West Lothian Question is the constitutional anomaly where Scottish, Welsh, and Northern Irish MPs can vote on legislation affecting only England, while English MPs have no equivalent power over devolved matters . English Votes for English Laws was introduced to address this, but critics argue it created “two classes of MP” and made the Scottish, Welsh, and Northern Irish members feel less welcome . The new system of English devolution raises the question in a new form, but no comprehensive solution has yet been found.


Newsrooms Are Not Courtrooms – Media, the Genocide Label, and the Battle for Factual Integrity


1. Introduction: When Newsrooms Become Courtrooms

In an era of polarized media and heightened political tensions, the distinction between journalism and adjudication has become dangerously blurred. A recent op-ed by Darcie Grunblatt, a US media researcher at the Committee for Accuracy in Middle East Reporting and Analysis (CAMERA), published in The Jerusalem Post, raises a critical question: should newsrooms be allowed to act as judge and jury on matters of international law?

Grunblatt’s analysis focuses on a series of interviews aired on MS NOW’s panel show “The Weekend: Primetime” between June 20 and June 21, 2026, featuring New York congressional candidates and campaign strategists [citation:original]. In every interview, the subject of “genocide” in Gaza was raised—either by the guests themselves or by panelist Ayman Mohyeldin [citation:original]. The op-ed argues that this represents a dangerous trend where media personalities flatten strict international law into political talking points, presuming guilt before any legal process has taken place.

This analysis examines the broader implications of this media phenomenon, exploring the legal definition of genocide, the role of the International Court of Justice (ICJ), the selective scrutiny of candidates, and the consequences for democratic discourse and the liberal world order.


2. The Legal Definition of Genocide: Not a Colloquialism

Central to Grunblatt’s argument is the claim that the term “genocide” has been devalued through casual usage in media discourse. Under the 1948 UN Genocide Convention, the crime requires a specifically proven “intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group” [citation:original]. This is not a colloquialism, a feeling, or a matter of opinion—it is a legal charge with a stringent threshold [citation:original].

The legal definition demands:

  1. Specific Intent: The perpetrator must have a clear, demonstrable intent to destroy a protected group.

  2. Protected Group: The destruction must target a national, ethnical, racial, or religious group.

  3. Actus Reus: The prohibited acts—killing members of the group, causing serious bodily or mental harm, deliberately inflicting conditions calculated to bring about physical destruction, imposing measures to prevent births, or forcibly transferring children—must be proven.

When media personalities bypass this evidentiary standard, they engage in what Grunblatt terms “legal illiteracy” [citation:original]. The term genocide, once reserved for the Holocaust, Rwanda, and Srebrenica, becomes a rhetorical weapon deployed without regard for the weight it carries.


3. The ICJ’s “Plausibility” Ruling: A Media Misunderstanding

A critical moment in the MS NOW interviews came when Jack Schlossberg, the candidate for New York’s 12th congressional district, stated that the International Court of Justice (ICJ) had found it “plausible” that Israel was committing genocide [citation:original]. Strikingly, none of the panelists corrected him, demonstrating their own failure to understand the narrow scope of the ICJ ruling.

In January 2024, the ICJ issued a preliminary ruling on South Africa’s genocide case against Israel. The court found that the Palestinians had a “plausible right to be protected from genocide” and that Israel must prevent acts of genocide in Gaza. However, the court did not rule on the merits of the genocide charge itself. Former ICJ President Joan Donoghue explicitly corrected this widespread media error on the BBC in April 2024, stating: “The court did not decide… that the claim of genocide was plausible” [citation:original]. The ruling was about the right to be protected, not the commission of genocide.

By conflating these two distinct legal concepts, the panelists demonstrated both their ignorance of the evidentiary standard and a clear agenda to malign Israel regardless of the facts [citation:original].


4. Selective Scrutiny: The Double Standard in Action

The op-ed identifies a clear double standard in the panelists’ approach to different candidates. When Schlossberg refused to label Israel’s war in Gaza a “genocide,” Mohyeldin pushed back twice, expressing visible dismay at the candidate’s refusal to capitulate to the narrative [citation:original]. The anchor attempted to corner Schlossberg by pulling up a recent social media post by Israeli Minister Itamar Ben-Gvir calling to “burn” Lebanon [citation:original].

However, as Grunblatt points out, this line of questioning reveals a “profound misunderstanding of how specific evidentiary standards work” [citation:original]. Ben-Gvir’s comment—while undeniably incendiary and condemned by the European Union —was about Lebanon, not Gaza. Using a quote about Lebanon to prove a legal charge of genocide in Gaza is legally irrelevant. Furthermore, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu quickly and explicitly refuted Ben-Gvir’s statement, distancing the government from the extremist rhetoric [citation:original].

In stark contrast, when other guests—such as candidates Antonio Reynoso and Claire Valdez, and strategist Morris Katz—casually dropped the phrase “genocide in Gaza,” the panelists never asked them to justify their accusation [citation:original]. Consider Valdez, who claimed to stand up for the dignity and security of “people everywhere.” The panelists failed to ask if that dignity extended to Israelis, giving her a complete pass while ignoring her admission to protesting Israel just after the October 7 Hamas massacre and her pledge to block Iron Dome funding—a policy that endangers Israeli lives [citation:original].

Similarly, when Katz decried “taking money from AIPAC” as corruption, the panel nodded along, failing to question his hyper-fixation on a lawfully operating American lobbying group while ignoring hostile foreign governments like Russia, Iran, and China that actively attempt to sway US elections [citation:original].

The MS NOW panelists, as Grunblatt concludes, only sought to scrutinize the one candidate who insisted on maintaining a “fact-based, legally accurate argument” [citation:original].


5. The Broader Context: MS NOW’s Weekend Shakeup

The controversy surrounding “The Weekend: Primetime” is occurring against the backdrop of significant changes at MS NOW. The network, formerly known as MSNBC, announced on June 26, 2026, that it would cancel “The Weekend: Primetime,” with its final episode airing on June 27 . The network is moving away from live, hosted hours after 6 p.m. on weekends and instead filling its schedule largely with taped video podcasts .

Ayman Mohyeldin, Catherine Rampell, and Elise Jordan, the hosts of the program, are expected to remain with MS NOW, though their roles will shift . Veteran anchor Alex Witt, who has anchored more hours on MS NOW than any other anchor in the network’s history, will depart later in the year after nearly 30 years of service .

The network’s move toward podcast-style content reflects a broader shift in media consumption, but it also raises questions about journalistic standards. As Grunblatt warns, when media personalities bypass legal processes and decide guilt in a studio rather than a courtroom, “they cease to act as journalists and instead mimic the outlets run by authoritarian regimes, where guilt is presumed before innocence and verdicts are decided by political narratives rather than evidence” [citation:original].


6. The Political Landscape: The NY-12 Primary and Jack Schlossberg

The interviews analyzed in Grunblatt’s op-ed took place in the context of the Democratic primary for New York’s 12th Congressional District, which covers much of Manhattan, including the Upper West Side, Upper East Side, Midtown, and Chelsea neighborhoods . The district is the nation’s smallest by area and firmly Democratic, making the primary effectively the general election .

The race featured a crowded field of candidates, including state Assemblyman Micah Lasher, state Assemblyman Alex Bores, lawyer George Conway, public health researcher Nina Schwalbe, and Jack Schlossberg, the only grandson of former President John F. Kennedy . Lasher, a moderate with backing from mainstream Democrats, ultimately won the primary, with Bores in second place and Schlossberg finishing third .

Schlossberg, 33, campaigned as a grassroots outsider, dubbing himself “No-PAC Jack” . He worked briefly at the State Department’s environmental bureau and has written political opinion pieces for Vogue . His campaign faced challenges, with The New York Times reporting on staff turnover and questioning his seriousness as a candidate .

The race became one of New York’s most expensive House primaries in history, with AI regulation emerging as a central issue . Dueling AI PACs funneled exorbitant amounts of cash into the race, making it a proxy fight among artificial intelligence interests .

Schlossberg’s refusal to label Israel’s actions as genocide set him apart from other candidates in the MS NOW interviews, positioning him as the target of the panelists’ scrutiny [citation:original].


7. The Danger of Legal Illiteracy in Media

The op-ed’s core argument is that the media’s casual use of legal terms like “genocide” undermines both journalism and the rule of law. When journalists “flatten strict international law into a political talking point,” they do a disservice to their audience and to the victims of actual genocide [citation:original].

The architects of the post-World War II order envisioned international law as the bedrock of a liberal democratic world, empowering courts to pursue justice against perpetrators of the ultimate evil based on rigorous evidence [citation:original]. When media personalities bypass this process, they set a dangerous precedent.

This is not to say that journalism should avoid covering allegations of genocide. To the contrary, rigorous, evidence-based journalism is essential to exposing atrocities. But journalism must distinguish between allegations and adjudication, between reporting and prosecuting. A newsroom is not a courtroom, and journalists are not judges.


8. Conclusion: Defending Truth in a Polarized World

The MS NOW interviews and Grunblatt’s response represent a microcosm of a broader struggle: the battle for factual integrity in an era of polarized media. When legal terms become rhetorical weapons, when selective scrutiny is applied based on political alignment, and when newsrooms presume guilt without due process, the foundations of liberal democracy are eroded.

New Yorkers who value democracy and the liberal world order, Grunblatt concludes, “should consider what kind of world they seek to live in and remember this when they watch complex, legal realities co-opted into colloquial political smears” [citation:original].

The distinction between newsrooms and courtrooms is not a technicality—it is a pillar of a just society. Preserving that distinction requires journalists to exercise restraint, precision, and a commitment to the truth, even—and especially—when it is politically inconvenient.

5 Questions & Answers on Media, Law, and the Genocide Debate

Q1. What is the central argument of Darcie Grunblatt’s op-ed regarding media coverage of the Israel-Gaza conflict?

A: Grunblatt argues that media outlets, particularly MS NOW’s “The Weekend: Primetime” panelists, are wrongly acting as judge and jury by labeling Israel’s actions in Gaza as “genocide” without meeting the stringent legal threshold required under the 1948 UN Genocide Convention [citation:original]. She contends that journalists are flattening complex international law into a political talking point and presuming guilt without legal evidence, which sets a dangerous precedent for both journalism and the rule of law.

Q2. What did the International Court of Justice (ICJ) actually rule in its January 2024 decision regarding Israel and genocide?

A: The ICJ ruled that the Palestinians had a “plausible right to be protected from genocide” and ordered Israel to prevent acts of genocide in Gaza. However, the court did not rule on the merits of the genocide charge itself. Former ICJ President Joan Donoghue later clarified on the BBC that the court “did not decide that the claim of genocide was plausible” [citation:original]. The ruling was about the right to be protected, not the commission of genocide.

Q3. How did the MS NOW panelists demonstrate a double standard in their interviews with different candidates?

A: The panelists applied rigorous scrutiny only to Jack Schlossberg, who refused to label Israel’s actions as genocide, pushing back twice when he did not capitulate [citation:original]. However, when other guests like Claire Valdez and Morris Katz casually used the term “genocide in Gaza,” the panelists did not challenge them. They failed to ask Valdez about her pledge to block Iron Dome funding or Katz about his hyper-fixation on AIPAC while ignoring hostile foreign governments [citation:original].

Q4. What is the legal definition of genocide under the 1948 UN Genocide Convention?

A: Under the UN Genocide Convention, genocide requires a specifically proven “intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group” [citation:original]. The term is not a colloquialism, feeling, or matter of opinion but a legal charge with a stringent evidentiary threshold [citation:original]. To prove genocide, one must demonstrate specific intent, the targeting of a protected group, and the commission of prohibited acts such as killing, causing serious harm, or deliberately inflicting conditions calculated to destroy the group.

Q5. What changes were announced regarding MS NOW’s weekend programming, and why is this relevant?

A: On June 26, 2026, MS NOW announced it would cancel “The Weekend: Primetime,” with its final episode airing on June 27 . The network is moving away from live, hosted hours on weekends and filling its schedule with taped video podcasts . While the hosts—including Ayman Mohyeldin—are expected to remain with the network, the shift reflects broader changes in media consumption . The cancellation is relevant because it raises questions about journalistic standards in an era of podcast-style programming, where legal complexities may be further flattened into entertainment [citation:original].


JD Vance, the Iran Deal, and the Erosion of the US-Israel Alliance


1. Introduction: When “Jews’ Demonizer” Speaks

Imagine the public outcry if a known antisemite like Louis Farrakhan or David Duke mocked Israel’s right to self-defense during a war of survival. Imagine the uproar if such criticism was delivered with a smirk, targeting the nation that suffered the most Jews murdered in one day since the Holocaust [citation:original]. Now imagine that the criticism came not from a fringe figure, but from the Vice President of the United States.

On June 18, 2026, JD Vance did exactly that. In an interview with The New York Times, Vance told Israel’s critics: “You’re a country of nine million people. You can’t just kill your way out of solving every single national security problem that you have” [citation:original]. The comment, part of a broader media blitz to defend the Trump administration’s controversial memorandum of understanding with Iran, has been condemned as one of the most antisemitic and outrageous statements ever made by a senior American official [citation:original].

The op-ed by Martin Oliner, Chairman of the Religious Zionists of America and a member of the United States Holocaust Memorial Council, argues that Vance’s initials should now stand for “Jews’ Demonizer” [citation:original]. This analysis examines the context of Vance’s remarks, the broader breakdown in US-Israel relations, and the implications for American foreign policy.


2. The Iran Deal and Vance’s Defensive Posture

The Trump administration’s memorandum of understanding with Iran, signed on June 17, 2026, brought an end to a brief but intense war that began on February 28, 2026 . The deal, which reopened the Strait of Hormuz and postponed discussions on Iran’s nuclear program to future negotiations, has been widely criticized in both the US and Israel for failing to curb Iran’s missile program and providing no clear path to dismantling its nuclear facilities .

Vance emerged as the deal’s primary defender, conducting a media round that critics described as speaking in “Carlsonese”—the conspiracy-addled style of his friend Tucker Carlson . In his efforts to sell the “Potemkin peace,” Vance came out fighting against Israel, offering a false choice between the deal and a “forever war” .

In a White House press briefing, Vance warned Israeli officials: “Donald J. Trump is the only head of state in the entire world who is sympathetic to the nation of Israel at this moment in time… If I was in the cabinet of the Israeli government, I might not be attacking the only powerful ally that I have anywhere left in the entire world” . He added that two-thirds of the defensive weapons that have protected Israel “have been built by American hands and paid for by American tax dollars” .

The vice president’s comments “sounded a whole lot like a threat,” according to CNN, representing the strongest public rebuke in a string of increasingly aggressive rhetoric from the Trump administration towards the Israeli government . Vance’s approach echoed Trump’s browbeating of Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky—the “Have you said ‘thank you’ once?” treatment—suggesting a transactional view of alliances where loyalty must be demonstrated through submission .


3. The “You Can’t Kill Your Way Out” Comment: Antisemitism or Realpolitik?

Vance’s most controversial statement—”You’re a country of nine million people. You can’t just kill your way out of solving every single national security problem that you have”—has been interpreted by Oliner as “pure antisemitism” [citation:original]. The argument is that the comment invokes the antisemitic trope of the bloodthirsty Jew, reducing Israel’s legitimate self-defense against existential threats to a caricature of violence.

Oliner’s defense of Israel is emphatic: “We are not killers. The world’s greatest experts on urban warfare have concluded that Israel has done more to avoid civilian deaths among its enemies than any army in the history of mankind on this earth. We want peace more than anyone. But to achieve it, we are not willing to lay down our arms, surrender, drop dead, and disappear without a fight” [citation:original].

The timing of Vance’s comments is particularly egregious. They came during a war of defense that began with the October 7 Hamas massacre, the deadliest day for Jews since the Holocaust [citation:original]. To mock Israel’s military response while its enemies pledge to repeat October 7 “again and again” with Iranian support is, Oliner argues, an act of profound moral failure [citation:original].

However, Vance’s defenders might argue that his comments were a blunt assessment of geopolitical reality, not antisemitism. Vance framed his criticism as a practical argument: “If your proposal is to send 200,000 ground troops into Tehran so that you can make Reza Pahlavi the leader of that country, then say that. But I don’t appreciate criticism without alternatives” . The vice president also claimed that pro-Israel Americans “make two critical mistakes”: not delineating between US and Israeli interests, and “always conflating criticism of a particular government with Jew hatred” . He warned against calling everything antisemitic, arguing that “if everything is Jew hatred, then nothing is Jew hatred” .

Yet the problem with Vance’s framing is that he offered a false dichotomy. Criticism of specific Israeli policies is legitimate, but Vance’s sweeping dismissal of Israel’s right to defend itself—”You can’t just kill your way out”—went far beyond policy critique. It delegitimized Israel’s very right to self-defense, echoing the language of those who seek Israel’s destruction.


4. The Broader Breakdown: Trump and Netanyahu’s Fractured Alliance

Vance’s comments did not emerge in a vacuum. They were the culmination of weeks of growing tensions between the Trump administration and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. According to Axios, Trump reportedly told Netanyahu in a heated phone call: “You’re f***ing crazy. You’d be in prison if it weren’t for me. I’m saving your ass. Everybody hates you now. Everybody hates Israel because of this” . Trump had previously told Netanyahu that he was “crazy” over Israel’s conduct in Lebanon and warned, “You better be careful, or you will be on your own very soon” .

Trump’s public criticism of Israel has been equally stark. At the G7 summit in France, he said: “You don’t have to knock down an apartment house every time you’re looking for somebody, because there are a lot of people in those apartment houses and they’re not all Hezbollah” . He concluded that “if it weren’t for the United States of America… Israel would not exist right now” .

The Israeli government’s response was defiant. National Security Minister Itamar Ben-Gvir, a frequent target of Vance’s criticism, responded to the vice president on X: “This is the proposal… To deal with the Nazis of the 21st century, just as the United States dealt with the Nazis of the 20th century” [citation:original]. Netanyahu himself insisted that Israeli troops would remain in southern Lebanon, directly challenging the terms of the US-Iran pact .

The breakdown is not just a personal feud between leaders; it reflects a deeper structural shift. CNN identified several reasons for the fracture: Israel’s goals for the Iran war were substantially different from America’s; Israel’s reputation in the US has declined; even the pro-Israel Republican Party has seen prominent influencers criticize Israel; and Trump treats allies well only insofar as it benefits him .


5. The Political Calculation: Vance’s 2028 Ambitions and the “Mad King”

Oliner’s op-ed raises a troubling question: why has there been no public outcry from Jewish organizations? “Where is the ADL? Where is the National Jewish Democratic Council?” he asks [citation:original]. His answer: “Perhaps because they happened to have been said by the man who is unfortunately the vice president of the United States, JD Vance” [citation:original]. Oliner suggests that Jewish organizations are reluctant to challenge a powerful man who could become commander-in-chief “in a heartbeat” [citation:original].

Yet the silence also reflects Vance’s calculation that bashing Israel serves his political ambitions. As The Jewish Chronicle notes, Vance is “positioning himself for the 2028 Republican nomination as the candidate of resentment, isolationism, podcast paranoia” . The Tucker Carlson wing of the Republican Party, which has grown increasingly critical of Israel, is Vance’s base.

Oliner warns that Vance’s comments will “lead to more war” and that “when the negotiations fail, as they will, Vance will blame Israel again” . The strategy is to channel the backlash against the failed deal away from the administration and onto Israel, using the Jewish state as a scapegoat.

The op-ed’s most damning metaphor is that of the “mad king.” The winners in the new oligarchic competition, Oliner suggests, are not those who make the best products or are the most innovative, but “those who are the least principled, and the best at flattering the mad king” [citation:original]. In this telling, Vance is the courtier flattering a president whose actions are driven by personal grievance and transactional calculation.


6. Conclusion: A Defining Moment for American Jewry

The Vance controversy is a watershed moment for American Jewry and the US-Israel alliance. For the first time in recent memory, a senior American official has openly questioned Israel’s right to defend itself, invoked antisemitic tropes, and faced no meaningful backlash from mainstream Jewish organizations.

Oliner’s op-ed is a call to action. “What Vance said should still be slammed by every Jewish organization, or he will believe he could get away with his antisemitism” [citation:original]. The failure to respond, Oliner warns, will only embolden Vance and others who seek to delegitimize Israel.

The controversy also highlights the fragility of the US-Israel alliance. The relationship, once considered sacrosanct, is now subject to the whims of a president who treats allies as transactional partners and a vice president who sees Israel as a political liability. The question for American Jewry is whether it will defend Israel’s right to exist and defend itself, or whether it will remain silent in the face of a growing threat.

As Oliner concludes, “After October 7, Vance’s initials became ‘Jews’ Demonizer'” [citation:original]. The question is whether the Jewish community will respond before the stain of that label becomes permanent.

5 Questions & Answers on Vance, the Iran Deal, and US-Israel Relations

Q1. What did JD Vance say about Israel that sparked such intense controversy?

A: In a New York Times interview on June 18, 2026, Vance told Israeli critics of the US-Iran deal: “You’re a country of nine million people. You can’t just kill your way out of solving every single national security problem that you have” [citation:original]. The comment, delivered during a war that began with the October 7 Hamas massacre, has been condemned as antisemitic by critics who argue it invokes the trope of the bloodthirsty Jew and delegitimizes Israel’s right to self-defense [citation:original].

Q2. What was the context of Vance’s comments, and what was he defending?

A: Vance was defending the Trump administration’s memorandum of understanding with Iran, signed on June 17, 2026, which reopened the Strait of Hormuz and postponed nuclear negotiations. Critics in both the US and Israel slammed the deal for failing to curb Iran’s missile program and providing no clear path to dismantling its nuclear facilities, while constraining Israel in its war with Hezbollah . Vance’s media blitz sought to shift blame away from the administration and onto Israel .

Q3. How did the Israeli government respond to Vance’s remarks?

A: National Security Minister Itamar Ben-Gvir responded on X: “This is the proposal… To deal with the Nazis of the 21st century, just as the United States dealt with the Nazis of the 20th century” [citation:original]. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu insisted that Israeli troops would remain in southern Lebanon, directly challenging the terms of the US-Iran pact . Other Israeli officials, speaking anonymously, said the deal terms were bad for Israel because they failed to address concerns over Iran’s nuclear program .

Q4. Why has there been a notable silence from mainstream Jewish organizations?

A: Martin Oliner, the author of the op-ed, asks: “Where is the ADL? Where is the National Jewish Democratic Council?” He suggests that Jewish organizations are reluctant to challenge a powerful figure like Vance, who could become president “in a heartbeat” [citation:original]. Oliner warns that this silence will only embolden Vance and normalize the antisemitic rhetoric [citation:original].

Q5. What does the Vance controversy reveal about the future of the US-Israel alliance?

A: The controversy signals a potential “break” in the longstanding US-Israel alliance, according to CNN . Several factors are driving the fracture: Israel’s war goals differ from America’s; Israel’s reputation in the US has declined; and the Trump administration treats allies as transactional partners . Vance’s comments echo Trump’s browbeating of Ukraine’s president, suggesting a transactional view of alliances where loyalty must be demonstrated through submission . The alliance is now subject to the whims of a president who treats allies as transactional partners and a vice president who sees Israel as a political liability .


China Opportunity 2.0″ – Innovation, Integration, and the Reframing of Global Growth


1. Introduction: A Tale of Two Narratives

As Chinese high-tech products gain global market share, some Western armchair strategists have slapped a new label on their “bogeyman”: “China Shock 2.0.” Catchy perhaps, but with a hollow ring [citation:original]. Speaking at the opening of the Summer Davos in Dalian, Liaoning province, on June 24, 2026, Chinese Premier Li Qiang offered a precise description of the moment. Rather than a shock, he pointed out, the world is experiencing “China Opportunity 2.0” — a new phase of development driven by the country’s innovation, technological upgrading, and deeper integration with the global economy [citation:original].

The difference between the two narratives is revealing. One views China’s technological rise as a “threat.” The other sees it as a boon. One incites fear. The other invites engagement [citation:original]. Premier Li’s framing at the 17th Annual Meeting of the New Champions (AMNC), held under the theme “Innovating at Scale,” marked a deliberate attempt to reset the global conversation around China’s economic ascent . This analysis examines the contours of the “China Opportunity 2.0” thesis, the evidence underpinning it, the political and economic motivations behind the competing “China Shock” narrative, and the implications for global cooperation and growth.


2. The “China Shock 2.0” Narrative: A Political Construct

The “China Shock 2.0” narrative is the latest iteration of a familiar theme. The original “China Shock” thesis, propounded by US economists David Autor, David Dorn, and Gordon Hanson, argued that China’s post-WTO accession export boom disrupted US labour markets . The current version, which has gained traction in Western media and political circles, claims that China’s rise in electric vehicles, clean energy, and advanced manufacturing represents a new wave of disruption .

2.1 The Political Function of the Narrative

Experts argue that this framing serves primarily as a political shield for protectionist policies rather than an objective economic assessment . Sun Chenghao, head of the US-Europe Program at Tsinghua University’s Center for International Security and Strategy, notes that the recent Western hype is “in essence a political construct” that layers together “Western anxieties over lost industrial competitiveness, the rising costs of a green transition, and a broader strategic competition with China” .

European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen’s remarks at the G7 summit exemplify this trend. She claimed that “some countries produce too much and do not consume enough,” labeling China’s trade surplus with the European Union “unsustainable” . European media and think tanks have depicted Chinese products as “flooding” European markets and endangering jobs .

2.2 The Intellectual Weakness of the Argument

Despite its political utility, the “China Shock 2.0” narrative is analytically weak. As one expert noted, the claim that Chinese exports are driving Europe’s industrial decline “mistakes symptoms for causes” . Trade imbalances are not moral tales of one economy “attacking” another; they reflect market demand, industrial specialization, and shifting comparative advantages .

Jian Junbo, director of the Center for China-Europe Relations at Fudan University, points out that the narrative largely focuses on alleged trade imbalances, specifically concerning China’s goods trade surplus with the West . Tu Xinquan, dean of the China Institute for WTO Studies at the University of International Business and Economics, argues that “the so-called China Shock is simply a natural outcome of market economics and competition” . Developed countries, he notes, “have grown accustomed to holding the technological upper hand for decades. Now, when they face a real competitor, they seem reluctant to embrace the free market principles they’ve preached for decades” .

2.3 The Danger of Misdiagnosis

Misdiagnosing Europe’s problems can produce bad policy: more protectionism, more ideological filtering of trade, and deeper suspicion toward one of Europe’s largest economic partners. In the long run, that risks narrowing Europe’s own development space . As one expert warned, the West’s “pan-securitization of normal industrial competition” will, in the long run, “escalate global production costs, diminish consumer welfare, fragment supply chains, and further erode the WTO-centered multilateral trading system” .


3. The “China Opportunity 2.0” Thesis: Evidence and Arguments

Premier Li’s “China Opportunity 2.0” framing is grounded in a comprehensive account of China’s innovation-driven development and its benefits for the global economy.

3.1 The Foundation: Innovation and R&D

The “China Shock” alarm is being sounded on the fabricated assumption that China’s economic success is somehow “artificial” and designed to be “pernicious” [citation:original]. Yet the evidence is nothing but a house of cards. China’s competitiveness is the fruit of its long-term input in innovation [citation:original].

The statistics are compelling:

  • R&D Expenditure: China’s total R&D expenditure reached 3.9262 trillion yuan ($586 billion) in 2025, with an intensity of 2.8% of GDP, exceeding the OECD average [citation:original]. This represents the sharpest reversal of innovation leadership in the modern era, with China expected to reach parity with the United States in R&D spending in 2026 .

  • Patent Activity: Chinese entities filed more than 73,000 international patent applications in various fields last year, ranking first in the world [citation:original]. China has ranked first globally in PCT international patent applications for six consecutive years, and its valid AI patents account for 60% of the global total .

  • High-Tech Manufacturing: In 2025, China’s high-tech manufacturing profits rose 13.3% year-on-year, 12.7 percentage points faster than the overall industrial sector .

These are not the statistics of a country relying on “subsidies,” “overcapacity,” or “currency manipulation,” the cards that allegedly support “China Shock 2.0” [citation:original]. Instead, China’s progress stems from its super-large competitive domestic market in which enterprises constantly innovate to survive. Companies face relentless pressure from rivals at home and abroad. Competition has acted as a catalyst for innovation [citation:original].

3.2 The Mechanism: Scale, Efficiency, and Integration

Premier Li described how China moves discoveries into industry, noting that “the most difficult leap in innovation is often not the one inside the lab, but the one across the Darwinian sea that separates the lab from the market” . He attributed Chinese competitiveness to scale rather than subsidy: enterprises now fund nearly 80% of China’s R&D .

At Summer Davos, business leaders elaborated on this mechanism. Ya-Qin Zhang, Founding Dean of the Institute for AI Industry Research at Tsinghua University, located China’s advantage in “scale, efficiency, and integration,” making the connection that a long-planned smart grid and cheap green power are “why China can produce very low-cost, high-quality tokens” . Energy, in this view, is AI policy .

The applications of this approach are already visible: from CATL’s 40 million idle EVs reimagined as distributed “token factories” to LONGi’s claim that China saved some $110 billion in 2025 by burning less imported oil and gas .

3.3 The Dividend: Making Advanced Technologies Accessible

The core of the “China Opportunity 2.0” thesis is that China’s innovation dividends are shared with the world. As Premier Li stated, “China is committed to an open approach to innovation. Much of its innovation is open-source. This enables more countries, particularly developing countries, to access affordable new technologies and new products” .

This is not just rhetoric. Chinese open-weight AI models have been downloaded more than 10 billion times worldwide . China’s renewable energy products—wind turbines, solar panels, and new energy vehicles—are exported to over 200 countries and regions, driving down global wind and solar power generation costs by over 60% and 80%, respectively .

The “AI+” International Cooperation Initiative, launched in September 2025, focuses on five key areas: people’s well-being, scientific and technological progress, industrial application, cultural prosperity, and talent cultivation . It provides low-cost, inclusive model technical support to the world through open-source sharing .

For developing countries, this is transformative. Chinese-made PV products to sub-Saharan Africa surged approximately 2.5-fold in Q1 2026, while exports of inverters, wires, and cables increased by 56.1% . The power projects built by Chinese companies are providing stable and reliable electricity to local communities .

3.4 The Demand Side: China as a Major Market

Premier Li emphasized that China offers the world converging dividends—anchored in its massive market scale and low-cost production factors, and reinforced by technological advancement and industrial upgrading . China remains the world’s second-largest import market for 17 consecutive years, with imports up 20.5% in the first five months of 2026 .

The foreign trade data supports this picture. In May alone, China’s foreign trade in yuan-denominated terms grew 16.9% year-on-year, with exports rising 13.8% and imports increasing 21.5% . In the first five months of 2026, total foreign trade reached 20.68 trillion yuan, up 15.3% year-on-year . Trade with Belt and Road partner countries went up 14.2% year-on-year, accounting for more than half of the total . This underscores China’s role not only as a producer but also as a major source of demand [citation:original].


4. The Western Policy Response: Protectionism vs. Rebuilding Competitiveness

For decades, some advanced economies have prioritized finance over manufacturing, short-term returns over long-term investment, and political theater over industrial strategy. The result: infrastructure aged, vocational training weakened, and industrial capacity hollowed out [citation:original]. When the consequences arrived, blaming China proved easier than meaningfully addressing the real causes [citation:original].

The irony is difficult to miss. Many of the policies now criticized when practiced by China—industrial planning, infrastructure investment, support for emerging industries, and strategic technological development—were once central features of the development strategies pursued by today’s advanced economies themselves [citation:original].

Even more striking is the policy response. Rather than rebuilding competitiveness through investment in education, infrastructure, and innovation, some Western countries have increasingly turned to tariffs, sanctions, and technology restrictions to “subsidize” the competitiveness of their enterprises [citation:original]. Such measures do little to address underlying structural weaknesses. In many cases, they raise costs for domestic consumers and businesses while fragmenting global supply chains [citation:original].

France’s economy offers a cautionary tale. Its economic stagnation has been attributed to weak global demand, shortsighted trade policies, and mounting debt burdens, not just Chinese competition . Blaming China for lost jobs is more electorally rewarding than admitting policy mistakes, but it does nothing to solve the underlying problems .


5. The Global Challenge: Rebalancing and Cooperation

Perhaps the most useful framing of the China question at Summer Davos came from Yuen Yuen Ang, the Alfred Chandler Chair Professor of Political Economy at Johns Hopkins University. She treated the whole issue as one connected mechanism, rather than a quarrel with two sides .

China can now make almost anything at scale and at a price no one can match. Whether that arrives in the world as a shock or as an opportunity turns on a single variable: China’s ability to generate sufficient domestic demand to absorb much more of what its factories produce. Kept in, the surplus is China’s to manage; pushed out, it becomes everyone’s .

This analysis was echoed by Columbia University historian Adam Tooze, who made the case for sorting, rather than lumping, since not every Chinese export carries the same weight. Cheap solar and batteries he could read only as a net gain, an industry that puts power into sub-Saharan villages that never had it. AI sits at the far pole, contested and freighted with national-security stakes. In between lies the hard country of cars and heavy industry, where the grown-up response is a negotiation over terms .

The broader point is that innovation-driven cooperation, not technological containment, offers the most promising path out of the current global growth slowdown. In a world grappling with mounting geopolitical uncertainty, the challenge is not how to contain the world’s second-largest economy, but how to engage more effectively with it and harness the opportunities its continued development creates [citation:original].


6. Conclusion: A New Phase of Global Engagement

The “China Opportunity 2.0” is not a public relations exercise; it is a reflection of China’s innovation-driven development and its integration with the global economy. The real lesson is that long-termism in the development of technology, human capital, and productive capacity still matters. China’s innovation gains, as Premier Li noted, were earned through years of strengthening domestic capabilities and relentless endeavor [citation:original].

Shutting China out while insisting that China stays open is not reciprocity; it is hypocrisy. Policymakers intoxicated by unilateralism should remember that no one has ever stopped springing by cutting the flowers. China’s development is not a seasonal anomaly but the result of decades of investment, innovation, and hard work. Efforts to isolate China will not isolate the country from the world; they risk isolating their own economies from growth and opportunity [citation:original].

As the world grapples with a global growth slowdown and mounting geopolitical uncertainty, the challenge is not how to contain China, but how to engage with it more effectively. The “China Opportunity 2.0” offers a pathway to more widely shared development benefits through innovation, openness, and cooperation. The question is whether the world will seize it.


5 Questions & Answers on China Opportunity 2.0

Q1. What is the “China Opportunity 2.0” thesis, and how does it differ from “China Shock 2.0”?

A: The “China Opportunity 2.0” thesis, articulated by Premier Li Qiang at Summer Davos 2026, argues that China’s innovation-driven development and technological upgrading create opportunities for the world through accessible advanced technologies, affordable products, and high-return investment prospects [citation:original]. In contrast, “China Shock 2.0” frames China’s industrial ascent as a threat that disrupts Western economies. The difference is fundamental: one invites engagement, the other incites fear [citation:original].

Q2. What evidence supports the “China Opportunity 2.0” narrative?

A: China’s R&D expenditure reached 3.9262 trillion yuan in 2025, with intensity of 2.8% of GDP exceeding the OECD average . China ranks first globally in international patent applications and holds 60% of global AI patents . Chinese renewables have driven down global solar and wind costs by over 60% and 80% . Open-weight AI models have been downloaded over 10 billion times worldwide . Foreign trade grew 16.9% in May 2026, with imports up 21.5%, underscoring China’s role as a major source of global demand .

Q3. Why do experts argue that the “China Shock 2.0” narrative is a political construct?

A: Experts argue that the narrative “layers together Western anxieties over lost industrial competitiveness, the rising costs of a green transition, and a broader strategic competition with China,” repackaging these issues as a “security threat” . It serves as a “political shield for protectionist policies” that externalizes internal challenges—industrial restructuring, income inequality, and technological competitive pressures—and blames them on Chinese manufacturing . The narrative ignores that trade imbalances reflect market demand and comparative advantage, not malicious intent .

Q4. What are the risks of protectionist responses to China’s industrial advancement?

A: Experts warn that the West’s “pan-securitization of normal industrial competition” will escalate global production costs, diminish consumer welfare, fragment supply chains, and erode the WTO-centered multilateral trading system . Protectionism does not address underlying structural weaknesses; it raises costs for domestic consumers and businesses while failing to rebuild competitiveness [citation:original]. Blaming China for lost jobs is more politically convenient than addressing energy policy failures, investment shortages, or productivity challenges .

Q5. What is the path forward for global cooperation on innovation and trade?

A: The consensus from Summer Davos is that “innovation-driven cooperation, not technological containment, offers the most promising path out of the current global growth slowdown” [citation:original]. The challenge is not how to contain China but “how to engage more effectively with it and harness the opportunities its continued development creates” [citation:original]. Cooperation is particularly promising in areas such as green development, where China and Europe are natural partners , and AI, where China’s open-source approach lowers barriers for developing countries . The key, as Premier Li stated, is that “innovation and cooperation is the answer to tackle challenges to global growth” .


China’s Carbon Challenge – A Balancing Act Between Emissions Cuts and Economic Growth


1. Introduction: The Dual Challenge of Development and Decarbonisation

As China has established the world’s largest domestic carbon market, it finds itself at the intersection of two powerful forces: the urgent need to reduce greenhouse gas emissions to meet its ambitious “dual carbon” goals, and the equally pressing imperative to sustain economic growth and industrial development . This is not merely an environmental challenge; it is a fundamental structural question about how the world’s second-largest economy can transform its energy-intensive industrial base while maintaining its position as a global manufacturing powerhouse.

The challenge is immense. China’s industrial sector accounts for approximately one-third of total emissions excluding land use, land-use change, and forestry (LULUCF), making it the country’s second-largest emitting sector . Emissions come from both energy use and industrial processes, creating a complex web of emission sources that require a multifaceted approach. The fossil fuel production sector accounts for an additional 8% of total emissions .

Yet there are signs of progress. In 2024, China contributed more than half of the world’s newly installed wind and solar capacity, reaffirming its leadership role in advancing the global pledge to triple renewable energy capacity by 2030 . CO2 emissions from fuel combustion fell 1.2% year-on-year in Q1 2025, the first drop tied directly to rapid clean energy deployment . However, as China navigates its ongoing transition, it faces complex trade-offs between economic growth, emissions abatement, and energy security .

This analysis examines the pressures facing China’s emissions reduction efforts, the policy responses being developed, and the technological pathways that could enable a successful balancing act.


2. The Pressures: Why Emissions Reduction is a “Steep Slope”

At a seminar hosted by Shanghai-based Wenhui Daily, experts including Li Jin, Deputy General Manager of the Shanghai Environment and Energy Exchange, and He Kebin, Dean of the Institute for Carbon Neutrality at Tsinghua University, outlined the specific pressures facing local governments in China regarding emissions reduction requirements . These pressures can be categorized into four key areas:

2.1 Carbon-Intensive Energy Mix

China has a carbon-intensive energy mix, in which fossil fuels, particularly coal, account for a relatively large share . Despite rapid growth in renewable energy, coal remains the dominant fuel, driven by China’s resource endowment of being “rich in coal, poor in oil, and low in gas” . This creates a fundamental structural challenge: the energy system itself is inherently carbon-intensive.

The power sector, which contributes more than 40% of national carbon emissions, has been the primary focus of China’s carbon market . Yet even as renewable energy expands rapidly, coal-fired power remains the cornerstone of electricity supply, owing to its reliability and capacity to meet base-load demand . In Guangdong Province, one of China’s most industrialized coastal regions, coal-fired electricity generation remains the primary emission source, despite a deceleration in thermal power growth .

2.2 Industrial Contribution to GDP and Production-Based Accounting

Industry is a major contributor to China’s GDP, with the country producing large quantities of construction materials, petrochemicals, and metallurgical products for the global market . This is not simply a matter of domestic consumption; China manufactures these products for the world, making it a global supplier of carbon-intensive goods.

The current international standard for accounting greenhouse gas emissions is production-based, not consumption-based . This means that emissions associated with producing goods that are exported are attributed to China, rather than to the countries that consume them. As one industry expert noted, researchers are exploring consumption-based accounting, but the international standard remains production-based . This drives up China’s emissions figures while it is still undergoing industrial transformation.

2.3 High Economic Growth Rates

China has maintained high economic growth rates, and aligning economic growth with emissions cuts is a significant challenge . The relationship between GDP growth and energy demand is not linear; economic growth creates demand for energy, which in turn creates emissions. The challenge of decoupling growth from emissions is one of the central questions in climate policy.

Research has shown that GDP per capita was the main driver of CO2 growth, while lower energy intensity helped curb emissions . However, the rebound of energy-intensive industries between 2015 and 2020 offset some of the emissions reductions from economic restructuring, highlighting the difficulty of maintaining a clean growth trajectory .

2.4 The “Steep Slope” Timeline

Unlike Europe and the United States, which have traveled on “a gentle slope” to reduce carbon emissions over several decades, China faces a “steep slope” because it has a tight timeline for achieving carbon peaking before 2030 and carbon neutrality before 2060 . The US and Europe have had the luxury of a longer transition period; China must achieve in a few decades what took Western countries more than a century.

This compressed timeline creates significant pressure. As one expert noted, achieving greenhouse gas neutrality by 2060 requires unprecedented, cross-sectoral mitigation efforts far exceeding those required for CO2 neutrality . Energy-related CO2 emissions must be completely eliminated by 2060 under the GHG neutrality scenario, requiring carbon capture capacity to expand to 1.9 gigatonnes .


3. The Policy Response: Building a Green Finance Ecosystem

In response to these challenges, the Chinese government is rolling out innovative policy measures to incentivize emissions reductions and support green transition.

3.1 Shanghai’s “Green Performance” Evaluation

Shanghai plans to roll out measures for evaluating the “green performance” of companies, including energy consumption, carbon emissions, and pollutant discharge . Enterprises will make self-declarations for evaluation, and the results will influence the granting of green credit and financial guarantees . This approach creates a direct link between environmental performance and access to finance, incentivizing companies to improve their carbon footprint.

3.2 Carbon as Collateral

Shanghai is also working to allow enterprises that use carbon as collateral to enjoy interest subsidies on loans . This will encourage enterprises to utilize carbon financial tools and engage more effectively in green financing . The approach is innovative because it treats carbon allowances as a financial asset, enabling companies to leverage their emission reduction efforts to secure better financing terms.

3.3 Expanding the National Carbon Market

China’s carbon market is currently expanding. In 2024, a total of 2,096 key emission units were included in the national carbon emission trading market, with a compliance rate close to 100% . The market has seen cumulative transaction volume reach 681 million tons, with a transaction value of 46.784 billion yuan .

The industry coverage is also expected to expand. From an initial focus on the power industry as a “single point of breakthrough,” the carbon market will cover steel, building materials, and other high-energy-consuming industries by 2025, with the goal of economy-wide coverage by 2030 . The expansion of the national carbon market currently faces bottlenecks in Measurement, Reporting, and Verification (MRV), but the EU’s Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM) has set a deadline of 2034 for China to fully mature its national carbon market .

3.4 The Open Coalition on Compliance Carbon Markets

At last year’s 30th Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change in Brazil, China, together with the European Union and Brazil, launched the Open Coalition on Compliance Carbon Markets to share its experience . This initiative represents China’s commitment to international cooperation on carbon market development, particularly with emerging and developing countries in Southeast Asia and the BRICS group that are seeking to develop their own carbon markets .


4. The Technological Solution: Innovation as the Key

Experts at the Wenhui Daily seminar emphasized that technological advancement and breakthroughs are crucial to addressing the challenges of emissions reduction . Several technological pathways are emerging as key enablers of China’s green transition.

4.1 Electrification and the Shift to Clean Energy

The industrial sector is seeing accelerated decarbonisation led by electrification . Energy intensity fell 3.5% in 2024, avoiding 130 million tonnes of CO2, as firms scale up clean technologies .

Under the Highest Possible Ambition scenario, China’s industrial sector could approach full decarbonisation in the 2040s and achieve negative emissions from energy demand by 2060 . Electricity’s share of the industrial energy mix would increase from 28% in 2023 to over 50% by 2040, reflecting accelerated electrification across the sector .

4.2 Renewable Energy Deployment

Renewables are reshaping China’s power system at record speed. China added 277 GW of solar and 79 GW of wind in 2024, reaching its 2030 target six years early . Renewables now make up over half of installed capacity .

The expansion is not just about capacity; it’s about integration. As experts note, however, transformation requires more than capacity expansion; market reforms and grid flexibility are urgently needed to ensure power grid reliability and system efficiency .

4.3 Carbon Capture, Utilization, and Storage (CCUS)

For hard-to-abate industrial sectors, CCUS is expected to play a critical role. Achieving GHG neutrality by 2060 requires carbon capture capacity to expand from 1.3 to 1.9 gigatonnes of CO2 . In industrialized coastal regions like Guangdong, emission projections for the power sector indicate a gradual decline through mid-century, contingent on accelerated deployment of CCUS, expansion of renewable energy, and strategic phaseout of outdated coal capacity .

4.4 Efficiency Improvements

Improved coal-fired unit efficiency has already had a significant impact. Between 2015 and 2020, improved efficiency reduced the electricity’s primary energy consumption conversion factor, avoiding 88 million tonnes of CO2 . The research highlights the role of coal-fired unit efficiency upgrades and clean energy use in reducing emissions .


5. The Barriers: Challenges to a Successful Transition

Despite significant progress, several barriers remain to achieving the dual carbon goals.

5.1 Carbon Pricing and Market Design

China’s carbon market is still developing. Compared to mature markets like the EU, China’s carbon market needs improvement in its liquidity, transparency, and price discovery functions . China’s carbon price is still relatively low, which some experts argue weakens the incentive for enterprises to invest in low-carbon technologies .

Research has identified several systemic barriers: undeducted CCERs distort the grid emission factor, creating unaccounted carbon liabilities for exporters, while generators internalize costs from the carbon price’s “tidal effect” rather than fully passing them through . These practices highlight imperfections in market design and its linkage to policy.

5.2 Continued Coal Expansion

Despite record renewable growth, China began construction on 94.5 GW of new coal power in 2024 – the highest since 2015 . This presents a risk of long-term carbon lock-in. Experts suggest that to avoid this, China must stop issuing new coal permits and optimize the utilization of existing assets, ensuring a just transition in coal-dependent provinces .

5.3 Electricity-Carbon Market Coupling

The coupling of electricity and carbon markets remains incomplete . The transmission efficiency of carbon prices to generator-side electricity tariffs has been quantified at 0.765, but the pass-through effect experienced temporary attenuation during major institutional transitions . The study identifies key systemic barriers: undeducted CCERs distort the grid emission factor, creating unaccounted carbon liabilities for exporters, while generators internalize costs from the carbon price’s “tidal effect” rather than fully passing them through .

5.4 Carbon Leakage and International Trade

Green trade barriers remain a concern. China’s export-oriented enterprises may face high carbon tariff risks, potentially putting them at a disadvantage in international competition . The EU’s Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM) is a particular concern, as it sets a deadline of 2034 for China to fully mature its national carbon market .


6. Conclusion: A Balanced Path Forward

China’s emissions reduction journey represents a challenging balancing act. The country must navigate the “steep slope” of rapid decarbonization while maintaining economic growth and industrial competitiveness. The path forward requires a combination of policy innovation, technological advancement, and market-based mechanisms.

The progress is undeniable. China’s carbon market is the world’s largest, renewables are being deployed at record speed, and emissions are beginning to show signs of plateauing . The challenges are equally significant: continued coal expansion, the need for electricity-carbon market coupling, and international trade barriers.

As experts at the Wenhui Daily seminar emphasized, technological advancement and breakthroughs are crucial to addressing these challenges . The evidence supports this view: improved coal-fired unit efficiency has already avoided significant emissions, and accelerated electrification could transform the industrial sector.

The balancing act is not simply about emissions cuts versus economic growth; it is about creating a new model of development that is both low-carbon and prosperous. China’s experience offers lessons for other emerging economies facing similar trade-offs, and its willingness to share expertise through initiatives like the Open Coalition on Compliance Carbon Markets  demonstrates a commitment to global cooperation on this defining challenge of our time.


5 Questions & Answers on China’s Carbon Challenge

Q1. Why is China’s emissions reduction path described as a “steep slope” compared to Europe and the United States?

A: Unlike Europe and the United States, which have had several decades to gradually reduce their carbon emissions—a “gentle slope”—China faces a compressed timeline to achieve carbon peaking before 2030 and carbon neutrality before 2060 . This means China must achieve in a few decades what took Western countries over a century. The challenge is compounded by China’s carbon-intensive energy mix (coal accounts for a large share) and its need to maintain high economic growth rates while industrializing .

Q2. What are the main pressures facing Chinese local governments in their emissions reduction efforts?

A: Chinese local governments face four key pressures: (1) a carbon-intensive energy mix where coal remains dominant; (2) industry being a major contributor to GDP, with production-based accounting attributing emissions from export manufacturing to China; (3) the need to align high economic growth with emissions cuts; and (4) the “steep slope” timeline for achieving the dual carbon goals .

Q3. What innovative financial tools is Shanghai developing to support emissions reductions?

A: Shanghai is planning two key initiatives: (1) a “green performance” evaluation system that measures companies on energy consumption, carbon emissions, and pollutant discharge, with results influencing access to green credit and financial guarantees ; and (2) allowing enterprises to use carbon as collateral for loans, with interest subsidies available, encouraging companies to utilize carbon financial tools for green financing .

Q4. How has China’s carbon market performed to date?

A: China has established the world’s largest domestic carbon market . As of the end of July 2025, the cumulative transaction volume reached 681 million tons, with a transaction value of 46.784 billion yuan . In 2024, 2,096 key emission units were included, with a compliance rate close to 100% . The market is expected to expand beyond the power sector to cover steel, building materials, and other high-energy-consuming industries by 2025 .

Q5. What role does technological innovation play in China’s green transition?

A: Technological advancement is seen as crucial to addressing emissions reduction challenges . Key areas include: (1) electrification of the industrial sector, with electricity’s share of industrial energy mix projected to exceed 50% by 2040 ; (2) rapid deployment of renewables, with 277 GW of solar and 79 GW of wind added in 2024 ; (3) improved coal-fired unit efficiency, which avoided 88 million tonnes of CO2 between 2015 and 2020 ; and (4) expansion of carbon capture capacity, needed to reach 1.9 gigatonnes by 2060 .

Innovation Needs Open Doors, Not High Walls – The Battle for the Future of Global Science


1. Introduction: A System at a Crossroads

The global innovation system is undergoing its most profound transformation since the end of the Cold War. Once driven by openness, cross-border collaboration, and optimal efficiency, global innovation chains are now being reshaped by “national security” strategies and “de-risking” policies, raising unprecedented concerns about fragmentation and division .

Yet, amid growing security anxieties, one fundamental reality remains unchanged: no country can sustain technological leadership behind closed doors . This is the central tension of our era—a clash between the logic of openness that has driven scientific progress for decades and the logic of security that increasingly demands control over critical technologies.

Recent data from the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) provides a snapshot of this tension. Global international patent applications filed through the Patent Cooperation Treaty (PCT) system reached 275,900 in 2025, marking the second consecutive year of growth . Yet this headline figure masks a more complex story: while China and South Korea posted robust growth of 5.3% and 4.9% respectively, the United States, Japan, and Germany all recorded their third or fourth consecutive years of decline . The digital communication sector grew 6.1% and semiconductors grew 6.1%, reflecting the strategic importance of these fields . Huawei Technologies led all filers with 7,523 published applications, maintaining its position since 2017 .

These figures reflect a world where innovation remains vibrant but increasingly nationalized. The challenge is compounded by what economists Henry Farrell and Abraham Newman have described as “weaponized interdependence”—the phenomenon where nations that control key nodes in global networks can leverage financial systems, technical standards, and data flows to restrict or sanction other countries .

This analysis examines the contours of this transformation, the mechanisms of weaponized interdependence, the dangers of science decoupling, and the pathways toward preserving global innovation cooperation.


2. Weaponized Interdependence: The New Logic of Global Power

The fundamental insight of Farrell and Newman’s concept is that globalization is not a flat landscape but a network of nodes and hubs . In this network, some nodes are more important than others. For example, in the global financial system, SWIFT in Belgium processes over three million transactions daily, making it a critical choke point . In the internet infrastructure, data flows through a mere seven undersea cables .

The concept of weaponized interdependence rests on two mechanisms :

The Panopticon Effect: If you control a central node, you can surveil all communication within the network. After 9/11, the US Treasury realized that access to SWIFT data would reveal never-before-seen financial links. The NSA’s PRISM program showed that you don’t need to access individual routers; you only need to tap a few corporate headquarters .

The Chokepoint Effect: By denying access to an adversary, you can cut them off from the global economy. The US used this against Iranian banks during the Obama administration, pushing them out of the SWIFT system .

The crucial point is that these networks are asymmetric in favor of powerful Western states, particularly the United States. Most of these networks were developed in the 1990s and early 2000s, a period of unparalleled US dominance. As a result, many key nodes are located under US control or in places where the US can exercise substantial pressure .

However, the tables are now turning. Other states—starting with China—have begun to weaponize their own chokepoints. As Farrell and Newman write, “The United States is discovering what it is like to have others do unto it as it has eagerly done unto others” . This has created a global collective security dilemma, where countries seek the benefits of openness yet fear being subjected to chokepoints where access can be cut off .


3. The Fragmentation of Global Innovation

The rise of weaponized interdependence has accelerated the fragmentation of global innovation systems across multiple dimensions.

Declining International Collaboration: WIPO data shows that the share of global PCT applications involving foreign co-applicants has been declining . Among the world’s top 20 countries in foreign co-applicant patent filings, 11 experienced a notable decline in their collaboration ratios between 2009 and 2023 . Countries like Canada, Finland, Israel, and the United Kingdom saw significant drops of 9.3, 9.6, 2.3, and 2.3 percentage points respectively .

Proliferation of Export Controls: Semiconductor trade restrictions illustrate the trend. Between 2019 and 2025, the volume of products targeted per region surged. As of the first four months of 2025, 906 products had been placed under restrictions, and the geographical reach had expanded to 215 economies . These controls have narrowed channels for international technology diffusion, exacerbating challenges for low- and middle-income countries .

The Dual-Track Science Architecture: UNESCO experts warn of the emergence of a “dual-track” science architecture—two scientific systems diverging with differing standards, norms, infrastructure, and governance layers . Research collaborations between the US and China have been narrowed in scope, excluding “emerging technologies” like quantum computing and advanced AI from joint efforts .

AI Fragmentation: The fear of a fractured AI world is no longer hypothetical. Export controls on advanced chips, restrictions on cross-border data flows, divergent regulatory regimes, and competing standards for “trustworthy AI” are hardening into structural divides . Governments increasingly speak of “AI sovereignty” and “data sovereignty” with the same gravity once reserved for territorial integrity .


4. The Dangers of Science Decoupling

The fragmentation of global science has profound consequences.

Slower Scientific Progress: Open exchange of data, samples, and expertise has been central to breakthroughs in fields such as climate science, genomics, and AI. As research security policies tighten, these flows are being restricted. Incompatible data-sharing regimes create silos where information once circulated freely . The result is duplication of effort, reduced efficiency, and the risk that scientific progress slows as researchers in each bloc rebuild the same infrastructure in isolation .

Reduced Ability to Address Global Challenges: Problems like pandemics, climate change, and food security require the rapid, transparent sharing of data across borders. A two-track system makes this much harder. Competing vaccine pipelines, segregated AI models, and separate climate datasets lead to duplication and delay .

Erosion of Trust and Mobility: Visa restrictions, disclosure requirements, and fears of espionage have made international collaboration politically sensitive. Scientists of Chinese origin working in Western institutions often face suspicion, while Western scholars in China encounter censorship and surveillance . Such mistrust not only deters individual researchers but also undermines the culture of openness that science depends upon.

Rising Scientific Nationalism: As states emphasize self-reliance and strategic competition, the purpose of research becomes tied to national power rather than universal discovery. Funding increasingly prioritizes defense-related technologies, while open inquiry is treated as a vulnerability .

Widening Inequalities: Countries outside the US-China axis may be forced to choose sides to access funding, technology, or partnerships. Those that remain neutral risk exclusion from both systems, losing access to the networks that enable scientific advancement .


5. The Countertrend: Open Source as a Bridge

Despite these pressures, there are countervailing forces. Open-source AI provides a vivid example of how openness can persist . Foundational open-source communities such as Hugging Face bring together hundreds of thousands of developers from around the globe. Without cross-border code sharing, open datasets, and distributed collaboration, the pace of AI technological iteration would slow down considerably .

Chinese companies are doubling down on open-source AI-powered models . Alibaba’s ModelScope platform hosts over 70,000 open-source models and serves 16 million developers from 36 countries . DeepSeek’s open-source models have taken the world by surprise, proving that advanced AI can be developed with high efficiency and lower costs than many Western alternatives .

The GENIE.AI initiative, led by the ITU, is developing an end-to-end open-source implementation framework for public services, enabling governments to build AI solutions without vendor lock-in . This represents a model of international cooperation that preserves space for digital sovereignty while advancing inclusive development.


6. Pathways Forward: Preserving Space for Innovation

Amid geopolitical realities, preserving the necessary space for global innovation requires more than just unilateral actions; it demands the collaborative participation of national governments, multilateral mechanisms, market entities, and the scientific community .

Establish Common Standards: Efforts should be made within multilateral frameworks—such as the World Trade Organization and the OECD—to establish common standards that clearly define the scope of national security reviews, export controls, and investment restrictions . Such measures should remain narrowly focused on genuinely sensitive areas related to national defense and critical infrastructure .

Transparent Mechanisms for Technology Export Policies: Multilateral platforms should develop a notification and early-warning system for technology export policies, defining sensitive sectors, applicable standards, and exemption clauses . This would help mitigate the disruptive effects of sudden policy changes on global cooperation networks.

Distinguish Between Strategic Control and Operational Openness: It is reasonable for countries to insist on domestic control over critical infrastructure or national security applications. But there is little justification for fragmenting areas where cooperation clearly serves collective interests, such as AI safety research, standards for robustness and interoperability, or governance of frontier models with systemic risks .

Prioritize a “Cooperation List”: Countries may prioritize cooperation in sectors such as public health, climate change, and basic sciences, combining a “positive list for encouraging cooperation” with a “limited prohibited zone” .

Institutional Safeguards: Equally important are institutional safeguards that prevent security concerns from becoming a broad justification for economic and technological restrictions . Major countries must provide policy leadership and act as stabilizing forces in innovation governance.

Knowledge Diplomacy: At this critical juncture, knowledge diplomacy—the use of education, research, and exchange to strengthen relationships—must be reaffirmed as the central value guiding international research collaboration. Knowledge diplomacy differs from knowledge power, where scientific expertise is exerted for global dominance .


7. Conclusion: A Stress Test for the International Community

The rise of economic security should not be seen as the end of open innovation. Rather, it is a stress test for the international community’s ability to preserve openness while addressing legitimate security concerns .

The lesson is clear: innovation advances fastest when knowledge circulates rather than when it is confined . A diversified supply system and an integrated global division of labor are, by themselves, the best ways to mitigate risk . If nations erect barriers and engage in redundant development, global supply chains will shift from a state of “efficient interconnection” to one of “fragmented islands.” This would not only push up inflation and drag down global growth but also expose every economy to systemic risks .

If major countries take the lead in establishing channels for dialogue on innovation policy, and reach a basic consensus on security boundaries and fundamental rules, they can preserve the strategic space necessary for global innovation cooperation . The world urgently needs to reach this consensus. Unnecessary barriers must be dismantled to ensure the flame of global innovation continues to burn .


5 Questions & Answers on Innovation, Security, and Global Cooperation

Q1. What is “weaponized interdependence,” and how does it shape global innovation?

A: Weaponized interdependence, as defined by political scientists Henry Farrell and Abraham Newman, is the phenomenon where countries that control key nodes or “chokepoints” in global networks can leverage financial systems, technical standards, data flows, and supply chains to restrict or sanction other countries . The global economy is not a flat landscape but a network of nodes and hubs, with some nodes being far more important than others . For example, the SWIFT financial messaging system processes over three million transactions daily, and control of such a node gives a state the ability to surveil communications or cut off an adversary from the global economy . This has turned interdependence from a source of mutual benefit into a potential instrument of strategic competition .

Q2. What evidence shows that global innovation is fragmenting?

A: Several trends indicate fragmentation: (1) The share of global patent applications involving foreign co-applicants has been declining, with 11 of the top 20 countries experiencing notable drops between 2009 and 2023 ; (2) Export controls have proliferated, with 906 semiconductor products under restrictions and 215 economies affected in early 2025 ; (3) Research collaborations between the US and China have narrowed, excluding emerging technologies like quantum computing and advanced AI ; (4) Governments increasingly speak of “AI sovereignty” and “data sovereignty,” framing AI in the language of national security .

Q3. What are the dangers of science decoupling?

A: UNESCO experts identify several dangers: (1) Slower scientific progress, as incompatible data-sharing regimes create silos and duplicate efforts ; (2) Reduced ability to address global challenges like pandemics, climate change, and food security, which require rapid data sharing across borders ; (3) Erosion of trust and mobility within the scientific community, as visa restrictions and fears of espionage deter international collaboration ; (4) Rising scientific nationalism, where research is tied to national power rather than universal discovery ; (5) Widening inequalities, as countries outside the US-China axis are forced to choose sides .

Q4. How does open-source AI provide an alternative model to fragmentation?

A: Open-source AI demonstrates that innovation can thrive through openness. Foundational communities like Hugging Face bring together hundreds of thousands of developers globally . Chinese companies like Alibaba have made over 200 generative AI models open-source, with their ModelScope platform hosting 70,000+ models and 16 million developers across 36 countries . The ITU-led GENIE.AI initiative is developing open-source frameworks for public services, enabling governments to build AI solutions without vendor lock-in . This model lowers barriers, reduces costs, and fosters global collaboration and innovation .

Q5. What pathways exist to preserve global innovation cooperation?

A: Recommendations from experts include: (1) Establishing common standards within multilateral frameworks like the WTO and OECD to define the scope of national security reviews and export controls ; (2) Developing notification and early-warning systems for technology export policies to reduce information asymmetry and chain reactions ; (3) Distinguishing between strategic control and operational openness, cooperating on AI safety research and climate science while protecting national security applications ; (4) Prioritizing a “cooperation list” in public health, climate change, and basic sciences ; (5) Reaffirming knowledge diplomacy—the use of research and exchange to strengthen relationships—as the guiding value .

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