The Road to Deoband, Muttaqi’s Pilgrimage and India’s Calculated Gambit in Afghanistan

The Road to Deoband, Muttaqi’s Pilgrimage and India’s Calculated Gambit in Afghanistan

In the intricate and often opaque theater of international diplomacy, symbolic gestures can carry the weight of declarations. The recent eight-day visit of Amir Khan Muttaqi, the Foreign Minister of Afghanistan’s Taliban government, to India, culminating in a carefully orchestrated trip to the Darul Uloom seminary in Deoband, is one such potent symbol. This journey, facilitated by New Delhi upon Muttaqi’s personal request, transcends a mere religious pilgrimage. It is a multifaceted event driven by personal history, ideological lineage, and a sophisticated, if cautious, exercise in “religious diplomacy” by India, signaling a pragmatic recalibration of its strategy towards its volatile western neighborhood.

For Muttaqi, the visit to the small town in Uttar Pradesh was a homecoming to the spiritual and ideological wellspring of the movement he represents. For India, allowing this visit was a calculated diplomatic gambit, an acknowledgment of the ground realities in Kabul, and a subtle message to its primary regional adversary, Pakistan. This article delves into the historical roots of the Deoband-Taliban connection, the personal significance for Muttaqi, and the complex diplomatic chessboard on which this visit was played out.

Part I: The Cradle of Ideology – Deoband and the Birth of a Movement

To understand the profound significance of Muttaqi’s journey, one must first understand Darul Uloom Deoband itself. Established in 1866 in the aftermath of the 1857 Rebellion, the seminary was founded as a bastion of Islamic orthodoxy and a conscious alternative to the Western-style education systems being promoted by the British colonial government. It was not merely a madrasa; it was the progenitor of the influential Deobandi movement.

The Deobandi school is a Sunni revivalist movement characterized by its:

• Orthopraxy: A strict emphasis on correct religious practice and adherence to the Hanafi school of Islamic jurisprudence.

• Resistance to Syncretism: A commitment to purifying Islamic practice from what it perceived as Hindu and Western cultural influences.

• Emphasis on Piety and Morality: A focus on individual piety and moral uprightness as the core of religious life.

From its humble beginnings, the influence of Darul Uloom spread far and wide across South Asia and beyond. For over a century and a half, it has served as an “incomparable scientific institution for the religious education of the Muslims,” producing scholars and clerics who shaped Islamic thought across the subcontinent. Its reputation is such that it is often considered second only to Al-Azhar University in Cairo in its prestige within the Sunni Islamic world. Crucially, the seminary also played a role in India’s freedom struggle, fostering political consciousness among Muslims and opposing British rule, a history that lends it a complex legacy of both anti-colonialism and religious conservatism.

Part II: The Afghan Offshoot – From Deoband to the Taliban

The ideological seeds sown in Deoband found fertile ground in Afghanistan through a critical transmission belt. After the partition of India in 1947, a teacher from the original Deoband seminary, Maulana Yousuf Banuri, migrated to what was then the North-West Frontier Province of Pakistan. There, he established the Darul Uloom Haqqania in Akora Khattak.

This seminary, patterned directly on its Deoband parent and propagating the same brand of conservative Sunni Islam, would become the most crucial ideological and recruitment center for the movement that would later be known as the Taliban. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 was the catalyst that militarized this ideology. Darul Uloom Haqqania became a training ground for the Afghan mujahideen resistance. The seminary’s leaders took the concept of jihad and refocused it explicitly on the fight against the Soviet occupation.

It was from the student bodies (taliban in Pashto) of such madrasas, particularly Darul Uloom Haqqania, that the Taliban emerged in the early 1990s. Key founders of the group, including the reclusive Mullah Omar, were products of this Deobandi-Haqqania network. Amir Khan Muttaqi himself, born in Afghanistan’s Helmand Province in 1970, was part of this generation. After the Soviet invasion, his family, like millions of others, sought refuge in Pakistan. It was during this period that Muttaqi received his education at Darul Uloom Haqqania, immersing himself in the Deobandi ideology that was now fused with the ethos of armed resistance.

Therefore, for Muttaqi, a visit to Deoband was not just a trip to a respected seminary; it was a pilgrimage to the source. It was an act of connecting with the root of his own ideological and religious identity. As one student at the seminary aptly put it, “Humein yeh kaafi hai ki woh Deoband ka maane wala hai” (For us, it’s enough that he believes in Deoband). This personal connection provided the emotional and ideological impetus for the visit, making it a powerful domestic signal within Taliban ranks.

Part III: India’s Diplomatic Calculus – Engaging the Inevitable

From New Delhi’s perspective, the decision to grant Muttaqi a visa and facilitate his Deoband visit represents a significant, pragmatic shift in its Afghanistan policy. For decades, India was a staunch supporter of the internationally recognized Afghan Republic, investing over $3 billion in infrastructure, development, and capacity-building projects. The Taliban’s return to power in August 2021 was a strategic setback for India, forcing a period of recalculation.

India’s initial approach was one of cautious distance, refusing to formally recognize the Taliban regime and prioritizing the evacuation of its citizens and the security of its assets. However, as the Taliban consolidated power and it became clear that no viable alternative existed, a policy of static disengagement became unsustainable. India has vital strategic interests in Afghanistan, including countering Pakistan’s influence, preventing the country from becoming a safe haven for anti-India terrorist groups, and securing its historical investments.

Muttaqi’s visit, therefore, is a key step in India’s policy of “engagement without recognition.” By allowing this religiously charged trip, New Delhi achieves several objectives:

1. Opens a Channel of Communication: It provides a high-level, semi-official platform to directly convey India’s concerns and interests to a key figure in the Taliban hierarchy, bypassing Pakistani intermediaries.

2. Leverages Soft Power: It subtly reminds the Taliban of India’s historical and cultural influence in the region, including its role as the home of a central pillar of their own ideology.

3. Exploits Pakistan-Afghanistan Tensions: With relations between Kabul and Islamabad fraying over the issue of the TTP (Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan), India sees an opportunity to weaken the historically strong Pakistan-Taliban axis. Engaging Kabul directly undermines Pakistan’s claim to being the sole arbiter of Afghanistan’s foreign relations.

4. Reclaims a Role: The visit signals to the international community that India remains a relevant player in the Afghan “Great Game,” capable of engaging with all factions.

Part IV: The Subtle Message – Ideology vs. Pragmatism

The visit was not without its inherent contradictions, which New Delhi likely anticipated. While Darul Uloom Deoband is the ideological forebear of the Taliban, it has, at times, charted a different course on key social issues. Most notably, the Indian seminary has historically issued fatwas supporting girls’ right to education, a stark contrast to the Taliban’s severe restrictions on female education and employment beyond the primary level.

This divergence was the subtle, unspoken message from India. By hosting Muttaqi at an institution that holds a different view on this critical issue, New Delhi was subtly demonstrating that the Deobandi ideology, as interpreted in India’s pluralistic and democratic context, can coexist with modern rights. It was a quiet, diplomatic nudge, suggesting that the Taliban’s most draconian policies are not an inevitable outcome of their religious beliefs but a matter of political choice.

This is not the first time India has employed such “religious diplomacy.” The text recalls the 1995 visit of former Iranian President Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani to Lucknow, a city with a large Shia population. At a time when India’s relations with the Muslim world were strained after the Babri Masjid demolition, Rafsanjani’s endorsement of Indian secularism from a prominent podium provided crucial diplomatic cover. Muttaqi’s Deoband trip operates on a similar, though more nuanced, principle: using a shared religious platform to advance strategic national interests.

Conclusion: A Journey of a Thousand Miles

Amir Khan Muttaqi’s journey to Deoband is a story layered with meaning. On one level, it is the personal journey of an ideologue returning to his movement’s spiritual home. On another, it is a significant diplomatic milestone, marking India’s cautious, pragmatic, and necessary engagement with the de facto authorities in Kabul.

The road ahead remains fraught with challenges. India’s core concerns regarding terrorism and human rights are unlikely to be resolved by a single visit. The Taliban, for their part, seek legitimacy and economic support that India can potentially offer. The Deoband visit has opened a door. Whether it leads to a stable and productive relationship, or remains a fleeting moment of diplomatic theater, will depend on the difficult negotiations and confidence-building measures that must now follow. In the high-stakes politics of South Asia, the road to Kabul, it seems, now runs through a small, dusty town in Uttar Pradesh called Deoband.

Q&A: Delving Deeper into Muttaqi’s Deoband Visit

1. What is the Darul Uloom Deoband, and why is it so influential?

Darul Uloom Deoband is one of the most influential Islamic seminaries in the world, established in British India in 1866. It is the birthplace of the Deobandi movement, a Sunni revivalist school of thought that emphasizes strict adherence to Islamic law (Hanafi jurisprudence), piety, and resistance to non-Islamic cultural influences. Its influence stems from its long history, its role in the anti-colonial struggle, and the vast network of thousands of madrasas it has inspired across South Asia and beyond, making it a central institution in the religious landscape of Sunni Islam.

2. What is the direct connection between a seminary in India and the Taliban in Afghanistan?

The connection is ideological and historical. After 1947, teachers from Deoband established sister seminaries in Pakistan, most notably the Darul Uloom Haqqania. This madrasa became a key center for educating and mobilizing Afghan refugees during the Soviet-Afghan War in the 1980s. The Taliban movement emerged in the early 1990s from the student bodies (taliban) of these Deobandi madrasas in Pakistan. Its founder, Mullah Omar, and many of its early leaders, including Amir Khan Muttaqi, were educated in this Deobandi tradition, making Deoband the ideological cradle of the Taliban.

3. Why did India, which does not officially recognize the Taliban government, allow this visit?

India’s decision is a classic example of pragmatic diplomacy. While withholding formal recognition, India cannot afford to ignore the reality of Taliban control in Afghanistan. By allowing the visit, India:

• Opens Communication: It establishes a direct channel with a senior Taliban leader to discuss security concerns (like terrorism) and India’s humanitarian assistance.

• Projects Soft Power: It reminds the Taliban of India’s cultural and religious significance in the region.

• Counters Pakistan: It subtly undermines Pakistan’s traditional role as the primary intermediary with the Taliban, especially amid current tensions between Kabul and Islamabad.

4. The article mentions a contradiction regarding girls’ education. What is it?

While the Taliban and Darul Uloom Deoband share a core ideological lineage, they differ on specific social issues. The Taliban have banned girls in Afghanistan from education beyond the sixth grade. In contrast, Darul Uloom Deoband in India has historically issued religious edicts (fatwas) supporting the right of girls to receive an education. This divergence highlights how the same religious ideology can be interpreted differently in various national and political contexts.

5. What is “religious diplomacy,” and has India used it before?

Religious diplomacy is the use of shared religious heritage, symbols, or institutions to advance foreign policy objectives. Yes, India has used this tool before. A notable precedent was in 1995 when New Delhi hosted the Iranian President, Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani. He addressed a massive Shia congregation in Lucknow and publicly endorsed Indian secularism. This was crucial for repairing India’s image in the Muslim world after the demolition of the Babri Masjid in 1992. Muttaqi’s visit is a similar tactic, using the shared Deobandi platform to build bridges with a difficult regime.