The Prime Minister’s Broadcast and the Model Code of Conduct, A Test of Electoral Regulation
The Model Code of Conduct (MCC), which guides political parties and candidates during elections, was first drafted by the Kerala government in 1960. The Election Commission (EC) formalised it in 1968, revised it in 1974, and added Part VII on the “party in power” in 1979. Former Chief Election Commissioner T.N. Seshan enforced it with unprecedented rigour from 1991. Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s April 18 address has raised questions about whether the address violated the Code. The broadcast was carried live on Doordarshan, Sansad TV, and All India Radio. The Prime Minister named four Opposition parties and urged women voters in Tamil Nadu and West Bengal to punish them at the polls on April 23 for defeating the 131st Constitution Amendment Bill in the Lok Sabha. At the time of writing, the Election Commission has taken no action on the complaints it has received. This silence is not a doctrinal difficulty. It is a choice. And it raises fundamental questions about the efficacy of India’s electoral regulation architecture.
The Evolution of the Model Code of Conduct
The Supreme Court, in Mohinder Singh Gill v. Chief Election Commissioner (1978), described Article 324 of the Constitution as “a reservoir of power” that allows the EC to act where Parliament has not legislated. The Punjab and Haryana High Court, in Harbans Singh Jalal v. Union of India (1997), held that the Code comes into effect from the announcement of the election schedule. Sanctions range from censure to the suspension of party recognition under paragraph 16A of the Election Symbols Order, 1968.
The MCC is not a statute. It is a set of political agreements, enforced by the EC through moral suasion and administrative sanctions. Its strength lies in its flexibility. Its weakness lies in its reliance on the EC’s willingness to act. Part VII of the MCC, added in 1979, specifically addresses the conduct of the “party in power.” It prohibits combining official visits with electioneering, using government machinery for campaign work, and misusing publicly funded mass media for partisan coverage during the election period.
On its face, the April 18 address appears to be a textbook Part VII matter. The Prime Minister used publicly funded broadcasters (Doordarshan, Sansad TV, All India Radio) to deliver a partisan message, naming Opposition parties and urging voters to punish them. The content was campaign material. The medium was state-owned. The timing was during an ongoing election. The audience was voters in Tamil Nadu and West Bengal, where polling was scheduled for April 23. This is precisely the kind of conduct that Part VII was designed to prevent.
The Statutory Framework: Section 123(3) and the Five Nouns
The statute is less flexible than the Code. Section 123(3) of the Representation of the People Act, 1951, as amended in 1961, makes it a corrupt practice for a candidate or his agent to appeal to voters on the ground of “hierarchy, race, caste, community, or language.” The provision turns on a pronoun, “his”, and five enumerated nouns. In Abhiram Singh v. C.D. Commachen (2017), a seven-judge bench of the Supreme Court settled, by a 4:3 majority, that “his” extends to the voter as well as the candidate.
However, Abhiram Singh grappled with the pronoun, not with the nouns. The 1961 Parliament was legislating against the sectarian appeals of its moment, when religion, race, caste, community, and language were the dominant axes of Indian politics. Section 123(3) was not drafted to police every form of partisan appeal. The April 18 broadcast ran on different axes: gender as a mobilising category, party affiliation as a target, and the Prime Minister’s national broadcast on Doordarshan as the medium. The objection here is not to the identity of the audience, but to the partisan use of publicly funded media. The statute’s five nouns were never meant to catch that.
The broadcast did not explicitly appeal on grounds of religion, caste, or language. It appealed on grounds of gender (women voters) and party affiliation (vote against certain parties). This is not covered by Section 123(3). The statute, as drafted, cannot reach it.
The Alternative Route: Section 123(7) and Government Assistance
A writ petition pending before the Supreme Court (Diary No. 24600 of 2026), filed by former Congress MP T.N. Prathapan, and a candidate in the just-concluded Assembly elections in Kerala, opens a different statutory route. It invokes Section 123(7), not Section 123(3). Section 123(7) makes it a corrupt practice to obtain or procure the assistance of government servants, including gazetted officers, for the furtherance of a candidate’s electoral prospects. The sub-section was drafted to deter candidates from pressuring police and revenue officials into electioneering; the petition asks whether its reach extends to public broadcasters and the Prime Minister’s Office.
The petition argues that the use of Doordarshan and Sansad TV, along with Prime Minister’s Office personnel, to prepare and disseminate a partisan broadcast falls within this prohibition. Where Section 123(3) focuses on the grounds of an appeal, Section 123(7) turns on who was pressed into service to deliver it. On that reading, the statute reaches April 18 not through its five nouns but through its workforce clause. This is a novel argument. It has not been tested in court. If accepted, it would significantly expand the scope of Section 123(7). If rejected, it would confirm that the statute has a gap that the MCC is meant to fill.
The Election Commission’s Silence: Choice or Difficulty?
This returns the conversation to the Code. The MCC, unlike the statute, was written to be open-textured. Part VII asks what the party in power did with public resources; the statute asks which of five categories the appeal invoked, or whose assistance it procured. The statute sets a floor on corrupt practice, not a ceiling on what the Code can reach.
The Commission’s silence on Mr. Modi’s broadcast is not a doctrinal difficulty. It is a choice not to use the one instrument in Indian electoral regulation that was kept open precisely for settings where the statute may reach only belatedly, if at all. The EC has the power to censure, to issue advisories, to suspend party recognition. It has used these powers in the past against smaller parties and individual candidates. It has not used them against the Prime Minister. This is not a legal impossibility; it is a political choice.
The EC’s independence has been questioned in recent years. Its handling of the Special Intensive Revision (SIR) of electoral rolls was criticised as partisan. Its failure to act on complaints against ruling party leaders has eroded its credibility. The silence on the April 18 broadcast will further damage its reputation. The EC is perceived by many as a captive of the executive, not a check on it.
The Constitutional Framework: Article 324 and the Reservoir of Power
The Supreme Court in Mohinder Singh Gill described Article 324 as “a reservoir of power” that allows the EC to act where Parliament has not legislated. The EC has the power to fill gaps in the statutory framework, to issue directions, and to take corrective action. This power is not unbounded, but it is broad. The EC could issue a direction that public broadcasters not be used for partisan messaging during election periods. It could censure the Prime Minister for violating the MCC. It could refer the matter to the President for disciplinary action under the Civil Services rules (since the Prime Minister is a public servant). It has done none of these things.
The EC’s inaction is particularly striking given that the broadcast occurred during an ongoing election. The Code is in force from the announcement of the election schedule. The broadcast was clearly campaign material. The medium was clearly state-owned. The timing was clearly during the election. The EC had the power to act. It chose not to.
The Way Forward: Judicial Intervention and Regulatory Reform
If the court admits the petition and the Commission is compelled to answer, the architecture of MCC enforcement may face its hardest test yet. The Supreme Court may have to decide whether the EC’s inaction amounts to a dereliction of its constitutional duty. The Court may have to clarify the scope of Article 324 and the EC’s powers. And the Court may have to issue directions to prevent such conduct in the future.
Regardless of the judicial outcome, the episode highlights the need for regulatory reform. The MCC is a political agreement, not a law. It has no statutory backing. Its sanctions are weak. Its enforcement is inconsistent. The time has come to convert the MCC into a statute, with clear provisions, independent enforcement, and meaningful penalties. Parliament should enact a “Election Conduct and Fairness Act” that codifies the MCC, creates an independent enforcement mechanism (perhaps a division of the EC with prosecutorial powers), and provides for sanctions including fines, disqualification, and imprisonment for serious violations.
Until then, the EC must act. Its silence is a choice. And that choice undermines the very purpose of the MCC: to ensure a level playing field for all parties and candidates. The Prime Minister’s broadcast may have been legal under the statute. It was certainly improper under the Code. The EC should have said so. Its failure to do so is a failure of democracy.
Q&A: The Prime Minister’s Broadcast and the Model Code of Conduct
Q1: What are the key provisions of Part VII of the Model Code of Conduct (MCC), and how do they apply to the Prime Minister’s April 18 broadcast?
A1: Part VII of the MCC prohibits the party in power from: “combining official visits with electioneering, using government machinery for campaign work, and misusing publicly funded mass media for partisan coverage during the election period.” The Prime Minister’s broadcast was carried live on Doordarshan, Sansad TV, and All India Radio (publicly funded broadcasters). The content named four Opposition parties and urged women voters in Tamil Nadu and West Bengal to “punish them at the polls.” The article states: “On its face, the April 18 address appears to be a textbook Part VII matter. The Prime Minister used publicly funded broadcasters to deliver a partisan message… The content was campaign material. The medium was state-owned. The timing was during an ongoing election.”
Q2: Why does Section 123(3) of the Representation of the People Act, 1951, not cover the Prime Minister’s broadcast?
A2: Section 123(3) makes it a corrupt practice to appeal to voters on the grounds of “hierarchy, race, caste, community, or language.” The Supreme Court in Abhiram Singh (2017) held that the pronoun “his” extends to the voter as well as the candidate, but the case “grappled with the pronoun, not with the nouns.” The April 18 broadcast “ran on different axes: gender as a mobilising category, party affiliation as a target, and the Prime Minister’s national broadcast on Doordarshan as the medium.” The article concludes: “The broadcast did not explicitly appeal on grounds of religion, caste, or language. It appealed on grounds of gender and party affiliation. This is not covered by Section 123(3). The statute, as drafted, cannot reach it.”
Q3: What is the alternative legal argument under Section 123(7) raised in the pending Supreme Court petition?
A3: Section 123(7) makes it a corrupt practice to “obtain or procure the assistance of government servants, including gazetted officers, for the furtherance of a candidate’s electoral prospects.” The petition argues that “the use of Doordarshan and Sansad TV, along with Prime Minister’s Office personnel, to prepare and disseminate a partisan broadcast falls within this prohibition.” While Section 123(3) focuses on the “grounds of an appeal,” Section 123(7) “turns on who was pressed into service to deliver it.” The article notes: “On that reading, the statute reaches April 18 not through its five nouns but through its workforce clause.” This argument is “novel” and has “not been tested in court.”
Q4: Why has the Election Commission not acted on complaints against the Prime Minister’s broadcast, and what are the implications?
A4: The article states that the EC’s silence “is not a doctrinal difficulty. It is a choice not to use the one instrument in Indian electoral regulation that was kept open precisely for settings where the statute may reach only belatedly, if at all.” The EC has the power to censure, issue advisories, and suspend party recognition. It has used these powers against smaller parties and individual candidates but “not against the Prime Minister.” The article concludes that “the EC’s inaction is particularly striking given that the broadcast occurred during an ongoing election.” The EC’s failure to act “will further damage its reputation” and the EC is “perceived by many as a captive of the executive, not a check on it.”
Q5: What reforms does the article recommend to strengthen electoral regulation in India?
A5: The article recommends converting the MCC into a statute: “Parliament should enact a ‘Election Conduct and Fairness Act’ that codifies the MCC, creates an independent enforcement mechanism (perhaps a division of the EC with prosecutorial powers), and provides for sanctions including fines, disqualification, and imprisonment for serious violations.” The current MCC is “a political agreement, not a law. It has no statutory backing. Its sanctions are weak. Its enforcement is inconsistent.” Until then, the article argues that “the EC must act.” The Prime Minister’s broadcast “may have been legal under the statute. It was certainly improper under the Code. The EC should have said so. Its failure to do so is a failure of democracy.” If the Supreme Court admits the petition, “the architecture of MCC enforcement may face its hardest test yet.” The Court may have to decide whether the EC’s “inaction amounts to a dereliction of its constitutional duty.”
