Who Surrendered to the US? That’s Asking the Wrong Question

Who Surrendered to the US? That’s Asking the Wrong Question

Last week, a major debate erupted over an observation of mine about oil imports from Iran and Russia at a conference in Washington, DC. I was wrong on the facts about Russia because India never stopped importing oil from that country. I promptly apologised. Yet, the Congress party used my observation to loudly reiterate its allegation that the Indian government had “surrendered” before the US. This is the pot calling the kettle black. The reduction of oil imports from Iran happened during the UPA-2 government. Until 2010, Iran was India’s second-largest oil supplier, accounting for almost 15 per cent of total imports. But in 2012, the Obama administration came out with a National Defence Authorisation Act and threatened India with sanctions if it didn’t stop buying oil from Iran. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton made a special visit to India to force Prime Minister Manmohan Singh to fall in line. Singh succumbed to US pressure by reducing oil imports from Iran to less than 5 per cent. Unlike the church leadership of Congress today, the mature BJP leadership did not call Manmohan Singh “Surrender Singh”. It understood the geopolitical complexities and reacted with restraint. The question is not who surrendered to the US; the question is how India should navigate a rapidly changing, unpredictable, and often hostile international environment while protecting its national interests.

The Pot Calling the Kettle Black: A History of US Pressure

The Congress party’s allegation that the current government has “surrendered” to the US ignores its own record. In 2012, the Obama administration threatened India with sanctions over oil imports from Iran. India’s imports from Iran had been substantial—almost 15 per cent of total oil imports. Under pressure, the Manmohan Singh government reduced those imports to less than 5 per cent. The US also pressured India to suspend oil shipments from Libya and Sudan. The BJP, then in opposition, did not call Manmohan Singh “Surrender Singh”. It understood the geopolitical complexities. It reacted with restraint. That was mature politics. Today’s Congress has forgotten that maturity.

The current government, by contrast, has maintained oil imports from Russia despite US pressure. It has diversified its energy sources. It has negotiated discounts. It has protected Indian consumers from the worst of global price spikes. That is not surrender; that is statecraft. The fact that the Congress cannot see the difference is a reflection of its own intellectual bankruptcy.

The Three Shaky Pillars of India-US Relations

The reaction to my observation came not only from the Opposition but also from a section of the supporters of the ruling party. Therein lies an important message for India-US relations, which, incidentally, was the main thrust of my speech at the DC conference. Unfortunately, that content was never publicised. I cautioned about the negative public perception in India of the US today. I underscored how the three important pillars of the relationship—geostrategic, geoeconomic and people-to-people—are all on shaky ground.

The India-US relationship was based on a common geostrategic understanding about global challenges like China, Islamic terror, etc. Today, nobody understands the US’s geostrategic priorities. The liberal international order is crumbling, and it is not clear where the US stands on that issue. Not just India, even NATO partners and other European allies do not know its priorities in Ukraine, Gaza or elsewhere. The US under Trump has been unpredictable, unreliable, and unilateral. It has threatened allies with tariffs. It has questioned the future of NATO. It has withdrawn from international agreements. It has sided with autocrats against democrats. The geostrategic pillar is crumbling.

Second, strong economic cooperation has been put into focus many times. The US is India’s largest trading partner. The past year, however, saw that partnership come under strain due to excessive tariffs imposed by the US. The new H-1B visa regime puts enormous pressure on US companies with Indian employees. The US has threatened to cap H-1B visas, to raise the minimum salary, and to restrict the ability of Indian IT firms to bring employees to the US. This is not free trade; it is protectionism. The geoeconomic pillar is under strain.

Even the people-to-people relationship, a key pillar, is undergoing considerable stress due to migration-related debates in the US. Incidents of intimidation, both online and in person, are growing, causing concern to the Indian diaspora. Indian students have been attacked. Indian professionals have been harassed. Indian temples have been vandalised. The climate of fear is real. The people-to-people pillar is shaky.

The “Three Mutuals”: A Framework for Reset

Given these challenges, I suggested “three mutuals” to improve bilateral ties—mutual respect, mutual sensitivity and mutual interest. Ironically, these were the points India made to Chinese officials a couple of years ago.

Mutual respect is a key missing element in the relationship at present. Comments like “hellhole”, “gangsters with laptops”, coming from the highest offices, vitiate the atmosphere. When a US president calls India a “hellhole”, it is not diplomacy; it is insult. When a US official calls Indian IT workers “gangsters with laptops”, it is not policy; it is racism. The Indian government has shown restraint, but restraint has limits. The US must learn to treat India as an equal, not as a subordinate.

Mutual sensitivity, too, is important. When India talked about strategic autonomy, it was ridiculed or reviled. But the US wants to engage with any country for its own interest without bothering about others’ sensitivities. India’s strategic autonomy is not anti-American; it is pro-India. India has the right to buy oil from Russia, to trade with Iran, to maintain relations with China. The US does not have the right to dictate India’s foreign policy. Mutual sensitivity means recognising that India has legitimate interests that may not always align with US interests. It means negotiating, not dictating.

Finally, we need to redefine what is in our mutual interest as two long-time friends. The US needs India as a counterweight to China. India needs the US as a source of investment, technology, and defence cooperation. The mutual interest is clear. But the path to that interest is not servitude; it is partnership. India is not a US ally; it is a US partner. The distinction matters. An ally is subordinate; a partner is equal. India must insist on being treated as a partner.

The US Ambassador’s Role: A Good Indian Hand

None of what I said was tantamount to surrender. On the contrary, it was a clear assertion that a reset is needed in the relationship. It is in the long-term interest of a peaceful world that the two countries have huge stakes in the relationship.

There is a visible dearth of a good Indian hand in the US administration today. Fortunately, that gap can be filled by the dynamic US ambassador to India, Sergio Gor. After John Kenneth Galbraith in the early 1960s, who had a close relationship with President John F Kennedy, and Robert Blackwill in the early 2000s, who was close to President George W. Bush, it is Ambassador Gor who has great proximity to the White House. That helps. In just a few months, Gor has made his presence felt by actively engaging with different stakeholders. He has visited multiple states. He has met with business leaders, civil society representatives, and government officials. He has shown a genuine interest in understanding India, not just lecturing it. That is a welcome change.

But an ambassador is not a policymaker; he is a representative. The policies must come from Washington. And Washington’s policies have been erratic, hostile, and counterproductive. The US must recognise that India is not a country that can be bullied. It is a country that must be persuaded. The difference is the difference between a master-servant relationship and a partnership of equals.

The Opposition’s “Surrender Politics”

India has important relationships with several major powers. The relationship with the US stands out as the most significant. In the current climate of uncertainty, India maintained a principled and well-thought-out “strategic restraint”. The Opposition should appreciate that and come out of its “surrender” politics.

The Congress party’s allegations are not based on policy; they are based on politics. They are trying to score points at home by criticising the government’s handling of US relations. But the government has handled the relationship with skill and prudence. It has not surrendered; it has navigated. It has maintained India’s strategic autonomy while deepening ties with the US. It has protected Indian interests while engaging with US officials. That is not surrender; that is statesmanship.

The Congress, which surrendered to US pressure in 2012, has no moral authority to accuse others of surrender. The BJP, which showed restraint then, deserves credit for showing restraint now. The differences are clear. The record is public. The people can judge.

Conclusion: The Wrong Question

Who surrendered to the US? That is the wrong question. The right question is: how can India and the US build a relationship based on mutual respect, mutual sensitivity, and mutual interest? The right question is: how can India protect its strategic autonomy while deepening its strategic partnership? The right question is: how can the US recognise that India is not a subordinate but an equal?

The debate over “surrender” is a distraction. It serves no purpose. It inflames passions. It obscures the real issues. India’s foreign policy is not about surrender; it is about survival and success in a dangerous world. The government has done well. The Opposition should acknowledge that. And both sides should work together to build a relationship with the US that serves India’s interests. That is the real question. That is the real answer.

Q&A: India-US Relations and the “Surrender” Debate

Q1: What was the author’s factual error about oil imports from Russia, and how did he respond?

A1: The author mistakenly stated that India had stopped importing oil from Russia. He promptly apologised, acknowledging that India “never stopped importing oil from that country.” The Congress party used this error to allege that the Indian government had “surrendered” before the US. The author counters that this is “the pot calling the kettle black,” pointing to the UPA-2 government’s record in 2012 when it reduced oil imports from Iran from almost 15 per cent to less than 5 per cent under US pressure from the Obama administration (Hillary Clinton made a special visit to India). The author notes that the BJP, then in opposition, “did not call Manmohan Singh ‘Surrender Singh’.”

Q2: What are the “three pillars” of India-US relations that the author identifies as “shaky”?

A2: The three pillars are:

1. Geostrategic: Based on common understanding about China, Islamic terror, etc. Today, “nobody understands the US’s geostrategic priorities.” The liberal international order is “crumbling,” and not even NATO partners know US priorities in Ukraine or Gaza.

2. Geoeconomic: The US is India’s largest trading partner, but excessive US tariffs and the new H-1B visa regime have put the partnership “under strain.” The US has threatened to cap H-1B visas, raise minimum salaries, and restrict Indian IT firms.

3. People-to-people: Migration-related debates in the US are causing “considerable stress.” Incidents of intimidation (online and in person) are growing, causing concern to the Indian diaspora—students attacked, professionals harassed, temples vandalised.

Q3: What are the “three mutuals” the author proposes to reset India-US relations?

A3: The author proposes “three mutuals”—mutual respect, mutual sensitivity, and mutual interest (ironically, these were points India made to Chinese officials earlier).

• Mutual respect: Comments like “hellhole” and “gangsters with laptops” from US highest offices “vitiate the atmosphere.” The US must treat India as an “equal, not as a subordinate.”

• Mutual sensitivity: India’s strategic autonomy was ridiculed, but India has the right to buy oil from Russia, trade with Iran, and maintain relations with China. The US does not have the right to “dictate India’s foreign policy.”

• Mutual interest: India is not a US “ally” (subordinate) but a “partner” (equal). India must insist on being treated as a partner.

Q4: What role does the author identify for US Ambassador to India Sergio Gor?

A4: The author notes a “visible dearth of a good Indian hand in the US administration today.” Ambassador Sergio Gor, who has “great proximity to the White House,” can fill this gap. He is compared to John Kenneth Galbraith (close to President Kennedy) and Robert Blackwill (close to President George W. Bush). In just a few months, Gor has “made his presence felt by actively engaging with different stakeholders”—visiting multiple states, meeting business leaders, civil society, and government officials. However, the author cautions that “an ambassador is not a policymaker; he is a representative. The policies must come from Washington.”

Q5: How does the author characterise the Congress party’s allegations and the government’s record?

A5: The author characterises the Congress party’s allegations as “not based on policy; they are based on politics”—trying to “score points at home.” He argues that the government has not surrendered but has “navigated” the relationship with “skill and prudence,” maintaining India’s strategic autonomy while deepening ties with the US. The author states: “The Congress, which surrendered to US pressure in 2012, has no moral authority to accuse others of surrender.” The question “Who surrendered to the US?” is the “wrong question.” The right question is: how can India and the US build a relationship based on mutual respect, mutual sensitivity, and mutual interest? India’s foreign policy is “not about surrender; it is about survival and success in a dangerous world.” The government has done well. The Opposition should “acknowledge that” and work together to build a relationship that serves India’s interests. “That is the real question. That is the real answer.”