The Great Indian Science Paradox, Ambitious Missions, Anemic Foundations, and the Perennial Promise of Tomorrow

The Great Indian Science Paradox, Ambitious Missions, Anemic Foundations, and the Perennial Promise of Tomorrow

The Union Budget 2026-27 arrived with a familiar flourish for India’s scientific establishment. The Finance Minister’s speech was sprinkled with the lexicon of national ambition: Biopharma SHAKTI, India Semiconductor Mission 2.0, a Carbon Capture Utilisation and Storage (CCUS) mission, and a ₹20,000 crore Research, Development and Innovation Fund. On paper, it was a budget that appeared to embrace science not merely as a expenditure heading but as a declared “engine of growth.” Yet, in the laboratories, lecture halls, and autonomous institutes across the country, the reception was markedly more subdued—not because researchers are unappreciative of missions, but because they have lived through this script before. The Indian science budget, for all its headline-grabbing numbers, confronts a stubborn structural crisis: a widening chasm between the government’s declaratory ambition and its actual fiscal and administrative delivery. As the state attempts the complex transition from being a consumer of foreign technology to a creator of indigenous innovation, it finds itself constrained not by a lack of vision, but by a persistent deficit in trust, transparency, timely funds, and the quiet, unglamorous support for basic research and state universities that forms the true bedrock of any scientific superpower.

The Arithmetic of Austerity: Budgets, Revisions, and the Credibility Gap

The most damning evidence against the government’s pro-science rhetoric lies not in the 2026-27 Budget Estimates (BE), but in the Revised Estimates (RE) and Actual Expenditure of previous years. This is where policy promises collide with fiscal reality—and where science has consistently lost.

Consider the Department of Biotechnology (DBT) . In 2023-24, its allocation was slashed from a Budget Estimate of ₹2,683.86 crore to a Revised Estimate of ₹1,607.32 crore—a cut of over 40%. Actual spending fell even further, to ₹1,467.34 crore. The Department of Science and Technology (DST) suffered a similar fate: from ₹7,931.05 crore (BE) to ₹4,891.78 crore (RE), with actuals of only ₹4,002.67 crore. Even in 2024-25, while DBT saw a rare increase in its RE, DST was subjected to a substantial cut from ₹8,029.01 crore (BE) to ₹5,661.45 crore (RE).

This pattern is not exceptional; it is systemic. It reflects a chronic disconnect between the ministries that announce schemes and the Expenditure Department that releases funds. For a researcher planning a multi-year project, hiring doctoral students, or commissioning expensive equipment, this unpredictability is paralyzing. You cannot build a gene sequencer or a telescope with a Budget Estimate; you need actual money in the bank. The government’s repeated resort to expenditure compression to meet fiscal deficit targets has consistently targeted science departments, treating them as discretionary spending rather than foundational investment.

Biopharma SHAKTI: A Mission in Search of an Ecosystem

The centrepiece of this year’s science budget is Biopharma SHAKTI, a ₹10,000 crore, five-year programme aimed at addressing non-communicable diseases and scaling the indigenous development of biologics and biosimilars. Department of Biotechnology Secretary Rajesh Gokhale has articulated an ambitious vision extending beyond the current mission to include cell and gene therapy, AI-integrated biofoundries, and “Moolankur” hubs.

There is no doubt that India possesses genuine, world-class competencies in this domain. The country’s vaccine manufacturing capacity, demonstrated during COVID-19, is unparalleled in the Global South. Its diagnostics industry is robust and cost-competitive. Its bioengineering talent pool is deep and expanding. A strategic, well-funded push could indeed propel India into the first rank of biopharma innovation.

However, the governance architecture of Biopharma SHAKTI raises red flags. Dr. L.S. Shashidhara, Director of the National Centre for Biological Sciences (NCBS), Bengaluru, articulates the central concern: the mission is to be administered primarily through the Department of Pharmaceuticals, which sits within the Ministry of Chemicals and Fertilizers. Its mandate is downstream—manufacturing, industrial policy, market access. Its expertise is not in fundamental biology, early-stage discovery, or academic research.

This creates a real risk of “thickening the top layer” —pumping resources into later-stage commercialisation while neglecting the upstream life-science ecosystem that generates the foundational knowledge, tools, and trained personnel. As Shashidhara puts it, “If you don’t actively engage the broader life sciences community in design and implementation, you end up privileging manufacturing goals over discovery goals.” A biopharma mission without robust investment in basic biology is like a skyscraper built on sand.

The Basic Research Drought: Stagnant Peaks and Vanishing Streams

The budget’s enthusiasm for applied, mission-mode projects stands in stark contrast to its treatment of basic research—the curiosity-driven, discovery-oriented science that does not have an immediate commercial application but underpins all long-term technological capability.

Dr. C.P. Rajendran of the National Institute of Advanced Studies (NIAS) offers a withering assessment: the budget follows a “globally fashionable script” that privileges semiconductors, space applications, and biomanufacturing while continuing to underfund the fundamental sciences. India’s gross expenditure on research and development (GERD) has stagnated at 0.64-0.7% of GDP for years. Adjusted for inflation, this constitutes a real-terms cut. Compare this to China (2.4%), the United States (3.5%), South Korea (4.8%), or Israel (5.4%). India aspires to be a developed nation by 2047 but funds its scientific future at one-fifth the rate of its competitors.

The astronomy community provides a poignant case study. The budget proposes ₹3,500 crore to upgrade four major observational facilities, including the National Large Solar Telescope and the National Large Optical Infrared Telescope. This is welcome. Yet, as Rajendran notes, the core operational funding for the Indian Institute of Astrophysics (IIA)—the institution that will actually run these telescopes—has stagnated. The autonomous institute ecosystem, of which IIA is a part, received a meagre ₹1,623 crore. You can build a world-class observatory, but if you cannot pay the astronomers who staff it, the photons from distant galaxies will fall on sensors that no one has time to analyse.

The ₹1 Lakh Crore Mirage: Promises, Disbursements, and the Credibility Deficit

Perhaps the most damaging revelation in the budget analysis concerns the government’s track record on large, multi-year research funds. In the 2024-25 budget, the Finance Minister announced a ₹1 lakh crore research fund to be deployed over seven years, a transformative infusion into the national innovation ecosystem. As of February 2026, only ₹3,000 crore has been disbursed.

This is not a resource constraint; it is a credibility deficit. When the government announces a ₹1 lakh crore fund and then releases less than 3% of it over two years, researchers learn a bitter lesson: budget announcements are not appropriations, and appropriations are not disbursements. The ₹20,000 crore Research, Development and Innovation Fund announced this year will be received with justified skepticism until funds actually land in institutional bank accounts.

The transition from the Science and Engineering Research Board (SERB) to the Anusandhan National Research Foundation (ANRF) , a major institutional reform intended to streamline research funding, has been plagued by “significant delays” and “administrative disruption,” according to Shashidhara. Some of the under-spending in recent years, he suggests, is less about lack of intent and more about the chaos of institutional transition. The budget, he acknowledges, has at least avoided “punishing” science departments with further cuts for this disruption. But avoiding punishment is not the same as providing enablement.

The Forgotten Foundation: State Universities and the 80% Problem

Amidst the dazzle of Biopharma SHAKTI and Semiconductor Mission 2.0, a quiet crisis continues to unfold in India’s state universities. These institutions educate more than 80% of the country’s higher education students. They produce the vast majority of India’s science graduates, postgraduates, and doctoral candidates. They are the seedbeds of the very talent that the shiny new missions seek to employ.

Yet, state universities are systematically starved of research funding, infrastructure investment, and faculty recruitment. Their laboratories are decades out of date. Their library budgets have been slashed. Their brightest faculty are poached by IITs, IISERs, and central universities. Their PhD students work with obsolete equipment and limited international exposure.

Dr. Renu Vig, Vice-Chancellor of Panjab University—one of India’s oldest and most distinguished state universities—articulates the frustration with eloquence. She welcomes the budget’s emphasis on “university townships” as a move towards integrating industry and education. But she issues a stern warning: the Centre must not bypass legacy state universities in favour of new, shiny enclaves.

Her alternative vision is compelling: a “thematic cluster” model where a legacy state university leads in the basic sciences, humanities, and regional innovation, while technical institutes (IITs, NITs, IISERs) provide the necessary toolkits and specialised expertise. “This kind of multi-disciplinarity is the core of the National Education Policy 2020 and it is already in the DNA of legacy institutions,” she argues. “These universities are a national asset that must be nurtured to ensure the success of India’s new educational map.”

This is not a plea for charity; it is a strategic argument. You cannot build a world-class biopharma industry if the biology graduates emerging from India’s universities are inadequately trained. You cannot staff a semiconductor mission if physics departments lack functioning cleanrooms. You cannot lead in AI if mathematics and computer science departments are under-resourced. The missions are the visible spire; the state universities are the invisible foundation. The spire cannot stand if the foundation crumbles.

The Private Sector Mirage: Waiting for Godot

For years, the government has articulated a hope that private sector investment will fill the gap left by stagnant public R&D expenditure. The 2026-27 budget continues this refrain, with various incentives and platforms designed to crowd-in corporate research spending.

This hope has not materialised. Indian private sector R&D intensity remains among the lowest in the world for a major economy. With a few honourable exceptions (Tata, Mahindra, Sun Pharma, Dr. Reddy’s), Indian corporations prefer to import technology rather than create it, to license patents rather than generate them, to recruit trained engineers rather than train them. The risk-return calculus of long-term, uncertain research does not align with quarterly earnings pressures and promoter-controlled governance structures.

Expecting the private sector to compensate for public disinvestment in basic research is not a strategy; it is a dereliction of duty. Basic research is a public good. Its benefits are diffuse, long-term, and impossible to fully appropriate. Only the state has the patience, the mandate, and the pool of risk capital to fund it adequately. Shifting this responsibility to the market is an abdication, not a reform.

Conclusion: From Script to Substance

The Union Budget 2026-27 is not a bad budget for Indian science. It is, in many respects, a better budget than its immediate predecessors. It has avoided drastic cuts. It has articulated a coherent, ambitious vision in biopharma, semiconductors, and climate tech. It has signalled continuity with the National Education Policy’s emphasis on multidisciplinary research.

But in a democracy, governments are judged not by their promises but by their delivery. And on delivery, the track record is deeply concerning. Revised Estimates that slash allocations. Actuals that fall short of Revised Estimates. Multi-year funds that release 3% of committed amounts. Institutional transitions that cause years of disruption. State universities that are systematically starved. Basic research that is perennially underfunded.

India’s scientific establishment does not need more slogans. It needs predictable, timely, adequate funding. It needs the Expenditure Department to treat science not as a discretionary expense to be cut whenever the fiscal deficit needs cosmetic improvement, but as a sovereign investment in the nation’s future. It needs the autonomy to spend grants without bureaucratic second-guessing. It needs state universities to be strengthened, not bypassed. It needs the private sector to be incentivised, not waited upon.

The Biopharma SHAKTI mission, the Semiconductor Mission 2.0, the CCUS mission, and the ₹20,000 crore research fund are all welcome. But they are, in Dr. Rajendran’s memorable phrase, part of a “globally fashionable script.” The world over, governments announce big-ticket missions. The true test of India’s commitment to becoming a science superpower is not what it announces in February, but what it disburses in March, what it sustains over five years, and what it builds in the state universities where 80% of its future scientists are being educated today.

The script has been written. The stage is set. The actors are in position. Now, the audience—the researchers, the students, the citizens—waits to see if this time, the performance will match the promise.

Q&A: India’s Science Budget—Missions, Gaps, and the Road Ahead

Q1: What is the “credibility gap” in India’s science funding, and how do Revised Estimates (RE) and Actual Expenditure expose it?

A1: The credibility gap refers to the systematic divergence between what the government promises in the Budget Estimate (BE) and what it actually releases (Revised Estimate, and eventually, Actual Expenditure) . For example:

• DBT (2023-24): BE ₹2,683.86 crore → RE ₹1,607.32 crore → Actual ₹1,467.34 crore (45% cut from BE).

• DST (2023-24): BE ₹7,931.05 crore → RE ₹4,891.78 crore → Actual ₹4,002.67 crore (50% cut from BE).

This pattern forces institutions to plan with uncertainty. Multi-year projects, PhD fellowships, and equipment purchases are disrupted when funds are slashed mid-year. Researchers learn to distrust budget announcements. The problem is not inadequate ambition; it is inadequate follow-through. The Expenditure Department’s resort to expenditure compression to meet fiscal deficit targets consistently targets science, treating it as discretionary rather than foundational investment.

Q2: What is Biopharma SHAKTI, and what are the concerns regarding its governance structure?

A2: Biopharma SHAKTI is a ₹10,000 crore, five-year mission announced in Budget 2026-27 to address non-communicable diseases and scale indigenous development of biologics and biosimilars. It aims to build on India’s COVID-19 vaccine manufacturing success and expand into cell and gene therapy, AI-biology hubs, and biofoundries.

The concern: The mission is to be administered primarily through the Department of Pharmaceuticals (under Ministry of Chemicals & Fertilizers), whose mandate is downstream manufacturing and industrial policy. Scientists worry this will “thicken the top layer” —prioritising later-stage commercialisation while neglecting upstream life-science research (discovery biology, tool development, basic mechanisms). Dr. L.S. Shashidhara (NCBS) argues the Department must “actively engage the broader life sciences community” in design and implementation, or the mission will fail to build the foundational ecosystem it depends on.

Q3: Why is the stagnation of India’s Gross Expenditure on R&D (GERD) at 0.64-0.7% of GDP a critical failure?

A3: India’s GERD-to-GDP ratio has remained stubbornly stagnant for over a decade at 0.64-0.7%. This is:

• Low in absolute terms: China (2.4%), USA (3.5%), South Korea (4.8%), Israel (5.4%).

• Declining in real terms: When adjusted for inflation, flat nominal budgets constitute actual cuts.

• Structurally imbalanced: Over 60% of this expenditure is defence/space/atomic energy-related; civilian science and basic research receive a shrinking share.

This stagnation is a critical failure because R&D intensity is the single best predictor of long-term economic complexity and innovation capacity. A nation that aspires to be a developed economy by 2047 cannot achieve that status by investing in knowledge creation at 0.64% of GDP. It is not that India cannot afford more; it is that the political system has not chosen to prioritise science.

Q4: What is the “₹1 lakh crore” credibility problem, and why does it matter for future funds?

A4: In the 2024-25 Budget, the government announced a ₹1 lakh crore research fund to be deployed over seven years—a transformative, game-changing infusion. As of February 2026, only ₹3,000 crore (3%) has been disbursed.

This matters for three reasons:

1. Demonstrated Unreliability: It proves that large, multi-year budget announcements are not binding commitments. They are aspirational press releases.

2. Eroded Trust: Researchers and institutions now view the newly announced ₹20,000 crore Research, Development and Innovation Fund with justified skepticism. Why believe this time will be different?

3. Wasted Opportunity: India has foregone two years of potential research output. The talent that could have been trained, the papers that could have been published, the patents that could have been filed—these are irretrievable losses.

Q5: What is the “80% problem” in India’s higher education and research ecosystem, and how does the budget address (or fail to address) it?

A5: The “80% problem” refers to the fact that state universities educate more than 80% of India’s higher education students, including the vast majority of science graduates, postgraduates, and PhDs. Yet, these institutions are systematically starved of research funding, infrastructure investment, and faculty recruitment. Their labs are obsolete; their brightest faculty are poached; their PhD students lack exposure.

The budget’s failure: The budget focuses on creating new, shiny institutions—”university townships,” technical enclaves, mission hubs. It offers little to strengthen the existing, foundational state university system.

Dr. Renu Vig’s (Panjab University VC) alternative: A “thematic cluster” model where a legacy state university leads in basic sciences and regional innovation, while technical institutes (IITs, IISERs) provide specialised toolkits. This leverages the existing DNA of multidisciplinary education (NEP 2020) without creating parallel, duplicative structures.

The strategic argument: You cannot build a world-class biopharma industry if the biology graduates emerging from state universities are inadequately trained. The missions are the spire; state universities are the foundation. The spire cannot stand if the foundation crumbles.