The Ghosts of the Past, Why India Must Reset Its Relationship with a New Bangladesh
On February 12, 2026, Bangladesh witnessed a political earthquake. The Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP), led by Tarique Rahman, secured a commanding two-thirds majority in the Jatiya Sangsad, ending nearly two decades of political marginalization and setting the stage for a new era in the country’s turbulent politics. For India, this victory presents both a challenge and an opportunity—a chance to reset ties with Dhaka, shed the historical baggage of the previous decade, and recalibrate its broader neighbourhood policy.
As strategic analyst Happymon Jacob argues, the BNP’s landslide victory, coupled with its diplomatic overtures towards India, gives New Delhi an important strategic opening. But navigating this opening will require a delicate balance of pragmatism, patience, and principle. The ghosts of the past—particularly the deeply unpopular rule of Sheikh Hasina and the BNP’s renewed demand for her extradition—must be exorcised if the relationship is to move forward.
The Hasina Years: A Tilt That Came at a Price
There is no denying that the Awami League regime under former Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina was dearly tilted in favour of India. On issues ranging from security cooperation to trade and connectivity, Dhaka and New Delhi worked closely together. The Land Boundary Agreement, the resolution of maritime disputes, and increased cross-border trade were all hallmarks of this partnership.
But that tilt came at a huge price. The Awami League’s increasingly authoritarian rule alienated vast sections of Bangladeshi society. The 2024 student-led uprising that eventually ousted Hasina was not just a rejection of her government; it was a rejection of a style of politics that had become deeply unpopular. And because India was so closely associated with the Hasina regime, that unpopularity extended, in some quarters, to India itself.
The bilateral relationship became painted by association with deeply unpopular rule. When the regime fell, India’s strategic interests in Bangladesh took a hit. The interim administration that followed was marked by anti-India rhetoric and a visible cooling of ties. For New Delhi, the lesson was stark: tying national interests too closely to the survival of a specific regime or dynasty is counterproductive.
The BNP Victory: An Opening for Reset
The BNP’s decisive victory offers a chance to break this pattern. Tarique Rahman, who has spent years in exile in London, has signalled a desire for stable, functional ties with India. Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s congratulatory message to Rahman set the right tone. When Dhaka invited Modi to attend Rahman’s swearing-in ceremony, the Indian government, mindful of prior commitments, sent Speaker Om Birla instead—a gesture of respect and engagement.
But gestures alone are not enough. The reset will require sustained, high-level diplomacy and a willingness to address the substantive issues that have long defined the bilateral relationship: water sharing, border management, trade, and connectivity. It will also require navigating the emotional and political minefield of Sheikh Hasina’s presence in India and the BNP’s demand for her extradition.
The Extradition Dilemma
The political hot potato is already on the table. The BNP has renewed its demand for the extradition of Sheikh Hasina, who fled to India following the 2024 uprising and has since been sentenced to death in absentia by a Bangladeshi court. For Dhaka, this is a matter of justice and sovereignty. For New Delhi, it is a complex legal and humanitarian dilemma.
India is unlikely to extradite Hasina to face a death sentence. This would violate longstanding Indian policy and legal principles. But a flat refusal could poison the well at the very start of a new relationship. Navigating this will require quiet diplomacy and a solution that satisfies Dhaka’s political optics without compromising New Delhi’s principled stand.
The good news is that both sides have signalled a willingness to look past this issue. Modi’s congratulatory message effectively de-linked India’s Bangladesh policy from the Awami League’s political fate. It was a quiet but firm rebuttal to Hasina’s claims from exile that the 2026 polls were a “voterless farce.” The message to Dhaka was clear: New Delhi’s bilateral ties will no longer be held hostage to her personal political preferences.
Now the ball is in Dhaka’s court. The new regime must look past the extradition card and recognize that India is ready for a partnership based on current realities, not historical loyalties.
The Geopolitical Context: A Contested Neighbourhood
Stabilizing relations with Dhaka is not just about bilateral ties; it is crucial for India’s broader neighbourhood strategy. An antagonistic Bangladesh—as witnessed during the recent interim administration—creates a strategic opportunity for regional rivals such as China and Pakistan, and even extra-regional players such as Turkey.
China has already deepened its footprint in Bangladesh through infrastructure investments under the Belt and Road Initiative. Pakistan has historical ties with certain political factions in Bangladesh, including the Jamaat-e-Islami, which saw a resurgence in the recent elections. The real risk is a pincer dynamic where India’s periphery becomes a theatre for coordinated geopolitical encroachment by its rivals.
This is why New Delhi must remain focused on the principal strategic equations in the region. The most consequential challenge is not the anti-India slogans on the streets of Dhaka; it is the structural transformation of the region’s geopolitics. A stable, cooperative Bangladesh is essential to countering that transformation.
The Substantive Agenda: Water, Border, Trade
Once the new government settles down and turns its attention to reviving the economy, it will have to deal with more substantive issues with India. These include water sharing, border management, connectivity, and trade. These may be less emotional than the extradition question, but they are not without their ability to flare up tensions if not handled carefully.
The 2026 Ganga Water Treaty renewal will be a critical test. The treaty, originally signed in 1996, governs the sharing of Ganges waters between the two countries. Its renewal requires delicate negotiations that balance the interests of both sides. Proactive diplomacy on this front will be essential if the reset is to survive the initial euphoria.
Border management is another perennial issue. The 4,000-kilometre border between India and Bangladesh is one of the most complex in the world, with enclaves, unfenced stretches, and frequent allegations of smuggling and cross-border crime. A stable, cooperative framework for border management is essential for preventing local incidents from escalating into diplomatic crises.
Trade and connectivity offer significant opportunities for mutual gain. Bangladesh is one of India’s largest trading partners in the region, and increased connectivity—through roads, railways, and waterways—could boost economic integration and create stakeholders in both countries who have an interest in stable relations.
Building a Coalition of Partners
New Delhi must also build a broader coalition of like-minded states to secure its interests in Dhaka. While India and the United States share broader goals in the Indo-Pacific, their approaches to Bangladesh have often been at cross-purposes. The US has historically been critical of human rights abuses in Bangladesh and has engaged with a range of political actors, including those critical of India.
To manage this friction and counter the challenge of an anti-India axis, India must court neutral development partners like Japan, South Korea, and the European Union. These countries have significant economic interests in Bangladesh and share India’s interest in a stable, predictable regional order. By aligning with them, India can create a broader coalition for stability that transcends bilateral differences.
The Lesson: Pragmatism Over Sentiment
The radical changes in Bangladesh’s politics from August 2024 to February 2026 offer a sobering lesson for Indian statecraft. Playing favourites in the neighbourhood, tying national interests to the survival of specific regimes or dynasties, is counterproductive. When a friendly regime falls, India’s strategic interests take a hit.
The coldest dictum of international relations—there are no permanent friends, only permanent interests—must be the guide. New Delhi’s pragmatic outreach to the Taliban in Kabul in 2021 and the military junta in Naypyidaw demonstrates an evolving capacity for foreign policy pragmatism. While it took some time to reconcile with a post-Hasina Dhaka, the precedent the government sets is clear: bilateral engagement cannot be a prisoner of moral or ideological preferences.
In a region undergoing profound geopolitical transformations, sentiment is a strategic liability. India must become a smart power that secures its interests through institutional depth, economic integration, and a clear-eyed realism that is able to look beyond the rise and fall of individual regimes.
Conclusion: A Structural Reset
The BNP’s victory offers India an opportunity for a structural reset in its relationship with Bangladesh. Not only must New Delhi ignore peripheral noises from both sides of the border, it must leverage the mutual need for stability and show openness to create a balanced and predictable bilateral framework.
The ghosts of the past—the Hasina era, the extradition demand, the historical baggage—must be exorcised. Both sides have signalled a willingness to move forward. The question now is whether they can translate that willingness into a sustained, productive partnership that serves the interests of both nations.
For India, dealing with an increasingly contested and restive South Asia will be the most important challenge going forward. While India remains the structural hegemon of the region, that hegemony must be exercised with far greater sophistication and subtlety. The reset with Bangladesh is an opportunity to demonstrate that sophistication. It should not be wasted.
Q&A: Unpacking the India-Bangladesh Reset
Q1: Why does the BNP’s victory in Bangladesh represent both a challenge and an opportunity for India?
A: The challenge stems from India’s deep association with the ousted Awami League regime of Sheikh Hasina, which was unpopular in Bangladesh. That association created a perception that India’s Bangladesh policy was tied to a single political family. The opportunity comes from the BNP’s signal that it wants stable, functional ties with India. If New Delhi can successfully reset the relationship, it can build a partnership based on mutual interests rather than historical loyalties, insulating its strategic interests from domestic political changes in Bangladesh.
Q2: What is the extradition dilemma, and how might it be resolved?
A: The BNP has renewed its demand for the extradition of Sheikh Hasina, who fled to India after the 2024 uprising and has since been sentenced to death in absentia in Bangladesh. India is unlikely to extradite her to face a death sentence, as this would violate longstanding policy. However, a flat refusal could damage the new relationship. The solution likely lies in quiet diplomacy, where both sides agree to de-emphasize the issue and focus on more substantive matters. Modi’s congratulatory message to Rahman was a signal that India’s ties with Bangladesh will not be held hostage to Hasina’s fate.
Q3: Why is the 2026 Ganga Water Treaty renewal so important?
A: The Ganga Water Treaty, originally signed in 1996, governs the sharing of Ganges waters between India and Bangladesh. Its renewal in 2026 is a critical test of the new relationship. Water sharing is an emotionally charged issue in Bangladesh, where concerns about Indian upstream withdrawals have deep historical roots. A successful renewal that is seen as fair by both sides would build trust and demonstrate that the reset is substantive, not just rhetorical. Failure could reignite tensions and undermine the broader relationship.
Q4: What role do other countries like China, the US, and Japan play in India-Bangladesh relations?
A: China has deepened its footprint in Bangladesh through infrastructure investments under the Belt and Road Initiative, creating strategic competition for India. The US has historically been critical of human rights in Bangladesh and engages with a range of political actors, sometimes at cross-purposes with India. Japan, South Korea, and the EU are neutral development partners with significant economic interests. India’s strategy should be to build a coalition with these like-minded partners to create a broader constituency for stability, countering the risk of an anti-India axis forming in Dhaka.
Q5: What is the broader lesson for Indian foreign policy from the Bangladesh experience?
A: The lesson is that tying national interests too closely to the survival of specific regimes or dynasties is counterproductive. When a friendly regime falls, India’s strategic interests take a hit. Foreign policy must be based on permanent interests, not permanent friends. India’s pragmatic outreach to the Taliban in Afghanistan and the military junta in Myanmar demonstrates an evolving capacity for such realism. In a region undergoing profound geopolitical change, sentiment is a strategic liability; clear-eyed pragmatism must guide policy.
