The Fragile Dawn, Manipur’s New Government, the Burden of the Past, and the Centre’s Unfinished Responsibility
On February 13, 2026, exactly one year after President’s Rule was imposed on a state bleeding from ethnic carnage, Manipur awakened to a new political dawn. The revocation of central rule, the installation of a popular government under Chief Minister Yumnam Khemchand Singh, and the unprecedented inclusion of one Kuki and one Naga deputy chief minister together constitute, as the accompanying editorial observes, “the best thing to have happened in Manipur in the last three years.”
This is not hyperbole; it is a measure of the depth from which the state has been retrieved. Three years ago, in May 2023, Manipur plunged into an abyss of ethnic violence from which it has only barely emerged. The trigger was the inclusion of the majority Meitei community in the list of Scheduled Tribes, a step fiercely opposed by the Kuki-Zo tribes who saw it as a threat to their own distinct identity and affirmative action protections. What followed was not spontaneous communal rioting but organised, systematic ethnic cleansing. More than 250 people were killed. Hundreds of houses, schools, and places of worship were torched. Thousands were driven from their homes into relief camps where, three years later, many remain.
The administration of then Chief Minister N. Biren Singh did not merely fail to prevent this catastrophe; it is accused of having actively enabled it. The Supreme Court of India, in a damning observation, declared a “total breakdown of the rule of law” in Manipur. The allegation, widely credited and never credibly refuted, is that Singh’s government provided “clandestine support” to Meitei rioters while its police forces looked the other way as Kuki-Zo villages were besieged and burned. The Centre, led by the same BJP of which Singh was a member, refused to intervene. Prime Minister Narendra Modi did not visit the state for over two years. The Union government, which possesses plenary constitutional authority to supersede a dysfunctional state administration, chose instead to look away, allowing the partisan government to continue its disastrous tenure until its chief minister’s position became politically untenable.
The imposition of President’s Rule in February 2025 was, therefore, not a proactive assertion of constitutional responsibility but a belated, damage-limiting response to a catastrophe that the Centre’s own inaction had prolonged. Governor Ajay Kumar Bhalla and his administration, working in concert with security forces, spent the subsequent year stabilising a state that had been brought to the brink of disintegration. They did not restore complete normalcy—the wounds are too deep, the displacements too extensive, the perpetrators too unpunished—but they did achieve something essential: they restored a measure of trust in the capacity of the state to protect all its citizens equally, regardless of ethnic identity.
That trust is now the most valuable asset that Chief Minister Khemchand Singh has inherited. His task is to convert it from a fragile achievement into a durable foundation. He has reportedly already initiated outreach to the Kuki-Zo community and commenced the patient, painstaking work of reconciliation. His deputies—one Kuki, one Naga—are not ceremonial appointees but operational partners in an administration that must demonstrate, daily and visibly, that it serves all Manipuris equally. The opportunity before him is real. So, too, are the perils.
The Complicity of Silence: Remembering the Centre’s Role
The editorial’s most pointed passages are reserved not for the Biren Singh administration, whose failures are by now well-documented, but for the Union government that sustained it. The BJP leadership at the Centre, the editorial notes, “refused to intervene.” Prime Minister Modi’s two-year absence from the state was not merely a diplomatic oversight; it was a political signal—a signal that Manipur’s agony was not sufficiently urgent to warrant the personal attention of the nation’s highest executive authority.
This was not neutrality; it was acquiescence. A Centre that genuinely sought to protect Manipur’s tribal communities would have acted decisively in May 2023, when the violence first erupted. It would have dismissed a chief minister whose administration was credibly accused of complicity in ethnic cleansing. It would have deployed central forces not to supplement a state apparatus that had abandoned its duty but to supersede it. It would have visited the relief camps, spoken with the displaced, and demonstrated through visible presence that the constitutional commitment to equal protection applied in the hills of Manipur as fully as in the corridors of Delhi.
It did none of these things. It waited, and it looked away. And by waiting and looking away, it became complicit in the very violence it now claims to have resolved.
This complicity is not merely a matter of historical record to be acknowledged and filed away. It is a living political reality that shapes the present moment. The tribal communities of Manipur have not forgotten that the Centre refused to protect them when they were being attacked, burned out of their homes, and driven into camps. They have not forgotten that the same political formation that now presents itself as the architect of reconciliation spent two years enabling the administration that presided over their dispossession. Their willingness to trust the new government, and the Centre that stands behind it, is not unlimited. It is conditional on demonstrated good faith.
The editorial’s warning that “the Centre which refused to intervene in the riots and violence should not withdraw completely” is therefore not a counsel of caution; it is a demand for accountability. The Union government cannot now, having finally taken minimal remedial action, declare its work complete and retreat to Delhi. It must remain engaged, not as a partisan actor favouring one community over another but as an impartial guarantor of the constitutional rights that it failed to protect when they were most at risk.
The Khemchand Singh Bet: Can a Meitei Leader Reconcile Manipur?
The choice of Yumnam Khemchand Singh as Chief Minister is, on its face, a gamble. He is, like his disgraced predecessor, a Meitei and a member of the BJP. He inherits an administration and a bureaucracy that were shaped by the Biren Singh years and that may harbour residual sympathies for the partisan approach to governance that produced the 2023 catastrophe. He must govern a state in which the majority community that elected him is viewed by the tribal minority as the perpetrator of ethnic cleansing.
Yet the editorial endorses his appointment, and does so with conviction. The reason is not that Khemchand Singh is a known quantity—he is not, having been elevated from relative obscurity—but that he has reportedly already “launched a mission to reach out to the Kuki-Zo community and started the process of reconciliation.” This is not merely a desirable attribute; it is the only conceivable basis on which a Meitei chief minister can hope to govern a bitterly divided Manipur.
The inclusion of Kuki and Naga deputy chief ministers is the institutional expression of this reconciliation strategy. It signals, with unmistakable clarity, that the new administration is not a continuation of the old under a new face. It demonstrates that tribal communities are not merely recipients of government policy but participants in government itself. It provides a mechanism through which tribal grievances can be articulated and addressed at the highest levels of decision-making, rather than being filtered through an administration that has historically been indifferent or hostile to them.
The success of this experiment depends on whether these institutional arrangements are backed by genuine political will. Token representation is worse than no representation; it creates the appearance of inclusion while perpetuating the reality of exclusion. The Kuki and Naga deputy chief ministers must be given meaningful portfolios, adequate resources, and genuine authority. Their voices must carry weight in cabinet deliberations, not be marginalised as inconvenient constraints on the majority’s preferences. The outreach that Khemchand Singh has reportedly initiated must be sustained through visible, verifiable actions: the return of displaced persons to their homes, the reconstruction of destroyed property, the prosecution of those responsible for violence regardless of community affiliation, and the equitable distribution of development resources across hills and valley.
The Unaddressed Grievance: Separate Administration for the Hills
The editorial raises, with deliberate understatement, the most politically charged issue in Manipur’s post-conflict landscape: the tribal demand for “a separate mechanism to administer the hill areas where they live.”
This demand is not new. It reflects a longstanding conviction among Kuki-Zo and Naga communities that the existing administrative structure, dominated by the Meitei majority of the valley, systematically discriminates against the tribal populations of the hills. Development resources are allocated inequitably. Government services are delivered inadequately. Political representation is diluted by the valley’s numerical preponderance. And when violence erupted in 2023, the state administration demonstrated that it was not merely indifferent to tribal welfare but actively hostile.
The demand for a separate administrative mechanism is, therefore, not a secessionist ambition or a rejection of Manipur’s territorial integrity. It is a demand for institutional protection—a recognition that communities which have been systematically discriminated against cannot rely on the goodwill of the majority to remedy their grievances. They require structural safeguards that insulate their welfare from the vicissitudes of electoral politics and the prejudices of majoritarian administrations.
The editorial’s formulation is careful but unmistakable: “The government must do what it takes to ensure they face no unjust discrimination, even if it calls for the taking of such a measure.” This is not a ringing endorsement of separate administration; it is an acknowledgment that no other solution has proven effective. Two decades of special development plans, constitutional protections under Article 371J, and repeated assurances from successive governments have not produced equitable outcomes for Manipur’s tribal communities. The time has come to consider more fundamental institutional reforms.
What form such a separate mechanism might take is not specified, and for good reason. The devil will be in the details, and those details must be negotiated among the affected communities themselves, with the Centre playing the role of facilitator rather than imposer. Autonomous councils, special development authorities, constitutionally guaranteed reservations in hill area administration, and enhanced financial devolution are all potential models. The essential principle is that tribal communities must have meaningful control over the decisions that affect their lives—and that the current arrangement, which denies them such control, is unsustainable.
The Centre’s Ongoing Role: From Complicity to Guarantorship
The editorial’s concluding injunction—that the Centre “should not withdraw completely”—is the most important sentence in the document. It recognises that the Union government’s responsibility for Manipur did not end with the revocation of President’s Rule and the installation of a popular government. It began there.
The Centre’s role in the coming months and years must be fundamentally different from its role during the crisis. During the violence and its immediate aftermath, the Centre was a passive observer—watching, waiting, and refusing to intervene as a state administration committed atrocities against its own citizens. It cannot now become an active interventionist, supplanting the elected government and dictating outcomes from Delhi. The constitutional balance between Union authority and State autonomy must be respected.
What it can and must be is an impartial guarantor. It must guarantee that the constitutional rights of all Manipuri citizens are protected equally, regardless of community affiliation. It must guarantee that the resources allocated for the reconstruction of destroyed property and the rehabilitation of displaced persons are disbursed transparently and reach their intended beneficiaries. It must guarantee that the investigations into the 2023 violence, which have so far produced few prosecutions and even fewer convictions, are pursued with genuine vigour and without political interference. It must guarantee that the Khemchand Singh government’s reconciliation initiatives are supported with adequate funding, technical assistance, and political backing—but not dictated from Delhi.
This is a difficult balance to strike. The Centre cannot be seen as reverting to the posture of the Biren Singh years, when its passivity was interpreted as complicity. Nor can it be seen as reverting to the colonial model of direct administration, treating Manipur as a dependent territory rather than a constituent unit of the Indian federation. It must navigate between these extremes with humility, consistency, and a genuine commitment to the welfare of all Manipuris.
Conclusion: The Long Road Ahead
The installation of the Khemchand Singh government is, as the editorial states, the best thing to have happened in Manipur in three years. It is not, however, anything like a solution to the deeper problems that produced the 2023 catastrophe. Those problems—ethnic polarisation, institutional discrimination, unequal development, the weaponisation of state power against minority communities—are not amenable to quick fixes or political settlements. They will require sustained effort over years, if not decades.
The new government faces a daunting agenda. It must secure the return of displaced persons to their homes, a process that requires both physical reconstruction and psychological reassurance. It must prosecute those responsible for the 2023 violence, a task that implicates powerful political interests and risks reopening wounds that have barely begun to heal. It must address the tribal demand for a separate administrative mechanism, a negotiation that will test the goodwill of all parties. It must rebuild an administration that was thoroughly compromised by the previous regime. It must restore confidence in institutions—the police, the civil service, the judiciary—that failed the people of Manipur when they were most needed.
The Centre, for its part, must remain engaged. It must provide the resources and security that the new government requires to succeed. It must resist the temptation to micromanage or to claim political credit for successes that belong to Manipuris themselves. It must acknowledge its own failures during the 2023-2025 period and demonstrate, through consistent action, that it has learned from them. It must become what it refused to be during the crisis: a reliable, impartial partner in the project of rebuilding Manipur.
Three years after the violence began, two years after the worst atrocities were committed, and one year after President’s Rule finally brought a measure of stability, Manipur has been given a fresh start. The opportunity is real, but it is also fragile. It can be seized, or it can be squandered. It can lead to genuine reconciliation, or it can be followed by renewed conflict. The difference will be made not by the installation of a new government but by what that government does, day after day, month after month, year after year. The difference will be made not by the Centre’s promises but by its actions. The difference will be made not by the passage of time but by the patient, unglamorous, irreplaceable labour of building peace.
Manipur has waited three years for this moment. It cannot afford to wait any longer.
Q&A Section
Q1: What specific allegations are levelled against former Chief Minister N. Biren Singh and the Union government regarding the 2023-2025 Manipur violence?
A1: The allegations against Biren Singh are severe and specific. He is accused of making no effort to stop the violence and, more gravely, of providing “clandestine support” to Meitei rioters attacking Kuki-Zo communities. His administration is alleged to have “looked the other way” while rioters burned hundreds of houses, schools, and places of worship. The Supreme Court declared a “total breakdown of the rule of law” in Manipur under his tenure. Against the Union government, the allegation is complicity through inaction. Despite possessing plenary constitutional authority to intervene, the Centre refused to dismiss Singh or impose President’s Rule for over 18 months, allowing a partisan administration credibly accused of ethnic cleansing to continue governing. Prime Minister Modi’s failure to visit the state for over two years is cited as evidence of “neglect.” President’s Rule was imposed only in February 2025, when Singh’s position became politically untenable—not when the violence was at its peak in 2023. This pattern of delayed, damage-limiting response, the editorial argues, made the Centre complicit in the very violence it now claims to have resolved.
Q2: Why does the editorial endorse Yumnam Khemchand Singh as Chief Minister despite his belonging to the same community and party as his disgraced predecessor?
A2: The endorsement rests on three specific factors. First, Singh has reportedly already “launched a mission to reach out to the Kuki-Zo community and started the process of reconciliation.” This demonstrates that his approach is fundamentally different from Biren Singh’s. Second, his government includes one Kuki and one Naga deputy chief minister—unprecedented representation at the highest level of decision-making. This is not tokenism but operational partnership: tribal communities are not merely recipients of policy but participants in government. Third, the year-long President’s Rule under Governor Ajay Kumar Bhalla, while not restoring complete normalcy, “helped the state stabilise” and “restored a measure of trust in the administration’s capacity to maintain order.” Singh inherits this stabilised environment. The endorsement is conditional: Singh’s reconciliation initiative must be sustained through visible, verifiable actions. He must demonstrate, daily and visibly, that his administration serves all Manipuris equally. The editorial’s confidence is not in Singh’s inherent qualities but in the institutional architecture—the deputy chief ministers, the security environment, the Centre’s ongoing engagement—that constrains and supports him.
Q3: What is the “legitimate complaint” of tribal citizens in Manipur, and what solution does the editorial suggest?
A3: Tribal citizens’ legitimate complaint is that they “face discrimination within the state.” This is not merely perceived discrimination; it is evidenced by the state administration’s conduct during the 2023-2025 violence (active hostility toward tribal communities), historical patterns of inequitable development resource allocation, inadequate government service delivery in hill areas, and political marginalisation due to the valley’s numerical dominance. The editorial suggests that the demand for “a separate mechanism to administer the hill areas” must be seriously considered. This is not a secessionist demand or rejection of Manipur’s territorial integrity but a demand for institutional protection—recognition that communities systematically discriminated against cannot rely on majority goodwill for remedy. The editorial’s formulation—”the government must do what it takes to ensure they face no unjust discrimination, even if it calls for the taking of such a measure”—is deliberately careful. It does not prescribe a specific model (autonomous councils, special development authorities, constitutionally guaranteed reservations, enhanced financial devolution) but insists that fundamental institutional reform is necessary because two decades of special plans, constitutional protections (Article 371J), and repeated assurances have not produced equitable outcomes.
Q4: What ongoing role does the editorial prescribe for the Centre in Manipur, and why is this role described as difficult to calibrate?
A4: The editorial prescribes that the Centre “should not withdraw completely” but also cannot revert to its pre-President’s Rule posture. Its role must be that of an “impartial guarantor” of constitutional rights—equally protective of all communities, willing to use its authority to support difficult decisions without dictating them. Specific responsibilities include: guaranteeing that constitutional rights are protected equally; ensuring reconstruction and rehabilitation resources are disbursed transparently; ensuring investigations into 2023 violence are pursued with genuine vigour and without political interference; supporting reconciliation initiatives with adequate funding, technical assistance, and political backing without dictating from Delhi.
This calibration is difficult because the Centre is not a neutral party. Its 18-month inaction during the 2023-2025 violence, when it “refused to intervene” despite mounting deaths and displacement, makes it complicit in the very failures the new government must now address. It cannot credibly claim clean hands. Yet it cannot abdicate responsibility, because the constitutional order and security of Manipur remain Union responsibilities. It cannot be seen as reverting to the passivity of the Biren Singh years (interpreted as complicity), nor as reverting to colonial-style direct administration (treating Manipur as a dependent territory). It must navigate between these extremes with humility, consistency, and genuine commitment to all Manipuris’ welfare.
Q5: Why does the editorial describe the Khemchand Singh government as a “fresh start” but not a solution, and what does this distinction imply?
A5: The distinction is between opportunity and achievement. The new government is a “fresh start” because it represents a break from the Biren Singh era’s partisan, ethnically hostile governance; because it includes unprecedented tribal representation at the highest level; because it inherits a stabilised security environment from the President’s Rule administration. These are necessary conditions for progress. They are not, however, sufficient conditions, and therefore do not constitute a solution. The solution requires: (1) sustained effort over years, if not decades—the 2023 catastrophe resulted from deep-seated ethnic polarisation, institutional discrimination, unequal development, and weaponisation of state power that cannot be undone quickly; (2) visible, verifiable actions—return of displaced persons, reconstruction of destroyed property, prosecution of perpetrators regardless of community, equitable resource distribution; (3) fundamental institutional reform—addressing the tribal demand for separate hill area administration; (4) genuine reconciliation—not merely political settlements but transformed relationships between communities. The distinction implies that celebration is premature. The installation of the new government is a necessary first step, but the road ahead is long, and the risk of relapse into conflict remains real. The editorial’s tone is hopeful but not complacent, supportive but not credulous.
