The End of the Post-Colonial Compact, India’s Foreign Policy Crossroads and the Urgent Search for a New Strategy in a Multipolar, Transactional World
For seven decades, the architecture of India’s foreign policy rested on a foundation that was, in retrospect, remarkably stable. That foundation was multilateralism—a system of international institutions, norms, and rules that, however imperfectly, provided a framework within which nations could conduct their relations. The United Nations, the World Trade Organization, the International Monetary Fund, and the World Bank were not merely forums for negotiation; they were guarantors of predictability, constraints on the exercise of raw power, and platforms through which developing countries could amplify their voices.
That foundation is now crumbling. The United States has withdrawn from 31 UN institutions. It has rendered the WTO’s dispute settlement mechanism dysfunctional and reverted to unilateral tariffs. China, having risen to become the world’s second-largest economy and the largest trading partner of 120 countries, has created alternative funding, economic, and security institutions that operate outside the traditional multilateral framework. The European Union and Canada acknowledge the collapse of the old order; developing countries are left wondering how to revive it.
In this new world, as Mukul Sanwal argues in the accompanying analysis, India must fundamentally reframe its foreign policy. The old lodestars—leadership of the Global South, strategic autonomy, non-alignment—have lost their relevance. The Global South no longer functions as a coherent bloc; its interests have become too differentiated, its members too diverse. Strategic autonomy, a concept forged in the crucible of the Cold War, has become a self-declared identity used to rationalise contradictory choices rather than a coherent strategic doctrine. India’s gravitation toward the United States in the Quad, its continued reliance on Russia for cutting-edge military technology, and its cautious engagement with China reflect not a unified strategy but a series of tactical responses to immediate pressures.
The challenge India faces is not merely to adjust its foreign policy but to reinvent it. This reinvention must begin with a clear-eyed assessment of India’s strengths and vulnerabilities. Its comparative advantage lies in its young population and its deep integration into the global knowledge economy. Nearly half of Silicon Valley’s workforce traces its roots to India. This is not merely a source of remittances; it is a reservoir of talent, expertise, and connections that can be mobilised to build India’s technological and economic capabilities.
The goal, Sanwal argues, should be to transform India into a “cyber superpower” —a nation capable of spreading artificial intelligence across security, manufacturing, and services to secure its development space in an increasingly competitive global environment. This is not a fantasy; it is an ambition grounded in India’s demonstrated strengths in information technology, its large pool of English-speaking professionals, and its growing ecosystem of startups and research institutions. But realising this ambition requires a foreign policy that is strategic, not reactive—one that prioritises capability development over rhetorical posturing, and that builds relationships based on mutual interest rather than historical sentiment.
The Erosion of Multilateralism: From Rules to Power
The multilateral order that India helped shape in the decades after independence was, from its inception, a contradictory creation. It was established by the former colonial powers, led by the United States, and its rules were designed to serve their interests in the post-colonial world. Yet it also provided space for developing countries to organise, to articulate their concerns, and to shape outcomes through skilled diplomacy. India’s Oxbridge-educated diplomats excelled in this environment, leading negotiations on behalf of the Global South and successfully diverting pressure on poor countries.
The 1992 climate negotiations, Sanwal notes, were left entirely to India by the Global South—a testament to the trust and respect India had earned. This was the high point of India’s multilateral influence.
The turning point came around 2010, with China’s rise. China did not merely grow economically; it began to create alternative institutions that challenged the Western-dominated multilateral framework. The Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, the New Development Bank, and the Belt and Road Initiative offered developing countries sources of funding and infrastructure development that did not come with the policy conditionalities attached to Western aid. China also began to assert itself within the UN system, eventually heading four principal UN agencies.
The United States, unable to manage this new reality, responded by withdrawing from multilateral engagement. It abandoned the Trans-Pacific Partnership, withdrew from UNESCO and the UN Human Rights Council, and blocked appointments to the WTO’s Appellate Body, rendering the organisation’s dispute settlement mechanism dysfunctional. The Trump administration’s “America First” doctrine was not an aberration; it was a systematic rejection of the multilateral rules-based order that the United States itself had created.
The result is a world in which power politics has returned with a vengeance. Reciprocity in trade is redefined as “America first,” implying that other nations are in a subordinate relationship. Tariffs are imposed unilaterally, without regard to WTO rules. Alliances are treated as transactional, to be discarded when they no longer serve immediate interests. The rules-based order that India relied upon to amplify its voice and protect its interests is being replaced by an order based on power alone.
The Evolution of Strategic Autonomy: From Doctrine to Rationalisation
India’s concept of “strategic autonomy” was forged in the Cold War. As a leader of the Non-Aligned Movement, India sought to maintain distance from both the US-led and Soviet-led blocs, preserving its freedom of action while drawing on both sides for economic and military support. This was not merely a rhetorical posture; it was a genuine strategic doctrine that guided India’s foreign policy choices for four decades.
The doctrine lost its moorings after the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. With the Cold War over, non-alignment became meaningless. Yet the phrase “strategic autonomy” persisted, gradually transforming from a doctrine into a self-declared identity used to rationalise foreign policy choices that were increasingly driven by circumstance rather than strategy.
Sanwal illustrates this with two examples. In 2017, India joined the US-led Quad, a clear alignment with the United States against China. In 2018, India chose the Russian S-400 missile system over the US Patriot system, a decision that risked US sanctions under the Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act. These choices are not inconsistent if one believes that strategic autonomy means the freedom to make contradictory choices. But they do not add up to a coherent strategy.
The deeper point is that India’s policy choices have been increasingly shaped by the structural realities of power, not by any autonomous strategic vision. India gravitated toward the Soviet Union after its 1951 veto prevented discussion of Kashmir in the UN Security Council. Russia remains India’s only long-trusted partner for cutting-edge military technology. The United States, meanwhile, has sought to chip away at this relationship, testing India’s commitment to a multipolar world. India’s “strategic autonomy” is, in practice, a continuous negotiation among competing pressures.
US analysts have begun to describe India not as strategically autonomous but as a “swing state” —a country whose alignment cannot be taken for granted and whose choices will shape the global balance of power. This is a more accurate description, but it also highlights the vulnerability inherent in India’s position. A swing state that swings too often, or that swings in response to immediate pressures rather than long-term interests, risks becoming a plaything of great powers rather than an autonomous actor.
The U.S. Challenge: Tariffs, Trade, and the New Transactionalism
The Trump administration’s approach to India, continued and intensified under subsequent administrations, has been consistently transactional. The 18 per cent tariff that the US now applies to Indian goods is presented as a concession, but it is still far above the near-zero tariffs that India applies to many US imports. The agreement under which India has committed to doubling imports of US products, largely industrial goods, is structured to benefit US producers while offering India only uncertain access to US markets.
The real question, Sanwal argues, is not why India was targeted by US tariffs but how to grow in a world marked by flux. The US is determined to prevent the rise of another China, and India—with its young population, democratic institutions, and economic potential—is the only country that could eventually overtake the United States. The long-term US policy of keeping India apart from Russia and China has now gained greater force, and blunting it will test Indian diplomacy.
China, meanwhile, has shown that it is possible to thrive in this environment. By diversifying its exports away from the United States, China has made itself the largest trading partner of 120 countries. It has built its own technological capabilities, reducing its dependence on Western technology. It has created alternative institutions that provide it with economic and political space independent of the US-led order.
India cannot simply copy China’s strategy; its circumstances are too different. But it can learn from China’s example. The key, Sanwal suggests, is to bide time, maintain a low international profile, and develop endogenous capabilities. This was the strategy that the United States itself followed in the early 1900s, when it was still a rising power. It is the strategy that China followed after 1978, when it began its economic reforms. It is the strategy that India must now adopt.
Reframing Foreign Policy: The Elements of a New Strategy
Sanwal’s prescription for India’s foreign policy reframing is organised around five elements.
First, prioritise endogenous capability development. India’s comparative advantage lies in its young population and its deep integration into the global knowledge economy. By building on this advantage—attracting talent, investing in research and development, creating an ecosystem that supports innovation—India can develop the capabilities it needs to secure its development space. The goal should be to become a “cyber superpower” capable of deploying AI across security, manufacturing, and services. This requires a diplomatic posture that accelerates the Asian Century while maintaining a passive role in all other regions.
Second, diversify trade away from the United States. Even as India remains engaged with the US, it must push for free trade agreements with Asia—which will soon have two-thirds of global wealth—and with Africa, the fastest-growing continent. The vulnerabilities inherent in bilateral relationships can only be managed through diversification.
Third, deepen relations with Russia and engage with China. Russia, now more an Asian than a European power, remains India’s steadfast and tested partner. New technological, cyber, and space relations should be developed. China should be enabled to invest in Indian infrastructure and partner in manufacturing, with appropriate safeguards, to take advantage of trade opportunities and accelerate growth.
Fourth, treat relations with Pakistan as a foreign policy issue rather than a security challenge. This is a significant reframing. It implies moving beyond the security-centric approach that has dominated Indian thinking and exploring economic incentives—a new water-sharing arrangement incorporating the needs of the Kashmir Valley, revival of the Iran-Pakistan-India Peace Pipeline with Pakistan benefiting from transit fees, and even a trade agreement—that could create mutual interests and reduce conflict.
Fifth, reposition BRICS as an economic cooperation community. As chair of BRICS, India has an opportunity to articulate its new foreign policy by building consensus on moving BRICS away from political posturing and toward practical economic cooperation. Linking official digital currencies to make cross-border trade, repatriation, and tourism payments smoother would be a good first step.
Conclusion: From Strategic Autonomy to Viksit Bharat
The phrase “Viksit Bharat 2047″—Developed India 2047—is not merely a domestic slogan; it is a foreign policy framework. It asserts that India’s primary goal in international relations must be to create the conditions for its own development. This is not isolationism; it is a strategic reorientation. It means that every foreign policy choice must be evaluated by its contribution to India’s long-term development objectives. It means that India must be willing to forgo short-term gains that come at the expense of long-term capability building. It means that India’s diplomats must be judged not by the number of speeches they deliver or the declarations they sign but by the concrete benefits they secure for India’s people.
The multilateral order that India helped shape is gone. The strategic autonomy that India once practised is no longer viable. The world that is emerging is one of power politics, transactional relationships, and great-power competition. In this world, India’s future will be determined not by its ability to lead the Global South or to balance between great powers but by its ability to build its own capabilities, diversify its partnerships, and focus relentlessly on its own development.
This is not a counsel of despair; it is a realistic assessment of the choices India faces. The path is difficult, but it is not impossible. India has the talent, the institutions, and the democratic resilience to succeed. What it needs now is a foreign policy that is worthy of its potential.
Q&A Section
Q1: What does Mukul Sanwal identify as the key factors eroding multilateralism, and why is this erosion particularly consequential for India?
A1: Sanwal identifies three key factors eroding multilateralism. First, China’s rise: around 2010, China began creating alternative funding, economic, and security institutions (AIIB, NDB, BRI) that operate outside the traditional Western-dominated multilateral framework. China now heads four principal UN agencies and its aid volumes exceed those of the West. Second, U.S. withdrawal: unable to manage the UN process in this new environment, the U.S. has withdrawn from 31 UN institutions and rendered the WTO’s dispute settlement mechanism dysfunctional, reverting to unilateral tariffs. Third, fragmentation of the Global South: developing countries’ interests have become too differentiated for a unified bloc to function effectively.
This erosion is particularly consequential for India because multilateralism was the foundation of India’s foreign policy influence. India’s leadership of the Global South at the UN gave it outsized influence and a platform to shape international norms. India’s Oxbridge-educated diplomats excelled in negotiating texts and diverting pressure on poor countries. With multilateral institutions withering and power politics returning, India loses this platform and must find new ways to advance its interests. The rules-based order that amplified India’s voice is being replaced by an order based on raw power, where India’s diplomatic skills matter less and its material capabilities matter more.
Q2: How does Sanwal characterise the evolution of India’s “strategic autonomy” doctrine, and why does he argue it has lost relevance?
A2: Sanwal traces strategic autonomy’s evolution through three phases. First, as genuine doctrine: during the Cold War, India led the Non-Aligned Movement and maintained genuine distance from both blocs, preserving freedom of action. Second, as self-declared identity: after the Soviet Union’s collapse in 1991, non-alignment became meaningless, but the phrase persisted, gradually transforming into a rhetorical device used to rationalise foreign policy choices driven by circumstance rather than strategy. Sanwal illustrates this with contradictory choices: joining the US-led Quad in 2017 while choosing the Russian S-400 missile system over the US Patriot system in 2018. Third, as “swing state”: U.S. analysts now describe India not as strategically autonomous but as a swing state whose alignment cannot be taken for granted.
Strategic autonomy has lost relevance because the conditions that made it meaningful no longer exist. The Cold War bipolar structure is gone; multilateral institutions are collapsing; great-power competition has returned. In this environment, India’s choices are increasingly shaped by structural pressures—its need for Russian military technology, its desire for US investment and market access, its rivalry with China—rather than any autonomous strategic vision. Sanwal argues that India must replace strategic autonomy with a new framework organised around “Viksit Bharat 2047″—the goal of becoming a developed nation—and evaluate every foreign policy choice by its contribution to that objective.
Q3: What is the “U.S. challenge” that Sanwal identifies, and how does it differ from previous iterations of U.S.-India relations?
A3: The U.S. challenge is defined by the transactional, zero-sum approach of the Trump administration and its successors. Key features include: unilateral tariff imposition without regard to WTO rules; redefinition of reciprocity as “America first,” implying others are in a subordinate relationship; demands for specific concessions (doubling Indian imports of U.S. products) while offering only uncertain market access in return; and pressure to distance India from Russia and China as part of long-term U.S. strategy.
This differs fundamentally from previous U.S.-India relations in several ways. First, it is not partnership but pressure: earlier U.S. administrations sought to build a strategic partnership with India based on shared values and interests; the current approach demands compliance with U.S. priorities. Second, it is transactional not relational: previous engagement emphasised long-term relationship building; current engagement demands immediate, quantifiable concessions. Third, it is zero-sum not positive-sum: earlier frameworks assumed both countries could benefit from closer ties; current U.S. policy treats Indian gains as potential threats to U.S. dominance, reflecting determination to prevent the rise of another China.
Sanwal notes that the U.S. is determined to prevent any country from overtaking it, and India—with its young population, democratic institutions, and economic potential—is the only country that could eventually do so. The long-term U.S. policy of keeping India apart from Russia and China has now gained greater force, and blunting it will test Indian diplomacy.
Q4: What does Sanwal mean by describing India’s goal as becoming a “cyber superpower,” and what is the strategic logic behind this framing?
A4: “Cyber superpower” refers to a nation capable of developing and deploying advanced digital technologies—especially artificial intelligence—across security, manufacturing, and services to secure its development space in an increasingly competitive global environment. The term is chosen deliberately to signal a shift from traditional measures of power (military forces, industrial capacity, territorial size) to the new determinants of influence in the 21st century.
The strategic logic has several components. First, leveraging India’s comparative advantage: nearly half of Silicon Valley’s workforce traces its roots to India. This is not merely a source of remittances but a reservoir of talent, expertise, and connections that can be mobilised to build India’s technological capabilities. Second, endogenous development: rather than relying on imported technology or foreign investment, India should focus on building its own capabilities in critical areas like AI, cybersecurity, and space. Third, securing development space: in a world where technological dominance is the new arena of great-power competition, countries without indigenous capabilities will be perpetually dependent. Becoming a cyber superpower is not about dominating others but about ensuring that India’s development is not constrained by external technological dependencies.
Sanwal argues that this goal requires a specific diplomatic posture: biding time, maintaining a low international profile, and prioritising capability development over rhetorical leadership. It also requires building relationships with multiple partners—the U.S., Russia, China—that can provide access to technology, markets, and talent while India builds its own capacity.
Q5: What are the five elements of Sanwal’s proposed foreign policy reframing, and how do they collectively constitute a coherent alternative to “strategic autonomy”?
A5: The five elements are:
First, prioritise endogenous capability development: build on India’s talent pool to develop technological capabilities, aiming to become a “cyber superpower” that can deploy AI across security, manufacturing, and services. This requires a diplomatic posture that accelerates the Asian Century while maintaining a passive role elsewhere.
Second, diversify trade away from the U.S.: push for free trade agreements with Asia (soon to have two-thirds of global wealth) and Africa (fastest-growing continent) to reduce vulnerabilities inherent in bilateral relationships.
Third, deepen relations with Russia and engage with China: develop new technological, cyber, and space relations with Russia, now more an Asian than European power. Enable Chinese investment in Indian infrastructure and manufacturing partnerships, with appropriate safeguards, to accelerate growth.
Fourth, reframe Pakistan relations: treat Pakistan as a foreign policy issue rather than a security challenge. Explore economic incentives—new water-sharing arrangements, revival of the Iran-Pakistan-India Peace Pipeline, trade agreements—that could create mutual interests and reduce conflict.
Fifth, reposition BRICS as an economic cooperation community: move BRICS away from political posturing toward practical economic cooperation, beginning with linking official digital currencies to facilitate cross-border trade, repatriation, and tourism payments.
These elements collectively constitute a coherent alternative to strategic autonomy because they are organised around a clear objective: Viksit Bharat 2047. Every element is evaluated by its contribution to India’s long-term development. The framework is pragmatic not ideological: it seeks engagement with all major powers based on mutual interest, not historical sentiment or rhetorical posturing. It is proactive not reactive: it anticipates changes in the global order and positions India to benefit from them. It is capability-focused not influence-focused: it prioritises building India’s own strength over seeking influence in forums that no longer matter. This is not a retreat from the world but a strategic reorientation toward a world that has fundamentally changed.
