Iran Remains a Fortress State, Built to Endure, Why Conventional Military Superiority Cannot Breach the Islamic Republic
As the US and Israel Wage War on Iran, the Country’s Interlocking Institutions, Social Distribution Networks, and Ideological Legitimacy Have Created a System Designed to Survive Decapitation
It has been four weeks, and already the heady rhetoric of regime change has sobered down to US President Donald Trump’s claims of backchannel negotiations. Most attribute this to Iran’s escalation dominance—its ability to strike back and raise the costs of continued aggression. While that is undoubtedly important, the key to understanding the state’s resilience also lies in its political economy and social forces. Iran is not merely a military power; it is a fortress state, built over decades to endure precisely the kind of assault it now faces.
In Prison Notebooks, the Italian Marxist philosopher Antonio Gramsci once compared the modern state to a system of fortifications where the coercive arm of the state was only the “outermost ditch,” while civil society—which produces consent for the state—was a system of earthworks inside protecting it. Simply put, civil society makes the people “believe in the system,” allowing the system to stay resilient during a crisis, making a direct attack (or “a war of manoeuvre”) ineffective. The US and Israel have bombed Iranian military installations, targeted nuclear facilities, and assassinated senior commanders. But they have not breached the fortress. They have not broken the will of the Iranian people. And they have not created the conditions for the regime change they sought.
The Architecture of Resilience
In Iran, this fortification can be imagined as a patchwork of interlocking institutions, allowing for flexibility and resilience. This is also the result of historical experience. The assassination of the Qajar monarch Naser al-Din in 1896, the forced exile of Reza Shah in 1941, and the CIA-MI6 coup against Mohammad Mossadegh in 1953 resulted in a system built to survive “decapitations.” Iran’s modern political history is a chronicle of leaders removed, of foreign interventions, of lessons learned the hard way. The Islamic Republic that emerged after 1979 was designed with survival in mind.
Post-1979, this was all the more important in the context of regional isolation and friction with the United States. The eight-year Iran-Iraq War, which cost hundreds of thousands of lives, taught the revolutionary leadership that they could not rely on external support. They had to build a system that could withstand sustained assault, that could absorb losses, that could continue functioning even when its leaders were targeted.
The Islamic Republic thus became an amalgam of overlapping institutions that substituted one another in case of incapacitation. For instance, at the executive level, the temporal institution of the president was tied to the spiritual rehbar (leader). If the president is removed, the rehbar continues. If the rehbar is removed, the Assembly of Experts can select a successor. There is no single point of failure.
Similarly, the elected parliament (majlis) is supplemented by the Guardian Council, which ensures constitutional structures comply with Islamic principles. The regular military (artesh) was complemented by the establishment of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) that guards the Islamic revolution. The IRGC has its own ground forces, navy, air force, intelligence apparatus, and economic empire. It is a state within a state, designed to survive even if the regular military is decimated. The reliance on a decentralised command-and-control structure allows Iran the flexibility to absorb the loss of senior command. A general can be killed, but the network of commanders and units continues to function.
The Social Foundations of Legitimacy
While these interlocking structures provide formal and coercive stability, Islamic republicanism and social distribution gave the system legitimacy. Extensive welfare projects managed not just by traditional state ministries, but a network of non-state revolutionary foundations and committees, resulted in the cultivation of strong social constituencies such as war veterans and the rural poor. These foundations, known as bonyads, control vast economic resources and provide social services that bind large segments of the population to the state.
By the 1990s, the project witnessed sharp developmental gains, and Iran outperformed several middle-income states. For instance, female literacy between ages 15 and 24 reached 99 per cent in 2025. This is not a country that has failed its people in material terms. Life expectancy has risen, infant mortality has fallen, and access to education and healthcare has expanded dramatically. The Islamic Republic has delivered tangible benefits to its population, and those benefits have generated loyalty.
The Ideological Foundation
The Iranian state’s legitimacy also relies on ideology. Even before 1979, the discontent against the Shah was spread through clandestinely popular audio recordings of Ayatollah Khomeini. While a lot of this discontent acquired a reactionary form and targeted visible symbols of modernity (such as women’s dress), it also stemmed from the economic inequities of the Shah’s rule. The revolution was not just about religion; it was about justice.
The revolutionary opposition also relied on framing the struggle against the Shah by utilising the traditional Shi’i theological metaphor of mostazafin (oppressed) versus the mostakbirin (oppressor). This framing gave the revolution moral power. It cast the struggle as one of the downtrodden against the arrogant, the poor against the rich, the authentic against the foreign. Islam was also presented as an alternative to capitalism and communism—avoiding the penury of the former and the atheism of the latter. This allowed the state’s ideology to resonate with the rural masses who had been marginalised under the Shah.
The Fragmented Opposition
Finally, the opposition forces struggle to assemble a counter-hegemonic bloc that can breach the fortress. The diaspora’s hawkish attitudes limit its social appeal, while the left remains largely subdued. Many Iranians in the diaspora advocate for regime change, but they are often seen as disconnected from the realities inside the country, as people who left and have not shared the hardships of those who stayed.
Meanwhile, the domestic reformist opposition has struggled to create an alliance with the street. Reformists like former presidents Mohammad Khatami and Hassan Rouhani sought to change the system from within, but they were repeatedly frustrated by the conservative establishment. They never built the organisational infrastructure to challenge the system, and their supporters grew disillusioned.
However, after the “Zan, Zendegi, Azadi” (Woman, Life, Freedom) movement sparked by the death of Mahsa Amini in 2022, and the economic crises that have followed, the street has managed to surprise, even pulling in the usually pliant Tehran Bazaar. The protests that erupted in late 2025 and early 2026 were spontaneous, unorganised, and leaderless—and they were brutally suppressed. But they showed that the fortress is not impregnable, that discontent can flare even in places that had been considered loyal.
But without organisation and leadership, this spontaneous momentum risks dissipation. A crowd that gathers in the street can be dispersed. A movement that has no leaders can be beheaded. The opposition has not yet built the kind of alternative institutions that could replace the Islamic Republic. It has not yet created the social forces that could sustain a prolonged challenge.
The Limits of Military Power
For Trump and Benjamin Netanyahu, the writing on the wall is clear. Conventional military superiority cannot affect political change if the balance of social forces is not in favour of a new political outcome. Empires spending billions of dollars on shiny but breakable new toys should take heed.
The US and Israel have the most advanced militaries in the world. They have stealth aircraft, precision-guided munitions, and intelligence capabilities that Iran can only dream of. They have killed Iranian generals, bombed Iranian nuclear facilities, and demonstrated their ability to strike at will. But they have not brought down the regime. They have not triggered a popular uprising. They have not broken the Iranian state.
This is because military power alone is not enough. To change a regime, you need an alternative that can command the loyalty of the population. You need a political project that can replace the existing order. You need a balance of social forces that favours a new outcome. The US and Israel have none of these in Iran.
Conclusion: A Fortress That Can Be Breached—But Not by Bombs
Iran remains a fortress state, built to endure. Its interlocking institutions, its social distribution networks, its ideological legitimacy, and its historical memory of foreign intervention have created a system that can absorb extraordinary punishment and continue to function. The US and Israel have inflicted damage, but they have not breached the walls.
But fortresses are not impregnable. They can be undermined from within. The protests of 2022 and 2025 showed that there is deep discontent in Iranian society. The economic crises have eroded the state’s ability to deliver the material benefits that buy loyalty. The regime is not as strong as it appears.
The question is not whether the fortress can be breached. It is whether there is an alternative that can replace it, a counter-hegemonic bloc that can command the loyalty of the Iranian people. And that alternative cannot be built by foreign powers dropping bombs. It must be built by Iranians themselves.
Q&A: Unpacking Iran’s Resilience
Q1: What does the author mean by describing Iran as a “fortress state”?
A: Drawing on Gramsci’s concept of the state as a system of fortifications, the author argues that Iran’s coercive military power is only the “outermost ditch.” Inside are interlocking civil society institutions that produce consent and legitimacy. The Islamic Republic has built a system with overlapping institutions that can substitute for one another if any part is incapacitated—the president and rehbar, the parliament and Guardian Council, the regular military and the IRGC. This decentralised structure allows the state to absorb the loss of senior leaders and continue functioning.
Q2: How has Iran’s historical experience shaped its institutional design?
A: Iran’s modern political history has been marked by “decapitations”—the assassination of Naser al-Din in 1896, the forced exile of Reza Shah in 1941, and the CIA-MI6 coup against Mossadegh in 1953. The Islamic Republic was designed to survive such attacks. Post-1979, the experience of the Iran-Iraq War reinforced the need for a system that could withstand sustained assault. The result is an amalgam of overlapping institutions with decentralised command-and-control, allowing the state to absorb losses and continue functioning.
Q3: What are the social foundations of the Iranian state’s legitimacy?
A: The state’s legitimacy rests on extensive welfare projects managed by a network of non-state revolutionary foundations and committees (bonyads) that cultivate strong social constituencies among war veterans and the rural poor. The Islamic Republic has delivered tangible developmental gains: female literacy between ages 15-24 reached 99 per cent in 2025, life expectancy has risen, and infant mortality has fallen. These material benefits have generated loyalty among significant segments of the population.
Q4: What role does ideology play in Iran’s resilience?
A: The revolution framed the struggle against the Shah using the Shi’i theological metaphor of mostazafin (oppressed) versus mostakbirin (oppressor), giving the revolution moral power. Islam was presented as an alternative to both capitalism and communism—avoiding the penury of the former and the atheism of the latter. This ideology resonates with rural masses who were marginalised under the Shah. Even today, the state draws on this ideological foundation to maintain legitimacy.
Q5: Why has the opposition not been able to breach the fortress?
A: The opposition remains fragmented. The diaspora’s hawkish attitudes limit its social appeal; the left is largely subdued; domestic reformists have struggled to create an alliance with the street. While spontaneous movements like “Zan, Zendegi, Azadi” have shown discontent can flare, they lack organisation and leadership, causing momentum to dissipate. Without alternative institutions and a coherent counter-hegemonic bloc, the opposition cannot replace the existing order. The author argues that military power alone cannot change a regime; a new political outcome requires a balance of social forces in its favour—which currently does not exist in Iran.
