Gang of Seven, How Large-Scale Defections Have Rendered the Tenth Schedule Impotent
On April 24, 2026, seven of the Aam Aadmi Party (AAP)’s 10 Rajya Sabha members announced their merger with the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP). The Rajya Sabha Chairman has accepted their claim of merger, raising the BJP’s strength in the Upper House to 113 and the combined strength of the National Democratic Alliance above the halfway mark for the first time. The episode highlights the nature of AAP, the cross opportunism of the turncoats, the machinations of the BJP, and the institutionalised defanging of the anti-defection law. Of the seven, Raghav Chadha, Sandeep Pathak, and Swati Maliwal were part of AAP in an organic manner, to the limited extent that it had an identity beyond the whims of its founder, Arvind Kejriwal. For the other four, their exit is as opportunistic as their entries into AAP were. This is not merely a story of political betrayal; it is a story of how the Tenth Schedule of the Constitution—the anti-defection law—has been rendered impotent by a brazen misinterpretation of its provisions. The “gang of seven” has exploited a loophole, and the Rajya Sabha Chairman has accepted their claim. The Supreme Court’s past interventions have been less than reassuring. Elected governments have been unseated on the back of large-scale defections, and the Court could not set any deterrence. Such acts are being repeated with impunity.
The Tenth Schedule: Intention and Loophole
The Tenth Schedule was added to the Constitution by the 52nd Amendment in 1985. Its objective was clear: to combat the evil of political defections, which had become rampant in the 1980s, destabilising governments and subverting the popular mandate. The law provides that an elected member of a legislature (Parliament or state assembly) can be disqualified for defecting from their original party. There are exceptions: a member can leave their party if the party merges with another party, provided that two-thirds of the members of the legislature party agree to the merger.
The merger exception is clear in its intention. It was designed to allow for genuine mergers where a party, as an organisational entity, decides to join another. It was not designed to allow individual legislators to jump ship by invoking a “split” or a “merger” of the legislature party alone. The Supreme Court has consistently held that the political party and the legislature party are distinct. A decision by a group of legislators to cross over does not constitute a merger of the political party.
In 2023, the Supreme Court elaborated that the legislature party cannot dictate the course of the political party, and the two cannot be conflated. Two-thirds of the members of the legislature party of the original party must accept a merger for it to be valid under the anti-defection law. The Court’s ruling was intended to close the loophole that had allowed large-scale defections in the past. But the gang of seven has found a way around it.
The Gang of Seven’s Interpretation: A Brazen Stretch
The argument advanced by the seven AAP Rajya Sabha members and accepted by the Chairman is this: Since they constitute two-thirds of AAP’s Rajya Sabha contingent (seven out of ten), they can “merge” with the BJP. They are not defecting individually; they are taking the party with them. But this is a brazen misinterpretation. The AAP’s Rajya Sabha members are not the political party. The political party is a national organisation with a structure, a leadership, and a membership that extends far beyond ten parliamentarians. The decision to merge AAP with the BJP cannot be taken by seven Rajya Sabha members; it would require the concurrence of the party’s national leadership, its state units, its elected representatives across the country, and its organisational wings. The fact that the Rajya Sabha Chairman accepted the claim without questioning the authority of the seven to speak for the party is a failure of institutional responsibility.
The article notes that “to turn this around and argue that two-thirds of a party’s legislative members can cross over to another party without attracting disqualification is a stretch, and is being challenged in the Court by AAP.” The AAP has challenged the Chairman’s decision in the Supreme Court. But the Court’s past interventions on similar developments are “less than reassuring.”
The Supreme Court’s Mixed Record: No Deterrence
The Supreme Court has had multiple opportunities to strengthen the anti-defection law and close the loopholes. In the 1994 case of Ravi Naik vs Union of India, the Court held that a “split” in a party requires a split in the original political party, not just in the legislature party. In 2023, the Court reiterated that two-thirds of the legislature party must accept a merger, and that the political party and legislature party are distinct.
But these rulings have not deterred defections. Elected governments have been unseated on the back of large-scale defections in Madhya Pradesh, Karnataka, Goa, and other states. In each case, the defectors argued that they had “merged” with the ruling party. In each case, the Speaker or Chairman accepted the claim. In each case, the Supreme Court was approached, but the relief was limited. The Court declined to interfere with the Speaker’s discretion, citing the need for judicial restraint. The result is a system where defections are punished only in theory, not in practice.
The article states: “That the Court could not set any deterrence to this open betrayal of popular mandates is borne out by the fact that such acts are being repeated with impunity.” The gang of seven is not the first; it will not be the last. As long as the merger exception is available for interpretation, ambitious legislators will find a way to exploit it.
The Opportunism of AAP: Reaping What It Sowed
The article does not spare AAP. It notes that Arvind Kejriwal used to taunt the Congress for losing its legislators to the BJP in several states, as symptomatic of the erosion of its ethical responsibility. But a “relentless campaign of anarchy in pursuit of power exposed the true character of AAP as a far cry from its grand claims.” The disintegration of its Rajya Sabha contingent is “the culmination of the cynicism and opportunism on which AAP thrived, imposing a heavy cost on the democratic institutions of India. It reaped what it sowed.”
This is an important point. AAP was founded on a platform of anti-corruption and ethical politics. It rose to power in Delhi by promising to clean up the system. But its own house was not in order. Its Rajya Sabha members were not chosen for their loyalty to the party’s ideology; they were chosen for their ability to win elections, raise funds, or generate publicity. When the BJP offered them a better deal, they took it. The four who were not “organic” to AAP had joined the party for opportunistic reasons; their exit was equally opportunistic. The three who were more organic—Raghav Chadha, Sandeep Pathak, and Swati Maliwal—have a more complicated relationship with the party, but their decision to join the merger is still a betrayal of the voters who elected them on an AAP ticket.
The article’s critique of AAP is not an endorsement of the BJP. The BJP’s role in orchestrating the defections is equally blameworthy. The party has systematically targeted opposition legislators, offering them inducements to defect. The “machinations of the BJP” are a feature of its political strategy, not a bug. The party believes that winning is all that matters, and that the end justifies the means. This is a dangerous philosophy for a democracy.
The Consequences: A Crisis of Legitimacy
The defection of seven AAP Rajya Sabha members has immediate and long-term consequences. In the short term, it gives the NDA a majority in the Upper House for the first time. This will allow the government to pass legislation that was previously blocked by the opposition, including potentially contentious bills on the Uniform Civil Code, simultaneous elections, and changes to the reservation policy.
In the long term, it undermines the legitimacy of the Rajya Sabha. The Upper House is supposed to be a house of elders, where members are insulated from the pressures of daily politics. They are elected for six-year terms, and they are not subject to dissolution. This stability is supposed to encourage thoughtful, long-term deliberation. But if members can defect at will, the Rajya Sabha becomes just another political battleground, no different from the Lok Sabha. The distinction between the two houses blurs.
The defections also erode public trust in democracy. Voters cast their ballots for a party and its candidates. When those candidates defect, the voter’s choice is nullified. The voter did not vote for the BJP; they voted for AAP. Yet their representative now sits on the BJP benches. This is a betrayal of the popular mandate. The anti-defection law was supposed to prevent this. It has failed.
The Way Forward: Strengthening the Tenth Schedule
What is to be done? The article implies that the Supreme Court must intervene decisively. The Court should clarify that the merger exception applies only when the political party, as an organisational entity, merges with another party. The decision of a group of legislators, no matter how large, cannot substitute for a decision of the party. The Court should also lay down guidelines for Speakers and Chairmen, requiring them to verify the authority of defecting legislators before accepting their claim of merger.
Alternatively, Parliament could amend the Tenth Schedule to remove the merger exception altogether. If a legislator wants to change parties, they should resign and contest a by-election. This would be a severe remedy, but it would end defections permanently. The original intention of the anti-defection law was to promote stability; it has failed. A new approach is needed.
The article’s final sentence is a warning: “That the Court could not set any deterrence to this open betrayal of popular mandates is borne out by the fact that such acts are being repeated with impunity.” The gang of seven is a symptom of a deeper disease. The disease is the erosion of political ethics, the normalisation of opportunism, and the failure of institutional safeguards. The cure requires political will, judicial courage, and public outrage. The people of India need to demand better from their leaders. Otherwise, the gang of seven will not be the last. And the Tenth Schedule will remain a dead letter.
Q&A: Anti-Defection Law and the “Gang of Seven”
Q1: What happened on April 24, 2026, involving AAP’s Rajya Sabha members?
A1: On April 24, 2026, seven of the Aam Aadmi Party (AAP)’s 10 Rajya Sabha members announced their “merger” with the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) . The Rajya Sabha Chairman accepted their claim of merger, raising the BJP’s strength in the Upper House to 113 and the combined strength of the NDA above the halfway mark for the first time. Among the seven were Raghav Chadha, Sandeep Pathak, and Swati Maliwal (described as “organic” to AAP, to the limited extent it had an identity beyond its founder), and four others whose exit was “as opportunistic as their entries into AAP were.” The article describes this as the “gang of seven” and argues that it highlights the “institutionalised defanging of the anti-defection law.”
Q2: What is the Tenth Schedule of the Constitution, and what is the “merger exception”?
A2: The Tenth Schedule was added by the 52nd Amendment in 1985 to combat political defections. It provides that an elected member of a legislature can be disqualified for defecting from their original party. However, there is an exception for mergers: a member can leave their party if the party merges with another party, provided that two-thirds of the members of the legislature party agree to the merger. The intention was to allow for genuine organisational mergers, not to allow individual legislators to jump ship. However, the “gang of seven” exploited this by arguing that since they constitute two-thirds of AAP’s Rajya Sabha contingent (7 out of 10), they can “merge” with the BJP—even though the political party (AAP) as an organisation has not consented. The article calls this a “brazen misinterpretation.”
Q3: What did the Supreme Court rule in 2023 regarding mergers and the anti-defection law?
A3: In 2023, the Supreme Court elaborated that the legislature party cannot dictate the course of the political party, and the two cannot be conflated. Two-thirds of the members of the legislature party of the original party must accept a merger for it to be valid under the anti-defection law. The Court’s ruling was intended to close the loophole that had allowed large-scale defections in the past. However, the “gang of seven” has effectively argued that the legislature party (their group of seven Rajya Sabha members) can decide to merge, even though the political party (AAP as a national organisation) has not consented. The article states that this interpretation is “a stretch” and is being challenged in the Supreme Court by AAP.
Q4: Has the Supreme Court been effective in deterring defections? Why or why not?
A4: The article argues that the Supreme Court’s past interventions have been “less than reassuring” and have “not set any deterrence.” Elected governments have been unseated on the back of large-scale defections in Madhya Pradesh, Karnataka, Goa, and other states. In each case, the defectors argued they had “merged” with the ruling party; in each case, the Speaker or Chairman accepted the claim; and in each case, the Supreme Court declined to interfere with the Speaker’s discretion, citing the need for judicial restraint. The result is a system where defections are punished only in theory, not in practice. The article states: “That the Court could not set any deterrence to this open betrayal of popular mandates is borne out by the fact that such acts are being repeated with impunity.” The “gang of seven” is not the first; it will not be the last.
Q5: What reforms does the article implicitly suggest to strengthen the anti-defection law?
A5: The article implicitly suggests two possible reforms:
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Judicial intervention: The Supreme Court must intervene decisively, clarify that the merger exception applies only when the political party as an organisational entity merges, and not when a group of legislators decides to cross over. The Court should also lay down guidelines for Speakers and Chairmen, requiring them to verify the authority of defecting legislators before accepting their claim of merger.
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Legislative amendment: Parliament could amend the Tenth Schedule to remove the merger exception altogether. If a legislator wants to change parties, they should resign and contest a by-election. This would be a severe remedy, but it would end defections permanently.
The article concludes that the “gang of seven” is a symptom of a deeper disease: “the erosion of political ethics, the normalisation of opportunism, and the failure of institutional safeguards.” The cure requires “political will, judicial courage, and public outrage.” The people of India need to demand better from their leaders; otherwise, the Tenth Schedule will remain a “dead letter.” The gang of seven will not be the last. And the anti-defection law will remain impotent.
