All Isn’t Quiet on the Eastern Front, Why India Must Shift Its Strategic Gaze
As we head for the first anniversary of Operation Sindoor next week, we should brace for being inundated by stirring stories of the military performance during those 87 hours. We should stop it, and here’s why. I’d see it as being in the national interest to play spoilsport and say that this non-stop jubilation over the past is most unwise. We need to think of wars of the future instead. We also need to shift our gaze across our landmass, from west to the east. Everything looks quiet on the eastern front now, but it will change. The best thing about Pakistan’s Army Chief Field Marshal Asim Munir is that he’s a big mouth. He’d be a bigger nuisance if he had the smiling cunning and vicious smarts of a Zia-ul-Haq. Munir has leaked his ‘eastern’ fantasy to India. Remember what he said in his boastful speech at Tampa, Florida on August 9, 2025. He said the next time Pakistan will start the war from the east, because that’s where “they (India) have located their most valuable resources.” It is time to take him seriously and shift our strategic gaze eastward.
The Eastern Seaboard: India’s Underestimated Vulnerability
Open the map now and spread your gaze wider. What do you see across our 3,416-kilometre eastern seaboard? It’s a tiny, 600-kilometre Bangladesh coastline at the head of the Bay of Bengal, followed by 2,227 kilometres of Myanmar coast, then Thailand. South of that, the Andaman Sea takes you across the Malacca Strait into the Pacific. Both Bangladesh and Myanmar—the latter more so—are vulnerable to Chinese presence. India’s eastern seaboard is home to its most valuable resources: the industrial corridors of Tamil Nadu, Andhra Pradesh, Odisha, and West Bengal; the ports of Chennai, Visakhapatnam, Paradip, and Kolkata; the nuclear facilities; the shipbuilding yards; and the dense population centres. If Pakistan were to start a war from the east, it would not be a land invasion across the border; it would be a naval campaign aimed at India’s economic lifelines.
India has historically and instinctively seen threats emerging from the west and the north, from Pakistan and China. The east has received less attention. Most of our key operational assets—Army and Air Force—look north and west. Even the Navy is focused towards the west (Pakistan). That focus is valid, but the vulnerability in the east now must be plugged. The Indian Ocean is India’s backyard, but the Bay of Bengal is its front yard. And that front yard is increasingly contested.
The Kra Canal: A 350-Year-Old Fantasy Becoming Real?
If somehow, at some point, the Thai idea of digging a canal across the Isthmus of Kra, about 50 kilometres at its narrowest, where the country’s southern zone tapers into the Malay peninsula, becomes reality, it will cut the sailing time from the Pacific to the Andaman Sea by about three days. Further, it would greatly undermine the significance of the Malacca Strait as a strategic choke point. The idea might cost $55 billion and makes it seem like a fantasy. But there is enough juice in it to have survived 350 years since it appeared as a vision in a Thai monarch’s dream. It was highlighted in October 2023, when then-Thai Prime Minister Srettha Thavisin’s doodle at the BRI Forum in Beijing was caught by cameras. The doodle marked a canal exactly at the narrowest point of the Isthmus.
You would then be complacent not to presume that if the project were to ever become a reality, it will be done with Chinese help, and maybe even ownership. It will expose India’s buzzing eastern seaboard, the big metros and industrial zones to China. The Pacific would come alarmingly closer to India. The Kra Canal would allow Chinese naval vessels to bypass the Malacca Strait entirely, entering the Andaman Sea directly. From there, they are a short sail to India’s Andaman and Nicobar Islands, and then to the mainland. The strategic implications are catastrophic.
The Andaman and Nicobar Islands: India’s Unsinkable Aircraft Carriers
Geography has gifted India just the assets it needs to defend itself. In the east, the Andaman and Nicobar islands are designed by gods as unsinkable aircraft carriers. These can harbour and launch ships and submarines, base combat and reconnaissance aircraft. Given the long ranges and refuellers, India can watch the entire Bay of Bengal, the Andaman Sea and beyond. The Andaman and Nicobar archipelago consists of over 500 islands, stretching from near the Myanmar coast to close to Indonesia. They are positioned exactly where India needs them: at the entrance to the Malacca Strait, the choke point through which a huge percentage of global trade passes.
That’s what makes the Great Nicobar Island, our southernmost territory, an incredible strategic asset. With Rahul Gandhi going there earlier this week to oppose a multipurpose township-cum-transshipment port, essentially a huge military base, the case for the project has somewhat grandly and erroneously become trapped in the prospect of India choking the Chinese in the Strait of Malacca. That is indeed possible but not so plausible. The Strait lies between powerful sovereign nations—Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore. Also, to block it, India would need to be as reckless as Iran with the Strait of Hormuz because it would hinder friend and foe: Japan, South Korea, Russia included. Things will need to be really desperate and dire for India to risk all of that.
It’s much simpler therefore to see the island territories—especially Great Nicobar—as India’s forward defensive shield. If developed prudently and patiently, these could become to the defence of eastern India what the Himalayas are to the north. That project is on right now. The proposed military infrastructure on Great Nicobar includes an airfield capable of handling heavy transport aircraft and fighter jets, a naval base, and a transshipment port. The port is not for choking the Malacca Strait; it is for supporting India’s naval presence in the region. It is for ensuring that India has the logistical capacity to sustain operations far from the mainland.
The Coco Islands: A Chinese Foothold Near India
Look at it this way. In the next 10-15 years, what is a more likely prospect: India going out to China proactively in the oceans, or the Chinese coming in to threaten us? It could be either direct, or as a distraction if India is caught in a larger conflict with Pakistan. If we take you back to that enlarged map, you might spot some tiny dots just 20 kilometres from Landfall Island, the northernmost point in the Andamans archipelago. Here sits Myanmar’s Great Coco Island. It is just 14.57 square kilometres but already has an airstrip longer (7,500 feet) than what we have built at Great Nicobar. There have been Chinese visits to Coco (it has four more, way tinier islands in the Little Coco chain) and anybody who rules out a Chinese foothold here, given the chaos in Myanmar, won’t be forgiven by history. The island territories in the east are now an indispensable defensive phalanx.
Myanmar has been in a state of civil war since the 2021 military coup. The central government does not control large parts of the country. Ethnic armed groups operate freely. In this chaos, China has been expanding its influence. It has built naval facilities in Myanmar, including a listening post on the Coco Islands. From there, Chinese intelligence can monitor Indian naval movements in the Bay of Bengal. In a conflict, China could use these facilities to strike at Indian assets. India cannot allow this. The Andaman and Nicobar Islands must be developed urgently to counter Chinese presence in the region.
The Quad Distraction: Realigning Strategic Priorities
The heady talk of the Quad (India, US, Japan, Australia) has blurred our strategic vision. It cannot be a realistic aspiration for India to proactively block the Strait of Malacca for the Chinese on behalf of the US and its allies. A more urgent need is to shore up our maritime defences in the east. The Quad is a useful diplomatic platform, but it is not a military alliance. India cannot rely on the US Navy to protect its eastern seaboard. India must build its own capabilities.
That’s why the islands need to be militarised urgently. India would be stupid not to leverage this gift worth trillions in strategic capital. The political fight over this has been hijacked by the argument over whether India can block the Malacca Strait or not. A more important point is that it gives India the presence to watch anything of interest in and out of it, and now we are building the muscle power to intervene if our security is so gravely threatened. Remember, any shipping going in and out of Malacca must pass through the Six Degree Channel, well within India’s Exclusive Economic Zone. To fully understand the value of these islands, we must anticipate threats of the future and stop fighting the wars of the past—least of all, an air skirmish of 87 hours.
Conclusion: Think East, Act Now
Any warfare hits the most sensitive emotional buttons and it is natural for human beings to be obsessed with what’s been already fought, especially if successfully. Serious nations, however, don’t act like mere individuals. They draw lessons from past conflicts and look at the battles that lie ahead. India’s victory in Operation Sindoor (the 87-hour air skirmish with Pakistan) was impressive. But it is in the past. The future threats are in the east.
We bring back Asim Munir. The best thing about him is that he’s such a big mouth. He’d be a bigger nuisance if he had the smiling cunning and vicious smarts of a Zia-ul-Haq. Unlike Zia, who knifed you in the back silently, Munir boasts. That’s why, as our attention widens to the east, we have to debate two questions. First, what is it that he describes as “what they value the most”? And second, what will be the wherewithal at his disposal to target those assets? I might have some guesswork, but I am not about to give anybody ideas in a mere column. All I can tell you is, he isn’t talking about Siliguri as many instinctively presumed, particularly at a juncture when anger and distrust with Bangladesh had been running high on establishment social media. I’d just say, think east, think eastern seaboard, and meanwhile, keep adding muscle and eyes on those islands.
The Andaman and Nicobar Islands are India’s eastern shield. They must be fortified. The Kra Canal may be a fantasy, but it is a fantasy that could become real. China is already present in Myanmar’s Coco Islands. India cannot afford to be complacent. The eastern front is not quiet. It is waiting.
Q&A: India’s Eastern Maritime Security
Q1: What did Pakistan’s Army Chief Asim Munir say about the next war with India, and why is it significant?
A1: In a speech at Tampa, Florida on August 9, 2025, Munir said that “the next time Pakistan will start the war from the east, because that’s where ‘they (India) have located their most valuable resources.'” The article argues that this is not a reference to Siliguri (as many presumed) but to India’s eastern seaboard—”the industrial corridors of Tamil Nadu, Andhra Pradesh, Odisha, and West Bengal; the ports of Chennai, Visakhapatnam, Paradip, and Kolkata; the nuclear facilities; the shipbuilding yards; and the dense population centres.” The author notes that Munir “has leaked his ‘eastern’ fantasy to India” and that “the best thing about him is that he’s such a big mouth” because unlike Zia-ul-Haq who “knifed you in the back silently, Munir boasts.”
Q2: What is the Kra Canal, and why is it a strategic concern for India?
A2: The Kra Canal is a proposed canal across the Isthmus of Kra in southern Thailand (about 50 kilometres at its narrowest). If built, it would cut sailing time from the Pacific to the Andaman Sea by about three days and would “greatly undermine the significance of the Malacca Strait as a strategic choke point.” The idea has survived 350 years. The article notes that in October 2023, then-Thai Prime Minister Srettha Thavisin’s doodle at the BRI Forum in Beijing marked the canal location. The author warns: “You would then be complacent not to presume that if the project were to ever become a reality, it will be done with Chinese help, and maybe even ownership.” It would expose India’s eastern seaboard to China as “the Pacific would come alarmingly closer to India.”
Q3: How does the article characterise the strategic value of the Andaman and Nicobar Islands?
A3: The article describes the islands as “designed by gods as unsinkable aircraft carriers” that “can harbour and launch ships and submarines, base combat and reconnaissance aircraft.” With long ranges and refuellers, “India can watch the entire Bay of Bengal, the Andaman Sea and beyond.” Great Nicobar Island (India’s southernmost territory) is an “incredible strategic asset.” The proposed military infrastructure—including an airfield, naval base, and transshipment port—is not for choking the Malacca Strait (which would be “reckless”) but as India’s “forward defensive shield.” The islands could become “to the defence of eastern India what the Himalayas are to the north.” The author criticises Rahul Gandhi for opposing the project, arguing that the debate has been “hijacked” by the wrong question.
Q4: What is the significance of Myanmar’s Great Coco Island for Indian security?
A4: Great Coco Island is just 14.57 square kilometres, located approximately 20 kilometres from Landfall Island (the northernmost point of the Andamans archipelago). It already has an airstrip longer (7,500 feet) than what India has built at Great Nicobar. There have been “Chinese visits to Coco” (plus four smaller islands in the Little Coco chain). Given the “chaos in Myanmar” (civil war since the 2021 military coup), the author warns: “anybody who rules out a Chinese foothold here won’t be forgiven by history.” From Coco, China could monitor Indian naval movements in the Bay of Bengal and potentially strike at Indian assets in a conflict. The island territories in the east are “now an indispensable defensive phalanx.”
Q5: What strategic shift does the article recommend for India, and why does it criticise the Quad?
A5: The article recommends shifting India’s strategic gaze “from west to the east.” India has historically focused on threats from Pakistan and China from the north and west, but “the vulnerability in the east now must be plugged.” The author criticises the “heady talk of the Quad” (India, US, Japan, Australia) for blurring strategic vision. India cannot realistically aspire to “proactively block the Strait of Malacca for the Chinese on behalf of the US and its allies.” A more urgent need is to “shore up our maritime defences in the east.” The author concludes: “The heady talk of the Quad has blurred our strategic vision… A more urgent need is to shore up our maritime defences in the east. That’s why the islands need to be militarised urgently. India would be stupid not to leverage this gift worth trillions in strategic capital.” The article ends: “think east, think eastern seaboard, and meanwhile, keep adding muscle and eyes on those islands.” The eastern front is not quiet; it is waiting. Serious nations “draw lessons from past conflicts and look at the battles that lie ahead.” India must stop fighting the wars of the past—”least of all, an air skirmish of 87 hours”—and prepare for the future.
