The Shifting Scales of Justice, How Bangladesh’s War Crimes Tribunal Became a Political Football
In the tumultuous landscape of Bangladeshi politics, few institutions embody the nation’s complex and often painful journey more than the International Crimes Tribunal (ICT). Conceived in the fiery aftermath of the 1971 Liberation War to deliver justice for genocide, it has, over five decades, been repeatedly resurrected and repurposed, its mandate shifting with the winds of political power. Today, the tribunal stands at a controversial new crossroads. No longer solely focused on the ghosts of 1971, it has been reconstituted by an interim government to prosecute the very government that previously wielded it as a political weapon: that of Sheikh Hasina. This dramatic evolution raises profound questions about the nature of transitional justice, the weaponization of legal frameworks, and whether a tribunal born from one political struggle can ever escape being a tool in another.
The story of the ICT is one of three distinct, politically charged phases, each reflecting a different chapter in Bangladesh’s national identity.
Phase One: The Unfulfilled Promise (1973-1974)
The tribunal was first established in 1973 under the government of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, the founding father of Bangladesh. Its purpose was solemn and clear: to prosecute the perpetrators of the atrocities committed during the 1971 war, which saw mass killings, widespread rape, and a systematic campaign of violence by the Pakistani army and its local collaborators, notably groups like Al-Badr and Al-Shams. The genocide left deep, festering wounds on the national psyche, and the ICT was envisioned as a crucial step toward healing and accountability.
However, this initial phase was short-lived. Driven by the pragmatic necessities of statecraft, Sheikh Mujib began to normalize relations with Pakistan. His attendance at the Lahore Islamic Summit in 1974 and his subsequent meeting with Pakistani Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto signaled a diplomatic thaw. In this new climate, the fervent calls for justice were deliberately muted. The tribunal lost its urgency and was effectively shelved, leaving the victims of 1971 without legal closure. For the next three decades, through the regimes of Ziaur Rahman, Hussain Muhammad Ershad, and Khaleda Zia, the demand for war crimes justice remained a potent but suppressed political undercurrent, a rallying cry for the Awami League but without the political will to act upon it.
Phase Two: The Hasina Era and Retributive Justice (2008-2024)
The tribunal’s second life began with Sheikh Hasina’s electoral victory in 2008. Campaigning on a platform that promised to finally address the unresolved grievances of 1971, she revived the ICT Act of 1973. This move was wildly popular among a significant portion of the electorate, particularly those who saw the war’s collaborators as having escaped justice for too long. The tribunal was hailed as a long-overdue reckoning with the nation’s dark past.
Between 2013 and 2016, the ICT delivered a series of high-profile verdicts, sentencing several leaders of the Bangladesh Jamaat-e-Islami—a party accused of collaborating with the Pakistani army—to death. The most prominent of these was Ghulam Azam, the senior-most Jamaat leader. However, this phase was mired in international and domestic controversy. Human rights organizations, including Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International, raised serious concerns about the tribunal’s procedures, citing allegations of inadequate witness protection, questionable standards of evidence, and a lack of due process. Critics argued that the tribunal had morphed from an instrument of justice into a tool for the Awami League to systematically dismantle its primary political opposition, the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP), and its ally, Jamaat-e-Islami. The justice for 1971, they claimed, was inextricably intertwined with the political exigencies of the present.
Phase Three: The Tables Turn (2024-Present)
The dramatic fall of Sheikh Hasina’s government in 2024, following widespread anti-government protests and a violent crackdown, ushered in the tribunal’s third and most ironic phase. An interim government took power, and it quickly moved to reconstitute the ICT. But its target had shifted 180 degrees. The tribunal’s new mandate was to “deliver justice for those who lost their lives or were left injured during the crackdown by Sheikh Hasina’s government in July-August 2024.”
This repurposing has exposed the tribunal to allegations of blatant political bias. The interim government appointed retired judge Galam Mortuza Mazumdar to head Tribunal 1, which is specifically tasked with trying the cases against Sheikh Hasina herself. Tribunal 2, under Nazrul Islam Chowdhury, is examining cases against her colleagues and aides accused of complicity in the violence. The most striking symbol of this dramatic reversal is the figure of Mohammad Tajul Islam, the tribunal’s current chief prosecutor. In a profound irony, Tajul Islam was previously the defense lawyer for Jamaat-e-Islami leaders, including Ghulam Azam, during the very trials he is now overseeing from the prosecution’s bench. This has led to accusations that the tribunal is now being used for political vendetta, mirroring the very criticisms leveled against the Hasina government.
The Enduring Dilemma: Domestic Tool or International Justice?
Throughout its three incarnations, the ICT has grappled with a fundamental and unresolved dilemma. It was conceived to adjudicate crimes considered heinous under international law—genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity—but it operates purely within a national legal framework. This inherent tension has plagued its legitimacy from the start.
In 1973, the “international” angle was necessitated because the architects of the 1971 genocide were primarily in Pakistan, beyond the tribunal’s reach. The focus turned to local collaborators, a necessary but incomplete form of justice. Similarly, during the 2013-2016 trials, the tribunal punished Bangladeshi nationals while the cases involving Pakistani military officials remained unaddressed, reinforcing the perception of a one-sided process.
This dilemma is acutely present in the current phase. The tribunal has attempted to frame the alleged crimes of the Hasina government’s 2024 crackdown under the lens of international law. However, this claim is being met with widespread skepticism. Official sources in India, a key regional power, have already indicated that they view the revived ICT as a “domestic legal mechanism,” not a legitimate international platform. They have also pointed out that the tribunal appears not to be granting equal hearing opportunities to the key accused, a basic tenet of a fair trial. Sheikh Hasina, now in exile, has denounced the proceedings as “politically motivated,” a charge the interim government vehemently denies, insisting it is merely seeking justice for the victims of the 2024 violence.
A Verdict on the Nation’s Soul
The upcoming verdict from the ICT, scheduled for November 17, is about far more than the guilt or innocence of a former leader and her associates. It is a verdict on the soul of Bangladeshi democracy and the rule of law. The tribunal’s journey from 1971 to 2025 is a cautionary tale about the perils of instrumentalizing justice.
When legal institutions are repeatedly reshaped to serve the political objectives of whoever holds power, the very concept of impartial justice is eroded. The ICT risks being seen not as a pillar of the state, but as a weapon in the endless cycle of political retribution between the Awami League and its opponents. The victims—whether of the 1971 genocide, the 2013-2016 crackdowns, or the 2024 violence—deserve a credible and impartial process. The continual repurposing of the same tribunal, with its shifting mandates and controversial figures, makes that increasingly difficult to achieve.
For Bangladesh to break this cycle, it must eventually build judicial institutions that are robustly independent, transparent, and insulated from the political fray. Until then, the International Crimes Tribunal will likely remain a powerful symbol not of immutable justice, but of its disquieting malleability in the face of raw political power. Its scales, it seems, are not balanced by blindfolded Lady Justice, but are constantly being recalibrated by the hands of the ruling regime.
Q&A: Understanding Bangladesh’s Evolving International Crimes Tribunal
Q1: What was the original purpose of the International Crimes Tribunal (ICT) when it was first created?
A1: The ICT was first established in 1973 by Sheikh Mujibur Rahman’s government to deliver justice for the atrocities committed during the 1971 Bangladesh Liberation War. Its mandate was to prosecute individuals for genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity perpetrated by the Pakistani army and their local Bangladeshi collaborators.
Q2: How did Sheikh Hasina’s government (2008-2024) use the tribunal, and why was it controversial?
A2: Sheikh Hasina revived the dormant tribunal after her 2008 election victory. Her government used it to try and convict leaders of the Jamaat-e-Islami party for their role as collaborators in the 1971 war, with several receiving death sentences. While popular with her base, it was controversial because international human rights groups and critics alleged the trials were politically motivated, lacked due process, and were used to weaken the political opposition, namely the BNP and its ally Jamaat-e-Islami.
Q3: How has the tribunal’s role changed under the current interim government?
A3: In its most dramatic shift, the interim government that took power after Sheikh Hasina’s fall in 2024 has reconstituted the ICT to prosecute Hasina and members of her government for the violent crackdown on protesters in July-August 2024. The tribunal’s focus has shifted from 1971 war crimes to alleged state-sponsored violence by the previous regime, leading to accusations that it is now being used as a tool for political retribution against Hasina and the Awami League.
Q4: What is the central dilemma that has plagued the ICT throughout its history?
A4: The core dilemma is the tension between its mandate and its framework. The ICT is tasked with prosecuting crimes defined under international law (like genocide and crimes against humanity) but operates solely within a domestic Bangladeshi legal system. This has repeatedly undermined its international legitimacy, as seen when it couldn’t try Pakistani nationals in the 1970s, and now as other countries, like India, view its current actions as a domestic political exercise rather than a genuine international justice process.
Q5: Who is Mohammad Tajul Islam, and why is his role significant in the tribunal’s current phase?
A5: Mohammad Tajul Islam is the current chief prosecutor of the ICT. His role is highly significant due to his past: between 2013 and 2016, he was the defense lawyer for several Jamaat-e-Islami leaders, including Ghulam Azam, who were convicted and sentenced to death by the very same tribunal. His shift from defending the tribunal’s targets to now prosecuting its new targets (Sheikh Hasina’s government) is seen by critics as a symbol of the court’s political malleability and lack of consistent judicial principle.
