The Great Unraveling, America’s Bilateral Turn and the Perilous New World Order for the Global South

The Great Unraveling, America’s Bilateral Turn and the Perilous New World Order for the Global South

In the annals of international relations, the post-World War II era has been defined by a framework of multilateralism, largely architected and underwritten by the United States. Institutions like the United Nations, the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and a web of treaties created a system—however imperfect—designed to manage conflict, foster development, and address global challenges through collective action. Today, as articulated by Professor Santhosh Mathew, we are witnessing a profound and deliberate unmaking of that order. The United States’ strategic withdrawal from multilateral commitments and its pivot towards a foreign policy grounded in bilateral treaties and transactional deal-making is more than a tactical shift. It represents a fundamental rethinking of American engagement with the world, with seismic repercussions for global governance, climate action, development aid, and the agency of nations across the Global South, including India, Bangladesh, and vulnerable small island states.

This transition from a multilateral to a predominantly bilateral paradigm is not merely a change in method; it is a transformation in the very nature of power and accountability in the international system. The consequences are far-reaching, threatening to dismantle the fragile scaffolding of global cooperation just as humanity faces its most existential and interconnected challenges.

The Core Contradiction: Concentrated Power vs. Diffused Responsibility

At the heart of this shift lies a critical dichotomy. Multilateralism, by its design, spreads responsibility, dilutes the influence of any single nation, and creates platforms for collective accountability. It embeds norms and rules that, while often favoring the powerful, provide a predictable framework for all. Bilateralism, in stark contrast, concentrates power. It reduces international relations to a series of one-on-one negotiations where asymmetry is the rule, not the exception.

For a hegemon like the United States, this is an attractive proposition. Bilateral treaties offer maximal control, direct political leverage, and clear, tangible returns on investment. Aid can be explicitly tied to strategic concessions—votes in the UN, military base access, or alignment on trade. The donor gets visibility and influence; the recipient gets a deal, but often at the cost of its policy autonomy and long-term strategic flexibility. As Professor Mathew notes, this emerging order risks subordinating humanitarian principles and developmental needs to cold, strategic calculation. The ideal of aid based on need is replaced by aid based on allegiance.

This withdrawal also carries a corrosive moral and practical effect. When the largest donor disengages from a UN agency or a global climate fund, it does more than reduce the budget. It emboldens other sceptical nations to question the institution’s value, triggering a cascade of disengagement. The result is a “shrinking humanitarian space” precisely when climate disasters, conflict, and demographic pressures are swelling the ranks of the vulnerable. The multilateral safety net, already frayed, begins to tear.

Climate Catastrophe: From Collective Action to Carbon Lock-in

Nowhere are the implications of this retreat more dire than in the fight against climate change. The Paris Agreement represented a hard-won, if flawed, multilateral consensus. The U.S. withdrawal from it and related frameworks like the International Solar Alliance (ISA) is a blow of symbolic and practical magnitude.

The ISA, co-led by India and France, was a landmark of South-South cooperation. It was a pragmatic effort to mobilize solar technology and financing for the sun-rich but capital-poor nations of the tropics, aiming to make renewable energy affordable and scalable. America’s disengagement from this initiative signals a lack of confidence in such cooperative, multilateral renewable frameworks. More insidiously, it creates a vacuum that may be filled by a regressive form of bilateralism.

A deeply troubling scenario emerges: as the U.S. steps back from global climate commitments, its powerful automotive and fossil fuel industries may aggressively seek to offload outdated technologies onto developing markets. The “dumping” of millions of cheaper, conventional petrol and diesel vehicles into the growing markets of Asia and Africa could lock these economies into carbon-intensive pathways for decades. For countries like India or Bangladesh, where affordable mobility is a pressing social and economic necessity, this presents a devastating “policy trap.” The immediate allure of cheap vehicles could undermine long-term climate goals, increase toxic air pollution, and create a crippling dependency on imported oil.

Without the strong, normative pressure and coordinated financial incentives of a robust multilateral system, climate commitments become optional. The peer pressure and collective momentum of forums like the UNFCCC are weakened, allowing short-term national interest to trump long-term planetary survival. The Maldives and Kiribati, facing literal extinction from sea-level rise, find their fate subject not to global cooperation, but to the whims of bilateral aid that may come with geopolitical strings attached.

The South Asian Crucible: Asymmetry and Diminished Agency

The ripple effects of this shift are acutely felt in regions like South Asia. Smaller nations such as Nepal, Sri Lanka, Bhutan, and the Maldives have historically relied on multilateral channels for development finance, climate adaptation funds, and as platforms to amplify their voices. These forums, however dominated by great powers, offered a space for negotiation and a degree of insulation from pure power politics.

In a bilateral world, this insulation evaporates. A country like Sri Lanka, seeking debt relief or infrastructure investment, must negotiate directly with a China, an India, or a disengaged U.S. on terms set overwhelmingly by the larger power. Aid becomes overtly transactional, “blurring the line between assistance and influence.” The principles of sovereignty and non-interference become bargaining chips. This dynamic could intensify regional rivalries, as larger powers use bilateral aid to build spheres of influence, forcing smaller states into difficult, binary choices.

India’s Precarious Dualism: Stakeholder and Aspirant in a Fragmenting World

India’s position in this new landscape is uniquely complex and precarious. It is simultaneously:

• A Major Recipient: It benefits from multilateral climate finance, World Bank projects, and WHO initiatives.

• An Emerging Donor and Agenda-Setter: It champions initiatives like the ISA and the Coalition for Disaster Resilient Infrastructure (CDRI).

• A Strategic Partner Sought by All: Both the U.S. (through bilateral frameworks like the iCET) and other blocs seek its alignment.

This dualism demands a high-wire diplomatic act. India has a profound stake in preserving and reforming the multilateral system that, despite its biases, offers it a seat at the rule-making table. Yet, it must pragmatically navigate a world where its most powerful strategic partner, the U.S., prefers bilateral deal-making. India’s path forward, as Mathew suggests, requires agile diplomacy: strengthening ties with the European Union (which remains a multilateral stalwart), deepening South-South cooperation to build alternative poles of consensus, and assuming greater leadership in sustaining the multilateral initiatives it has helped create.

However, this is a formidable burden. India lacks the economic heft of China or the historic institutional influence of the U.S. to single-handedly underwrite global governance. Its ability to be a “stabiliser” is contingent on its own rapid development and its success in building durable coalitions—a challenging task in an increasingly fragmented and transactional environment.

The Erosion of the Global Commons: Knowledge, Health, and Data

The retreat from multilateralism has a less visible but equally damaging impact on the global knowledge and cooperative commons. International networks of experts, scientists, and development professionals who worked through UN systems face shrinking opportunities and resources. Coordinated responses to global crises become harder.

• Pandemic Preparedness: The weakening of the WHO’s authority and funding, exacerbated by U.S. ambivalence, leaves the world more vulnerable to the next pandemic. The data-sharing, research collaboration, and equitable vaccine distribution that require multilateral frameworks are jeopardized.

• Scientific Collaboration: Global research initiatives on climate modeling, biodiversity loss, or ocean health rely on open data-sharing and pooled resources. A bilateral, competitive mindset fosters secrecy and slows progress.

• Development Expertise: The institutional memory and neutral technical assistance provided by multilateral agencies are eroded, often replaced by consultants from donor countries whose advice may align with commercial or strategic interests rather than local needs.

The American Paradox: Sacrificing Enduring Influence for Transient Leverage

Historically, as Professor Mathew astutely observes, America’s pre-eminence was not derived solely from its military or economy, but from its role as the “architect and guarantor” of the international system. This role bestowed a form of legitimate, institutionalized authority—the power to set agendas and shape norms. By dismantling the very system it built, Washington engages in a profound paradox. It may gain short-term, transactional leverage over individual countries, but it surrenders the long-term, systemic influence that comes from being at the center of a rules-based order. Influence exercised through cooperation and perceived legitimacy is more durable and less costly than influence imposed through coercion or mercenary deals.

This shift echoes an older, pre-World War II worldview that prioritizes naked national advantage. Yet, the problems of the 21st century—a warming planet, mass migration, cyber threats, pandemics—are inherently transnational. They disrespect borders and cannot be solved by a patchwork of bilateral agreements. They demand the coordinated, scaled responses that only multilateral frameworks can hope to muster.

Conclusion: A Stark Choice and a Daunting Opportunity for the Global South

The erosion of multilateralism presents the Global South with a stark reality: a future with fewer safeguards, less predictability, and greater vulnerability to the whims of great power politics. The modest protections and voice offered by the UN system are diminished.

Yet, within this crisis lies a daunting opportunity. The retreat of the traditional hegemon creates space—and imposes necessity—for emerging powers and middle-income nations to step forward. The task is not to replace the U.S. but to forge a new, more pluralistic, and equitable form of multilateralism. This means reinvigorating existing institutions from within, creating new, more agile coalitions (like the ISA), and insisting that great powers, including a resurgent China, be held to cooperative norms.

The fundamental question of our time, as framed by this analysis, is no longer whether multilateralism is imperfect—it always has been. The question is whether the world can afford its decline. In choosing the immediate, calculable gains of bilateralism, the United States may be winning battles of leverage. But the long-term war—for a stable climate, for humanitarian conscience, for a predictable world order—is one that will be lost by all. The silence left by America’s retreat is not just a vacuum of power; it is the unsettling sound of the global commons crumbling. The responsibility to respond now falls, disproportionately and urgently, on the collective shoulders of the rest of the world.

Q&A: Delving Deeper into America’s Pullback and Global Consequences

Q1: The article argues bilateralism concentrates power and reduces autonomy for aid recipients. Can you provide a concrete, hypothetical example of how this might play out for a country like Bangladesh or Nepal in the next decade?

A1: Scenario: Climate Resilience Financing for Bangladesh.
Under a robust multilateral system, Bangladesh would access adaptation funds through the UNFCCC’s Green Climate Fund (GCF) or the Global Environment Facility (GEF). The application would be evaluated by technical experts based on vulnerability, project efficacy, and coherence with national plans. While political influence exists, the process has transparent criteria and avenues for appeal.

In a bilateral world dominated by U.S. retreat, Bangladesh’s options shrink. It might turn to a major power like Country X for a bilateral loan to build cyclone shelters and embankments.

• The Strings Attached: The loan agreement could mandate that 70% of construction contracts go to firms from Country X. It might require Bangladesh to support Country X’s geopolitical stance in a regional forum, or grant its navy preferential port access. The technical specifications might favor Country X’s patented (and more expensive) technology over cheaper, locally suitable alternatives.

• The Loss of Autonomy: Bangladesh’s national procurement laws and its strategy to develop local engineering capacity are undermined. Its foreign policy neutrality is compromised. The project serves Country X’s strategic and commercial interests as much as, if not more than, Bangladesh’s adaptation needs. If Bangladesh balks at the terms, Country X can simply withdraw, leaving the project—and vulnerable communities—in limbo. The recipient becomes a supplicant, not a partner.

Q2: The article mentions the U.S. withdrawal from the International Solar Alliance (ISA) as a significant setback. Beyond symbolism, what are the tangible, practical impacts of this on India’s climate leadership and on solar deployment in Africa?

A2:

• For India’s Leadership: The ISA was a cornerstone of India’s claim to global climate leadership. U.S. participation would have brought crucial financial credibility, cutting-edge technology, and political weight, helping to crowd in investment from other developed nations and the private sector. Its withdrawal undermines the alliance’s perceived viability, making it harder for India to attract significant capital from Western markets. It forces India to shoulder more of the financial and diplomatic burden alone or with partners like France, straining its resources.

• For Solar Deployment in Africa: The ISA’s goal is to mobilize $1 trillion for solar projects by 2030. The U.S., through its development finance institutions (like the DFC), is a major source of patient, low-cost capital for infrastructure. Its absence creates a major funding gap. Without U.S. involvement, risk mitigation instruments (like guarantees) are scarcer, making projects more expensive and less bankable. This slows down deployment precisely when acceleration is needed. It also leaves the field more open for China, which offers bilateral solar deals often tied to its own equipment and strategic interests, potentially creating a new form of dependency.

Q3: The writer states that multilateral forums provided smaller powers with a platform. How exactly did this work in practice, and what specific mechanisms of leverage are lost in a bilateral setting?

A3: Mechanisms in Multilateral Forums:

• Coalition Building: Small states could band together in blocs like the Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS) or the G77+China. As a voting bloc, they could wield significant influence in UN General Assembly resolutions or during climate negotiations, forcing larger powers to negotiate with them as a collective.

• Norm Entrepreneurship: A small country could use the UN podium to champion a new norm (e.g., the human right to a clean environment, pioneered by small islands). The multilateral forum provides amplification and legitimacy.

• Third-Party Mediation and Rules: Disputes could be brought to the International Court of Justice or WTO dispute panels, where rules, not raw power, theoretically decide outcomes. A small country could challenge a great power on a legal basis.

• Technical Committees: Experts from smaller nations could contribute to setting global standards (e.g., in telecommunications, aviation) through ITU or ICAO, ensuring their needs are considered.

Losses in a Bilateral Setting: All these mechanisms evaporate. Negotiation is one-on-one. There is no bloc to hide in, no independent arbitrator, no global stage to shame a powerful actor. The leverage shifts entirely to economic and military might. A small nation’s only card is often its geographic location or its vote in an institution the great power may no longer value.

Q4: Could the U.S. bilateral approach inadvertently strengthen China’s influence in the Global South, and if so, how?

A4: Absolutely. The U.S. retreat creates a vacuum of leadership, financing, and engagement that China is uniquely positioned and willing to fill.

• Contrasting Models: The U.S. bilateral model, as described, is often portrayed as transactional, with political conditionalities. China, through its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), offers a different bilateral model: one with fewer overt political strings (adhering to its stated principle of “non-interference”) but with strong economic and strategic strings (use of Chinese contractors, alignment with China on core issues like Taiwan, acquisition of strategic assets in case of default).

• Filling the Void: When the U.S. withdraws from climate finance or development banks, China steps in with the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) and Silk Road Fund. When the U.S. disengages from UN agencies, China increases its contributions and places more of its nationals in senior roles. For a Global South nation frustrated with Western conditionalities, China’s “no-questions-asked” approach can be appealing in the short term.

• Setting Alternative Standards: By walking away from multilateral rule-setting, the U.S. cedes the terrain to China to promote its own standards in technology (5G, surveillance), infrastructure, and digital governance. The U.S. bilateral strategy may win specific deals, but China wins the broader contest to shape the operating system for the developing world.

Q5: Is there a scenario where a “new multilateralism” emerges from the Global South or middle powers, and what would be its essential characteristics to avoid the pitfalls of the old system?

A5: Yes, this is the nascent opportunity within the crisis. A “new multilateralism” would likely be:

• Pluralistic and Networked: Not centered on one or two hegemons, but structured as a network of overlapping coalitions tailored to specific issues—e.g., the ISA for solar, the CDRI for resilience, regional bodies for trade.

• Minilateral and Agile: Smaller groups of willing and relevant states (e.g., “coalitions of the concerned”) may prove more effective than sprawling, 190-member assemblies for rapid action on issues like maritime security or supply chain resilience.

• Focus on Functional Cooperation: Emphasis on solving concrete problems (disease surveillance, renewable energy grids, cybercrime) rather than grand ideological bargains. Start with technical cooperation to build trust.

• Equitable Governance: Reforming voting shares in IFIs to reflect 21st-century economic weight, and ensuring leadership positions are merit-based and geographically rotated.

• South-South at its Core: Built on principles of mutual benefit and solidarity, rather than donor-recipient hierarchies. It would leverage the developing world’s shared experiences and pool resources, as seen in India’s Vaccine Maitri initiative.
  The challenge is scaling this without the traditional financial and security underpinnings provided by a hegemon. It would require middle powers like India, Brazil, Indonesia, South Africa, and others to consistently invest political and economic capital in these new institutions, and to forge pragmatic partnerships with those elements in Europe and elsewhere that still value the old multilateral ideal. It would be messier, but potentially more representative and resilient.