The Final Frontier of Friendship, How China-Pakistan Space Cooperation Is Reshaping Regional Dynamics

The Final Frontier of Friendship, How China-Pakistan Space Cooperation Is Reshaping Regional Dynamics

The ‘all-weather ties’ between China and Pakistan are reflected in their space cooperation as well. The Chinese space programme has undertaken major strides since it built and launched its first satellite in 1970. In the last half a century, Beijing has conducted satellite launches, built its own navigation system (Beidou), carried out successful spacewalks, and built and operated its own space station (Tiangong). China is also in the process of undertaking a manned moon mission by 2030. China has also consistently promoted its space technologies and pushed for cooperation under the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). This entails “a service network weaved by satellites and ground stations among the BRI partner countries has promoted the space industry to better benefit the local people.” China has also used its launching platform, the Long March, to promote its soft power by launching satellites for a number of other countries. The most significant and sustained of these partnerships, however, is with Pakistan. The partnership began in 1990 with China launching Pakistan’s Badr-I satellite. Today, China has built and launched numerous satellites for Pakistan and, in 2026, announced that it will send one Pakistani astronaut to the Tiangong space station. This evolving cooperation is not merely a technological endeavour; it is a strategic alignment that has profound implications for regional security, India’s position in space, and the global balance of power.

The Historical Arc: From Badr-I to the Tiangong Space Station

The partnership between China and Pakistan in space began in 1990 with the launch of Pakistan’s first satellite, Badr-I, aboard a Chinese Long March rocket. At the time, it was a modest achievement—a symbolic gesture of friendship and technological cooperation. But it laid the foundation for a relationship that would deepen over three decades.

Over the years, China has been the only country that has launched a significant number of Pakistani satellites, helping Pakistan build a network of reconnaissance and communication satellites. This has dramatically enhanced Pakistan’s surveillance capabilities, its ability to monitor its borders, and its communication resilience.

The latest mission in April 2026 saw Pakistan’s indigenous electro-optical satellite, EO-3, being launched from China’s Taiyuan Satellite Launch Center. In 2025 alone, China launched three Pakistani satellites: a remote-sensing satellite (PRSS-2) in October 2025, the Pakistan Remote Sensing Satellite (PRSS-1) in July 2025, and PRSC-E01 in January 2025. In 2024, China had launched the second communication satellite. The frequency and scale of these launches indicate a mature and ongoing cooperation, not a one-off assistance.

China has also launched the ICUBE-Q in 2024 on the Chang’e 6 orbiter. This was developed in a collaboration between Pakistan’s Institute of Space Technology (IST) and Shanghai Jiao Tong University (SJTU). The ICUBE-Q, a lunar CubeSat weighing about 7 kg, was designed to explore the far side of the moon. It was successful in capturing images of the moon and the sun and transmitting them back to Earth. This was a significant milestone: it was Pakistan’s first lunar mission, and it was achieved through Chinese collaboration.

The most symbolic development, however, is the announcement in 2026 that China will send one Pakistani astronaut to the Tiangong space station. China has selected Muhammad Zeeshan Ali and Khurram Daud, two Pakistani candidates who will be trained in China for a visit to the Tiangong space station. However, only one of them will be visiting the space station as the payload specialist. This is being done under the 2025 agreement between the China Manned Space Engineering Office (CMSEO) and the Pakistan Space and Upper Atmosphere Research Commission (SUPARCO).

This is not merely a technological exchange; it is a political statement. By allowing a Pakistani astronaut on its space station, China is signalling that its partnership with Pakistan is unique, deep, and strategic. No other country has been granted this privilege. It also sends a message to India: while India is pursuing its own human spaceflight programme (Gaganyaan), China is already hosting international astronauts—starting with India’s rival.

The Strategic Implications: Reconnaissance, Communication, and Military Applications

The satellites launched by China for Pakistan are not merely for peaceful purposes. They have clear military applications. The PRSS-1 and PRSS-2 are remote-sensing satellites, capable of high-resolution imaging. They can be used for monitoring troop movements, tracking naval vessels, and assessing battlefield damage. The EO-3 is an electro-optical satellite, which also provides imagery. The communication satellites enhance the Pakistan military’s command and control capabilities.

For India, this is a concern. Pakistan’s surveillance capabilities have been limited by its technological constraints. With China’s help, Pakistan is rapidly closing the gap. Indian military planners must assume that their movements are being monitored by Pakistani satellites—and, by extension, by Chinese satellites, since China has access to the data.

The cooperation also extends to navigation. China’s Beidou navigation system is the global competitor to the US GPS, Russian GLONASS, and European Galileo. Pakistan is a heavy user of Beidou, which provides accurate positioning data for military and civilian applications. Unlike GPS, which can be selectively denied to adversaries, Beidou is under Chinese control. In a conflict, China could theoretically degrade or deny Beidou signals to India while maintaining them for Pakistan. This asymmetry is a strategic vulnerability for India.

The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and Space Diplomacy

China has consistently promoted its space technologies and pushed for cooperation under the Belt and Road Initiative. This entails “a service network weaved by satellites and ground stations among the BRI partner countries has promoted the space industry to better benefit the local people.” This is not just rhetoric; China has established ground stations in several BRI countries, including Pakistan, providing them with satellite data and services.

The space component of BRI serves multiple purposes. First, it builds dependency: countries that rely on Chinese satellites for communications, navigation, earth observation, and weather forecasting become strategically aligned with China. Second, it generates revenue: China charges for launch services, data, and training. Third, it enhances China’s soft power: launching a country’s first satellite or hosting its astronaut is a powerful diplomatic tool.

Pakistan is the most prominent beneficiary of this space diplomacy. But China has also launched satellites for other countries, including Nigeria, Venezuela, Bolivia, and Belarus. The Long March rocket is a workhorse for commercial launches. However, the depth and duration of the China-Pakistan partnership is unmatched.

India’s Response: The Need for Strategic Space Autonomy

India has its own robust space programme. The Indian Space Research Organisation (ISRO) has launched satellites for dozens of countries, including developed nations like the US, France, and Germany. India has also demonstrated anti-satellite (ASAT) capability, destroying one of its own satellites in 2019 (Mission Shakti). India is planning its own human spaceflight mission, Gaganyaan, and has announced plans for a space station and a crewed lunar mission by 2040.

But India’s space cooperation with other countries has been largely transactional, not strategic. India has not offered to host foreign astronauts on its future space station. It has not built and launched an entire satellite network for a neighbouring country. It has not integrated its space programme with a military alliance.

The China-Pakistan space partnership should be a wake-up call for India. India must accelerate its space programme, not just for technological prestige but for strategic necessity. It must deepen its own space cooperation with friendly countries, including the US, Japan, Australia, France, and the Quad partners. It must develop capabilities to monitor, and if necessary, counter Chinese and Pakistani satellites. And it must ensure that its space assets are protected from attack.

India should also consider offering space cooperation to countries that feel threatened by China’s growing influence. For example, India could offer to build and launch satellites for Vietnam, the Philippines, Indonesia, or Sri Lanka. It could offer training to their astronauts (if and when India has a crewed programme). It could provide them with data from Indian remote-sensing satellites. This would not only counter Chinese influence but also build a coalition of spacefaring nations aligned with India.

The Future: Pakistan’s Astronaut and the Geopolitics of Space

The training of Pakistani astronauts in China is a multi-year process. The selected candidate will learn Mandarin, undergo rigorous physical and technical training, and familiarise themselves with the Tiangong space station’s systems. The actual mission is expected to take place in the late 2020s.

When a Pakistani astronaut looks down at Earth from the Tiangong space station, the view will include the disputed territory of Kashmir. It is not difficult to imagine the propaganda value of such an image. The Pakistan astronaut could unfurl a Pakistani flag, offer a prayer for the nation, and beam back messages of national pride. India would have no similar image from its own space station, which is still years away.

The geopolitical implications are clear. Space is no longer a neutral domain; it is an arena of competition. China and Pakistan’s cooperation in space is a form of strategic alignment that has terrestrial consequences. India cannot afford to be left behind.

Conclusion: A New Frontier of Friendship

The evolving China-Pakistan space cooperation is a testament to the depth of their “all-weather friendship.” It began with a satellite launch in 1990; it now includes lunar missions, an astronaut on China’s space station, and a network of reconnaissance satellites. This cooperation is not merely technological; it is strategic, military, and geopolitical.

For India, the message is clear: the space domain is contested, and its rivals are cooperating. India must respond with urgency, investment, and strategic vision. It must accelerate its own space programme, deepen its international partnerships, and develop counters to Chinese and Pakistani space capabilities. The final frontier is also a battlefield. India must be prepared.

Q&A: China-Pakistan Space Cooperation

Q1: When did China-Pakistan space cooperation begin, and what were the early milestones?

A1: The partnership began in 1990 with China launching Pakistan’s first satellite, Badr-I, aboard a Chinese Long March rocket. At the time, it was a modest achievement—a symbolic gesture of friendship and technological cooperation. Over the decades, China has been the only country that has launched a significant number of Pakistani satellites, helping Pakistan build a network of reconnaissance and communication satellites. A key milestone was the ICUBE-Q mission in 2024—a lunar CubeSat (7 kg) launched on Chang’e 6 orbiter, developed in collaboration between Pakistan’s Institute of Space Technology (IST) and Shanghai Jiao Tong University (SJTU). It successfully explored the far side of the moon, marking Pakistan’s first lunar mission. In 2026, China announced that it will send one Pakistani astronaut to the Tiangong space station, with two candidates (Muhammad Zeeshan Ali and Khurram Daud) selected for training.

Q2: What types of satellites has China launched for Pakistan, and what are their potential military applications?

A2: China has launched a variety of satellites for Pakistan:

• Remote-sensing satellites (PRSS-1, PRSS-2): Capable of high-resolution imaging for monitoring troop movements, tracking naval vessels, and assessing battlefield damage.

• Electro-optical satellites (EO-3): Provide imagery for surveillance and reconnaissance.

• Communication satellites: Enhance command and control capabilities for the Pakistan military.

• PRSC-E01 (January 2025): Part of the growing reconnaissance network.
  In 2025 alone, China launched three Pakistani satellites. The article notes that India must assume that Pakistani satellites—and by extension Chinese satellites (since China has access to the data)—are monitoring Indian military movements. Pakistan is also a heavy user of China’s Beidou navigation system, which, unlike GPS, is under Chinese control and could be selectively degraded or denied to India in a conflict.

Q3: What is the significance of China sending a Pakistani astronaut to the Tiangong space station?

A3: This is a highly symbolic and strategic move. China has selected two Pakistani candidates (Muhammad Zeeshan Ali and Khurram Daud) for training, though only one will visit as a payload specialist under a 2025 agreement between CMSEO and SUPARCO. The significance includes:

• Political statement: It signals that China’s partnership with Pakistan is “unique, deep, and strategic.” No other country has been granted this privilege.

• Message to India: China is already hosting international astronauts—starting with India’s rival—while India’s Gaganyaan human spaceflight programme is still in progress.

• Propaganda value: When a Pakistani astronaut looks down from Tiangong, the view will include Kashmir. Unfurling a Pakistani flag or beaming back patriotic messages would have powerful domestic and international resonance.

Q4: How does China use its space programme as a tool of diplomacy under the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)?

A4: China promotes its space technologies under the BRI through a “service network weaved by satellites and ground stations among the BRI partner countries.” This serves multiple purposes:

• Builds dependency: Countries relying on Chinese satellites for communications, navigation, earth observation, and weather forecasting become strategically aligned with China.

• Generates revenue: China charges for launch services, data, and training.

• Enhances soft power: Launching a country’s first satellite or hosting its astronaut is a powerful diplomatic tool.
  China has established ground stations in several BRI countries, including Pakistan. While China has launched satellites for other countries (Nigeria, Venezuela, Bolivia, Belarus), the “depth and duration” of the China-Pakistan partnership is unmatched.

Q5: What should India’s strategic response be to the evolving China-Pakistan space cooperation?

A5: The article argues that India must respond with urgency and strategic vision:

• Accelerate India’s space programme: Not just for technological prestige but for strategic necessity. India must develop capabilities to monitor, and if necessary, counter Chinese and Pakistani satellites.

• Deepen international space cooperation: India should work closely with the US, Japan, Australia, France, and Quad partners. It should offer to build and launch satellites for countries feeling threatened by China (Vietnam, Philippines, Indonesia, Sri Lanka), offer astronaut training, and share remote-sensing data.

• Ensure protection of space assets: India must develop counters to Chinese and Pakistani space capabilities, including anti-satellite (ASAT) capabilities (demonstrated with Mission Shakti in 2019).

• Build a coalition of spacefaring nations: Counter Chinese influence by offering strategic space cooperation to friendly countries.
  The article concludes: “The final frontier is also a battlefield. India must be prepared.” The China-Pakistan space partnership is a “wake-up call” for India to stop treating space cooperation as merely transactional and start treating it as strategic. The message is clear: India cannot afford to be left behind.