The Battle for Bengal, Bhadraloks, BJP, and the Narrow Win That Could Spell Trouble for Trinamool
The second phase of the Bengal election, on April 29, closer to Kolkata and its surrounding urban belt, is the harder test for the BJP. Anger against Trinamool’s 15 years in office is no longer scattered, the BJP has sharper organisation now, and its language of Hindu consolidation appears to have found firmer ground in Bengal. What it still, however, needs is a seal of respectability from sections of the educated Hindu middle class. In Bengal, that question cannot be separated from the older social world of Bhadraloks. After voting completed on 152 Bengal seats last week, the BJP is upbeat, but nobody is counting Trinamool out. While no one should doubt the BJP’s hunger for power, observers suggest two possible outcomes. One is a Trinamool return, albeit with a narrower margin than 2021. The other is a BJP victory. However, if Mamata Banerjee returns to office with a reduced number of seats, it may open the possibility of a Maharashtra-like party split and the prospect of a BJP-led government emerging through political manoeuvring. For a full-term stable government, Trinamool would need to win with a significant margin, somewhat like its performance in 2021. The battle for Bengal is not just about numbers; it is about cultural legitimacy, electoral mathematics, and the haunting question of whether Hindutva can finally break through in a state that has long kept it at arm’s length.
The Bhadralok Conundrum: Cultural Legitimacy for Hindutva
The Bhadralok was never an electoral bloc or official social category. Historically, it referred to Bengal’s educated upper-caste Hindu middle classes, many of them property-owning, who came to dominate public life in and around colonial Calcutta. The old world that produced it has changed, but its social afterlife remains strong, especially in Kolkata and its older urban neighbourhoods. It still names a class with caste privilege and a strong self-image as custodian of Bengali civility. The Bhadralok has never voted as a bloc, though its acceptance can still make a party appear culturally legitimate in Bengal’s urban middle-class spaces.
For the BJP, the value is clear—it can make a vote for Hindutva appear like a vote for order and good sense. Rashbehari in South Kolkata gives this problem a constituency. BJP nominee Swapan Dasgupta’s campaign here reads like an appeal to educated upper-caste, middle-class voters. His local ‘manifesto’ speaks of ‘reviving’ Kalighat and Adi Ganga. He has promised to protect and beautify Rabindra Sarobar and give Rashbehari a more polished civic life, lined with cafes—telling South Kolkata that the BJP can speak in the language of neighbourhood upkeep and cultural restoration.
Rashbehari has long been Trinamool ground. The BJP is fighting there through a figure like Dasgupta, with a long record in conservative politics, legible to the educated Hindu middle class. His campaign places the BJP’s politics inside familiar South Kolkata concerns—about cafes around Rabindra Sarobar, public spaces, and civic order. The idea is to make the BJP sound less bohiragoto (outsider), more bhadro (genteel).
Mamata’s Style: Charisma, Discomfort, and the Class Divide
Mamata Banerjee’s power and charismatic public style, meanwhile, never depended on old Kolkata refinement. She challenged the Left’s hegemony by making herself legible to voters outside the Bhadralok world. Her public persona—simple cotton saris, rubber sandals, street-corner speeches—was a deliberate rejection of the cultured, Anglicised style of the Left Front establishment. She spoke the language of the common man, not the club.
This has long unsettled sections of the Bhadralok, who have seen her politics as a fall in the standards they imagine for Bengal’s public life. For years, that unease could coexist with acceptance of her dominance. She was uncouth, but she won elections. She was not genteel, but she was effective. Now, however, charges of recruitment scams, syndicate power, and lack of women’s safety have made that discomfort palpable. Yet, some of it still comes from a class discomfort with Mamata’s style. The Bhadralok may have tolerated her when she was winning; they may now be ready to replace her, not because the BJP is better, but because she is no longer acceptable.
The Electoral Arithmetic: From 3 Seats to 77 to Perhaps Power
The numbers tell a story of rapid rise. In the 2016 state polls, the BJP won 3 seats in Bengal with 10 per cent of the vote. By 2021, it emerged as the principal opposition with 77 MLAs and 39 per cent of the vote. Trinamool won 211 seats with 46 per cent in 2016. In 2021, the party increased its tally slightly to 213 seats and raised its vote share to 49 per cent. Thus, while Trinamool added only about 3 percentage points to its vote share, the BJP added nearly 28 percentage points.
The comparison with Odisha is instructive. In the 2024 assembly election, when the BJP toppled the 24-year stint of the Biju Janata Dal (BJD) government, the vote swing in the BJP’s favour was a little below 8 percentage points—from 33 per cent in 2019 to 40 per cent. But it gained 55 seats. In Bengal, the BJP may see its vote share grow further, but whether it will become the new governing party or simply consolidate its position as principal opposition depends on how well it can convert votes into seats. The first-past-the-post system magnifies small swings. A 5 per cent shift in vote share can translate into a 20 per cent shift in seats if it is concentrated in the right constituencies.
The Suvendu Factor: A Weak Clone of Himanta?
The BJP is known as an ideological party, but it has demonstrated flexibility in co-opting political veterans from other parties. In Bengal, the BJP has similarly co-opted Suvendu Adhikari, once a trusted Mamata aide. He is the BJP’s Leader of the Opposition in the outgoing assembly and its chief ministerial face. But Suvendu is no match for Assam’s Himanta Biswa Sarma in either rhetoric or organisational skills. Himanta was a Congress veteran who switched to the BJP and built the party in Assam from the ground up. He has a grassroots organisation, a network of loyal workers, and a strategic mind. Suvendu, by contrast, is seen as an opportunist who rode on Mamata’s coattails and then jumped ship. He has not built an alternative organisation. He has not cultivated a second rung of leadership. This, perhaps, remains a major weakness for the BJP in Bengal.
The Polarisation and Its Victims: Bengali Muslims
Both in terms of campaign and rhetoric, this election has only deepened polarisation in Bengali society, and its main victims are Bengali Muslims. Bengal and Assam share close to 4,096 kilometres of border with Bangladesh. According to Navine Murshid, author of India’s Bangladesh Problem, the Bengali Muslim ethnic identity renders them Bangladeshi in the Indian imagination. A Muslim who speaks Bengali, eats rice and fish, and dresses in a lungi is not seen as a fellow Indian; he is seen as an infiltrator, an outsider, a threat.
This perception has made Bengalis—particularly working-class Bengalis—targets of hate campaigns in various parts of India. In Gujarat, in Maharashtra, in Karnataka, Bengali workers have been attacked, their shops looted, their families threatened. The language used against them is the same language used in the Bengal election campaign: “infiltrators,” “Bangladeshis,” “termites.” The political discourse of one state legitimises violence in another.
The BJP’s campaign has prominently featured the issue of ghuspathyas (infiltrators). Even during the 2014 Lok Sabha elections, when Modi campaigned on the slogan ‘Sabka Saath, Sabka Vikas’, he had raised the issue of infiltrators in Bengal, remarking, “You can write it down. After May 16, these Bangladeshis better be prepared with their bags packed.” That promise was not fulfilled, but the rhetoric has not abated. In the 2026 campaign, the issue has resurfaced. The National Register of Citizens (NRC) is promised yet again.
Two Scenarios, One Uncertain Outcome
Observers suggest two possible outcomes. One is a Trinamool return, albeit with a narrower margin than 2021’s. The other is a BJP victory. The Left and Congress, sadly, have become insignificant electoral players. They are contesting but not competing. Their votes, if they receive any, will be protest votes against both Trinamool and the BJP, not affirmations of an alternative.
However, if Mamata returns to office with a reduced number of seats, it may open the possibility of a Maharashtra-like party split. In Maharashtra, the Shiv Sena split after the 2019 assembly elections, with a faction led by Eknath Shinde joining the BJP and forming a government. A similar scenario is possible in Bengal. If Trinamool’s margin is narrow, if internal dissent is high, and if the BJP can lure a sufficient number of MLAs, a BJP-led government could emerge through political manoeuvring rather than electoral victory. For a full-term stable government, Trinamool would need to win with a significant margin, somewhat like its performance in 2021. A narrow win may be worse than a loss.
Conclusion: The Wait for May 4
The counting will take place on May 4. Until then, the parties will wait, strategise, and prepare. The BJP will hope that its cultural offensive has worked, that the Bhadralok has finally given it permission to rule. Trinamool will hope that its grassroots organisation, its welfare schemes, and Mamata’s personal appeal have held. The people of Bengal will hope that whoever wins, the violence, the polarisation, and the hate will end.
The battle for Bengal is not just about which party forms the government. It is about what kind of politics will prevail in a state that has prided itself on its syncretic culture, its literary heritage, and its tradition of tolerance. The Bhadralok may decide that Hindutva is respectable. Or they may decide that civility is more important than order. The choice is theirs. The consequences will be for all.
Q&A: The Bengal Election and the Bhadralok Question
Q1: Who are the Bhadraloks, and why are they significant in Bengal’s urban middle-class politics?
A1: The Bhadralok historically referred to “Bengal’s educated upper-caste Hindu middle classes, many of them property-owning, who came to dominate public life in and around colonial Calcutta.” The old world that produced it has changed, but its “social afterlife remains strong, especially in Kolkata and its older urban neighbourhoods.” It still names “a class with caste privilege and strong self-image as custodian of Bengali civility.” While the Bhadralok has “never voted as a bloc,” its acceptance can still make a party appear “culturally legitimate in Bengal’s urban middle-class spaces.” For the BJP, the value is clear—it can make a vote for Hindutva “appear like a vote for order & good sense.” The party is trying to make itself sound less bohiragoto (outsider) and more bhadro (genteel).
Q2: What is the significance of Rashbehari constituency in this election, and who is the BJP’s candidate there?
A2: Rashbehari in South Kolkata has “long been Trinamool ground.” The BJP is contesting there through Swapan Dasgupta, a figure with a “long record in conservative politics” who is “legible to educated Hindu middle class.” His campaign places BJP’s politics “inside familiar South Kolkata concerns—about cafes around Rabindra Sarobar, public spaces, and civic order.” His local ‘manifesto’ speaks of “reviving” Kalighat and Adi Ganga, protecting and beautifying Rabindra Sarobar, and giving Rashbehari a “more polished civic life, lined with cafes.” The strategy is to make BJP appear as the party of “neighbourhood upkeep and cultural restoration.”
Q3: How has Mamata Banerjee’s public style unsettled sections of the Bhadralok?
A3: Mamata Banerjee’s “power and charismatic public style never depended on old Kolkata refinement.” She challenged the Left’s hegemony by making herself “legible to voters outside that world.” Her public persona—”simple cotton saris, rubber sandals, street-corner speeches”—was a “deliberate rejection of the cultured, Anglicised style of the Left Front establishment.” This has “long unsettled sections of the Bhadralok, who’ve seen her politics as a fall in standards they imagine for Bengal’s public life.” For years, that unease could coexist with acceptance of her dominance. Now, charges of “recruitment scams, syndicate power, and lack of women’s safety, have made that discomfort palpable.” Yet, some of it still comes from “class discomfort with Mamata’s style.”
Q4: What are the two possible electoral outcomes, and what could a narrow Trinamool win lead to?
A4: Observers suggest two possible outcomes: one is a “Trinamool return, albeit with a narrower margin than 2021’s”; the other is a “BJP victory.” The Left and Congress have become “insignificant electoral players.” However, if Mamata returns to office with a “reduced number of seats, it may open the possibility of a Maharashtra-like party split, and a prospect of a BJP-led govt emerging through political manoeuvring.” The article cites the Maharashtra example where the Shiv Sena split after the 2019 elections, with a faction joining the BJP to form a government. “For a full-term stable govt, Trinamool would need to win with a significant margin, somewhat like its performance in 2021. A narrow win may be worse than a loss.”
Q5: How has the election campaign affected Bengali Muslims, and what is the “infiltrator” discourse?
A5: Both in terms of campaign and rhetoric, this election has “only deepened polarisation in Bengal society, and its main victims are Bengali Muslims.” Bengal shares “close to 4,096km of border with Bangladesh.” According to Navine Murshid, author of India’s Bangladesh Problem, “the Bengali Muslim ethnic identity renders them Bangladeshi in Indian imagination.” A Muslim who speaks Bengali, eats rice and fish, and dresses in a lungi is seen as an “infiltrator, an outsider, a threat.” This perception has made Bengalis “targets of hate campaigns in various parts of India.” In Gujarat, Maharashtra, and Karnataka, “Bengali workers have been attacked, their shops looted, their families threatened.” The BJP’s campaign has prominently featured the issue of ghuspathyas (infiltrators). Even during the 2014 Lok Sabha elections, Modi had remarked: “You can write it down. After May 16, these Bangladeshis better be prepared with their bags packed.” The National Register of Citizens (NRC) is promised yet again. The political discourse of one state “legitimises violence in another.” The article concludes: “The battle for Bengal is not just about which party forms the government. It is about what kind of politics will prevail in a state that has prided itself on its syncretic culture, its literary heritage, and its tradition of tolerance.”
