For True Nari Shakti, Take Jobs to Where Women Workers Are

For True Nari Shakti, Take Jobs to Where Women Workers Are

The data is both striking and sobering. Bihar, one of India’s poorest and most populous states, records a Female Labour Force Participation Rate (FLFPR) of just 24.7 per cent, while Uttar Pradesh (UP) stands at 32.4 per cent, Jharkhand at 43.7 per cent, and Odisha at 47.3 per cent. Bihar also reports the highest fertility rate at 2.8, compared to the all-India figure of 1.9, consistent with its high annual population growth rate of 1.43 per cent against the national average of 0.9 per cent. More concerning, it is girls in Bihar who exhibit the highest dropout rates in schools across states: 8.7 per cent at the primary level, 25.9 per cent at the secondary level, and 25.1 per cent at the higher secondary level. Under such socio-economic conditions, how can one empower women? The answer, increasingly clear from evidence across East and Southeast Asia, lies not in scattered welfare schemes or symbolic gestures, but in creating formal wage employment for women at scale. And the most powerful instrument for achieving this is the garment sector.

The Asian Precedent: Garments as a Pathway to Women’s Employment

Look to East and Southeast Asia. Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, China, and Vietnam all used the garment sector to transition women into the formal wage economy. In these countries, the garment industry served as the first rung on the ladder of industrial development—a labour-intensive, low-capital, export-oriented sector that could absorb large numbers of women with limited formal education, train them on the job, and integrate them into the formal economy. From there, women moved into more skilled manufacturing, then services, then professional occupations. The garment sector was not the end of the journey; it was the beginning.

India has the potential to replicate this trajectory. The country has a rich history of textile production, a large pool of cheap labour, and a growing global market for apparel. But the potential has been only partially realised. Most garment production remains concentrated in a few clusters—Tiruppur, Bengaluru, Delhi-NCR, Kolkata—far from the states where surplus female labour is most abundant. Women from Bihar, Jharkhand, Odisha, and UP migrate thousands of kilometres to work in these clusters, leaving behind their families, communities, and support networks. They live in crowded hostels, face high attrition rates, and often return home after a few years, their skills underutilised.

The Economic Case for Garments: Jobs per Rupee

India’s apparel sector generates 153 jobs per Rs 1 crore of capital invested, compared to 27 in automobile manufacturing and just 14 in steel. But the number that deserves attention is this: the apparel sector creates 55 female jobs per Rs 1 crore investment, while automobiles and steel generate fewer than one. If nari shakti is not to be reduced to a slogan, then the garment sector is the most powerful instrument available to policymakers. No other industry comes close.

This is not an argument against capital-intensive, high-tech industries. India needs steel plants and automobile factories. But those industries create relatively few jobs, especially for women. To absorb the millions of young women entering the workforce each year—many of them with limited education and no prior work experience—India needs labour-intensive manufacturing. The garment sector is labour-intensive. It is also female-intensive. And it is scalable.

The Muzaffarpur Model: A Glimpse of the Transition

In Muzaffarpur, Bihar, Pearl Global Industries has taken an initiative that offers a glimpse of what this transition could look like. The company has set up a manufacturing unit that, as of early 2026, employed 650 workers on 500 machines, with plans to scale to 3,000 workers by March-April 2027. Almost 90 per cent of the workforce is female—residents of the district itself. All are first-generation factory workers: women with no prior industrial experience, trained from scratch by the firm.

This is a private firm making a commercially rational bet: that a woman worker in a labour-surplus state, if trained, will be productive, reliable, and loyal. In the course of this transition, she retains her social ties, her family, her community. She does not have to migrate to Tiruppur. She does not have to live in a crowded hostel. She can live at home, work in a factory, and return to her family in the evening. This is not charity; it is sound business. Female workers in labour-surplus states have lower turnover rates, higher attendance rates, and are more motivated than migrant workers who are far from home. The firm is betting that the productivity gains will offset the costs of training and the challenges of operating in a state with weak infrastructure.

The Centre and states can incentivise such firms in the apparel sector. The PM MITRA (Mega Integrated Textile Region and Apparel) scheme, designed to create large-scale, plug-and-play textile parks with shared infrastructure, represents exactly the kind of instrument needed. But the scheme has to open such parks in Bihar, Jharkhand, and Odisha—the states that supply labour to southern clusters. Bring infrastructure to where the women are. That would build true nari shakti.

The Skilling Challenge: From Training to Employment

The challenge lies in skilling the women workforce that makes those factories globally competitive. Bihar’s industrial policy recognises this. Training incentives of up to Rs 20,000 per worker exist on paper. Employment-linked incentives allow textile units to claim a subsidy of up to Rs 5,000 per month per employee, or reimbursement of up to 300 per cent of employer contributions to ESI and EPF. These are generous incentives. But they exist largely on paper. The problem is not the absence of incentives; it is the weakness of training infrastructure and poor industry alignment.

China and Vietnam developed cluster-anchored training institutions that evolved alongside industry. Curricula were designed by firms, not by bureaucrats. Quality assurance was maintained by the state, but content was driven by market demand. Workers were trained on the specific machines, techniques, and quality standards that factories actually used. There was no gap between training and employment because the training was provided by the employers themselves, often in partnership with technical institutions.

Bihar needs to make a similar transition. The government should not build training centres; it should enable firms to build them. It should not design curricula; it should certify curricula designed by industry. It should not guarantee employment; it should ensure that training leads to employment by linking subsidies to actual job creation.

Three Essential Shifts

Three shifts are essential to realise the potential of garment-led women’s employment in labour-surplus states.

First, invest in training infrastructure and curriculum quality, co-managed by industry, government, and technical institutions. Public money should fund infrastructure and quality assurance; firms should lead curriculum design and on-the-job upgrading. The government should not try to run training centres; it should fund firms to run them.

Second, restructure employment-linked incentives to be explicitly linked to the employment of women, with higher subsidy rates, particularly in the first two years of employment when attrition and training costs are highest. The current incentives are available to all workers; they should be tilted sharply towards women. A firm that hires a woman should receive a higher subsidy than a firm that hires a man. A firm that retains a woman for two years should receive a bonus. The goal is not just to create jobs; it is to create stable, long-term careers for women.

Third, bring infrastructure to where the women are. The PM MITRA scheme is a powerful instrument, but it must be deployed strategically. Parks should be located in states that supply surplus labour—Bihar, Jharkhand, Odisha, eastern UP. These states have the workers; they need the factories. Currently, the scheme has been slow to take off. The government should prioritise land acquisition, clearances, and infrastructure development in these states. It should also consider additional incentives for firms that locate in labour-surplus states: lower power tariffs, faster clearances, subsidised land.

The Bigger Picture: From Welfare to Wage Employment

India has tried many approaches to women’s empowerment: self-help groups, microfinance, skill training, entrepreneurship schemes, cash transfers. These have had some success. But the most powerful pathway to empowerment is formal wage employment. A woman who earns a regular salary has control over her own income. She has bargaining power within her household. She has a say in decisions about her children’s education, her family’s health, her own future. She is less likely to be married off early, less likely to have many children, more likely to send her daughters to school. Formal wage employment is transformative.

The garment sector is not the only industry that can provide such employment. But it is the most immediately scalable. It requires relatively low capital investment, relatively low skill levels, and relatively simple technology. It is already globalised, with established supply chains and export markets. India has a comparative advantage in labour-intensive manufacturing, but it has lost ground to China, Bangladesh, and Vietnam. To regain that ground, India needs to reduce the cost of doing business, improve logistics, and, most critically, train its workforce.

The example of Pearl Global in Muzaffarpur shows what is possible. A private firm, acting on commercial logic, has created hundreds of formal jobs for women in one of India’s poorest states. It plans to create thousands more. The government did not create these jobs; it only needed to provide the enabling environment: power, water, roads, clearances, and a regulatory framework that does not discourage formal employment. The firm did the rest.

Conclusion: Will the Government Focus on This?

The government deserves credit for establishing the Ministry of Skill Development and Entrepreneurship in 2014, now spanning 38 sectors, with a 2026-27 allocation of Rs 9,886 crore, with Rs 3,400 crore for the Pradhan Mantri Kaushal Vikas Yojana (PMKVY). PMKVY provides free skills training with certification to youth aged 18-45. But training without jobs is futile. The missing link is not training; it is employment. And the missing link in employment is not demand; it is the location of supply.

Women workers are in Bihar, Jharkhand, Odisha, and UP. They will not come to factories; factories must go to them. The technology exists, the capital exists, the market exists. What is missing is the will to build infrastructure, provide incentives, and coordinate across ministries. The PM MITRA scheme is the right instrument. But it has to open such parks in Bihar, Jharkhand, and Odisha that supply labour to southern clusters. That would build true nari shakti.

Will the government focus on this? Only time will tell. But the evidence is clear. The pathway is known. The tools are available. What remains is the political will to take jobs to where women workers are.

Q&A: Women’s Employment and the Garment Sector in Labour-Surplus States

Q1: What are the key socio-economic indicators for Bihar that make women’s employment a critical challenge?

A1: Bihar has a Female Labour Force Participation Rate (FLFPR) of just 24.7 per cent, compared to the all-India average of approximately 37 per cent. It also has the highest fertility rate in India at 2.8 (all-India average 1.9) and the highest annual population growth rate at 1.43 per cent (national average 0.9 per cent). Critically, girls in Bihar exhibit the highest dropout rates in the country: 8.7 per cent at primary level, 25.9 per cent at secondary level, and 25.1 per cent at higher secondary level. These conditions—low female workforce participation, high fertility, rapid population growth, and high dropout rates—create a cycle of poverty and dependence. The article argues that formal wage employment, particularly in the garment sector, can break this cycle by providing women with financial independence, bargaining power, and incentives to invest in their children’s education.

Q2: Why does the article identify the garment sector as the most powerful instrument for women’s empowerment in India?

A2: The garment sector generates 153 jobs per Rs 1 crore of capital invested, compared to 27 in automobile manufacturing and just 14 in steel. More importantly, it creates 55 female jobs per Rs 1 crore investment, while automobiles and steel generate fewer than one female job per Rs 1 crore. No other industry comes close. The sector is labour-intensive, female-intensive, and scalable. It requires relatively low capital investment, low skill levels, and simple technology. It has established global supply chains and export markets. East and Southeast Asian countries (Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, China, Vietnam) all used the garment sector as the first rung on the ladder of women’s formal employment, from which women moved into more skilled manufacturing, then services, then professional occupations. India can replicate this trajectory.

Q3: What is the Muzaffarpur model, and why is it significant?

A3: In Muzaffarpur, Bihar, Pearl Global Industries has set up a manufacturing unit employing 650 workers on 500 machines (as of early 2026), with plans to scale to 3,000 workers by March-April 2027. Almost 90 per cent of the workforce is female—residents of the district itself. All are first-generation factory workers with no prior industrial experience, trained from scratch by the firm. The significance is that this is a private firm making a commercially rational bet: that a woman worker in a labour-surplus state, if trained, will be productive, reliable, and loyal. She retains her social ties, family, and community, avoiding the high attrition rates and social costs of migration. The firm believes productivity gains will offset training costs. This model demonstrates that factories can be located where women workers are, rather than forcing women to migrate to existing industrial clusters.

Q4: What three essential shifts does the article propose to realise the potential of garment-led women’s employment?

A4: The three essential shifts are:

1. Invest in training infrastructure and curriculum quality, co-managed by industry, government, and technical institutions. Public money should fund infrastructure and quality assurance; firms should lead curriculum design and on-the-job upgrading. The government should not run training centres; it should fund firms to run them.

2. Restructure employment-linked incentives to be explicitly linked to the employment of women, with higher subsidy rates, particularly in the first two years of employment when attrition and training costs are highest. The goal is not just to create jobs but to create stable, long-term careers for women.

3. Bring infrastructure to where the women are. The PM MITRA (Mega Integrated Textile Region and Apparel) scheme should be deployed strategically, with parks located in states that supply surplus labour—Bihar, Jharkhand, Odisha, and eastern UP. Bring infrastructure to where women workers live, rather than forcing women to migrate.

Q5: What is the PM MITRA scheme, and why is its strategic deployment crucial for women’s employment?

A5: The PM MITRA (Mega Integrated Textile Region and Apparel) scheme is designed to create large-scale, plug-and-play textile parks with shared infrastructure (power, water, logistics, common effluent treatment). It is the right instrument for attracting garment firms to labour-surplus states. However, the scheme has been slow to take off, and parks have not been prioritised in states that supply surplus labour (Bihar, Jharkhand, Odisha, eastern UP). The article argues that the government must open such parks in these states, where women workers are located, rather than in existing industrial clusters (Tiruppur, Bengaluru, Delhi-NCR). Currently, women from Bihar, Jharkhand, Odisha, and UP migrate thousands of kilometres to work in southern clusters, facing high attrition rates, social costs, and loss of family support. The PM MITRA scheme, strategically deployed, could create jobs where women live, building “true nari shakti.” The article asks: “Will the government focus on this? Only time will tell.” The evidence is clear; the pathway is known; the tools are available. What remains is political will.