Daily Current Affairs 14-07-2026

Why Policy Needs to Focus on Gender Wealth Inequality

1. Introduction: The Invisible Half of the Inequality Story

The World Inequality Report (WIR) 2026 was published in June by the World Inequality Lab, Paris School of Economics. The UN report “Counting What Counts” was released in May. The first focuses on inequality head on. The second does so in part. Both pay some attention to gender inequality. But how? By focusing entirely on women’s unequal position in the labour market . Dare we ask: What about wealth inequality? Neither report mentions women and wealth, although the WIR spends many ungendered chapters on household wealth inequality. So, what are these reports implying? That wealth is only for men while women are merely labour? 

The vast body of academic research on women’s economic status over the decades has focused mainly on one thing: Women’s situation in the labour market. This persistent mismeasurement of women’s economic status by ignoring gender inequality in wealth and assets in numerous papers, reports and policy briefs makes the main source of gendered economic inequality in much of the world invisible and ignored in policy . Work by feminist economists does not entirely escape this bias.

2. Why Measuring Gendered Wealth Inequality Matters

Why is measuring gendered inequality in wealth so important? Not just to correct serious conceptual flaws in measuring gender inequality, but also because wealth/asset ownership (a) affects women’s and children’s well-being in ways that employment alone does not; (b) impacts productivity and economic growth; and (c) is key to most sources of decent work and earnings .

The Impact on Well-Being

A vast body of global empirical evidence over three decades (1994-2024), starting from that cited in my 1994 book, A Field of One’s Own, till today, shows that in the Global South if the mother owns assets, child survival, health and education outcomes are likely to be significantly better than if only the father owns assets. Gender matters beyond class. Owning immovable assets also hugely reduces women’s risk of domestic violence and of poverty in case of marital breakdown .

The Impact on Productivity

Several studies, including those collated by the Food and Agriculture Organisation, show that if women have access to a productive asset like farmland and related inputs, it can greatly increase farm productivity and a country’s agricultural growth rates .

The Key to Livelihoods

For vast numbers of women, especially in the Global South, owning productive assets is essential for viable livelihoods since women are employed largely in the informal sector and especially in agriculture .

3. The Reality in India: Asset Ownership and Women’s Work

In India, the Periodic Labour Force Survey 2023-24 reveals two stark realities :

1. Informality: Some 86 per cent of all women workers and 91 per cent of rural women workers are informally employed. About 77 per cent of the latter work in agriculture.

2. Self-Employment: 73 per cent of rural women workers are “self-employed”, mostly as unpaid workers on family farms or in small businesses enterprises, including street vending. Hence, barely a quarter of rural women workers (and a third of all women workers) are in wage employment (regular or casual). For the rest, asset ownership is key to viable earnings. For example, land for farming, carts or stalls for street vending, and so on.

However, as diverse data sources (NFHS, ICRISAT, IHDS) consistently show, Indian women own land in only 12-16 per cent of rural landowning households, even though many are de facto farmers as mainly men out-migrate to non-farm jobs . For these women farmers, owning land, farm tools, and other assets is complementary to their ability to work and earn. The same argument applies to small businesses .

4. The Measurement Problem: What the Reports Get Wrong

Both the WIR and UN reports use average hourly earnings as the primary measure of women’s economic status, ignoring their wealth/asset status, and hence greatly undercount economic gender inequalities. Also, by conflating women’s “unpaid” work with domestic work hours, they fail to capture women’s unpaid productive work on family farms and businesses .

Third, using the ratio of female to male hourly earnings as a measure of gender inequality, as done by both reports, is problematic. Most people don’t earn by the “hour”. Returns from self-employment, in particular, cannot be converted easily into “hourly” earnings. How would you measure, say, the hourly earnings of a farmer, shopkeeper, or vegetable vendor who rarely record hours worked? At the very least, the measure should be female/male annual earnings .

Fourth, the WIR attributes women’s lower (than male) employment rates globally to inadequate access to affordable childcare, transport, family leave, and hiring discrimination, again ignoring asset ownership. The impact of lower pay for women on their wealth accumulation is mentioned in passing, but as the Paris Lab has itself established, the main contributor to wealth inequality is inheritance, not earnings .

The gender gap in labour income persists across all regions. Excluding unpaid work, women earn only 61% of what men earn per working hour; when unpaid labor is included, this figure falls to just 32%. Women capture just over 25% of total global labour income . Yet the reports ignore that the main source of wealth inequality is inheritance, not earnings .

5. The Data Excuse: A Failure of Will

A common excuse for not measuring gender inequality in wealth is lack of data. This elides the issue .

First, there is existing data on some indicators: For instance, in the Global North, pension-wealth data are available by gender in many countries, as is gender information on the richest 1 per cent. In the Global South, gendered data on land owned are available for a growing number of countries (FAO and World Bank) .

Second, the World Inequality Lab (Paris) actively mines data and has successfully persuaded many governments to collect/share wealth data. Even with incomplete data, some gender estimates are possible. Equally important is acknowledging that labour market analysis barely touches the surface of economic inequality by gender .

Moreover, for reducing global wealth inequality, policies to tackle gender wealth inequality are as essential as policies to tackle household wealth inequality. But the two sets of policies cannot be identical, since the former also need to grapple with intra-household inequalities .

6. Conclusion: The Invisible Inequality

Ignoring gender gaps in wealth and focusing only on women’s labour implies that the authors of the two reports, all progressive thinkers, are fine with a world where only men yield capital while women sell their labour. Even Marx (despite his limited gender analysis) would feel uncomfortable with that scenario in the 21st century .

As Professor Bina Agarwal’s work has long shown, the hidden nature of this inequality is precisely what makes it so persistent. A policy framework that doesn’t measure what it seeks to change is a policy framework that will fail. The challenge is not just to count the hours women work, but to count the assets they own—and to design policies that address the structural barriers that keep them from owning them .

5 Questions & Answers

Q1. What is the main critique of the World Inequality Report 2026 and the UN report on gender inequality?

A. Both reports focus primarily on women’s unequal position in the labour market, using measures like hourly earnings and employment rates. They ignore gender inequality in wealth and asset ownership, which is a critical dimension of economic inequality. This oversight makes the main source of gendered economic inequality invisible and excluded from policy discussions .

Q2. Why is asset ownership important for women beyond just income?

A. Asset ownership affects women’s well-being in ways that employment alone does not. It improves child survival, health and education outcomes, reduces the risk of domestic violence, enhances farm productivity and agricultural growth, and is essential for viable livelihoods, especially for the large number of women working in the informal sector and agriculture .

Q3. What are the key findings about women’s land ownership and employment status in India?

A. In India, women own land in only 12-16 per cent of rural landowning households. Around 86 per cent of all women workers and 91 per cent of rural women workers are informally employed, with 73 per cent of rural women workers being “self-employed,” mostly as unpaid workers on family farms or in small businesses. For these women, owning productive assets is essential for viable earnings .

Q4. Why is measuring gender inequality in wealth so important?

A. Wealth inequality is more extreme than income inequality. The top 1% alone controls 37% of global wealth and 40% of India’s wealth. The main contributor to wealth inequality is inheritance, not earnings. Thus, policies that ignore gender wealth gaps fail to address a key source of inequality and miss the opportunity to improve women’s well-being, productivity, and livelihoods .

Q5. What is the commonly cited excuse for not measuring gender wealth inequality, and why is it flawed?

A. The common excuse is a lack of data. However, this argument is flawed because existing data exists on some indicators, such as gender-disaggregated pension-wealth data in many countries and gendered data on land owned in many developing countries. Moreover, the World Inequality Lab actively mines data and has persuaded governments to share wealth data. Even with incomplete data, estimates are possible, and acknowledging the issue is a first step toward policy action .

Omar is Spot On, Doesn’t Need Trump Clickbait, The Politics of J&K Statehood

1. Introduction: A Promise Unfulfilled

The restoration of statehood to Jammu and Kashmir has become the central political flashpoint in the region, pitting the elected government led by Chief Minister Omar Abdullah against the Union Government’s indefinite timeline. In a landmark 2023 judgment upholding the abrogation of Article 370, the Supreme Court recorded the Solicitor General’s assurance that statehood would be restored “in the near future upon elections being held” . The peaceful conduct of the 2024 Assembly elections, which saw a high voter turnout and the return of an elected government, was seen as a critical step in fulfilling that promise. However, nearly two years later, the promise remains unfulfilled, testing the patience of the people and the political credibility of the National Conference (NC) government.

Omar Abdullah, who has led his party to a decisive victory, now finds himself at a crossroads. He has shifted from a posture of patient negotiation to a more aggressive campaign, culminating in the announcement of a ‘Chalo Delhi’ rally and a protest at Jantar Mantar on July 20, 2026 . While his frustration is justified, his recent invocation of US President Donald Trump in this domestic political debate has sparked a significant controversy, drawing sharp criticism from the BJP and raising questions about the wisdom of such rhetoric . This analysis delves into the political context of the statehood demand, the nature of the NC’s campaign, and the political and historical sensitivity of Abdullah’s remarks.

2. The Constitutional and Political Context of the Statehood Demand

The demand for statehood is rooted in a constitutional commitment. The Supreme Court’s December 2023 judgment was a clear directive, and the successful conduct of Assembly elections in September-October 2024 created the political conditions for its implementation . The BJP has often touted the “Naya Kashmir” narrative, citing a drop in militancy, growth in tourism, and the successful conduct of the elections as evidence of normalcy . This democratic exercise restored a political process that had been suspended for over six years, and the high voter turnout signalled a degree of public trust in the democratic framework.

For Omar Abdullah, the restoration of statehood is not merely a political demand but a test of the Union Government’s credibility. He has staked his political capital on pursuing dialogue with the Centre instead of confrontation. In his maiden press conference after taking office in early 2025, he stressed the urgency of restoring statehood, citing the Supreme Court’s directive . He reiterated that securing the jobs, land, and resources of Jammu and Kashmir was paramount . He later wrote to national parties, seeking their support for a bill on statehood restoration in Parliament .

However, the Centre’s response has been to reiterate that statehood would be restored at the “appropriate” time, without providing a specific timeline . This opaque assurance has been a source of growing frustration for Abdullah and the broader political leadership in the Valley.

3. The National Conference Campaign: ‘Enough is Enough’

After nearly two years of what he described as patience and restraint, Omar Abdullah announced a significant shift in strategy. Addressing a grand convention on the death anniversary of his grandmother, Akbar Jehan, he declared that the Centre must not mistake the people’s patience for weakness . He announced that a peaceful demonstration would be held in New Delhi on July 20, the first day of the Monsoon Session of Parliament, marking the beginning of a broader democratic movement .

This decision was a clear signal that dialogue had failed to yield results. The NC leadership believes that while they have continued to engage, the political capital they invested in a conciliatory approach has not been reciprocated with action. The demand for statehood is framed not as a concession but as a constitutional right, which they argue transcends party lines . Omar Abdullah highlighted that every political party, including the BJP, had contested the 2024 elections on a platform that included statehood restoration .

4. The Trump Controversy: Sarcasm, Clickbait, or a Misstep?

The controversy erupted when Omar Abdullah, in his speeches, sarcastically questioned the BJP’s criticism of the planned ‘Jantar Mantar’ protest . In a bid to highlight the absurdity of the BJP’s stance, he asked: “Should we go to President Trump’s White House in America to seek our statehood? If we cannot get justice in our own country’s capital, then tell us where we should go” . He later amplified this on social media by sharing a satirical, AI-generated post imitating Trump’s style, which praised Abdullah’s efforts and “Statehood or bust!” campaign . He responded to the obviously fake post with a dry “If only!” .

While the remarks were intended as a facetious jibe at the BJP, they touched a raw nerve in Indian politics. The BJP was quick to pounce, with party general secretary Tarun Chugh accusing Abdullah of attempting to “internationalise the Kashmir issue” . This is a serious charge, as “internationalisation” has historically been a sensitive topic.

5. The Sensitive History of “Internationalising” Kashmir

The invocation of a foreign leader, even in jest, is politically fraught for a Kashmiri leader. The “internationalisation of Kashmir” has been Pakistan’s longstanding aim, and India has successfully resisted third-party mediation for decades . Historically, the US has played a dubious role, from the formation of the United Commission for India and Pakistan (UNCIP) in 1948 to the Cold War-era support for Pakistan, and the perceived backing of separatism by US officials in the 1990s . This makes any reference to American intervention a political liability.

For Omar Abdullah, this is a departure from his carefully crafted political image. Since assuming office, he has located the political process squarely within the framework of Indian federalism . He has chosen not to confront the Lieutenant Governor’s office and, in the aftermath of the Pahalgam attack, delivered a stirring speech that framed the Kashmir tragedy as one of the entire country, backing the Union government’s diplomatic and political moves . His strength has been in crafting a new political language that rejects separatism and works within the constitutional framework.

The Trump remarks risk undermining this narrative. While he clarified that the tweet was fake and his comments were sarcastic, the political damage was done. The BJP used it to frame him as a leader who is not serious about keeping the issue within the country, and to question the NC’s commitment to the new political dispensation in Kashmir.

6. Conclusion: A Distraction from the Core Issue

Omar Abdullah’s frustration over the delay in statehood restoration is entirely justified and appropriate . The Centre’s failure to honour the Supreme Court’s directive and its vague assurances have created a credibility crisis. The NC’s decision to take the fight to the streets is a legitimate political response to what they see as a constitutional betrayal.

However, the use of Trump in this campaign was a misstep. As the editorial in The Indian Express rightly points out, Abdullah’s greatest strength lies in his ability to speak a new political language in Kashmir, one that does not rely on internationalising the issue . His sarcasm, intended to corner the BJP, instead gave them the ammunition to divert attention from the core issue of statehood to the sensitive question of national sovereignty. This “Trump clickbait”  was a political gift to his rivals and a potential distraction from the central demand. The narrative should have remained focused on the promise made by Prime Minister Narendra Modi in Katra, the commitment made in Parliament, and the constitutional obligation, not on the hypothetical of approaching a foreign leader. The movement for statehood is strongest when it is framed as a domestic democratic demand, not as a plea to an external power.

On SIR, Listen to Digital Governance Pioneer

The recent Special Intensive Revision (SIR) of India’s electoral rolls has evolved from a routine bureaucratic exercise into a major constitutional flashpoint. This controversy is not merely about updating a list; it challenges the very nature of Indian citizenship and state-citizen relations. As one of the country’s foremost digital governance pioneers, Ram Sewak Sharma, has pointed out, the way the Election Commission (EC) is conducting this revision threatens to undermine the democratic gains made by the nation’s digital infrastructure .

The Deepening Voter Exclusion Crisis

The scale of the SIR’s impact is alarming. Reports indicate that since the exercise began, over 5.58 crore names have been deleted from voter rolls across various states . In West Bengal alone, more than 27 lakh electors were removed during the adjudication process, leaving their appeals pending before sluggish judicial tribunals . This situation has not only disenfranchised citizens but has also raised concerns about its effect on future generations. The EC has quietly introduced a new declaration on the online Form 6 for new voters, requiring them to disclose whether they or their parents were part of the last SIR .

This shift in the “burden of proof” from the state to the citizen is the core of the controversy. Historically, the presumption was that a person whose name appeared on the electoral roll was a citizen entitled to vote. The SIR process, however, has effectively inverted this logic by requiring citizens to prove their citizenship, often with documents that the state itself has failed to maintain reliably . This places a disproportionate burden on marginalised communities and women, who are less likely to possess these documents .

The Aadhaar Paradox and Digital Public Infrastructure

India’s digital revolution has been built on the philosophy of “asking less, not more” of citizens. Ram Sewak Sharma, who spearheaded the creation of Aadhaar, has voiced his deep concerns about the SIR process, which seems to be moving in the opposite direction . He writes about “using a document-heavy method to solve a problem the country has already solved,” referring to the existence of Aadhaar .

This has created a bizarre paradox. In September 2025, the Supreme Court directed the EC to accept Aadhaar as a valid proof of identity during the SIR . The Court, however, has been clear that Aadhaar is a proof of identity, not citizenship . The EC, while complying, continues to insist that voters need additional documents to prove eligibility, refusing to trust the data it has helped collect and maintain . As Sharma noted, “India has a DPI the world now studies. It would be perverse to declare that none of it can be trusted” .

The ECINET Platform and the Surreptitious Rules Change

The controversy is further fuelled by the surreptitious nature of some procedural changes. A new, unlettered declaration has been inserted into the online version of Form 6 on the ECINET portal . The statutory version of the form has not been formally amended, raising questions about the process followed . This declaration requires applicants to provide details about the status of their parents or elderly kin in the SIR .

This change, introduced amidst exceptional public anxiety, risks cementing the EC’s image as an “imperious, insensitive institution” . It raises the fear that the offspring of those whose names have been deleted may be unable to enrol as voters . This would not only deny them their right to vote but could also create a system of inherited disenfranchisement.

The Judiciary and the Need for Constitutional Scrutiny

The Supreme Court has been the primary check on the EC’s actions. The Court’s intervention in Bihar—where it directed the acceptance of Aadhaar—was a critical moment . However, the exercise has continued in other states, notably West Bengal, where the Court has appeared less vigilant . The Court’s 2023 assurance, recorded during the Article 370 hearing, that the Centre would restore statehood to Jammu and Kashmir, stands in stark contrast to the seemingly indifferent attitude towards procedural justice in the electoral revision . A procedure that carries the possibility of disenfranchisement demands the closest constitutional scrutiny . As Sharma argues, “A republic that takes its duties seriously does not make its people prove again and again they belong” . The EC would be wise to heed this warning from the man who helped build the very system of identity verification the country is now failing to trust.

The Nightingale Falls Silent, S. Janaki’s Enduring Legacy and Quiet Rebellion

On the evening of July 11, 2026, a voice that had defined the musical landscape of South India for over six decades fell silent. Sistala Janaki, known to millions simply as S. Janaki, passed away at the age of 88 in Mysuru, Karnataka, leaving behind a legacy of over 48,000 songs in nearly 20 languages . Her death marked the end of an era, not merely for the film industry, but for the countless hearts she had touched and the lives she had soundtracked. As her granddaughter, Apsara Vydyula, poignantly stated at her state-honoured funeral, “There is no goodbye. We are always together” .

1. A Voice That Transcended Borders

Born in Pallapatla village in Andhra Pradesh’s Guntur district on April 23, 1938, Janaki’s journey to becoming the “Nightingale of South India” was one of immense talent and relentless dedication . With no formal musical training, she would listen intently to Lata Mangeshkar’s songs on the family radio and belt them out during intervals of plays organised by her theatre-artist uncle [citation:source]. It was during one such performance that she was discovered by filmmaker B.R. Panthulu and music director T.G. Lingappa, who invited her to Chennai to record her first song for the Tamil film Vidhiyin Vilayattu in 1957 [citation:source].

Despite being a native Telugu speaker, her mastery over pronunciation in Tamil, Malayalam, and Kannada was unparalleled [citation:source]. Her ability to adapt her voice to the distinct nuances of each language contributed to her pan-Indian appeal and her record of singing over 48,000 songs . Over a career that spanned six decades, she worked with successive generations of composers, from M.S. Viswanathan and K.V. Mahadevan to Ilaiyaraaja, Bappi Lahiri, and A.R. Rahman, adapting effortlessly to evolving musical preferences [citation:source].

2. The Nightingale’s Versatility

What truly set S. Janaki apart was her extraordinary versatility. She was not just a singer; she was a voice artist who could embody any character, mood, or age . She could laugh, cry, pray, and romance with equal conviction, breathing life into every song .

• A Vocal Chameleon: Her ability to alter her voice to suit different characters was legendary. In the 1994 Tamil film Magalir Mattum, she sang a single song in three distinct voices to match the personalities of actresses Revathi, Urvashi, and Rohini, changing her tone, diction, and slang for each .

• Genre-Defying Artistry: From the devotional classic “Singara Velane Deva” to the sensuous “Ponmeni Uruguthey” and the playful “Nethu Rathiri Yemma,” she proved her mastery over every genre . Even in her personal life, she was known for her devotion to Lord Guruvayurappan and regularly visited the Guruvayur Temple .

• The Ilaiyaraaja Partnership: Her collaboration with maestro Ilaiyaraaja produced some of the most iconic soundtracks of Indian cinema. Songs from Ilaiyaraaja’s debut film Annakkili (1976) catapulted her to the top of the playback singing world .

3. Awards and the Rebel’s Stand

Janaki’s talent was recognised with numerous accolades, including four National Film Awards for Best Female Playback Singer and 33 state-level awards . She was the recipient of the Kalaimamani award and an honorary doctorate from the University of Mysore . However, her most defining moment of public recognition was her principled rejection of the Padma Bhushan in 2013 .

She refused the honour, stating that it had come too late after her 55-year career, and that she deserved to be recognised with the Bharat Ratna, India’s highest civilian award . She also used the platform to protest against the perceived neglect of artists from the South, famously saying, “I deserve much more” . This act of defiance cemented her image not just as a musical icon, but as a figure of self-respect and a champion for artists from her region .

4. A Quiet End and a Lasting Legacy

In her final years, Janaki lived quietly in Mysuru, a city she adored. Her last wish was to spend her final days there, and it was there that she was cremated with full state honours on July 12, 2026 .

Her death was mourned by political leaders and film personalities across the country. Prime Minister Narendra Modi described her passing as an “irreparable loss,” while Karnataka Chief Minister D.K. Shivakumar pledged that her voice would remain immortal in the cultural heritage of Karnataka . Her granddaughter encapsulated the feelings of millions when she said, “To the world, she was an iconic voice whose songs became part of countless memories. To us, she was a loving grandmother whose warmth, humility, kindness and grace will remain with us forever” .

Even in the digital age, S. Janaki’s discography continues to be a treasure trove of musical excellence. Platforms like Spotify host curated playlists, such as “S. Janaki – The Evergreen Voice,” reminding the current generation of her timeless appeal . The nightingale has fallen silent, but her song lives on.

5 Questions & Answers

1. What is S. Janaki’s claim to the title “Nightingale of South India”?
S. Janaki earned the title for her extraordinary vocal range, melodic voice, and her ability to sing thousands of songs across multiple South Indian languages with perfect diction and emotional depth, becoming the defining voice of an era .

2. How many songs did S. Janaki sing in her career, and in which languages?
She recorded over 48,000 songs . Her repertoire spanned more than 20 languages, predominantly Tamil, Telugu, Kannada, and Malayalam, but also included Hindi, Bengali, Odia, and even foreign languages like Japanese and German .

3. What was the unique vocal feat she achieved in the song “Magalir Mattum”?
In the Tamil film Magalir Mattum (1994), S. Janaki sang one song in three distinct voices to match the personalities of the three lead actresses. She altered her tone, diction, and slang for each character, showcasing her remarkable versatility as a playback singer .

4. Why did S. Janaki refuse the Padma Bhushan award in 2013?
She refused the Padma Bhushan, stating it had come too late after 55 years of singing . She felt that her contributions were deserving of the Bharat Ratna, the country’s highest civilian award, and she also used the opportunity to protest against the government’s neglect of artists from South India .

5. What was the historical significance of her song “Senthoora Poove”?
“Senthoora Poove” from Bharathiraja’s 1977 film 16 Vayathinile was the song that earned S. Janaki her first National Film Award for Best Female Playback Singer . This film also marked the directorial debut of Bharathiraja, who passed away just weeks before her, making her departure an especially poignant moment for Tamil cinema .

Ramamurti Rajaraman and the Journey Back Home, A Life of Physics, Conscience, and Belonging

In 1963, a young Indian confronted a dilemma that few would face today. Ramamurti Rajaraman had just obtained his doctorate in nuclear theory from Cornell University, his supervisor being the future Nobel laureate Hans Bethe, a major figure in the Manhattan Project. In those days of armament, Ramamurti, just 24, was a prize catch for America. But he wanted to return home and devote himself to social service.

With his first death anniversary on July 12, it is an occasion to reflect on how much India has changed since then. Born in 1939 in Coimbatore, Rajaraman shifted to Delhi with his parents. His father, Dr B Ramamurti, taught Mathematics before joining the founding team of the Central Statistical Organisation.

Around that time, Tamils had begun arriving in Delhi for jobs in the British bureaucracy. But they were worried about how to inculcate the Tamil ethos in their children. Thus, the Delhi Tamil Education Association founded what were popularly known as Madrasi Schools.

Next to the school on Mandir Marg was the Hindu Mahasabha’s office. Stories of a certain Nathuram Godse who once conducted target practice with a gun on the office premises were part of the school lore. The actor Hema Malini was his junior; among his classmates was Shyamala Gopalan, who later migrated to the US and gave birth to the future US Vice President Kamala Harris.

Rajaraman also went to America, but his heart lay elsewhere. He returned to India in 1963 and visited C Rajagopalachari for guidance. He didn’t know the fellow Tamilian, but in those days people often sought the counsel of respected elders. Rajaji was also the grandfather of his closest friend, fellow Stephanian and future philosopher Ramchandra Gandhi. The old man advised him to leave politics to others — the country needs you in Physics, he said.

Six decades later when Rajaraman narrated the incident to me, he still regretted having followed Rajaji’s advice: “I really wanted to do social service.”

Rajaraman stayed back in India but could barely focus on Physics. Unable to lend any meaning to his life, the young man returned to Cornell before joining the Institute of Advanced Study at Princeton following the invitation of its director Robert Oppenheimer.

Home continued to haunt him. He came back in 1969 and began teaching at Delhi University. This time, he took an even bolder step. He returned his Green Card.

Teaching now became his way of giving back to society. He taught at several Indian institutions over the next decades and became a major voice committed to nuclear safety. He was co-Chairman of the International Panel on Fissile Materials and a member of the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists’ Science and Security Board . He was also a founding member of the Asia-Pacific Leadership Network and a member of the Council of the Pugwash Conference on Science & World Affairs .

I met him while writing Ramchandra Gandhi’s biography. They remained lifelong friends until Gandhi’s death in 2007. In December 1958, when Rajaraman was leaving for Cornell, Gandhi gifted him a handwritten notebook of Kierkegaard’s quotations. The stapled pages contained a letter in which Gandhi recalled his friend’s “unerring honesty”, and underlined that “because of him and in spite of myself I discovered that to seek honesty” “is the law of life even if it involved death.” Rajaraman changed cities and continents, lost numerous belongings, but the notebook, yellowed and brittle, remained with him.

Rajaraman’s life was a testament to the power of conscience and the relentless pursuit of meaning. Despite the allure of a prestigious career in the United States and despite the immense respect he commanded on the global stage, the call of his homeland was a constant, haunting presence. His journey reflects the deep, complex relationship between the Indian diaspora and their homeland—a relationship often defined by a profound sense of duty and a yearning to contribute to the nation’s progress. He was not just a physicist; he was a man of immense moral conviction, a public intellectual who fearlessly engaged with the most pressing issues of his time.

I met Rajaraman in his final years. Even after being diagnosed with Parkinson’s, he continued to be agile, continued to visit his JNU office, where he was professor emeritus.

I missed the news of his passing last year, having lost my father just weeks before. Much later, I came across tributes to a great teacher who resolved the complex problems of quantum and theoretical Physics.

And then, one conversation returned to me. He was reminiscing about his philosopher friend when I posed to him a question that had been simmering in me for long — Was Albert Einstein a scientist or a philosopher as well?

Rajaraman was emphatic: “Einstein only dealt with physical phenomena that can be measured. Anything that can’t be measured he was not interested in. He was deep, reflective, but not a philosopher.”

That distinction Rajaraman reserved for his friend.

5 Questions & Answers

Q1. Who was Ramamurti Rajaraman and what was his most significant contribution to Indian science?

A. Ramamurti Rajaraman was a renowned Indian theoretical physicist who served as emeritus professor at Jawaharlal Nehru University . He made pioneering contributions to theoretical physics and nuclear policy, served as co-chairman of the International Panel on Fissile Materials, and was a member of the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists’ Science and Security Board .

Q2. What was Rajaraman’s relationship with Hans Bethe and why was it significant?

A. Rajaraman completed his PhD in theoretical physics in 1963 under the supervision of Hans Bethe, a Nobel laureate and a key figure in the Manhattan Project . This training placed him among the world’s leading theoretical physicists at a young age.

Q3. Why did Rajaraman return to India after completing his doctorate at Cornell?

A. Despite being a “prize catch” for America, Rajaraman returned to India driven by a deep desire to devote himself to social service. He sought guidance from C. Rajagopalachari, who advised him to stay in physics as the country needed him. However, Rajaraman later regretted this advice, wishing he had pursued his original calling.

Q4. What was Rajaraman’s role in nuclear disarmament and public policy?

A. Rajaraman was a tireless advocate for nuclear disarmament. He co-chaired the International Panel on Fissile Materials, was a member of the Pugwash Council, and served on the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists’ Science and Security Board, writing extensively on nuclear policy in South Asia .

Q5. What was the significance of the notebook Rajaraman kept throughout his life?

A. The notebook was a gift from his lifelong friend, philosopher Ramchandra Gandhi, when Rajaraman left for Cornell in 1958. It contained quotes from Kierkegaard and a letter about honesty and the meaning of life. Rajaraman kept this yellowed, brittle notebook with him through numerous moves and the loss of many belongings, symbolizing the deep bond and shared values between the two friends.

Acting East in an Uncertain Indo-Pacific, India’s Strategic Balancing Act in a Shifting World Order

Introduction: A Decade of “Acting East”

The transformation of India’s “Look East Policy” into the “Act East Policy” in 2014 represented a fundamental shift in New Delhi’s strategic calculus. As Prime Minister Narendra Modi declared at the 12th ASEAN-India Summit, the change went beyond mere nomenclature, reflecting the new realpolitik underlying India’s approach to the East . The objective was to promote economic cooperation, strengthen cultural ties, and develop strategic relationships with countries in the Indo-Pacific at both bilateral and multilateral levels .

In July 2026, Modi’s six-day visit to Indonesia, Australia, and New Zealand demonstrated the policy’s enduring relevance. Before departing, he stated that the tour would “further strengthen India’s Act East Policy, MAHASAGAR Vision, as well as our outlook towards a free and open Indo-Pacific” . This comprehensive engagement marked a decisive shift in India’s diplomatic rationale toward the Eastern Maritime Zones of the Indian Ocean, representing an attempt to stitch together separate regional security complexes into a strategic space where India seeks a powerful standing rather than acting as an external balancer .

MAHASAGAR and the Maritime Vision

Central to India’s Indo-Pacific strategy is the MAHASAGAR framework—Mutual and Holistic Advancement for Security Across the Regions—which represents India’s institutional blueprint for fostering security, stability, and inclusive growth across the maritime domain . Complementing earlier initiatives like SAGAR (Security and Growth for All in the Region) and the Indo-Pacific Oceans Initiative (IPOI), MAHASAGAR provides a comprehensive vision for India’s maritime engagement .

Addressing the Indonesian Parliament, Modi underlined how New Delhi places ASEAN at the core of India’s Act East Policy, stating, “We have placed ASEAN at the centre of this approach; our ‘Act East Policy’ is also ASEAN-centric” . This commitment to ASEAN centrality is vital for regional stability. India has consistently backed ASEAN centrality and its Indo-Pacific outlook, aligning its own initiatives with the region’s vision for a rules-based order . This approach offers ASEAN members a major power partnership without the baggage of military alliances or political conditionality, giving them room to manoeuvre while deepening security ties with India and maintaining economic links with China .

The Economic Pillar: Trade and Integration

Despite progress, the economic pillar of India’s Act East Policy reveals persistent challenges. Bilateral trade with ASEAN surpassed $123 billion in 2024-25, with ASEAN accounting for 11 per cent of India’s global commerce . Yet the trade figures are lopsided—India imported USD 79.67 billion whilst exporting only USD 41.2 billion . The comprehensive review of the ASEAN-India Trade in Goods Agreement (AITIGA), launched in February 2024, addresses tariff rates, market access, and rules of origin . Completing this review is essential for unlocking the full economic potential of the relationship .

India has concluded free trade agreements with several major Indo-Pacific economies, including recent agreements with Australia and New Zealand . However, most of its key Indo-Pacific partners belong to the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) and the 12-nation CPTPP, trade blocs from which India remains absent . As one expert argues, “Without becoming part of the value chains driving the region’s dynamic growth, maritime and defence cooperation with key partners alone will not be sufficient to shape the evolving regional order” .

Security Cooperation and Defence Diplomacy

Defence cooperation has emerged as a key pillar of the Act East Policy. India’s sale of BrahMos supersonic cruise missiles to the Philippines demonstrated that India can deliver advanced weaponry . The BrahMos deal proved particularly significant because it came without strings—no basing rights demanded, no alliance obligations imposed, a model valued by Southeast Asian nations . India expects to close deals with two more ASEAN nations by 2025, with a newly inaugurated facility capable of producing 100 missiles annually .

Beyond missile sales, operational cooperation has deepened. The first ASEAN-India Maritime Exercise was conducted in 2023, with a second exercise proposed for 2026 alongside the second ASEAN-India Defence Ministers’ Meeting . India also co-chairs the ADMM-Plus Experts’ Working Group on Counter-Terrorism with Malaysia for 2024-2027, hosting the group’s 14th meeting in New Delhi .

The July 2026 visit saw further agreements, including a $630 million missile deal with Indonesia . New Delhi earmarked dedicated training slots for Indonesian cadets and officers at the National Defence Academy (NDA) and the Defence Services Staff College (DSSC) to bolster long-term defence capacity-building . An Indonesian Liaison Officer is being stationed at the Information Fusion Centre-Indian Ocean Region (IFC-IOR) to strengthen collective maritime domain awareness .

The Northeast India Challenge

The success of the Act East Policy hinges on the development of Northeast India as a gateway to Southeast Asia. Despite significant investment—budgetary allocation jumped nearly 300 per cent from ₹36,108 crore in 2014-15 to over ₹1 lakh crore in 2024-25—challenges persist . India constructed over 10,000 kilometres of highways, eight airports, and more than 800 kilometres of rail, yet exports from Northeast India constitute less than 1 per cent of total Indian merchandise exports .

The flagship connectivity projects, the India-Myanmar-Thailand Trilateral Highway and Kaladan Multi-Modal Transit Transport Project, remain incomplete . The Trilateral Highway is said to be 70 per cent finished, but successive deadlines have been delayed, and security concerns in Myanmar following the February 2021 coup have contributed to long delays . External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar acknowledged bluntly: “The situation in Myanmar has paused the IMTT Highway project” .

The implementation architecture is fragmented, with infrastructure ministries building roads, the Ministry of External Affairs conducting diplomacy, and the Ministry for Development of North Eastern Region managing development funds, without sufficient coordination between them . This silo mentality particularly affects trade facilitation. Land customs stations on the Myanmar border are only open a few hours a day and process little cross-border trade. The Moreh-Tamu Integrated Check Post transports considerably less goods than other posts on India’s western borders. Informal trade at these borders is several times that of formal trade, but it does not produce revenues or instill trust .

Digital Transformation and Innovation

Digital cooperation has sprinted ahead where physical infrastructure lags. The UPI-Singapore PayNow integration stands as the partnership’s most substantial innovation, allowing Indians to transfer funds to Singaporean accounts using just a mobile number or UPI ID . More than 12,000 Singapore merchants now accept UPI payments .

During the Indonesia visit, greater connectivity between India’s UPI and Indonesia’s Quick Response Code Indonesian Standard (QRIS) digital payment ecosystems was finalised . Once implemented, this cross-border integration will make travel, tourism, trade, and financial transactions between the two countries simpler, faster, and more seamless . India also extended support to Indonesia’s food security priorities, including the critical supply of 100 tonnes of high-quality wheat seeds .

The Geopolitical Context

The Act East Policy operates against a backdrop of significant geopolitical uncertainty. The United States is weaning away “Indo” from the Indo-Pacific, as evidenced by the Pentagon’s decision to rename the U.S. Indo-Pacific Command back to Pacific Command . Yet as one analysis notes, “the reality of hyphenation cannot be ignored in the long run, particularly in light of China’s increasing assertiveness” .

Modi’s visit to three countries spanning the Eastern and Southern Indian Ocean can be read as a decisive shift in India’s diplomatic rationale toward the Eastern Maritime Zones—an attempt to stitch together separate regional security complexes into a strategic space in which India seeks a powerful standing rather than acting as an external balancer . The tour, which included a historic first visit by an Indian Prime Minister to New Zealand in 40 years , exemplified India’s commitment to building a multi-layered and extensive network of partnerships within and outside the Indo-Pacific .

The Road Ahead

The Act East Policy has made significant strides in a decade: trade quintupled, India supplies advanced weapons regionally, digital payment integration works, and defence cooperation is institutionalised . Yet the next decade demands more. ASEAN’s digital economy will surpass USD 600 billion by 2030, a terrain where Indian fintech, e-commerce, and cybersecurity firms can compete . Renewable energy collaboration aligns India’s solar and green hydrogen leadership with ASEAN’s decarbonisation imperatives . Vietnam, Malaysia, and Thailand dominate electronics and semiconductor manufacturing, creating opportunities for Indian integration into regional value chains .

Together, India and ASEAN represent nearly one-fourth of the global population. Geography, history, and shared democratic values connect them. Yet economic integration lags far behind potential. Act East 2.0 requires concrete changes: conclude the AITIGA review to fix market access asymmetries, scale digital public infrastructure cooperation beyond Singapore to broader ASEAN adoption, diversify defence ties from missile sales to co-production and technology transfer, accelerate connectivity through maritime-first strategies where land routes falter, and deepen people-to-people links via educational exchanges and tourism facilitation .

As Modi declared, the 21st century is “our century, the century of India and ASEAN” . Realising that vision requires not just strategic ambition, but also the institutional capacity and commitment to translate policy intent into tangible outcomes.

5 Questions & Answers on India’s Act East Policy

Q1. What is the difference between India’s Look East Policy and Act East Policy?

A. The Look East Policy, launched in 1991, focused mainly on economic cooperation with Southeast Asia . Prime Minister Modi transformed it into the “Act East Policy” in 2014, expanding its scope beyond economics to include security, culture, and connectivity, while geographically extending beyond Southeast Asia to the wider Asia-Pacific and Indo-Pacific . The change reflected a shift from passive engagement to active strategic partnership.

Q2. What is India’s MAHASAGAR vision, and how does it relate to the Act East Policy?

A. MAHASAGAR (Mutual and Holistic Advancement for Security Across the Regions) is India’s institutional blueprint for fostering security, stability, and inclusive growth across the maritime domain . It complements the Act East Policy by providing a comprehensive maritime framework that integrates India’s Indian Ocean and Indo-Pacific strategies. The Act East Policy and MAHASAGAR together define India’s approach to the broader Indo-Pacific region .

Q3. What are the main economic challenges facing India’s Act East Policy?

A. Key challenges include the trade imbalance with ASEAN (India imports nearly twice what it exports) , the delayed completion of the AITIGA review , infrastructure bottlenecks in Northeast India , and India’s absence from mega-regional trade agreements like RCEP and CPTPP that most of its key Indo-Pacific partners belong to . Exports from Northeast India constitute less than 1 per cent of total Indian merchandise exports .

Q4. What is the significance of Northeast India for the Act East Policy?

A. Northeast India serves as India’s land gateway to Southeast Asia, sharing international borders with five countries . The region’s development is a critical litmus test for the policy’s success . Key connectivity projects like the India-Myanmar-Thailand Trilateral Highway and Kaladan Multi-Modal Transit Transport Project are designed to link Northeast India to Southeast Asian markets, but remain incomplete due to security concerns in Myanmar and infrastructure challenges .

Q5. What security cooperation has developed under the Act East Policy?

A. Defence cooperation includes the sale of BrahMos missiles to the Philippines and potentially other ASEAN nations , India co-chairing the ADMM-Plus Experts’ Working Group on Counter-Terrorism with Malaysia , conducting bilateral and multilateral maritime exercises, and strengthening defence industry cooperation. India also earmarks training slots for Indonesian cadets and officers at the National Defence Academy and Defence Services Staff College . A $630 million missile deal with Indonesia was announced during the July 2026 visit .

Bulldozer Justice Reaches Academia, The Campaign to Cripple CSDS

In a move that has sent shockwaves through India’s intellectual community, the government is on the verge of effectively dismantling one of the country’s most prestigious social science institutions. The Centre for the Study of Developing Societies (CSDS), a beacon of independent research for over six decades, is facing a potentially fatal funding cut that threatens to silence one of India’s last credible voices in electoral analysis .

The demolition of CSDS follows a pattern that has become distressingly familiar: an initial “public indictment,” a swift judgment without due process, and the use of bureaucratic technicalities to justify a predetermined outcome .

1. The Crisis: A 90% Salary Cut

The immediate threat is existential. The Indian Council of Social Science Research (ICSSR), which channels government grants to CSDS, has stopped funding the institution . This support accounts for approximately 90% of the institute’s salary bill—a sum of over ₹5.8 crore in 2024-25 . For the last year, the institution has been struggling to pay its staff . The worst victims are the non-academic staff, who have nothing to do with the controversy .

The faculty has expressed “deep concern,” noting that the institute had never faced such a situation “even during the Emergency” . An ICSSR-appointed inquiry committee has reportedly recommended action against CSDS, a step that could lead to the suspension of its grants-in-aid status .

2. The Trigger: A Trivial Error, A Swift Indictment

The official trigger for this assault was trivial, bordering on the ridiculous . On August 17, 2025, CSDS professor Sanjay Kumar posted on his personal X account data on voter numbers in four Maharashtra constituencies . The calculation was wrong. Within 48 hours, he deleted the post and apologized for the error .

This was a bland presentation of data with no political interpretation . It was not institutional reporting. Yet, the BJP’s ecosystem smartly conflated it with another CSDS poll that reported a decline in public trust in the Election Commission, and the troll army demanded exemplary punishment .

On August 19, the ICSSR took to X to announce it was taking “serious cognizance” of “data manipulation” and an attempt to “create a narrative with the intention of undermining the sanctity of the Election Commission of India” . The verdict had been delivered before the trial began .

3. The Real Reason: A Barometer That Cannot Be “Adjusted”

Why would the government target an institution that has, by all accounts, been politically neutral? CSDS was founded in 1963 by Rajni Kothari as a non-Marxist, if not anti-Marxist, school of thought . Its scholars pioneered the decolonisation of social sciences and the advancement of social sciences in Indian languages . Its election surveys over the last decade have overestimated, not underestimated, the BJP’s electoral performance .

The real reason, as the analysis by Yogendra Yadav suggests, is that the CSDS’s Lokniti programme is “arguably the only trustworthy political barometer in the country that continues to adhere to scientific protocols of survey and transparent reporting, a barometer that cannot be ‘adjusted’ to suit the demands of the rulers” . This is one thing authoritarian regimes do not like, especially when they face allegations of electoral malpractice amidst rising public disquiet .

4. The Precedent: A Pattern of Silencing Dissent

The assault on CSDS follows a pattern established with the Centre for Policy Research (CPR), another premier think tank. CPR was forced to cut its headcount by 75% after its foreign funding licence was cancelled following an Income Tax probe and the suspension of its FCRA licence . The prestige of CSDS makes it the perfect example to send a message to an entire community of academics and intellectuals: Nobody is safe if CPR and CSDS can be targeted .

5. The Casualties: Collateral Damage in a Political Battle

The committee’s report has not been released. But the ICSSR stopped the CSDS grant with immediate effect, and the institute has been struggling to pay salaries for the entire faculty for the last year . The worst victims are the non-academic staff, who have nothing to do with all this . “Demolition has begun. The trial can wait,” the analysis concludes .

5 Questions & Answers

Q1. What is the Centre for the Study of Developing Societies (CSDS), and why is it significant?
A. CSDS is a premier autonomous social science research institute founded in 1963 by Rajni Kothari. It is considered to Indian social science what the Tata Institute of Fundamental Research (TIFR) is to Indian science . Its faculty and associates have been at the centre of Indian and global debates on politics, society, and culture for over six decades .

Q2. What immediate threat does CSDS currently face?
A. CSDS faces the prospect of losing its grants-in-aid from the Indian Council of Social Science Research (ICSSR), which account for roughly 90% of the faculty’s salaries . The ICSSR has already stopped the grant, and the institution has been struggling to pay salaries for the last year .

Q3. What was the official trigger for the government’s action against CSDS?
A. The trigger was an August 2025 social media post by CSDS professor Sanjay Kumar, who shared erroneous voter data for two Maharashtra constituencies. He deleted the post and apologized within 48 hours . The ICSSR, however, accused CSDS of “data manipulation” and an attempt to undermine the Election Commission of India .

Q4. What is the real reason, according to critics, for the government’s move to cripple CSDS?
A. Critics argue that the real reason is CSDS’s reputation as a credible and independent political barometer. Its Lokniti programme is seen as the only trustworthy survey that cannot be “adjusted” to suit the rulers’ demands . The prestige of CSDS also makes it a perfect example to send a message to the entire academic community: that nobody is safe .

Q5. How does this incident fit into a broader pattern of government action against independent institutions?
A. The assault on CSDS follows a pattern established with other institutions like the Centre for Policy Research (CPR), which had its foreign funding licence cancelled . In both cases, administrative and financial technicalities have been used to silence dissenting voices and curtail independent research.

Parliament, Not Fate, Must Shape India’s Road Safety Future

1. Introduction: A Preventable Tragedy That Defies Counting

Every three minutes, someone in India dies a preventable death on the road. This grim statistic translates to approximately 480 lives lost daily, a figure so staggering that it challenges our collective conscience. The tragedy is compounded by a bureaucratic failure: when two official bodies counted those deaths in 2024, they arrived at three different numbers.

The Ministry of Road Transport and Highways reported 1.77 lakh deaths. The National Crime Records Bureau’s “Accidental Deaths and Suicides” report recorded 1.75 lakh road accident deaths. The same NCRB’s “Crime in India” report, which records deaths due to negligence, showed that 1.81 lakh people lost their lives. This is not a data problem. It is a governance failure, with nearly 6,000 lives of unexplained variance.

2. The Constitutional Quagmire: Seven Entries, No Owner

Part of why the problem persists is constitutional. Roads, police, public health and vehicle regulation are divided across the Union List, State List and Concurrent List in ways that ensure no single institution owns prevention. A crash on a highway simultaneously touches at least seven constitutional entries, and not one of them assigns clear responsibility for preventing the next crash.

National highways belong to the Centre; State roads and police belong to states; motor vehicles sit in the Concurrent List; public health is a state subject. Jurisdictional fragmentation is not incidental to this failure. It is the design. The institutional response to this fragmentation has been a succession of committees, advisories and proposed boards.

In the landmark case S. Rajasekaran v. Union of India (2014), the Supreme Court recorded the full dimensions of the problem. Four working groups studied what the Court called the four Es of road safety: Engineering, enforcement, education and emergency care. The findings across all four were alarming. Highway maintenance was receiving only 35 to 40 percent of estimated funding. Salvageable patients were dying because ambulances were inadequate, trauma centres absent, and police stations arguing over jurisdiction instead of rushing people to hospitals. Laws on enforcement existed on paper but were rarely applied with consistency.

3. Article 21 and the Constitutional Imperative

What gave the Court’s intervention its constitutional force was a prior recognition: that road accidents are not random misfortunes. Every crash, traced to its cause, is the product of human failure, and therefore preventable. The resignation to fate, the Court said, has never been the accepted philosophy of human life. It is precisely this understanding that ties road safety to Article 21. If these deaths are preventable, tolerating a governance structure that allows them to continue is a constitutional failure.

The Supreme Court has not been silent. In its 2017 directives, it mandated that all states formulate a Road Safety Policy, set up a Road Safety Council by January 31, 2018, and establish a Road Safety Committee in every district. Yet, the fragmentation persists. A 2025 parliamentary answer reveals that while 33 States/UTs have notified District Road Safety Committees, only 18 have confirmed that these committees are functional. In Uttar Pradesh, for example, despite the rollout of initiatives like ‘Sadak Suraksha Mitra’ engaging youth volunteers, the success of such programs depends on consistent oversight and functioning DRSCs.

4. The Reform Path: Learning from GST

The reform path is constitutional, and it has a precedent. When tax revenues fragmented across the same three constitutional lists became unworkable, Parliament did not create another advisory committee. It passed the 101st Constitutional Amendment Act and created the GST Council. The Law Commission, as early as 2009, recommended that the Seventh Schedule be amended to bring all traffic under the purview of Parliament.

A Road Safety Coordination Council built on the GST model, where Centre and states jointly set standards for road design, vehicle fitness, emergency care and fatality reporting, would give this problem the institutional weight it requires. Amending the Seventh Schedule to bring roads and traffic more firmly within Parliament’s legislative reach would close the constitutional gaps that every advisory body falls through. Below that structural layer, Parliament needs to mandate District Road Safety Committees by statute with defined powers and real consequences for states that ignore them.

5. Data and the Promise of a Unified System

The rollout of the Electronic Detailed Accident Report (e-DAR)/Integrated Road Accident Database (iRAD) system in 2021-22 was intended to resolve the data discrepancies by collecting real-time data from police and linking it with hospitals. Yet, the mismatch persists because state reporting remains inconsistent. The solution requires a binding mandate for unified data entry across all states, integrating police, hospital, and transport department records to create a single, reliable source of truth on road deaths.

6. Conclusion: A Choice Between Fate and Action

Parliament has acted before when a structure failed too many people for too long. Roads have been failing people for longer. Courts have stepped in on road safety repeatedly because executive and legislative institutions have not built durable accountability. That step-in can only go so far.

The choice is stark: accept the resignation to fate, or act on the constitutional truth that these deaths are preventable. The path forward is clear: a constitutional amendment to reform the Seventh Schedule, the creation of a GST-style Road Safety Coordination Council, and the statutory empowerment of District Road Safety Committees.

5 Questions & Answers on India’s Road Safety Crisis

Q1. What is the current state of road accident data in India?

A: Multiple agencies report conflicting figures, with no single authoritative source. In 2024, the Ministry of Road Transport and Highways reported 1.77 lakh fatalities, while two different NCRB reports recorded 1.75 lakh and 1.81 lakh deaths, resulting in a difference of nearly 6,000 lives. This mismatch is due to data being collected through separate administrative pipelines and differing methodologies.

Q2. What is the constitutional challenge to road safety legislation in India?

A: Road safety is fragmented across the Seventh Schedule. National highways fall under the Union List; State roads and police are State subjects; motor vehicles are in the Concurrent List; and public health is a State subject. This fragmentation means no single authority is accountable for preventing crashes, and Parliament cannot enact a comprehensive road safety law without a constitutional amendment.

Q3. What is the significance of the Supreme Court’s intervention in S. Rajasekaran v. Union of India (2014)?

A: The Court recognized that road accidents are not random misfortunes but preventable deaths, and linked road safety to the right to life under Article 21. It highlighted severe deficiencies in engineering, enforcement, education, and emergency care. The Court’s observation that “resignation to fate has never been the accepted philosophy of human life” established the constitutional imperative for state action.

Q4. What constitutional reform does the author propose to address road safety?

A: The author proposes a two-pronged approach: first, amending the Seventh Schedule to bring roads and traffic more firmly under Parliament’s legislative reach; second, creating a Road Safety Coordination Council modeled on the GST Council, where Centre and states jointly set standards for road design, vehicle fitness, emergency care, and fatality reporting. This would close the constitutional gaps that current advisory bodies fall through.

Q5. How does the GST Council precedent apply to road safety reform?

A: When tax revenues were fragmented across the Union, State, and Concurrent Lists, Parliament did not create another advisory committee but passed the 101st Constitutional Amendment Act, creating the GST Council. The road safety authority is fragmented across the same constitutional lists in the same way. A Road Safety Coordination Council built on the GST model would give the problem the institutional weight it requires, with clear jurisdictional accountability.

The Regional Party Does Not Hold, A Crisis of Federalism in the Age of BJP Dominance

At the end of this month, Prashant Kishor will contest a bypoll in Bihar, in a renewed bid to claim political space, months after his new party failed to achieve a foothold in the November assembly election . In West Bengal, Mamata Banerjee’s TMC continues to come apart at many seams, almost immediately after its electoral drubbing in April . In Uttar Pradesh, speculation about the ruling BJP’s internal wrangles makes more news than the Samajwadi Party, its principal opposition party that remains frozen in its 2017 image . In Andhra Pradesh, Chandrababu Naidu’s son and working president of the TDP, Nara Lokesh, describes “Namo” as Naidu plus Modi, a pairing of unequals, with the once larger-than-his-state regional player unresistingly subsumed in Modi’s cult of personality .

These images of regional parties and leaders laid low are part of a larger phenomenon of our time. The predatory politics of the BJP, backed by its “one nation” thesis and drive towards uniformity, has quickened the crisis of the regional party. But that is not the whole explanation . Regional parties have also conspired in their own crumpling and, in the process, in a larger undoing of the gains made on federalism for nearly two decades from the mid-1980s . For now, even as cracks in BJP dominance begin showing, the parties that could have benefited from the opening up of political spaces are unfortunately just not up to it .

The Unravelling of the Regional Project

The speed with which parties are unravelling and the scale on which splits are taking place have taken many by surprise . The 80-MLA-strong TMC broke up in the West Bengal Assembly within weeks of its defeat, followed by 20 of its 28 Lok Sabha MPs announcing both a merger with a little-known party called the Nationalist Citizens Party of India (NCPI) and support for the BJP-led NDA in Parliament . On Monday, the rebel MLAs replaced Banerjee herself as the TMC chairperson, setting the stage for a court battle over who constitutes the real party . The Election Commission has asked both factions, the loyalists led by Mamata Banerjee and the rebel group, to submit detailed responses regarding the conduct of organisational elections within the party, a decision that will have a major impact on West Bengal politics .

The TMC’s implosion reflects the existential questions that many regional parties now face. Despite arguments that regional players have outperformed the Congress in one-on-one contests against the BJP—in West Bengal, the BJP’s success rate against the TMC was 33%, and in Uttar Pradesh, it had a strike rate of 45% against the SP —they remain increasingly vulnerable to splits, defections, and absorption into BJP-led political coalitions .

The BJP’s Playbook: Defeat, Break, or Tame

The BJP has perfected a four-pronged strategy to neutralise regional rivals: break and absorb, counter the regional narrative, re-engineer caste coalitions, and tame through power dependence .

First, break and absorb. In Maharashtra, both the Uddhav Thackeray-led Shiv Sena and the Sharad Pawar-led NCP saw vertical splits. The party names and symbols went to factions aligned with the BJP, while the offshoots now survive under the BJP’s wings . In West Bengal, the BJP is fishing in the TMC’s troubled waters, offering a safe haven to disgruntled leaders.

Second, counter the regional narrative. In West Bengal, the BJP’s campaign was built on a ‘Bengal First’ plank, with a local CM face, to defang Mamata Banerjee’s “Bengali Asmita” pitch . In Odisha, Amit Shah cornered Naveen Patnaik by questioning his heir apparent V.K. Pandian, a Tamil bureaucrat, asking “Will Odisha accept a Tamil leading the state?”  The BJD’s regional pride pitch was turned against it .

Third, re-engineer caste coalitions. Against the Samajwadi Party and RJD’s M-Y formula, the BJP has built a counter to the Muslim-Yadav formula, using Hindutva as the glue, combined with aggressive consolidation of non-Yadav OBCs, EBCs, and Dalits .

Fourth, tame through power dependence. The JDU and LJP survive today as the BJP’s dependents, with the BJP eventually installing its own CM in Bihar, reducing Nitish Kumar to a junior partner . In Andhra Pradesh, despite being the bigger partner, Chandrababu Naidu’s stature is nowhere close to his Vajpayee-era clout .

Why Regional Parties Are Imploding: Three Structural Crises

Three problems now haunt regional parties: family-run structures, fading regional sentiment, and an unsustainable cadre model .

Family-run structures are a key vulnerability. Most regional parties are one-family shows: SP, RJD, NCP, Shiv Sena, TMC, BJD, DMK, BRS . Succession fights and limited upward mobility for cadre create exits, which the BJP exploits by offering “better opportunity” to second-rung leaders . Breakaways in Maharashtra, UP, and Bihar prove the point .

The Samajwadi Party is a prime example of this structural crisis. Travelling through UP recently reveals how the Akhilesh Yadav-led SP, more than nine years out of power now, is a prisoner of its past image . He is seen as the leader surrounded by family, and the SP is seen as the Muslim-Yadav party that presides over lawlessness when it is in government . Many who feel angry or alienated from the ruling BJP are reluctant to see the SP as an alternative . Its proclaimed shift from M-Y to PDA (pichhda, dalit, alpsankhyak) is still seen as its inability to move beyond exclusionary caste arithmetic . The party’s latest misstep—its hasty reaction to the Ayodhya offerings controversy, seen as hurting Sanatan sentiments—has only deepened public distrust .

Similarly, the TMC’s implosion can be summed up as the “Abhishek phenomenon”—a simmering discontent against the leadership of Mamata’s nephew and heir apparent Abhishek Banerjee, who had been given unfettered control of the party . The BJP was able to fish in the TMC’s troubled waters because of the intensity of that sentiment, which Mamata was not able to either gauge and defuse, or chose to ignore .

The End of an Era: The Shrinking Space for Regional Forces

India is moving from a federation dominated by strong state parties to a polity increasingly centred around national parties, with the BJP as the principal pole . Regional parties, once kingmakers in coalition-era politics, are now caught in a binary choice: adapt or perish . Adaptation means moving beyond family-centric politics, building ideologies that transcend state borders, and delivering governance that can outperform the BJP’s “double-engine” pitch . Perishing means gradual absorption, as seen with the LJP, the Shinde-led Shiv Sena, and the Ajit Pawar faction of the NCP .

The era of regional satraps as kingmakers appears over. The verdict suggests that India is moving from a federation dominated by strong state parties to a polity increasingly centred around national parties, with the BJP as the principal pole . The question for 2029 is no longer whether regional parties can stop a BJP landslide. It is whether they can survive at all as independent political forces .

5 Questions & Answers

Q1: What are the key factors driving the decline of regional parties in India?
A: The decline is driven by a combination of the BJP’s aggressive, predatory politics—using strategies like splitting parties, co-opting regional narratives, and re-engineering caste coalitions—and internal weaknesses of regional parties, including family-run leadership structures, fading regional sentiment due to urbanisation and pan-India media, and unsustainable cadre models when out of power .

Q2: What is the “Abhishek phenomenon” in the context of the TMC’s crisis?
A: The “Abhishek phenomenon” refers to the simmering discontent within the TMC against the leadership of Mamata Banerjee’s nephew and heir apparent, Abhishek Banerjee, who had been given unfettered control of the party. This discontent was a key factor that the BJP exploited to engineer the party’s split and attract defections .

Q3: What is the significance of the Bankipur bypoll for Prashant Kishor and Jan Suraaj?
A: The Bankipur bypoll marks Prashant Kishor’s electoral debut and a test of his Jan Suraaj Party’s viability. Kishor has framed the contest as a “referendum” on the NDA government in Bihar, claiming his victory would compel Chief Minister Samrat Choudhary to step down. It is a test of whether a new, clean-slate party can break through in a state dominated by established players .

Q4: How has the BJP countered the “Bengali Asmita” narrative in West Bengal?
A: The BJP flipped the script by declaring that its Chief Minister candidate would be “local and Bengali speaking” and engaging in symbolic gestures like campaigning with fish to signal that the party was not anti-Bengali culture, but anti-TMC misgovernance. This neutralised the TMC’s long-standing strategy of painting the BJP as a party of “outsiders” .

Q5: What structural weaknesses make regional parties particularly vulnerable to the BJP’s expansion?
A: Key weaknesses include their reliance on family-run structures, which creates succession battles and limits cadre mobility; the fading appeal of regional identity politics in an era of urbanisation and digital media; and their struggle to sustain cadre and patronage networks when out of power, making them susceptible to defections, absorption, and splits.

The Burden Only Messi Can Bear, A Psychological Shield in the Form of a Footballer

The 2026 FIFA World Cup, a tournament of shocks and upsets, has provided a stage for the extraordinary once again. As the defending champions, Argentina have navigated a turbulent path to the semi-finals, their journey a testament to resilience, dramatic comebacks, and the enduring, almost supernatural, influence of their captain, Lionel Messi.

In a sport obsessed with statistics—goals, assists, passes completed, and distance covered—the truest measure of Messi’s greatness in 2026 cannot be found on a spreadsheet. It lies in a more intangible realm: his ability to serve as a psychological shield for his teammates. “Messi’s greatest skill has been to concentrate the pressure and responsibility of performing onto his diminutive shoulders, freeing up space for his teammates to play the game as they’d like” [citation:original].

The Dramatic Art of the Comeback

The Round of 16 clash against Egypt was a microcosm of this entire World Cup campaign: a slow start, a moment of despair, and a furious, last-gasp fightback. Egypt, having taken a shock lead through Yasser Ibrahim in the 15th minute, were immense . They defended with discipline and threatened on the counter, and their goalkeeper, Mostafa Shobeir, was having the game of his life . When he saved a first-half Messi penalty—the Argentine’s second miss from the spot in the tournament—it seemed the footballing gods had abandoned the Albiceleste .

Egypt then doubled their lead in the 67th minute through Mostafa Ziko, leaving Argentina staring into the abyss . It was from this brink of elimination that Messi, and by extension Argentina, found their greatest strength.

The Psychological Shield

The true weight of Messi’s presence is not in the goals he scores, but in the safety he provides for others to try. “It is his mere presence on the pitch that allows his teammates to play with a freedom from consequence” [citation:original]. In the past, Argentina were a team paralysed by the fear of failure. The decade of defeat following his 2008 Olympic gold was defined by an anxious deference to Messi. “Every pass in the midfield became an act of anxious deterrence, forcing the ball into a suffocating thicket of defenders where Messi was marooned” [citation:original].

That has changed. Under Lionel Scaloni, the team has learned to support the captain rather than simply rely on him. By commanding that overwhelming defensive focus, he has “vacuumed the structural and emotional stress completely out of the final third” [citation:original]. This creates a sanctuary for his teammates, visible in how they play with confidence rather than fear.

Against Egypt, after his penalty miss, many players might have vanished. Instead, Messi persisted, providing a pinpoint cross for Cristian Romero to head home in the 79th minute. Four minutes later, he smashed in the equaliser . With the momentum having swung, Enzo Fernandez was able to surge into the box and score the winner in stoppage time, his calm finish a product of the space and freedom Messi’s presence had created .

The Scars and the Strength

For a player who has spent two decades redefining what is possible on a football pitch, the penalty spot remains his most consistent antagonist . With a conversion rate that is, surprisingly, merely average compared to elite peers like Harry Kane or Cristiano Ronaldo, Messi’s Achilles’ heel is a paradox . His genius is rooted in improvisation, reading a moving defense in real-time. A penalty, a static duel, demands a wholly different, more repetitive skill set .

After the Egypt match, Messi broke down in tears . He admitted: “I cried because I felt that I let my team-mates down because of the penalty I missed, and the way I took it” . But by the end of the game, those tears were for a different reason: the sheer relief of triumph .

Messi is no longer just a footballer; he has become a psychological phenomenon. By absorbing the gravity of an entire sport onto his bulletproof legacy, he has granted his teammates the safety to play football as it ought to be played, entirely free from the fear of making mistakes.

5 Questions & Answers on Argentina’s World Cup Campaign

1. How did Argentina manage to come back from 2-0 down against Egypt?

Argentina produced a stunning late fightback. Cristian Romero headed in a Messi cross in the 79th minute. Messi then scored a brilliant equaliser in the 84th minute. The comeback was completed in stoppage time when Enzo Fernandez headed in the winner .

2. What is the “psychological shield” that Lionel Messi provides for his teammates?

Messi absorbs the immense pressure and responsibility of performing at a World Cup. This “psychological shield” allows his teammates to play with a freedom from consequence, knowing that the spotlight and criticism will always fall on the captain [citation:original]. He frees them from the “fear of making mistakes.”

3. Why is Lionel Messi considered to have a weakness for penalties?

Despite being a footballing genius, Messi’s record from the penalty spot in open play is surprisingly average. His conversion rate of 78.8% is lower than many elite forwards. His style relies on improvisation, whereas penalties often favour a more rigid, repeatable routine . This weakness was highlighted when he missed two penalties during the 2026 tournament .

4. What records did Lionel Messi break during the 2026 World Cup?

Messi broke several records, including becoming the all-time leading assist provider in World Cup history with nine, surpassing Diego Maradona. He also became the first player ever to score in nine consecutive World Cup matches . His goal against Egypt was his 21st World Cup goal, extending his own record .

5. What is the main concern about Argentina’s reliance on Lionel Messi as they progress in the tournament?

While Messi’s brilliance is a major asset, Argentina have struggled in knockout games against disciplined opponents who successfully close him down. Their over-reliance on a 39-year-old for creativity and goal-scoring is a risk. However, players like Julian Alvarez and Lautaro Martinez have shown they can make decisive contributions, and the team has won without Messi scoring.

More Births, Recorded, The Promise and Gaps of India’s Civil Registration Milestone

1. Introduction: A Silent Revolution in Vital Statistics

On July 1, 2026, India released a milestone that marks a fundamental shift in how the nation will govern itself in the future. The Civil Registration System (CRS) Report for 2024 revealed that India officially recorded more than 99% of its estimated births and deaths for the first time . This is not merely a bureaucratic achievement; it is a quiet revolution that moves India closer to a system in which every birth and death can be counted, certified, and ultimately used to inform public policy .

The numbers tell the story: 25,473,389 births and 8,938,301 deaths were registered in 2024 . To put this in perspective, this means that 99.1% of estimated births and 99.4% of estimated deaths were registered, a dramatic improvement from 2014 when birth registration was 86.6% and death registration was 72.5% . For a country of 1.4 billion people that has historically struggled to count its own citizens, this achievement opens new possibilities for governance, planning, and service delivery. This analysis examines the journey to universal registration, the reasons behind the shift, the benefits it unlocks, and the gaps that remain.

2. The Journey: From 56% to 99%

The Civil Registration System has been legally operational in India since 1970, when the Registration of Births and Deaths (RBD) Act, 1969 came into effect . However, for decades, coverage was abysmally low. Until 2000, India registered only 56% of births and 48% of deaths . The reasons were manifold: lack of awareness, weak administrative infrastructure, and a system that often failed to reach the poorest and most marginalised.

The path to universal registration has been gradual but accelerating. By 2014, birth registration had improved to 86.6% and death registration to 72.5% . The Covid-19 pandemic years saw a temporary dip in birth registration (to 91.8% in 2020 and 91.7% in 2021) but an unusual surge in death registration (99.9% and 99.7%), driven by heightened awareness and the need for death certificates for inheritance and insurance claims . By 2024, the system had achieved near-universal coverage .

The improvement is visible across states. In 2024, 18 states and Union Territories achieved 100% birth registration, while 21 states and UTs achieved 100% death registration . However, challenges persist: birth registration levels remained in the 80-90% range in six states—Odisha, Andhra Pradesh, Assam, Chhattisgarh, Kerala, and Uttar Pradesh—and death registration was even lower in Bihar (62.1%) and Jharkhand (50.7%) . The CRS report itself cautions that state-level registration levels should be interpreted with care, as the Sample Registration System (SRS) estimates are based on usual residence, while events are registered at the place of occurrence .

3. The Drivers of Change: What Explains the Shift?

The rapid rise in registration for births and deaths is likely due to a combination of factors, as outlined by the analysis in the source material .

First, increasing incentives for documentation to avail welfare and other benefits may be among the key drivers. For births, the increase in institutional deliveries, incentivised by post-delivery benefits, is an important driver. Birth certificates are now necessary for school admission, identity documents, welfare benefits, and other official purposes, strongly incentivising registration.

Second, death registration may have increased because more people are accessing formal healthcare, including through expanded health insurance and public health schemes. The expansion of schemes, particularly the Pradhan Mantri Jan Arogya Yojana (PM-JAY), has increased coverage among poorer and vulnerable households. Families also require death certificates for pensions, insurance, inheritance, property transfer, bank accounts, and other administrative processes.

Third, digitisation has played a crucial role. The Registration of Births and Deaths (Amendment) Act, 2023, marked an important step towards making civil registration more complete, timely, and accessible . By making the birth certificate an essential document for education and enrolment for Aadhaar and voter ID, the amendment gives families a strong incentive to register every birth .

However, as the source article cautions, much will depend on effective implementation, digital access, and consistent monitoring . The centralised online portal for registering births and deaths has faced technical issues, including slow performance, delayed OTP generation, and persistent error messages, which have caused backlogs in some states .

4. The Benefits: Why Universal Registration Matters

A complete CRS is one of the most important sources of vital statistics. It is a crucial input for administrative use, assessing the impact of health and social policies, and understanding trends in fertility, mortality, and population change .

First, timely registration of births and deaths can provide real-time information on demographic changes and population health. During a health crisis like the Covid-19 pandemic, timely reporting of deaths was crucial for identifying high-risk areas and controlling the spread of the disease. CRS is also important for understanding seasonal mortality changes, driven by high temperatures and pollution .

Second, because of the CRS’s historically poor coverage, India has traditionally depended heavily on the Census, the Sample Registration System (SRS), and household surveys for estimates. But the Census is conducted only once every 10 years, and sample surveys do not provide reliable annual estimates at the district level .

Third, a complete CRS can support local planning under decentralised governance, since district and sub-district level data are far more useful for programme design than national or state-level estimates alone. As India moves towards Viksit Bharat 2047, the ability to plan at the grassroots level will be essential .

5. The Gaps: What Still Needs to Be Done

Despite the remarkable progress, significant gaps remain.

First, regional disparities persist. While the national average is nearing 100%, some states continue to languish. Birth registration is in the 80-90% range in six states, and death registration is even lower in Bihar and Jharkhand . In West Bengal, for instance, state law requires reporting within 14 days, but in Union Territories, the period is 7 days, reflecting variation in administrative capacity .

Second, timely registration is a challenge. Many births and deaths are not registered within the prescribed 21-day period . This delay undermines the utility of the system for real-time monitoring.

Third, the most important gap concerns infant death registration. The report shows that 84.2% of registered infant deaths occurred in urban areas, compared with only 15.8% in rural areas. Since a large share of the population still lives in rural areas, where early-age mortality is higher, this pattern may indicate under-registration of infant deaths . Experts have noted that Tamil Nadu ranks among the top states in infant mortality figures, but this is likely due to better reporting rather than worse health outcomes .

Fourth, there is the quality of information. Registering a death is not the same as recording a medically certified cause of death. Many deaths may still lack reliable medical certification, limiting the usefulness of CRS for disease and mortality analysis .

Finally, the completeness of death registration is itself estimated using SRS figures. However, previous studies have shown that the SRS undercounts both births and deaths, which may lead to an overestimation of CRS coverage . As one expert noted, a registration level of 99.4% indicates that registered deaths closely match expected deaths based on demographic estimates rather than implying that every death has been individually verified .

6. The Way Forward: Building on the Progress

Building on the progress thus far, the next stage of improvement must focus not only on coverage but also its quality — including timely registration, accurate records, and responsible use of digital data .

The Registration of Births and Deaths (Amendment) Act, 2023 provides the legal framework for digital registration and the establishment of national and state-level databases. However, effective implementation, digital access, and consistent monitoring will be essential .

India could further consider a system for recording internal migration, which would strengthen administrative planning . As one expert noted, a robust civil registration system is not just about counting births and deaths but about building the foundation for a modern, data-driven state.

5 Questions & Answers

Q1. What is the Civil Registration System (CRS), and what does the 2024 data show?
A. The CRS is India’s system for recording vital events like births, deaths, and stillbirths under the Registration of Births and Deaths Act, 1969 . The 2024 CRS report shows that India achieved 99.1% birth registration and 99.4% death registration, a significant milestone compared to 2014 when registration levels were 86.6% and 72.5% respectively . This marks a major shift towards universal civil registration, moving India from a survey-dependent system to one where every event is counted .

Q2. Why has registration coverage improved so dramatically?
A. The improvement is due to a combination of factors: increasing incentives for documentation, including the requirement of birth certificates for school admission, Aadhaar, and welfare benefits; digitisation and the 2023 amendment to the RBD Act; and the expansion of institutional deliveries and health insurance schemes . The integration of CRS with Aadhaar and the centralised portal, despite technical glitches, has also played a role .

Q3. What are the benefits of a complete CRS?
A. A complete CRS provides real-time data on demographic changes and population health, supports local planning at the district level, and reduces dependence on decennial Censuses and sample surveys . It enables better targeting of health and social policies, understanding of seasonal mortality patterns, and preparation for demographic shifts .

Q4. What gaps remain in India’s CRS?
A. Key gaps include: regional disparities, with states like Bihar (62.1%) and Jharkhand (50.7%) lagging in death registration; challenges in timely registration within the 21-day period; under-registration of infant deaths in rural areas; lack of medically certified causes of death; and methodological concerns that the completeness of death registration is estimated using SRS figures that may themselves undercount births and deaths .

Q5. What is the significance of the urban-rural divide in infant death registration?
A. The CRS report shows that 84.2% of registered infant deaths occurred in urban areas, while only 15.8% were in rural areas. Since a large share of the population still lives in rural areas, where early-age mortality is higher, this pattern may indicate under-registration of infant deaths in rural areas. This could be due to rural births often taking place in urban hospitals or at home, and the registration process being weaker in rural settings .

With 4 New Benches, How SC Plans to Clear Its Oldest Pending Cases

1. Introduction: A Structural Attempt to Tackle the Mounting Backlog

To tackle the mounting backlog of cases in the Supreme Court, Chief Justice of India Surya Kant has, in a significant move, created four specific benches exclusively to hear the oldest pending civil and criminal matters. This marks a structured attempt to ensure the conclusion of decades-old disputes pending before the apex court .

The initiative comes as the Supreme Court faces a staggering pendency of over 96,000 cases . Of these, 37,883 cases, around 39.4%, are less than one year old, indicating that a large chunk of the docket comprises older cases awaiting adjudication . CJI Kant described the move as an “experiment” that will ultimately be judged by its results, hoping it will become a model that future Chief Justices might want to emulate .

2. The New Roster and Special Benches

According to the new roster notification, two division benches, headed by Justices P.K. Mishra and S.V.N. Bhatti, will focus solely on the oldest civil cases. Two other division benches, led by Justices Manoj Misra and Ujjal Bhuyan, will be dedicated solely to the oldest criminal matters .

These special benches will operate on “non-miscellaneous days”, namely Tuesday, Wednesday and Thursday. In the Supreme Court’s parlance, Mondays and Fridays are “miscellaneous days” reserved for fresh filings and preliminary hearings. The middle of the week is meant for “regular matters” that require detailed, lengthy arguments . By freeing these four benches from the regular burden of miscellaneous hearings, the court will be able to give uninterrupted judicial attention to its longest pending cases .

Each of the four benches will initially focus on nearly 200 of the oldest disputes, totalling about 800 cases identified for expedited disposal in the Supreme Court’s first structured docket-management exercise in recent years .

3. Scale of the Backlog

Data from the National Judicial Data Grid provides a glimpse at the enormity of the backlog these benches are meant to address. The Supreme Court currently has 96,045 pending cases. Civil matters make up most of this burden, standing at 74,244 cases, while criminal matters account for the remaining 21,801 .

Within this backlog, there are 24 civil cases and two criminal cases that have been pending before the court for over 30 years. The oldest civil case has been pending since 1986, while the oldest criminal case was registered in 1991 . Another 525 civil cases and seven criminal cases were registered between 1996 and 2005. The bulk of the older backlog lies in the 10– to 20–year bracket, which accounts for 7,993 civil cases and 1,585 criminal cases .

4. The Pendency Paradox

This growing backlog presents a productivity paradox. Over the last five years, the Supreme Court has actually increased its rate of clearing cases, picking up markedly from the pandemic years—when courts operated at reduced functioning—to record its best-ever disposal figures. However, the overall pendency figure has continued to rise .

This is primarily because the rate of new case intake is outpacing the rate of disposal. With the court becoming more accessible to citizens nationwide through e-filing and virtual hearings, case intake has risen exponentially . In fact, a year starting from February 2025, the Supreme Court had a clearance rate of 0.817, meaning more cases were instituted than disposed of .

The CJI himself clarified that of the roughly 93,000 matters shown as pending, nearly 10,000 are defective matters where objections are pending and lawyers have not removed them. Thus, the actual pendency is around 83,000-plus matters. Out of these, nearly 40 to 45 per cent are appeals where leave has been granted—and these are among the oldest matters on the docket .

5. Shift in Strategy: Why Old Cases Got Left Behind

The CJI explained that the existing listing pattern prioritised fresh matters and post-notice matters. “Because fresh and post-notice matters stay in constant circulation, the turn of the old matters never comes” . The new arrangement corrects this by forcing the oldest cases to the top of the cause list.

Former Chief Justices have deployed varying strategies to unlock the docket. Former CJI U.U. Lalit introduced a rigorous listing mechanism that carved out distinct time slots for fresh matters and long-pending regular hearings . CJI D.Y. Chandrachud launched the SC-JUDICARE project to automate the classification of pending cases and group matters with similar legal issues. Former CJI Sanjiv Khanna shifted the focus toward “admission matters” and tasked the court’s Centre for Research and Planning with identifying short, infructuous and old matters, successfully weeding out thousands of such cases .

6. Restoring Faith in Justice Delivery

CJI Kant emphasised the human cost of delays. “Every old pending matter represents a litigant who has waited years, and sometimes decades, for closure. The age of a case cannot become the reason for its continued neglect” .

He explained that there is a “strong feeling among litigants who have waited eight or ten years that cases filed after theirs are being decided while their cases are never taken up” . By institutionalising a culture where long-pending litigation receives sustained and uninterrupted judicial attention, the initiative is expected to reaffirm public confidence in the justice delivery system .

This initiative is one of the first major administrative reforms undertaken by CJI Kant and aligns with his stated objective of tackling pendency through targeted judicial management rather than ad hoc disposal drives .

5 Questions & Answers

Q1: What is the new roster introduced by CJI Surya Kant to tackle the Supreme Court’s backlog?

A: CJI Surya Kant has created four special division benches to exclusively hear the oldest pending civil and criminal cases. Two benches will focus on the oldest civil matters, and two on the oldest criminal matters. They will operate on non-miscellaneous days (Tuesday, Wednesday, and Thursday) to provide uninterrupted judicial attention to these legacy cases .

Q2: How many cases have been identified for these special benches to begin with?

A: Around 800 long-pending matters have been identified for expedited disposal. Each of the four benches will initially focus on nearly 200 of the oldest disputes .

Q3: What is the scale of the Supreme Court’s pending caseload?

A: The Supreme Court currently has 96,045 pending cases, comprising 74,244 civil matters and 21,801 criminal matters. Of these, 24 civil cases and two criminal cases have been pending for over 30 years, with the oldest civil case dating back to 1986 .

Q4: Why has the Supreme Court’s pendency continued to rise despite increasing its disposal rate?

A: The primary reason is that the rate of new case intake is outpacing the rate of disposal. With the court becoming more accessible through e-filing and virtual hearings, case intake has risen exponentially, leading to a clearance rate below 1.0 .

Q5: How did the CJI describe the rationale behind this initiative?

A: CJI Kant stated that the initiative is intended to reaffirm public confidence in the justice delivery system by ensuring that age-old cases receive sustained judicial attention. He emphasised that “the age of a case cannot become the reason for its continued neglect”.

The Overleveraged AI Dream, A Tale of Two Markets

1. Introduction: A Divergence in the Semiconductor Heartland

The global AI boom, fueled by an insatiable demand for high-performance chips, has created unprecedented wealth and lifted national stock markets to historic highs.  However, the subsequent correction has revealed a stark divergence between two of Asia’s most AI-dependent markets: South Korea and Taiwan. While South Korea’s KOSPI index entered a bear market, plummeting nearly 27% from its peak in a matter of weeks, Taiwan’s TAIEX has shown remarkable resilience .

This divergence is not merely a reflection of differing corporate earnings or global demand for chips. It is a testament to the profound impact of retail investor behavior, regulatory design, and market structure. As the panic over overstretched AI valuations deepened, the way investors in Seoul and Taipei were positioned determined how hard they fell .

2. The Anatomy of a South Korean Meltdown: A Perfect Storm of Leverage

The KOSPI’s stunning reversal from being the best-performing major market to a bear market is a cautionary tale of how overleveraged retail debt can cripple a national economy .

2.1 The “Hyper-Speculative” Leveraged ETF Gamble

In late May 2026, South Korean regulators, seeking to stem the outflow of retail money to US markets, launched domestic single-stock leveraged exchange-traded funds (ETFs) . These products doubled the gains and losses of the underlying stocks. However, to protect investor safety, eligibility was limited to companies that met strict criteria, effectively reducing the universe to just two stocks: Samsung Electronics and SK Hynix .

This regulatory narrowing created a “volatility catalyst.”  Retail investors, who account for a massive share of the market, poured billions into these products. The largest SK Hynix leveraged ETF alone accumulated over $3 billion in assets, with 92% held by individuals . They treated these short-term trading instruments as long-term investments, a mistake that would prove catastrophic .

2.2 A Death Spiral: The Negative Feedback Loop

The design of these leveraged ETFs, which require daily rebalancing to maintain their 2x exposure, created a dangerous feedback loop . When AI fears and geopolitical tensions triggered a sell-off, the ETFs were forced to sell massive quantities of the underlying stocks to maintain their leverage ratios. This exacerbated the decline, triggering margin calls on the record retail debt that had ballooned to $39 billion in May . The result was a “negative Gamma death spiral,” where a falling market forced ETF selling, which pushed the market lower, leading to further forced liquidations of retail margin accounts .

2.3 The Human Cost of a Policy Mistake

The consequences were devastating. South Korea’s Financial Supervisory Service (FSS) head later publicly admitted that the approval of these leveraged ETFs was “too hasty,” expressing deep regret as an estimated 32,000 to 46,000 retail accounts were fully wiped out . Young investors in their 20s and 30s bore the brunt of the losses, with over $1.1 billion in margin calls occurring in June alone . The KOSPI’s fall, triggered by a policy designed to help, has now been dubbed an “AI-driven bear market” . The $900 billion in market value that evaporated was a direct result of this structural fragility .

3. Taiwan’s Resilience: The High-Dividend Hedge

In contrast to Seoul’s volatility, Taiwan’s TAIEX, dominated by TSMC at a 40% weight, has weathered the storm with far less damage . The primary reason lies in the different approach of its retail investors. Instead of the “hyper-speculative” leveraged products favored in South Korea, Taiwanese retail investors have a well-established preference for passive, income-generating options like high-dividend ETFs . These products provide monthly or quarterly payouts, encouraging investors to hold through market volatility and avoid panic selling . Taiwan has been able to benefit from the AI boom while maintaining a more stable investor base .

4. The Market’s Fundamental Question: Is the AI Thesis Broken?

Despite the violent correction, most experts agree that the selloff is a “healthy” and “cyclical” pullback triggered by over-leverage and exuberance, not a collapse in the AI investment thesis . A Goldman Sachs strategist argued that one should be “comforted” by bearish arguments, as it indicates the market is not fully overvalued . The “AI arms race” continues, and the long-term structural trend remains intact . The market is entering a new, more sophisticated phase where it rewards companies that can generate tangible cash flow rather than just those participating in the narrative . For South Korea, the challenge is to ensure its next rally is built on a more stable foundation, learning the hard lesson that democratizing access to risky leverage without proper safeguards can turn a national dream into a national crisis.

5 Questions & Answers on the AI Market Divergence

Q1: Why did South Korea’s KOSPI crash while Taiwan’s TAIEX remained relatively stable?

A: The primary reason is retail investor behavior. In South Korea, regulators launched 2x leveraged ETFs tied exclusively to Samsung and SK Hynix, which attracted a flood of speculative retail money. When the market turned, these leveraged products forced massive sell-offs, creating a feedback loop that triggered margin calls and over $1 billion in forced liquidations. In contrast, Taiwanese investors favored passive, high-dividend ETFs, which encourage holding through volatility rather than panic selling .

Q2: What role did South Korea’s single-stock leveraged ETFs play in the market meltdown?

A: The leveraged ETFs, introduced to bring retail money back from US markets, became the primary catalyst for the crash. Their daily rebalancing mechanism forced them to sell underlying shares on the way down, amplifying the decline. This created a “negative Gamma death spiral” where falling prices triggered ETF selling, which pushed prices lower, triggering more margin calls and a wave of retail liquidations . Regulators later admitted the approval was “too hasty” .

Q3: How much margin debt did South Korean retail investors accumulate, and what was the impact?

A: Retail investors’ margin debt swelled to a record high of $39 billion (60 trillion won) in May 2026. This leverage, combined with the 2x leveraged ETFs, meant that a relatively small decline in chip stocks was enough to wipe out investor accounts. The Financial Supervisory Service confirmed that margin calls forced the liquidation of billions of won in positions, leading to estimates of 32,000 to 46,000 retail accounts being fully liquidated .

Q4: Does the crash indicate that the AI investment boom is over?

A: Most experts believe the crash is a “healthy” and “cyclical” correction driven by over-leverage and excessive speculation, rather than a collapse in the AI investment thesis. Goldman Sachs and others maintain that the AI “arms race” and capital expenditure cycles are structurally intact, and the selloff is a market shakeout, not a fundamental breakdown . The market is now shifting to reward companies that can demonstrate tangible returns and cash flow .

Q5: What were the lessons learned from this divergence in market performance?

A: The key lesson is the danger of poor regulatory design. By restricting leveraged ETFs to just two stocks, South Korean regulators created a hyper-concentrated market where leverage could cascade. Taiwan’s success highlights the stabilizing effect of a retail base oriented towards dividends and passive income. The divergence underscores that local market structure and investor protection rules are as critical as global demand in determining a market’s ability to withstand a correction.

Aditya Birla Renewables to Acquire Shell’s Solenergi Power for Rs 17,200 Crore

1. Introduction: A Landmark Deal in India’s Energy Transition

In one of the largest acquisitions in India’s renewable energy sector, the Aditya Birla Group has signed a definitive agreement to acquire 100% of Solenergi Power Pvt Ltd from Shell Overseas Investment B.V., a wholly owned subsidiary of Shell Plc. The transaction, valued at an enterprise value of Rs 17,200 crore ($1.8 billion), will give the conglomerate control of the Sprng Energy group of companies, a major Indian renewable energy platform .

This acquisition marks a significant milestone in the Aditya Birla Group’s strategic push into the clean energy space, nearly doubling the renewable portfolio of its subsidiary, Aditya Birla Renewables Ltd (ABRen), to approximately 9.3 GW . It is also a significant move by Shell, reflecting the global energy major’s strategy of refining its portfolio and recycling capital towards its core oil and gas business while improving returns.

For the Aditya Birla Group, this move is part of a larger vision to “strengthen our nation’s energy future, enhance industrial competitiveness, and create the foundations for sustained economic growth” .

2. The Players and the Deal

Aditya Birla Renewables Ltd (ABRen): ABRen is the renewable energy arm of the Aditya Birla Group, operating as a subsidiary of the group’s flagship company, Grasim Industries Ltd. Before this acquisition, ABRen had a portfolio of approximately 4.4 GWp, primarily focused on the Commercial & Industrial (C&I) segment, where it develops and operates captive renewable power projects for group companies . The acquisition is designed to catapult ABRen from a C&I-focused player into one of India’s largest integrated renewable energy platforms .

Sprng Energy: Sprng Energy, the target company, is a utility-scale renewable energy platform that operates across India. It develops and operates solar, wind, and hybrid power projects. Its portfolio consists of around 5 GWp of contracted capacity, including approximately 3.3 GWp of operational assets and 1.7 GWp of assets currently under construction, along with a strong connectivity and development pipeline . The company supplies power to state-owned electricity distribution companies and has a track record of creditworthy off-takers and strong contracted cash flows . Sprng Energy reported a consolidated turnover of Rs 1,253.4 crore in FY25 .

The Acquisition: ABRen will acquire 100% of the equity shares and securities of Solenergi Power Pvt Ltd, the Mauritius-incorporated holding company of Sprng Energy . The final equity consideration will be determined after adjustments for debt, cash, and other customary items . The transaction is expected to be funded through a mix of debt, equity infusion from Grasim, and investment from funds managed by Global Infrastructure Partners (GIP), a part of BlackRock . The deal is expected to close by the end of calendar year 2026, subject to regulatory approvals .

3. Strategic Implications: Why This Deal Matters

3.1. Accelerating Aditya Birla’s Renewable Ambitions

For the Aditya Birla Group, the acquisition is a strategic masterstroke that immediately scales its renewable energy business to a national level . By combining ABRen’s C&I expertise with Sprng Energy’s utility-scale capabilities, the group creates a diversified and resilient platform capable of capturing opportunities across the entire renewable energy value chain . Kumar Mangalam Birla, Chairman of the Aditya Birla Group, emphasized that the acquisition positions the group to scale beyond 20 GWp in the coming years and to participate meaningfully in “one of the largest energy transformations underway anywhere in the world” .

Aryaman Vikram Birla, Director of Aditya Birla Renewables, described the acquisition as a “pivotal moment” that allows the company to reach its near-term 10 GWp capacity target ahead of schedule and set its sights on doubling capacity over the next few years . The acquisition essentially provides a shortcut to scale, saving years of project development time and providing a portfolio of operational assets, transmission connectivity, and long-term power purchase agreements .

3.2. Shell’s Strategic Portfolio Adjustment

For Shell, the sale is a clear signal of its strategic focus on its asset-backed trading strategy, as outlined in its Capital Markets Day 2025 . Machteld de Haan, Shell’s President of Downstream, Renewables and Energy Solutions, stated that the deal reflects Shell’s continued focus on “adjusting the portfolio in our power business,” high-grading the portfolio and recycling capital to build a more focused, competitive, and resilient business . The sale of Sprng Energy, which Shell acquired from Actis in August 2022 for $1.55 billion, comes as shareholders have pressured the company to focus on its core oil and gas business .

3.3. Consolidation in India’s Renewable Sector

The deal is a prime example of the accelerating consolidation in India’s renewable energy sector. Large industrial groups are increasingly choosing to acquire established platforms to gain scale rather than build long-gestation greenfield projects from scratch . This trend is driven by the rising demand for clean power from manufacturing, data centres, and corporate decarbonisation efforts . Analysts noted that the acquisition was executed at a meaningful discount to listed renewable energy companies, suggesting Grasim acquired a large portfolio of operational and de-risked assets at an attractive price .

4. Industry Reactions and Analyst Views

The deal has been received positively by analysts. Morgan Stanley maintained an “Overweight” rating on Grasim, calling the acquisition a positive development that provides immediate scale and aligns with India’s energy security agenda . Citi retained its “Buy” rating, though analysts noted that investors might initially focus on the impact of the acquisition on Grasim’s leverage, expecting the company to strike a balance between capital allocation and scaling up its renewable business .

The sale process attracted significant interest from major global players, including KKR, Actis, a NIIF-Temasek consortium, and Sembcorp, before narrowing down to the Aditya Birla Group and KKR . The final approval came after Shell executives visited India and reviewed the Birla proposal .

Jayant Dua, Business Head of Aditya Birla Renewables, highlighted the complementary capabilities and geographical presence of the two platforms, noting that the combined talent pool and expertise across project development, engineering, procurement, construction, and asset management would unlock meaningful operational synergies .

5. Conclusion: A Defining Moment for India’s Clean Energy Future

The Aditya Birla Group’s acquisition of Sprng Energy from Shell for Rs 17,200 crore is a landmark transaction that signals India’s growing importance in the global energy transition. It marks a significant step for the Aditya Birla Group in its journey to become a major player in renewable energy, and it reflects the broader trend of consolidation and strategic realignment in the sector. As Aryaman Vikram Birla noted, the company has almost achieved its 10 GWp target “ahead of time” and is now “on track to double capacity in the next few years,” with a “sharper focus on quality, execution, and long-term value creation” . This acquisition positions the group to play a defining role in India’s energy future.

5 Questions & Answers on the Acquisition

Q1. What is the scale and value of the Aditya Birla Group’s acquisition of Sprng Energy?

A. The transaction is valued at an enterprise value of Rs 17,200 crore ($1.8 billion). It involves the acquisition of 100% of Solenergi Power Pvt Ltd, the holding company of Sprng Energy, making it one of the largest acquisitions in India’s renewable energy sector by value and scale .

Q2. How will this acquisition impact Aditya Birla Renewables’ portfolio?

A. The acquisition will add a contracted portfolio of approximately 5 GWp (3.3 GWp operational, 1.7 GWp under construction) to ABRen’s existing 4.4 GWp portfolio, bringing the combined total to about 9.3 GWp. This positions ABRen among India’s largest renewable energy platforms .

Q3. What is the strategic rationale for Shell selling Sprng Energy?

A. Shell is selling Sprng Energy as part of its strategy to “high-grade” its power portfolio and recycle capital in line with its asset-backed trading strategy. Shareholders have also pressured the company to focus on its core oil and gas business .

Q4. Why is this acquisition considered significant for India’s renewable energy sector?

A. The deal highlights the accelerating consolidation in the sector, where large industrial groups are acquiring established platforms to scale quickly rather than building greenfield projects. It is also a strategic move by one of India’s largest conglomerates to position itself as a major player in the country’s energy transition .

Q5. Who are the key financiers for this acquisition?

A. The acquisition will be funded through a mix of debt and equity from Grasim Industries and investment from funds managed by Global Infrastructure Partners (GIP), an infrastructure investment arm of BlackRock.

India’s Trade Deficit Widens to $30.4 Billion in June as Shipping Disruptions Weigh on Exports

1. Introduction: A Five-Month High for India’s Trade Gap

India’s merchandise trade deficit widened to a five-month high of $30.43 billion in June 2026, as exports fell faster than imports amid shipping disruptions in the Strait of Hormuz linked to the West Asia conflict . The deficit significantly exceeded economists’ expectations of $26.63 billion, according to a Reuters poll .

Merchandise exports fell to $40.41 billion in June from $45.2 billion in the previous month, while imports declined to $70.84 billion from $73.41 billion in May . However, on a year-on-year basis, goods exports rose 15.5% to $40.41 billion, while imports surged nearly 31% to $70.8 billion . The trade deficit was $19.1 billion a year earlier .

Aditi Nayar, chief economist at ICRA, noted that the merchandise trade deficit widened by over 50% from a year earlier as elevated commodity prices pushed up the import bill . With West Asia’s impact on crude prices remaining a monitorable, ICRA expects the current account deficit to widen to at least 1.0% of GDP in FY2027 .

2. The Impact of Shipping Disruptions

The West Asia conflict, particularly the disruption of shipping through the Strait of Hormuz, significantly impacted India’s trade flows in June. The number of vessels transiting the Strait of Hormuz fell to multi-week lows as renewed strikes between the US and Iran and attacks on ships heightened safety concerns .

Indian exporters faced difficulties in shipping goods to the region, with shipments to West Asia declining in March due to the US-Iran conflict before improving in April and May . However, the conflict impacted the movement of ships carrying cargoes in international waters, particularly through the Strait of Hormuz . After the initial disruption in exports to the region, India used three ports in Oman—Duqm, Sohar and Salalah—to push shipments .

Exporters’ bodies have flagged concerns over global demand softness, particularly from Western markets, as a drag on growth in outbound shipments . The US and Europe no longer fuel India’s export growth, with countries from the ASEAN region, Africa and South Asia becoming the biggest drivers of growth .

3. Rising Imports and the Import Bill

The widening trade deficit was driven by a sharp increase in imports of crude oil, gold and electronics products . Commerce Secretary Rajesh Agarwal said the surge in imports was largely driven by higher global prices of crude oil and precious metals, and that the increase did not mean a rise in import volumes .

Key import figures for June:

• Crude oil imports jumped 40% year-on-year to $19.32 billion 

• Petroleum, gold and electronics imports added $20 billion to the trade deficit 

• Electronics imports grew 58.77% to $13.4 billion 

• Gold imports increased to about $2 billion in June, with first-quarter gold imports rising to $11.01 billion from $7.49 billion in the April-June period of 2025 

• Fertiliser imports jumped 201.3% year-on-year 

Agarwal attributed higher electronics imports to “a rising middle class and disposable incomes and demand in the country” . Higher import bills for petroleum products and gold were due to increase in prices in the international markets .

4. Export Growth and Sectoral Performance

Despite the overall decline in sequential exports, India’s exports have shown resilience on a year-on-year basis, with merchandise exports rising 15.5% in June and 15.92% during the April-June quarter .

Top performing export sectors in June:

• Gems and jewellery: 34.64% year-on-year growth 

• Engineering goods: 20.74% growth 

• Organic and inorganic chemicals: 19.42% growth 

• Electronic goods: 18.93% growth 

India’s total exports, comprising merchandise and services, were estimated at $73.45 billion in June 2026, up 9.48% from a year earlier . The cumulative value of merchandise exports during the April-June period rose to $129.32 billion, as compared to $111.57 billion during the corresponding period of the previous year, registering a growth of 15.92% .

Pankaj Chadha, Chairman of EEPC India, attributed the double-digit growth in exports to “free trade pacts with key partner countries, exporters’ product and market diversification strategy, and the rising competitiveness of Brand India products” .

5. Quarterly Performance and Outlook

During the April-June quarter of FY2026-27, India’s total exports (merchandise and services combined) rose 11.37% year-on-year to a record $232.73 billion, while total imports rose 17.55% to $270.15 billion . The merchandise trade deficit widened to $86.86 billion in the April-June period from $68.75 billion a year earlier .

Services exports provided a cushion, with the estimated value of services exports for June 2026 at $33.03 billion and services imports at $17.92 billion, leading to a services trade surplus of $15.11 billion . For the April-June quarter, services exports increased to an estimated $103.41 billion from $97.41 billion in the year-ago period, with the services trade surplus widening to $49.43 billion from $47.90 billion .

The trade data underscores pressure on India to sustain exports and contain import costs as it holds out for a better deal with the United States . India has rejected a quick trade agreement with the US in recent talks and is holding out for a better deal as Prime Minister Narendra Modi draws confidence from new trading partners, eased economic risks and political gains at home .

Upasna Bhardwaj, chief economist at Kotak Mahindra Bank, said: “The widening of the June trade deficit is largely led by higher net imports of oil and electronics. However, exports continue to hold firm. We continue to monitor oil prices going ahead for any risks to our CAD/GDP ratio of 1.5 per cent” .

5 Questions & Answers

Q1: What was India’s merchandise trade deficit in June 2026, and how did it compare to expectations?

A: India’s merchandise trade deficit widened to $30.43 billion in June 2026, a five-month high. This significantly exceeded economists’ expectations of $26.63 billion, according to a Reuters poll .

Q2: What were the key factors driving the widening trade deficit?

A: The widening trade deficit was driven by higher imports of crude oil (up 40% year-on-year), gold, and electronics products. Petroleum, gold and electronics imports added $20 billion to the trade deficit. Elevated global commodity prices pushed up the import bill .

Q3: How did the West Asia conflict impact India’s trade performance?

A: The West Asia conflict and shipping disruptions through the Strait of Hormuz weighed on exports, with merchandise exports falling sequentially to $40.41 billion from $45.2 billion in May. Exporters faced difficulties in shipping goods to the region, though India used ports in Oman to bypass disruptions .

Q4: What were the top-performing export sectors in June 2026?

A: The top-performing export sectors were gems and jewellery (34.64% year-on-year growth), engineering goods (20.74%), organic and inorganic chemicals (19.42%), and electronic goods (18.93%) .

Q5: What is the outlook for India’s current account deficit in FY2027?

A: ICRA expects the current account deficit to widen to at least 1.0% of GDP in FY2027 due to elevated commodity prices and West Asia’s impact on crude prices. Kotak Mahindra Bank is monitoring oil prices for any risks to its CAD/GDP ratio projection of 1.5%.

The NRI Dollar Rush, How India’s Forex Blitz Is Reshaping Overseas Indian Banking

1. Introduction: A Banking Blitz for Foreign Currency

In a concerted push to attract foreign capital and strengthen India’s external buffers, the government has launched a multi-pronged strategy to mobilise foreign currency deposits from its vast diaspora. Finance Minister Nirmala Sitharaman recently convened a high-level review meeting with the chiefs of public sector banks (PSBs) and financial institutions to assess the progress of the Reserve Bank of India’s (RBI) swap initiatives for Foreign Currency Non-Resident (Bank) deposits (FCNR(B)), External Commercial Borrowings (ECBs), and Overseas Foreign Currency Borrowings (OFCBs) .

The meeting highlighted the encouraging initial response to these schemes and underscored the government’s determination to intensify outreach to the NRI diaspora, introduce innovative deposit products, and sustain the momentum of mobilisation during the remaining tenure of the schemes . This push comes against the backdrop of a sharp decline in FCNR(B) inflows, which dropped to just USD 946 million in FY26 from USD 7.1 billion in FY25 . The situation has been further complicated by rising overseas interest rates by around 50 basis points since the RBI announced the swap facility, which has somewhat reduced the attractiveness of FCNR(B) deposits .

This analysis examines the mechanics of the FCNR(B) scheme, the policy backdrop, the opportunities it presents for NRIs, and the challenges that remain in mobilising foreign currency deposits at scale.

2. The Scheme Mechanics: How RBI Is Sweetening the Deal

The RBI, in its June 2026 Monetary Policy Statement, announced a package of measures to encourage foreign currency inflows, with a special focus on attracting foreign currency deposits from the Indian diaspora . The package comprises a US dollar-rupee forex swap facility at par for fresh FCNR(B) deposits and a concessional swap facility for eligible ECBs and OFCBs .

The key features of the scheme are:

• Interest Rate Deregulation: On June 17, 2026, the RBI issued amendments to deposit interest rate directions for urban cooperative banks, small finance banks, and regional rural banks, temporarily withdrawing the interest rate ceiling on fresh FCNR(B) deposits of 3-5 year tenors and the restriction on interest rates on NRE deposits of 3-year and above tenors . This relaxation applies until September 30, 2026 .

• Hedging Cost Absorption: Under the temporary FCNR(B) arrangement, the central bank will absorb the entire hedging cost—estimated at 280-300 basis points—allowing banks to offer substantially higher returns on foreign currency deposits without bearing the associated currency risk . This makes FCNR(B) deposits attractive for NRIs, with several banks increasing interest rates to as much as 7.1% for certain US dollar deposits .

• Swap Coverage: The RBI clarified that the swap facility operates as a plain buy-sell forex swap, covering only the principal amount of the deposits and not the interest component . This provides banks with a mechanism to manage exchange rate risk while mobilising foreign currency deposits.

• Daily Reporting Framework: The RBI has instituted a robust daily reporting framework requiring all authorised dealer banks to submit daily data on FCNR(B) deposits, ECBs, and OFCBs mobilised under the swap facility by 6 p.m. every day . This enables transparent, real-time monitoring of progress across participating institutions .

3. Bank Response: A Race to Attract NRI Deposits

Banks have responded swiftly to the RBI’s measures, revising their FCNR(B) deposit rates and launching special schemes to attract NRI deposits.

Interest Rates on Offer:

• Indian Overseas Bank raised interest rates on its FCNR(B) deposits, offering a flat 6.5% per annum on US dollar deposits across three- to five-year tenures .

• DBS Bank India revised its FCNR(B) deposit rates, offering up to 5.6% per annum on USD deposits for 3-5 years, effective July 1, 2026 .

• Some smaller banks have offered rates as high as 7.1% per annum on USD FCNR(B) deposits, significantly higher than the US Treasury yield of 4-4.2% .

Features of FCNR(B) Deposits:

FCNR(B) deposits are fixed deposits that NRIs, Overseas Citizens of India (OCIs), and Persons of Indian Origin (PIOs) can maintain with banks in India in designated foreign currencies such as the US dollar, British pound, Euro, Japanese yen, Canadian dollar, and Australian dollar . The key benefits include:

• Currency Protection: The deposits remain denominated in the foreign currency, insulating depositors from exchange-rate fluctuations .

• Tax Exemption: Both the principal and interest are entirely tax-free in India .

• Full Repatriability: Both the principal and interest are freely repatriable .

• No Rupee Exposure: Unlike NRE fixed deposits, which convert foreign currency into rupees, FCNR(B) deposits keep the money in the original currency throughout the tenure .

4. The Government’s Push: Enhancing NRI Outreach

Finance Minister Nirmala Sitharaman has called upon banks to further intensify outreach to the NRI diaspora, introduce innovative deposit products, and sustain the momentum of mobilisation during the remaining period of the schemes .

During the review meeting, bank chiefs informed the finance minister that the scheme has generated strong interest among NRIs, particularly in Singapore, Hong Kong, West Asia, the US, and the UK . Public sector banks have rolled out customised outreach programmes, including digital initiatives, to engage the NRI diaspora . Banks also informed the finance minister that International Banking Units (IBUs) at the International Financial Services Centre (IFSC) at GIFT City, Gujarat, are being utilised to leverage fund mobilisation from multiple jurisdictions .

However, bankers also flagged operational hurdles. One key issue was the difficulty in completing KYC formalities through representative offices in certain overseas markets, particularly the UAE, where banks do not have branches . The finance minister assured the banks that the ministry would discuss the KYC issue with the RBI and explore additional measures or regulatory relaxations that could help enhance forex inflows from West Asia .

5. The Opportunity for NRIs: A Window of Attractive Returns

For NRIs, the current FCNR(B) scheme presents a rare opportunity to earn attractive, tax-free returns on their foreign currency savings while hedging against currency risk . The key considerations for NRIs are:

Who Can Invest:

FCNR(B) deposits are open to NRIs, Overseas Citizens of India (OCIs), and Persons of Indian Origin (PIOs) .

Investment Horizon:

The scheme is available for fresh deposits with a 3-5 year tenor, with a one-year lock-in period . Premature withdrawal before completion of the tenure will attract a penalty .

Currency Risk:

FCNR(B) deposits are denominated in foreign currency, insulating depositors from exchange rate fluctuations . Unlike NRE fixed deposits, which are denominated in rupees and subject to depreciation risk, FCNR(B) deposits offer a hedge against currency risk . As one advisor noted, “FCNR is inarguably a much better option than a rupee deposit right now, because the currency hedge is completely covered” .

Taxation:

FCNR(B) deposits are fully tax-free in India, but the tax exemption does not override home-country tax obligations. For instance, Indian tax exemption does not override the IRS, HMRC, or any other tax authority in the investor’s country of residence .

Deadline:

The scheme is available only until September 30, 2026, for fresh deposits with a 3-5 year tenor .

6. Conclusion: A Defining Moment for NRI Banking

The government’s push to mobilise foreign currency deposits through FCNR(B) deposits, ECBs, and OFCBs represents a defining moment for NRI banking in India. The RBI’s measures, including the suspension of interest rate ceilings and the absorption of hedging costs, have created a window of opportunity for NRIs to earn attractive, tax-free returns on their foreign currency savings while insulating themselves from currency risk.

However, significant challenges remain. The decline in FCNR(B) inflows to just USD 946 million in FY26 underscores the need for a sustained and strategic effort to attract NRI deposits . The success of the scheme will depend on the ability of banks to address operational hurdles, enhance outreach, and build trust with the Indian diaspora.

For NRIs, the current window offers a rare opportunity to park their foreign currency savings at attractive rates. But as the RBI’s daily reporting framework and the government’s push for innovation underscore, the scheme is not just about attracting deposits—it is about building a long-term, sustainable relationship with the Indian diaspora, one that will reinforce India’s foreign exchange reserves and strengthen the resilience of the external sector amid global uncertainty .

5 Questions & Answers on the FCNR(B) Scheme

1. What is the FCNR(B) deposit scheme, and how does it benefit NRIs?

FCNR(B) is a fixed deposit scheme for NRIs, Overseas Citizens of India (OCIs), and Persons of Indian Origin (PIOs) in India, allowing them to hold deposits in designated foreign currencies . The key benefits include: protection against exchange rate fluctuations, tax-free interest in India, and full repatriability of both principal and interest .

2. What policy changes has the RBI made to boost FCNR(B) deposits?

The RBI temporarily withdrew the interest rate ceiling on fresh FCNR(B) deposits with tenors of 3-5 years and the restriction on NRE deposit rates of 3 years and above, for the period until September 30, 2026 . It also introduced a US dollar-rupee swap facility at par for FCNR(B) deposits, absorbing the hedging cost for banks .

3. What are the key operational challenges facing banks in mobilising FCNR(B) deposits?

Banks have flagged difficulties in completing KYC formalities through representative offices in certain overseas markets, particularly the UAE, where banks do not have branches . The finance minister has assured banks that the ministry will discuss the KYC issue with the RBI and explore regulatory relaxations to help enhance forex inflows from West Asia .

4. What is the significance of the GIFT City IFSC in the FCNR(B) mobilisation drive?

Banks are utilising the International Banking Units (IBUs) at the International Financial Services Centre (IFSC) at GIFT City, Gujarat, to leverage fund mobilisation from multiple jurisdictions, including the UK, the US, West Asia, Hong Kong, Singapore, and Southeast Asia . The finance minister has exhorted banks to maximise utilisation of the financial services and institutional infrastructure available at GIFT City .

5. What is the deadline for the FCNR(B) swap facility, and what is the outlook for the scheme?

Fresh FCNR(B) deposits are eligible under the scheme until September 30, 2026, while ECBs and OFCBs are eligible until December 31, 2026 . Bank chiefs have expressed confidence that ECB mobilisations will gather stronger traction during the third quarter of FY27 (October-December 2026) . The government aims to build on the positive sentiment and accelerate deposit mobilisation during the remaining tenure of the schemes.