Counting Chickens Before They Hatch, The Ugly Manoeuvre for Kerala’s Chief Minister’s Post
In Kerala, the United Democratic Front (UDF) has been engaged in ugly manoeuvres for the Chief Minister’s post—before a single vote has been counted. The Congress in the state has been counting its chickens before they hatch. For several weeks, even before the Assembly elections held on May 4, senior leaders have been publicly positioning themselves for the Chief Minister’s chair, assuming that the UDF would win. Just as the party sought to put a lid on the unseemly public display of personal ambition, its most important ally muddied the waters further. Panakkad Sadiq Ali Shahab Thangal, State president of the Indian Union Muslim League (IUML), publicly backed V.D. Satheesan for Chief Minister, citing exit polls of dubious authority, and urging the Congress’s central leadership to let “public sentiment” guide the choice.
The blowback was immediate. Sectarian leaders who have been whipping up anti-Muslim sentiment were quick to claim that the Congress and the UDF were in the IUML’s stranglehold. The charge has a history to feed on. The IUML’s maximalist demands for seats, cabinet berths, and portfolios have contributed to that impression over decades. The public posturing is a stinging reminder of what to avoid if the UDF is to remain viable in the face of rapid social change. This article examines the conventions of Kerala’s coalition politics, the implications of the IUML’s intervention, the historical context of the Congress-IUML relationship, and what this manoeuvring means for the UDF’s social base and electoral prospects.
Part I: The Conventions of Kerala’s Coalition Politics
The conventions of Kerala’s coalition politics are clear and have held for decades. A single party rarely wins an absolute majority in the 140-member Kerala Legislative Assembly. Instead, the partners of a front—the UDF or the Left Democratic Front (LDF)—collectively win those numbers. The leading party—the Congress in the UDF, the Communist Party of India (Marxist) or CPI-M in the LDF—elects its legislature party leader, who is then accepted by the front as Chief Minister.
There is no record of this decorum being broken by any junior partner in either front in Kerala’s history. The arrangement is not a legal requirement; it is a political convention, built on trust, mutual respect, and the recognition that coalition governments require stable leadership. The leading party provides the Chief Minister; the junior partners provide cabinet ministers, support, and their respective social bases. In return, the junior partners expect their interests to be accommodated, but not to dictate the top leadership choice.
Neither front contested the 2026 election with a declared chief ministerial candidate. Even the sitting Chief Minister, Pinarayi Vijayan, was not named as the LDF’s CM candidate. In both fronts, the Chief Minister has traditionally emerged through a two-step process: first, the newly elected MLAs of the leading party choose their leader; second, that leader is presented to the front partners for acceptance. This process happens after the election, not before, and certainly not on the basis of exit polls.
The IUML’s public intervention—backing a specific candidate, citing exit polls, and calling on the Congress high command to follow “public sentiment”—breaks with this convention. It is not merely a statement of preference; it is an attempt to pre-empt and constrain the Congress’s internal decision-making process.
Part II: The IUML’s Intervention – What Happened and Why It Matters
Panakkad Sadiq Ali Shahab Thangal is not an ordinary politician. As the State president of the IUML and a member of the Panakkad family, which has led the Muslim League in Kerala for generations, his words carry enormous weight within the Muslim community and beyond. When he publicly backed V.D. Satheesan for Chief Minister, citing exit polls of dubious authority, he was not merely expressing an opinion. He was, in effect, telling the Congress high command: this is our preference, and we expect you to follow it.
The timing was particularly damaging. The Congress had been trying to put a lid on the unseemly public display of personal ambition by its own senior leaders. Several Congress veterans had been positioning themselves for the Chief Minister’s post for weeks, giving interviews, mobilising supporters, and making their case through the media. Just as the party leadership in Delhi sought to calm the situation, the IUML reignited it.
The IUML’s justification—that “public sentiment” should guide the choice—is convenient but hollow. Exit polls in India have a well-documented record of inaccuracy. Even if they were reliable, they measure voting intention, not sentiment about who should be Chief Minister. Moreover, the IUML has never before asserted a right to dictate the Congress’s leadership choice. The question is: why now?
The most plausible explanation is that the IUML sees an opportunity. The Congress in Kerala has been weakened by internal factionalism, the departure of key leaders to the BJP or to regional parties, and the challenge of the CPI-M-led LDF. The IUML, with its disciplined vote bank and its status as the UDF’s second-largest constituent, may believe that it can extract greater influence at a moment of Congress vulnerability. But such strategic overreach carries significant risks.
Part III: The Blowback – Sectarian Politics and Anti-Muslim Sentiment
The blowback to the IUML’s intervention was immediate and predictable. Sectarian leaders who have been whipping up anti-Muslim sentiment for years were quick to claim that the Congress and the UDF were in the IUML’s “stranglehold.” The charge was amplified on social media, on television news channels, and in campaign rallies. The BJP, which has been trying to expand its footprint in Kerala, seized on the issue to argue that a vote for the UDF is a vote for Muslim League domination.
The charge has a history to feed on. The IUML’s maximalist demands for seats, cabinet berths, and portfolios have contributed to the impression that the Congress is subservient to its Muslim ally. In every election, the IUML negotiates hard for a larger share of seats than its electoral strength might justify. In coalition governments, it has often secured portfolios that give it significant administrative power—education, industries, revenue, and others. Critics have long argued that the Congress has been unwilling or unable to push back against IUML demands for fear of losing its Muslim vote base.
This dynamic has contributed to rising tensions between the Muslim community on the one side and Hindus and Christians on the other. The perception that the Congress is beholden to the IUML has pushed some Hindu voters away from the UDF and toward the BJP or the LDF. At the same time, the IUML’s own rhetoric and positioning have alienated some Christian voters, who feel that their interests are not adequately represented within the UDF.
The realignment has proved beneficial for the BJP. In the 2021 Assembly elections, the BJP won a seat in Kerala for the first time (Nemom) and increased its vote share across the state. In the 2024 Lok Sabha elections, the BJP’s vote share in Kerala rose further, though it still won only one seat. The UDF’s internal squabbles over leadership only play into the BJP’s narrative of a divided, communalised opposition.
Part IV: The Social Base of the UDF – A Coalition Under Strain
The UDF has traditionally been a coalition of diverse social groups: upper-caste Hindus (particularly Nairs), Christians (Syrian Catholics, Orthodox, Jacobite, and others), Muslims, and Dalits. The Congress has been the umbrella that holds these groups together. The IUML has been the principal representative of the Muslim community, which constitutes approximately 27 per cent of Kerala’s population—the highest share of any Indian state.
This coalition has been remarkably stable for decades. It has survived internal disputes, electoral defeats, and the rise of the BJP. But it is now under strain. The causes are multiple:
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The Congress’s own decline: The Congress party nationally and in Kerala has lost its once-dominant position. Its internal factionalism, lack of a clear ideological message, and inability to counter the CPI-M’s organisational strength have weakened the umbrella.
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The IUML’s growing assertiveness: As the Congress has weakened, the IUML has become more assertive. Its demands for seats and portfolios have increased. Its public interventions on leadership choices, as seen in this election, represent a qualitative escalation.
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The BJP’s inroads: The BJP has successfully appealed to sections of Hindu voters who feel that the Congress has abandoned them in favour of minority appeasement. While the BJP remains a marginal force in Kerala electorally, its growth has been at the expense of the UDF.
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Generational change: Older voters who remember the Congress-led United Front governments of the past are being replaced by younger voters who have no such nostalgia. The IUML’s leadership, too, is undergoing generational change, with Panakkad Sadiq Ali Shahab Thangal representing a new, more assertive style.
The UDF may have barely stalled the disintegration of its social base in the 2026 election, if at all. The exit polls (of dubious authority) suggest a close contest between the UDF and the LDF. But even if the UDF wins, the underlying social strains have not been resolved.
Part V: The Congress High Command’s Dilemma
The Congress high command in Delhi faces a difficult choice. On one hand, it cannot afford to alienate the IUML, which is the UDF’s second-largest constituent and the principal representative of Kerala’s Muslim community. Without IUML support, the UDF cannot hope to form a government in Kerala.
On the other hand, the high command cannot be seen as yielding to pressure from a junior partner on the question of who will be Chief Minister. If the IUML’s public intervention is rewarded with the Chief Ministership of its preferred candidate, the message will be clear: the Congress is weak, it cannot control its own allies, and the real power in the UDF lies with the Muslim League. This perception would further erode the Congress’s support among Hindu and Christian voters, accelerate the realignment toward the BJP, and weaken the UDF’s long-term viability.
The convention of Kerala’s coalition politics—that the leading party chooses its leader, who is then accepted by the front—exists precisely to avoid such dilemmas. It provides a clear, predictable, and stable mechanism for leadership selection. The IUML’s intervention breaks with that convention. The Congress high command must therefore demonstrate that manoeuvres that embarrass the party carry a cost, not a reward.
This does not necessarily mean rejecting the IUML’s preferred candidate if that candidate is also acceptable to the Congress’s own MLAs. The point is not about V.D. Satheesan personally; it is about the process. If Satheesan emerges as the legislature party leader through the legitimate, post-election process of MLA voting, there is no problem. The problem arises if the high command imposes Satheesan (or anyone else) solely because the IUML demanded it, bypassing the internal Congress process.
Part VI: The Lessons for the UDF – What to Avoid
The IUML’s public posturing is a stinging reminder of what to avoid if the UDF is to remain viable in the face of rapid social change. Several lessons emerge:
First, leadership contests must be kept internal. The public display of personal ambition by Congress leaders in the weeks before the election was unseemly and damaging. It conveyed the impression that the party was more interested in dividing the spoils than in serving the people. The Congress high command must enforce discipline and ensure that leadership discussions happen behind closed doors.
Second, allies must respect coalition conventions. The IUML’s intervention was a violation of the understood norms of Kerala’s coalition politics. The convention is clear: the leading party chooses the Chief Minister; the allies accept that choice. If the IUML wishes to change this convention, it should negotiate that change privately, not through public statements citing exit polls.
Third, the Congress must strengthen its own organisation. The weakness of the Congress in Kerala—its factionalism, its lack of a strong grassroots presence, its dependence on a handful of leaders—has created the space for the IUML’s assertiveness. A stronger Congress would be better positioned to negotiate with allies from a position of strength.
Fourth, the UDF must address the perception of minority appeasement. Whether fair or not, the perception that the Congress is beholden to the IUML has cost the UDF Hindu votes. The Congress must demonstrate, through policies and messaging, that it represents all communities equally, and that its commitment to secularism is not a cover for minority communalism.
Fifth, the high command must act decisively. The Congress’s central leadership in Delhi has often been accused of indecisiveness and factional balancing. In the Kerala case, the high command must take a clear position: the convention will be respected, the Chief Minister will be chosen by the Congress’s elected MLAs after the election, and no ally will be allowed to pre-empt that process.
Part VII: The Broader Context – Kerala’s Rapid Social Change
The leadership manoeuvring cannot be understood in isolation from Kerala’s rapid social change. The state has undergone profound transformations in recent decades: rising education levels, increased migration to the Gulf and to other states, changing family structures, the growth of new media, and the decline of traditional authority structures.
The IUML’s own leadership transition—from the older generation of Panakkad leaders to the current generation—reflects these changes. The Panakkad family has historically commanded immense respect and deference within the Muslim community. But that deference is not automatic among younger, more educated, and more globally connected Muslims. The IUML’s assertiveness may be, in part, a response to this internal pressure: the leadership needs to demonstrate that it can deliver tangible benefits—including political power—to retain its relevance.
Similarly, the Congress’s internal factionalism reflects a party struggling to adapt to a new political landscape where old loyalties have eroded. The CPI-M-led LDF has its own challenges, but it has historically been more successful at managing internal disagreements behind closed doors.
The UDF’s ability to navigate these changes will determine its long-term viability. The coalition that was built for the political landscape of the 1980s and 1990s may not be sustainable in the 2020s and 2030s without significant reform.
Conclusion: A Test of Decorum and Viability
The UDF may or may not win the 2026 Assembly elections. The exit polls are of dubious authority, and the final results will not be known for several days. But regardless of the electoral outcome, the ugly manoeuvring for the Chief Minister’s post has already done damage.
It has exposed the UDF’s internal divisions. It has fed the BJP’s narrative of minority appeasement. It has strained the coalition’s social base. And it has raised questions about whether the Congress can still lead its alliance effectively.
The IUML would serve itself, the culture of coalition politics, and the social fabric of Kerala far better by respecting the decorum of the past. The Congress high command, for its part, must demonstrate that manoeuvres that embarrass the party carry a cost, not a reward. And both parties must recognise that Kerala’s voters are watching—and that they punish coalitions that appear more interested in power than in governance.
The conventions of Kerala’s coalition politics have held for decades because they worked. They provided stability, predictability, and a mechanism for resolving disagreements without public acrimony. Breaking those conventions for short-term gain may yield a Chief Minister, but it may also break the coalition. And a broken coalition benefits no one except the BJP and the LDF.
5 Questions & Answers Based on the Article
Q1. What are the established conventions of coalition politics in Kerala regarding the selection of the Chief Minister?
A1. The established conventions are clear and have held for decades. Since a single party rarely wins an absolute majority, the partners of a front collectively win the required numbers. The leading party—the Congress in the United Democratic Front (UDF) and the CPI-M in the Left Democratic Front (LDF)—elects its legislature party leader after the election. That leader is then accepted by the front as Chief Minister. There is no record of this decorum being broken by any junior partner in either front. Neither front contests elections with a declared chief ministerial candidate; the Chief Minister emerges through a two-step process involving newly elected MLAs and the central leadership of the leading party.
Q2. What did Panakkad Sadiq Ali Shahab Thangal, the IUML State president, do that broke with convention, and why was it controversial?
A2. Panakkad Sadiq Ali Shahab Thangal publicly backed V.D. Satheesan for Chief Minister, citing exit polls of dubious authority, and urged the Congress’s central leadership to let “public sentiment” guide the choice. This broke with convention because leadership selection is supposed to happen after the election, through the Congress’s internal process of MLA voting, not before the election based on exit polls. The IUML, as a junior partner, has no established role in dictating the Congress’s leadership choice. The intervention was controversial because it appeared to be an attempt to pre-empt and constrain the Congress’s decision-making, feeding the perception that the Congress is in the IUML’s “stranglehold.”
Q3. How did sectarian leaders and the BJP respond to the IUML’s intervention, and why is this significant for the UDF’s social base?
A3. Sectarian leaders who have been whipping up anti-Muslim sentiment claimed that the Congress and the UDF were in the IUML’s stranglehold. The BJP seized on the issue to argue that a vote for the UDF is a vote for Muslim League domination. This is significant because the UDF’s social base includes upper-caste Hindus (particularly Nairs), Christians, Muslims, and Dalits. The perception that the Congress is beholden to the IUML has pushed some Hindu voters away from the UDF and toward the BJP or the LDF. This realignment has benefited the BJP, which has been trying to expand its footprint in Kerala. The UDF may have barely stalled the disintegration of its social base, and the IUML’s public posturing threatens to accelerate that disintegration.
Q4. Why does the article argue that the IUML’s intervention could be counterproductive for the UDF’s long-term viability?
A4. The article argues that the IUML’s intervention breaks with the established conventions of coalition politics, which have provided stability and predictability for decades. If the IUML is seen as dictating the Chief Minister choice, it will reinforce the perception that the Congress is weak and the UDF is under minority communalism. This will further erode the Congress’s support among Hindu and Christian voters, accelerate the realignment toward the BJP, and weaken the UDF’s long-term viability. Moreover, the intervention sets a dangerous precedent: if a junior partner can publicly pressure the leading party on leadership choices, the convention dissolves, and coalition politics becomes a free-for-all.
Q5. What does the article suggest the Congress high command must do in response to the IUML’s manoeuvring, and why?
A5. The article suggests that the Congress high command must demonstrate that manoeuvres that embarrass the party carry a cost, not a reward. This does not necessarily mean rejecting the IUML’s preferred candidate (V.D. Satheesan) if he emerges as the legislature party leader through the legitimate, post-election process of MLA voting. The problem is the process, not the person. The high command must enforce the convention that the Chief Minister will be chosen by the Congress’s elected MLAs after the election, not pre-empted by an ally citing exit polls. If the high command yields to the IUML’s pressure and imposes Satheesan without an internal Congress process, it will signal weakness, further erode the Congress’s social base, and damage the UDF’s viability. The high command must act decisively to restore the convention.
