Capitalising on Changing Tamil Voter Mood, The Rise of Vijay and the Crisis of Dravidian Politics

Capitalising on Changing Tamil Voter Mood, The Rise of Vijay and the Crisis of Dravidian Politics

Social justice, especially the reservation policy, is not an existential issue in that it is yet another detail to be attended to while filling forms. Or it becomes a matter of contention when used to discredit reservation for Dalits. In short, reservation is neither valued nor understood, and Dravidian parties have been lax in meaningful political communication on the subject. For older voters, reservation, or for that matter social justice, holds no special interest—after all, it is a default setting. It has been important only when it helped to build dominant caste constituencies. As Tamil scholar Stalin Rajangam pointed out nearly 15 years ago, reservation has been a focal point for numerically powerful backward castes to mobilise their caste brethren into a political force, which is then used to torment Dalits who are assertive, and on that basis, to proclaim a caste’s claim to power within the larger body politic. This is the context in which the 2026 Tamil Nadu election results must be understood. The DMK’s model of rule has contributed to the party being edged out. The real and tragic losers are the Viduthalai Chiruthaigal Katchi (VCK) and the Left parties. And the unexpected gainer is actor C. Joseph Vijay’s Tamizhaga Vetri Kazhagam (TVK), which has capitalised on the sins of omission and commission of extant parties.

The Hollowing of Social Justice

Claims to social justice cannot but appear ironic to Dalits in this context. The two Dravidian parties have been indifferent to the persistence of brutal violence against them—especially the spate of killings of young Dalit men who dared to love caste Hindu women. For all their veneration of Periyar, the DMK’s leaders have not sustained a public dialogue or educational outreach on inter-caste love and marriage. The party that claims to represent the legacy of the Self-Respect Movement has been silent when Dalit lives are lost to caste pride. This silence is not an oversight; it is a structural feature. The DMK’s support base includes powerful backward castes (Vanniyars, Thevars, Gounders) who are often the perpetrators of violence against Dalits. To speak out would be to alienate these constituencies. So the party chooses silence, and Dalits learn that their lives are expendable.

Meanwhile, Hindutva’s machinations have helped shore up dominant caste identities in the state, and in some contexts served the interests of subaltern caste persons who are disgruntled with the political truisms of the Dravidian parties. It is not so much the BJP’s known antipathy to Muslims and Christians that marks its existence here—though that is not absent; rather, the party is viewed as ‘their’ own by segments of caste Hindus. The BJP has successfully positioned itself as the party of upper-caste consolidation, but also as a vehicle for backward caste aspirations that feel betrayed by the Dravidian parties. In the 2021 elections, the BJP won no seats, but its vote share increased. In 2026, it may win a handful. The trend is upward.

The DMK’s Model of Rule: Governance Without Dialogue

The DMK’s model of rule too has contributed to the party being edged out. For some time now, the government has relied on policymaking undertaken by able bureaucrats, with the support of non-governmental organisations or private research institutes, rather than heed voices from the ground. It is ironic that sanitary workers complaining about unfair wages are ignored until it is impossible to do so, even as local bodies commission studies on municipal waste. The DMK has become a party of technocrats, not cadres. Policy is made in air-conditioned offices, not in village meetings. The voice of the ordinary party worker has been replaced by the survey of the professional consultant.

This is not unique to the DMK. Across the world, political parties have shifted from mass-based organisations to electoral-professional machines. But the DMK’s transformation is particularly striking because it claims a mass base. The party that once organised agitations, that once brought people into the streets, now relies on welfare schemes delivered through Direct Benefit Transfer (DBT). The cadre has been repurposed from organisers to beneficiaries. They no longer debate ideology; they queue for cash.

The Real Losers: VCK and the Left

The real and tragic losers in this election are the Viduthalai Chiruthaigal Katchi (VCK) and the Left parties. The AIADMK is not burdened by ideology and has been let down by an uneven caste arithmetic. But the Left and Dalit parties have stayed within an uneasy alliance and not benefited from it—in spite of individual victories, their vision of social change has been forced into a framework that is not theirs, and they would now need to retrieve it. The VCK, led by Thol. Thirumavalavan, has been the most consistent voice against caste oppression in Tamil Nadu. It has organised Dalits, articulated their grievances, and challenged the Dravidian parties on their hypocrisy. But in alliance with the DMK, the VCK has been rendered silent. It has traded its ideological edge for ministerial berths. The Left parties (CPI and CPI-M) have suffered a similar fate. Once the alternative to Dravidian politics, they are now reduced to junior partners in a coalition they cannot lead.

The alliance with the DMK has not benefited the VCK or the Left because the DMK’s model of governance leaves no space for their vision. The DMK wants technicians, not ideologues. It wants implementers, not agitators. The VCK and Left have been forced into this mould, and they have lost their reason for being.

The Rise of Vijay: The Instant Politics of Celebrity

Mr. Vijay has thus gained from the sins of omission and commission of extant parties. And it is to his advantage that his young followers are not part of that slow world of thought and dialogue which continues to attract young persons inspired by Periyar, Ambedkar and Marx. Rather, the adoring crowds that have voted Mr. Vijay to power move to a different rhythm. Thanks to social media, they respond to the instant rather than anything else. The proliferation of images and words on our screens has collapsed the gap between intent and action. And Mr. Vijay occupies this collapsed space—his presence is already action.

Vijay’s TVK is not a party in the traditional sense. It has no ideology, no cadre, no organisational structure. What it has is a celebrity leader with a massive fan following, a social media team that generates 24/7 content, and a youthful electorate that is impatient with the slow pace of politics. For young Tamils, the DMK and AIADMK represent the past. They are parties of their parents’ generation, mired in corruption, caste politics, and empty rhetoric. The Left is irrelevant. The VCK is compromised. Vijay offers something new: not a programme, but a persona. Not a vision, but a vibe.

This is not to dismiss Vijay’s victory. It is real. But it is built on sand. Celebrity politics thrives on emotion, not reason. It can win elections, but can it govern? A film star can attract crowds, but can he manage a budget? A social media campaign can go viral, but can it deliver sanitation? These questions will be answered in the coming years. But for now, Vijay’s rise is a symptom of a deeper malaise: the collapse of ideological politics and the rise of instant, image-based, leader-centric democracy.

What the Future Holds

The 2026 election results mark the end of an era. The Dravidian parties, which have dominated Tamil Nadu politics for half a century, are in decline. The DMK has been edged out. The AIADMK is in disarray. The VCK and Left are marginalised. The BJP is gaining. And Vijay is rising. The political landscape of Tamil Nadu is fragmenting. The bipolar system is giving way to a multi-polar free-for-all.

For Dalits and the oppressed, the future is uncertain. The DMK took them for granted. The VCK sold them out. The BJP is hostile. Vijay is an unknown quantity. His party’s manifesto says little about caste, and his statements have been carefully ambiguous. Will he challenge caste oppression or accommodate it? Will he protect inter-caste couples or look away? These are open questions.

For the Left, the future is bleak. The CPI and CPI-M must retrieve their vision of social change and build a politics that speaks to the youth, not through old slogans but through new struggles. They must decide whether to remain in alliances that dilute their identity or to go it alone and risk electoral irrelevance.

For the VCK, the future is a choice. It can continue as a junior partner in Dravidian coalitions, trading ideology for office, or it can return to its roots as a Dalit assertion movement, building power from the ground up. The latter is harder, but it is the only path to relevance.

For Tamil Nadu, the future is a question. Will the state continue its tradition of social justice, or will it slide into majoritarian politics? Will it produce a new ideological alternative, or will it settle for celebrity spectacle? The answers will be written not in the next election, but in the streets, the classrooms, and the homes where the work of politics is done.

Q&A: Tamil Nadu’s Changing Political Mood

Q1: How does the article characterise the Dravidian parties’ handling of social justice and reservation?

A1: The article argues that the Dravidian parties (DMK and AIADMK) have been “lax in meaningful political communication” on social justice and reservation. Reservation is “neither valued nor understood” by older voters—it is a “default setting.” As Tamil scholar Stalin Rajangam noted, reservation has been a “focal point for numerically powerful backward castes to mobilise their caste brethren into a political force,” which is then used to “torment Dalits who are assertive.” The two Dravidian parties have been “indifferent to the persistence of brutal violence” against Dalits, especially “killings of young Dalit men who dared to love caste Hindu women.” For all their veneration of Periyar, the DMK’s leaders have not sustained a “public dialogue or educational outreach on inter-caste love and marriage.”

Q2: How has the DMK’s model of governance contributed to its decline?

A2: The DMK has relied on “policymaking undertaken by able bureaucrats, with the support of non-governmental organisations or private research institutes, rather than heed voices from the ground.” Sanitary workers complaining about unfair wages are “ignored until it is impossible to do so, even as local bodies commission studies on municipal waste.” The DMK has become a “party of technocrats, not cadres.” Policy is made in “air-conditioned offices, not in village meetings.” The voice of the ordinary party worker has been “replaced by the survey of the professional consultant.” The party that once organised agitations now relies on “welfare schemes delivered through Direct Benefit Transfer (DBT).” The cadre has been “repurposed from organisers to beneficiaries.”

Q3: Who are described as the “real and tragic losers” in the election, and why?

A3: The “real and tragic losers” are the Viduthalai Chiruthaigal Katchi (VCK) and the Left parties. The VCK, led by Thol. Thirumavalavan, had been the “most consistent voice against caste oppression in Tamil Nadu.” But in alliance with the DMK, the VCK has been “rendered silent,” trading its “ideological edge for ministerial berths.” The Left parties (CPI and CPI-M) have suffered a similar fate—once the “alternative to Dravidian politics,” they are now “reduced to junior partners in a coalition they cannot lead.” The alliance with the DMK has not benefited them because the DMK’s model of governance leaves “no space for their vision.” The DMK wants “technicians, not ideologues; implementers, not agitators.” The VCK and Left have been forced into this mould and have “lost their reason for being.”

Q4: What explains the rise of actor C. Joseph Vijay’s Tamizhaga Vetri Kazhagam (TVK)?

A4: Vijay has “gained from the sins of omission and commission of extant parties.” His young followers are “not part of that slow world of thought and dialogue” that attracts young persons inspired by Periyar, Ambedkar, and Marx. Instead, thanks to social media, they “respond to the instant rather than anything else.” The proliferation of images and words on screens has “collapsed the gap between intent and action.” Vijay “occupies this collapsed space—his presence is already action.” The TVK is “not a party in the traditional sense”—it has “no ideology, no cadre, no organisational structure.” What it has is a “celebrity leader with a massive fan following, a social media team that generates 24/7 content, and a youthful electorate that is impatient with the slow pace of politics.” For young Tamils, the DMK and AIADMK “represent the past… mired in corruption, caste politics, and empty rhetoric.”

Q5: What are the uncertainties and questions for the future of Tamil Nadu politics?

A5: The future is uncertain for multiple actors:

• For Dalits: The DMK took them for granted; the VCK sold them out; the BJP is hostile; Vijay is an “unknown quantity.” Will he “challenge caste oppression or accommodate it? Will he protect inter-caste couples or look away?”

• For the Left: The future is “bleak.” They must “retrieve their vision of social change and build a politics that speaks to the youth, not through old slogans but through new struggles.” They must decide whether to “remain in alliances that dilute their identity or go it alone.”

• For the VCK: It can continue as a “junior partner in Dravidian coalitions, trading ideology for office, or return to its roots as a Dalit assertion movement, building power from the ground up.”

• For Tamil Nadu: Will the state “continue its tradition of social justice, or slide into majoritarian politics”? Will it “produce a new ideological alternative, or settle for celebrity spectacle”? The answers will be written “in the streets, the classrooms, and the homes where the work of politics is done.”