Beijing’s Long Game, How China Made the World Dependent and Even America Vulnerable
Recently, I attended a lecture on ‘Long-term missions in a short-term world’ by S. Gurumurthy. To me, the biggest example has been China. It has not only had an astounding growth story over nearly fifty years, it has been strategic in its intent and execution. While the West has focused on quarterly earnings, election cycles, and immediate returns, China has been playing a very different game: one measured in decades, not quarters. And the results are now undeniable. China’s GDP grew 5 per cent in the first quarter of 2026, well ahead of estimates. We like to fault China on many fronts—deteriorating demographics, excess construction, export dependence. And yes, it is growing less than India’s 7-odd per cent per annum. But the Chinese economy is about five times the size of India’s. China’s 5 per cent growth rate versus India’s 7 per cent means that China adds 25 units to its GDP for every seven units we add. In just five to six years, China can add an entire Indian economy to its size. This is not a critique of India; it is a reality check.
Now consider research and development (R&D) spend. As a percentage of GDP, China spends seven times what India does. In nominal terms, because China’s economy is five times larger, China spends thirty-five times what India spends on R&D. The difference shows in results. China is now the only genuine technology rival to the United States. It dominates electric vehicles, advanced manufacturing, and is rapidly closing the gap in artificial intelligence, quantum computing, and biotech. This article examines China’s five-year plans, its strategic focus on technological self-reliance, its control over critical raw materials that the US military depends upon, and the implications for global power.
Part I: The Five-Year Plan as a Strategic Weapon
China’s 2021-25 Five-Year Plan placed technological self-reliance at the core of development, shifting focus from high-speed growth to high-quality, innovation-driven security. It identified seven ‘frontier areas’ for major science and technology projects where it sought self-reliance, breakthroughs, and ultimately dominance: artificial intelligence (AI), quantum information, integrated circuits, biotechnology and health sciences, deep-earth, deep-sea and polar exploration, aerospace and space technology, and brain science and neuromorphic computing.
Strategic emerging industries prioritized for immediate upgradation included new energy vehicles (NEVs), advanced manufacturing, high-end robotics, smart production and heavy equipment, next-generation information technology, and green tech. The plan also outlined upgrades to the digital economy and infrastructure.
Has China delivered? For sure. China is now the only technology rival to the US. The top five Chinese electric vehicle manufacturers control 43 per cent of the global market, with BYD alone at 20 per cent. In AI, Chinese firms like DeepSeek have demonstrated that they can achieve 90 per cent of Western performance at a fraction of the cost. In quantum communication, China has launched the world’s first quantum satellite, Micius, and has a network of quantum communication links that the US cannot yet match. In biotech, Chinese firms developed and deployed vaccines during the COVID-19 pandemic faster than almost any other nation.
Part II: The Next Frontier – 2026 to 2030
Now comes the next five-year plan, from 2026 to 2030. It focuses on two main tiers of technology: strategic emerging industries, which are ready for large-scale industrial use, and future industries, which represent the next frontier of global competition.
The first category includes:
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Massive deployment of the ‘AI Plus’ initiative to integrate AI across manufacturing, healthcare, and governance.
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Focus on high-end robotics, industrial machine tools, and ‘intelligentized’ production systems.
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Further dominance in electric vehicles.
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Large-scale commercialization of bio-medicine and innovative drug development.
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Expansion of drones and commercial space exploration.
The second category—the “industries of the future”—is where China aims to gain first-mover advantage. These include quantum technology (beyond what has already been achieved), next-generation networks including 6G mobile technology, human-machine integration (including focused development of a brain-computer interface), and humanoid robots. Plus unconventional energy options like nuclear fusion power and hydrogen, as well as bio-manufacturing.
We are practically in science fiction territory now. Self-reliance is a key theme to reduce dependence on any foreign technology or materials in all these areas. The unstated part is to make others reliant on you. And this is where China’s long game becomes most visible.
Part III: America’s Arsenal – Empty After Two Wars
In an article in Fortune, ‘America shot its arsenal empty in 2 wars. Now it needs Beijing’s permission to reload,’ Steve H. Hanke and Jeffrey Weng set out precisely why China is critical to America’s attempt to build back its depleted war arsenal. The facts are staggering.
According to the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), in the Iran war alone, the United States burned through:
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45 per cent of its Precision Strike Missile stockpile
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Half of its THAAD interceptors (Terminal High Altitude Area Defense)
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Nearly half of its Patriot PAC-3 inventory
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Roughly 30 per cent of its Tomahawk cruise missiles
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More than 20 per cent of its long-range JASSMs (Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missiles)
There is now a real risk of the United States running out of ammunition. And production cannot be restarted without a go-ahead from Beijing. Too many of the critical raw materials needed for these weapons flow almost exclusively through China.
Part IV: Rare Earths – The Invisible Chokepoint
Consider the specific materials. Each Tomahawk cruise missile’s fin actuators run on samarium-cobalt magnets. China mines and refines 99 per cent of the world’s samarium. In April 2025, China placed samarium under export licensing. The Patriot PAC-3 interceptor uses samarium-cobalt and yttrium-iron-garnet phase shifters. Besides samarium, China supplies 93 per cent of US yttrium imports.
The fin servos and seekers of JASSM-ER stealth cruise missiles run on neodymium-iron-boron magnets doped with dysprosium and terbium for thermal stability. China refines the vast majority of the world’s dysprosium and terbium. The F-35 Lightning II fighter jet contains 920 pounds of rare earths, most of which have been put under licence by China.
Across just these four weapon systems—Tomahawk, Patriot, JASSM, and F-35—the back-of-the-envelope replenishment requirement is between five and ten metric tons of finished defense-grade rare earth magnets. More than 95 per cent of these will have to come from China.
This is not a hypothetical vulnerability. It is a real, present, and growing chokepoint. China has put nearly all rare earths as well as antimony, gallium, germanium, and other critical minerals under export licensing or direct control. It has been playing the long game and has got the world and the United States exactly where it wants them.
Part V: Beyond Rare Earths – Gallium, Germanium, and Antimony
Rare earths are not the only critical materials. In July 2023, China imposed export controls on gallium and germanium, two minerals essential for semiconductor manufacturing, radar systems, and solar cells. China produces over 90 per cent of the world’s gallium and germanium. The timing was not accidental; it was a direct response to US sanctions on Chinese semiconductor technology.
Antimony, another critical mineral used in batteries, flame retardants, and munitions (including the explosive charges in certain missiles), is also dominated by China, which produces over 80 per cent of global supply. China has placed antimony under export controls as well.
The United States has made some efforts to diversify: it has funded rare earth mining projects in Australia and Canada, and it has encouraged recycling and stockpiling. But building a mine takes years. Building a refinery takes even longer. China has a multi-decade head start. It controls the entire supply chain—mining, refining, processing, and fabrication—for dozens of critical materials. The US, by contrast, has outsourced most of its refining capacity and has allowed its domestic mining industry to atrophy.
Part VI: The Long Game – How China Got Here
China’s strategy did not emerge overnight. It was deliberate, patient, and ruthless. In the 1980s and 1990s, while the West celebrated the end of the Cold War and the triumph of neoliberalism, China was studying what made nations powerful. It concluded that technological self-reliance and control over strategic resources were essential. It invested heavily in education, science, and engineering. It built a national innovation system that was not always efficient but was relentlessly focused on long-term goals.
In the 2000s, as China joined the World Trade Organization and became the world’s factory, it negotiated technology transfer from foreign companies. Western firms that wanted access to China’s market had to share their intellectual property, set up joint ventures, and transfer manufacturing know-how. China learned, copied, adapted, and then innovated. By the 2010s, China was no longer just the assembler of iPhones; it was designing its own smartphones, developing its own 5G technology, and building its own electric vehicle industry from scratch.
In the 2020s, China accelerated. It poured billions into semiconductor research, trying to break the stranglehold of US-designed, Taiwan-manufactured chips. It invested heavily in AI, quantum computing, and biotech. And it tightened its control over critical minerals, realizing that the West had made itself dependent on Chinese supply chains.
The West, meanwhile, was distracted. The wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, the 2008 financial crisis, Brexit, the COVID-19 pandemic, and now the Iran war—each crisis drew attention away from the long-term strategic competition with China. By the time Western policymakers woke up to the vulnerability, China was already a decade ahead.
Part VII: The Implications for Global Power
The implications of China’s long game are profound. The United States remains the world’s preeminent military power. It has more aircraft carriers, more fighter jets, more nuclear warheads, and more special forces than any other nation. But military power is not just about hardware; it is about the capacity to replenish that hardware. A missile that cannot be reloaded is not a deterrent; it is a one-shot weapon. A fighter jet that cannot fly because its magnets need rare earths that are controlled by an adversary is a hangar queen.
The CSIS data reveals that the United States has depleted its stockpiles in the Iran war. To rebuild, it needs Chinese permission. China has placed the necessary rare earths under export licensing. It can decide, at any moment, to slow or stop exports. It could use this leverage to extract concessions—on Taiwan, on trade, on technology transfer. The United States is, in effect, fighting a war with ammunition that it cannot replace without the cooperation of its primary strategic competitor.
This is not an apocalypse; it is not a declaration of defeat. The United States has immense resources, ingenuity, and alliance networks. It could, over time, rebuild its domestic supply chains, invest in recycling, and diversify its sources of critical minerals. But that takes time—years, perhaps decades. And in the short to medium term, China holds the cards.
Part VIII: Lessons for India
What does this mean for India? India is not the United States. It is not engaged in a direct military conflict with China (though border tensions remain). India’s vulnerabilities are different: it imports 80 per cent of its oil, most of its electronics, and a growing share of its active pharmaceutical ingredients from China. It is also dependent on Chinese supply chains for many critical minerals.
India’s R&D spend, as noted, is a fraction of China’s. Its technological ambitions—in AI, quantum computing, semiconductors, and biotech—are far behind. India has chosen a different path: services-led growth, digital public infrastructure, and a vibrant startup ecosystem. These are not without merit, but they do not directly address the strategic challenge posed by China’s technological and resource dominance.
India’s policymakers have recently begun to focus on these issues: the Production Linked Incentive (PLI) scheme for electronics, the push for domestic semiconductor manufacturing, and the exploration of critical mineral partnerships with Australia, Canada, and African nations. But the scale of the challenge is enormous. China has a multi-decade head start. India cannot close that gap overnight. What India can do is learn from China’s long-game strategy: invest consistently in R&D, build strategic stockpiles, diversify supply chains, and avoid becoming dependent on any single source of critical materials.
Conclusion: The Long Game Continues
China’s 5 per cent GDP growth is not a sign of weakness; it is a sign of a mature economy transitioning from breakneck expansion to high-quality, innovation-driven growth. Its R&D spending dwarfs that of India and is now on par with the United States in nominal terms. Its control over critical minerals gives it leverage over the world’s most advanced militaries. Its five-year plans are not wish lists; they are execution documents.
The West has been distracted. It has fought expensive wars, endured financial crises, and argued about cultural issues while China quietly built the foundations of 21st-century power. An old Chinese proverb says: “The best time to plant a tree was twenty years ago. The second best time is now.” For the United States, Europe, and India, the question is not whether China has a lead—it clearly does. The question is whether they are willing to play the long game themselves.
Beijing has been playing the long game and has got the world and the United States exactly where it wants it. The only question that remains is: what will it do with that leverage?
5 Questions & Answers Based on the Article
Q1. How does China’s R&D spending compare to India’s, and what are the implications of this gap?
A1. As a percentage of GDP, China spends seven times what India does on R&D. In nominal terms, because China’s economy is about five times larger than India’s, China spends roughly thirty-five times what India spends on R&D. The implications are immense: China leads in electric vehicles (43 per cent global market share, BYD alone at 20 per cent), has advanced in AI, quantum communication, biotech, and aerospace, and is now the only genuine technology rival to the United States. India’s technological ambitions in semiconductors, AI, and critical minerals remain far behind due to this chronic underinvestment.
Q2. What are the key priorities of China’s 2026-2030 Five-Year Plan, and which “future industries” does it target for first-mover advantage?
A2. The plan focuses on two tiers. Strategic emerging industries (ready for large-scale use) include: massive deployment of the ‘AI Plus’ initiative, high-end robotics, further dominance in EVs, large-scale commercialization of bio-medicine, and expansion of drones and commercial space exploration. Future industries (next frontier) include: quantum technology, next-generation networks including 6G, human-machine integration (brain-computer interface), humanoid robots, unconventional energy (nuclear fusion, hydrogen), and bio-manufacturing. Self-reliance to reduce dependence on foreign technology—and to make others reliant on China—is the unstated key theme.
Q3. According to CSIS data cited in the article, how much of America’s weapons stockpile was depleted in the Iran war, and why is China critical to replenishing it?
A3. According to the Center for Strategic and International Studies, the US burned through: 45 per cent of its Precision Strike Missile stockpile, half of its THAAD interceptors, nearly half of its Patriot PAC-3 inventory, roughly 30 per cent of its Tomahawks, and more than 20 per cent of its long-range JASSMs. China is critical for replenishment because these weapons depend on rare earth magnets (samarium-cobalt, neodymium-iron-boron doped with dysprosium and terbium) that China mines and refines. Across just four systems, replenishment requires 5-10 metric tons of defense-grade magnets, over 95 per cent of which must come from China.
Q4. What specific critical raw materials does China control, and which American weapons depend on them?
A4. China controls: Samarium (99 per cent of world supply) – used in Tomahawk fin actuators and Patriot PAC-3 phase shifters. Yttrium (93 per cent of US imports) – used in Patriot systems. Dysprosium and terbium (vast majority refined by China) – used in JASSM-ER fin servos and seekers to provide thermal stability. Neodymium – used in JASSM-ER magnets. The F-35 Lightning II contains 920 pounds of rare earths, most under Chinese licensing. China also controls antimony (80+ per cent), gallium (90+ per cent), and germanium (90+ per cent), which are used in semiconductors, radar, solar cells, and munitions.
Q5. What lessons does the article draw for India from China’s long-game strategy?
A5. The article notes that India imports 80 per cent of its oil, most of its electronics, and a growing share of its active pharmaceutical ingredients from China. India’s R&D spend is a fraction of China’s, and its ambitions in AI, quantum computing, semiconductors, and biotech are far behind. India has chosen a services-led growth and digital public infrastructure path, which does not directly address the strategic challenge of technological and resource dependence. India’s recent policy moves—the PLI scheme for electronics, domestic semiconductor push, and critical mineral partnerships with Australia, Canada, and African nations—are steps in the right direction, but the scale of the challenge is enormous given China’s multi-decade head start. India must learn to play the long game: consistent R&D investment, strategic stockpiling, and supply chain diversification.
