An Ill-Omined Blueprint, Deconstructing the Challenges Facing Trump’s Proposed Gaza Stabilisation Force

An Ill-Omined Blueprint, Deconstructing the Challenges Facing Trump’s Proposed Gaza Stabilisation Force

The protracted and devastating conflict in Gaza has spurred numerous international initiatives aimed at ceasefire, stabilisation, and a lasting political solution. One of the most recent and contentious proposals emerged from the administration of former US President Donald Trump, whose 20-point ‘Comprehensive Plan to End the Gaza Conflict’ attempts to address both immediate hostilities and the territory’s long-term future. While the plan’s first component—a prisoner exchange and immediate ceasefire—has found a degree of consensus, its second, more ambitious part, which outlines a political roadmap for Gaza, is mired in profound contradictions and operational ambiguities. At the heart of this controversy lies the proposed International Stabilization Force (ISF), a security mechanism that, upon close examination, appears fraught with political, logistical, and strategic pitfalls that render its successful implementation highly improbable. This force, conceived outside the traditional framework of international law and amid a complete absence of political resolution, risks becoming either stillborn or a catalyst for further conflict.

Deconstructing the Trump Plan: A Tale of Two Tiers

President Trump’s plan, as analysed by Bashir Ali Abbas of the Council for Strategic and Defense Research, is bifurcated. The first tier is tactical and immediate: a ceasefire coupled with the release of all prisoners held by Israel and Hamas. After years of brutal conflict, this element offers a palpable, humanitarian reprieve, and it is unsurprising that both warring parties have publicly acquiesced to it. It provides a temporary halt to the bloodshed without demanding significant long-term political concessions from either side.

The second tier, however, is where the plan ventures into the deeply contentious arena of permanent conflict resolution. This section deals with the existential questions that have plagued the region for decades: the fate of Hamas, the extent of Israeli military withdrawal, and the political future of Gaza. Crucially, the plan introduces the ISF as the lynchpin of its security architecture. This force, which the US intends to develop “with Jordan and international partners,” is envisioned as the “temporary ‘but’ long term internal security” component of a new Palestinian political committee. This entire structure would ultimately be overseen by a “Board of Peace” chaired by Trump himself, centralising authority far from the region and within a politically polarising figure.

The ISF’s proposed mandate is both ambitious and vague. It is tasked with setting “standards, milestones, and timeframes linked to demilitarisation” for a phased Israeli military withdrawal, while simultaneously ensuring “the continued disarmament of Hamas by blocking the entry of all munitions.” This dual function places the force squarely between two hostile actors, expecting it to act as an honest broker while being fundamentally aligned with the strategic objectives of one of them—Israel. The plan calls for the ISF to be deployed “immediately” in “terror free areas handed over from the IDF,” a conditional and sequential process that Israel could use to indefinitely delay a full withdrawal.

The Fatal Flaw: The Absence of a UN Mandate

Historically, international peacekeeping and stabilisation forces deployed in volatile, post-conflict environments have derived their legitimacy, authority, and operational guidelines from a mandate issued by the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). In the absence of effective state authority, the imprimatur of the UNSC provides a veneer of international legitimacy, legal authority, and crucially, a framework of perceived neutrality and accountability under international law. This has been the consistent demand from the Palestinian and Arab side. The Arab League’s 2024 Bahrain Declaration explicitly called for a UN international protection and peacekeeping force. Similarly, the Palestinian Ambassador to the UN in 2025 appealed for a similar force as an “immediate international intervention to stop the genocide,” implicitly recognising the UN as the appropriate conduit for such action.

Trump’s plan, however, deliberately sidesteps the United Nations. It constructs the ISF as an ad-hoc coalition, effectively a tool of the US and its willing partners, with the UN’s role restricted to the peripheral, albeit critical, task of aid distribution. This is a critical flaw with multifaceted consequences. Firstly, it strips the force of the legal and political legitimacy that only a UNSC resolution can confer. In the eyes of many Palestinians and the broader international community, an ISF without a UN mandate would not be a neutral peacekeeper but an occupying force in disguise, acting as an arm of US and Israeli policy.

Secondly, this structure inherently lacks the systems of accountability and transparency typically embedded in UN peacekeeping missions. Without the legal and reporting frameworks of the UN, the force’s “outlook and operations will ultimately be determined by the Trump-led Board,” a prospect that alarms many stakeholders. This overbearing alignment with US and Israeli objectives has already prompted Arab diplomats to consistently maintain that their forces will not participate in any non-UN international deployment in Palestine. Without the participation of Arab nations, whose cultural, linguistic, and religious ties could provide a degree of local acceptance, the ISF would be seen as a purely Western imposition, doomed to be perceived as a hostile entity.

Dangerous Precedents: Lessons from Afghanistan and Lebanon

The annals of international intervention are littered with missions that failed due to a mismatch between their mandate and the political reality on the ground. UN peacekeeping forces are typically deployed after a political resolution has been reached, their purpose being to monitor and uphold a peace agreement, not to enforce one. The rise of protracted intra-state wars, featuring resilient non-state actors, has shown that the absence of such a resolution creates a lethal environment for any international force.

The NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan serves as a stark warning. Initially established by the UN with a mandate to secure Kabul, its mission rapidly ballooned into a full-scale combat operation against the Taliban across the country. Despite its immense military power and UN authorisation, ISAF and its successor, the Resolute Support Mission, failed to achieve their strategic objectives. The Taliban, a non-state actor deeply embedded in the local population and resistant to foreign intervention, simply waited out the international community, culminating in its return to power in 2021. The ISF in Gaza would face a similarly determined non-state actor in Hamas, which has survived for decades under extreme pressure and is unlikely to willingly disarm for a force it does not recognise as legitimate.

An even more direct parallel can be drawn from the 1982 Multinational Force (MNF) in Lebanon. Created outside the UN framework by the US, France, and Britain, the MNF was deployed to oversee the withdrawal of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) during Israel’s invasion. Initially, there appeared to be a political resolution. However, the MNF was soon drawn into the complex and violent fray of the Lebanese Civil War, facing attacks from multiple militias. The mission ended in a humiliating withdrawal by 1984, after the catastrophic bombing of the US Marine barracks in Beirut. The MNF’s responsibilities were partially transferred to the UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL), a UN-mandated force that, while also facing challenges, has maintained a presence since 1978. The lesson is clear: even with initial political agreements, non-UN forces in the Middle East’s political minefields are vulnerable to being perceived as combatants and drawn into a conflict they cannot control. Arab states, keenly aware of this history, are determined to avoid having their troops caught in a similar crossfire in Gaza.

The Palestinian Quagmire: Why the ISF Faces Unique Obstacles

The challenges specific to the Palestinian context make the ISF’s proposed mission perhaps more difficult than any previous international deployment. First and foremost, there is no political resolution in sight. All extant UNSC resolutions—including those the US has historically supported—create obligations for Israel to end its occupation and work towards a two-state solution. Trump’s plan, by contrast, seems to circumvent these foundational principles.

Two irreconcilable positions form the core of the impasse. On one hand, Israel, under Prime Minister Netanyahu, has explicitly ruled out a complete withdrawal from the Strip, with the White House plan retaining Israel’s right to maintain a “security buffer.” On the other hand, Hamas has not committed to disarm or remove itself from the “comprehensive Palestinian national framework.” For both parties, these are non-negotiable, cardinal conditions. The proposed ISF is therefore being asked to implement a plan that neither of the primary belligerents fully accepts.

This discrepancy is not merely academic. Arab officials have pointed out that Trump’s publicly released plan differs from the versions they received privately. An eight-nation Arab-Islamic joint statement on September 29 called for a “full Israeli withdrawal,” a demand conspicuously absent from the White House’s announcement. This gap exacerbates Palestinian, Arab, and international apprehensions that the ISF’s true purpose is not to facilitate a sovereign Palestinian entity but to legitimise and manage a perpetual Israeli occupation under a new guise. The force would not be overseeing a liberation but policing a protracted siege.

Furthermore, the lack of a full Israeli withdrawal guarantees continued resistance. If Israeli troops remain in any part of Gaza, splinter Palestinian groups, potentially more radical than Hamas, will almost certainly continue armed attacks. Any international force deployed to “demilitarise” the area and secure these “handed over” zones would immediately become a target, seen as protecting the Israeli flank. This transforms the ISF from a stabilisation force into a counter-insurgency one, a mission for which it is unlikely to be designed or welcomed. The political cost for any Arab state joining such a force would be catastrophic, likely provoking fury within their own populations and across the Muslim world.

Conclusion: A Plan Doomed by Its Own Contradictions

In conclusion, the proposed International Stabilization Force for Gaza, as outlined in Trump’s 20-point plan, is a construct built on a foundation of sand. Its lack of a UN mandate strips it of legitimacy and ensures the non-participation of crucial Arab partners. Its operational precedents in Afghanistan and Lebanon are cautionary tales of failure and retreat. Most critically, it attempts to impose a security solution in the utter vacuum of a political one, asking a force to disarm one party while the other party—seen by much of the world as the occupying power—does not fully withdraw.

The limited global support the plan receives is driven not by an endorsement of its details, but by the desperate, immediate, and urgent need to end a war the UN has characterised as a “genocide.” This humanitarian imperative is being leveraged to push through a political framework that is structurally unsound and politically toxic. The ISF, in its current conception, is less a tool for peace and more a mechanism for managing a conflict on terms favourable to one side. Until a plan emerges that is rooted in a genuine political resolution, backed by the full legitimacy of the United Nations, and accepted by the Palestinians as a path to sovereign statehood, any proposed international force will not find things easy; it will find them impossible.

Q&A: Unpacking the Proposed Gaza Stabilisation Force

1. What are the two main components of Trump’s 20-point plan for Gaza, and which part has found agreement?

The plan is divided into two distinct tiers. The first component is an immediate, tactical measure calling for a ceasefire and a mutual release of all prisoners held by Israel and Hamas. Given the immense human toll of the conflict, this humanitarian reprieve has been publicly agreed upon by both parties. The second component is a strategic, long-term political roadmap for Gaza. This includes the fate of Hamas, the terms of Israeli military withdrawal, and the creation of a new Palestinian political structure overseen by a US-led “Board of Peace.” It is this second part, particularly the role of the proposed International Stabilization Force (ISF), that is mired in controversy and contradictory interpretations from Israel, Hamas, Arab states, and the US.

2. Why is the proposed ISF’s lack of a UN mandate considered such a critical flaw?

A UN Security Council mandate is the bedrock of legitimacy for international peacekeeping and stabilisation missions. It provides legal authority under international law, establishes frameworks for accountability and neutrality, and is often a prerequisite for the participation of contributing nations, particularly from the Arab and Muslim world. Without it, the ISF is perceived as an ad-hoc coalition of the willing, inherently aligned with the interests of its creators—the US and Israel. This lack of perceived neutrality makes it a potential target for local resistance and disqualifies it in the eyes of many key stakeholders. Arab diplomats have consistently stated their countries will not contribute troops to any non-UN force in Palestine, effectively dooming the ISF to a legitimacy deficit and a shortage of regionally acceptable peacekeepers from the outset.

3. How do the precedents of Afghanistan and Lebanon serve as warnings for the ISF?

The historical examples of the NATO-led ISAF in Afghanistan and the Multinational Force (MNF) in Lebanon illustrate the perils of deploying international forces without a durable political resolution and a clear, neutral mandate.

• Afghanistan (ISAF): A UN-mandated force saw its mission expand from stabilisation to full-scale combat against the Taliban. Despite its power, it failed to defeat a resilient non-state actor and ultimately withdrew after 20 years, with the Taliban returning to power. This shows that without a political settlement, a stabilisation force can become a counter-insurgency force destined to fail.

• Lebanon (MNF): Deployed outside the UN framework, the MNF was initially successful in overseeing a PLO withdrawal but was soon drawn into the Lebanese Civil War, suffering catastrophic casualties and withdrawing in failure. This demonstrates that even with initial agreements, non-UN forces in the Middle East are highly vulnerable to being perceived as combatants and becoming bogged down in complex local conflicts.

4. What are the two “cardinal conditions” from Israel and Hamas that the Trump plan fails to resolve, making the ISF’s mission so challenging?

The plan fails to bridge the fundamental, non-negotiable demands of the two primary belligerents:

• Israel has refused a full withdrawal from Gaza, with the plan explicitly retaining its right to maintain a “security buffer.” Netanyahu has publicly ruled out a complete IDF pullout.

• Hamas has not committed to disarm or dissolve itself, intending instead to remain within the “comprehensive Palestinian national framework.”
  The ISF is tasked with implementing a plan—partial Israeli withdrawal and Hamas disarmament—that neither side has agreed to. This places the force in an impossible position, expected to operate in an environment where the core issues of the conflict remain entirely unresolved, guaranteeing hostility from all sides.

5. Why is there a significant discrepancy between Arab states’ demands and the publicly released Trump plan, and what is its implication?

Arab states, in an eight-nation joint statement, explicitly demanded a “full Israeli withdrawal” from Gaza as a cornerstone of any peace plan. However, the version announced by the White House retains Israel’s right to maintain a security presence inside the territory. This discrepancy is not a minor detail; it is the very heart of the conflict. For the Arab and Palestinian side, it suggests that the true purpose of the ISF is not to facilitate the emergence of a sovereign Palestinian state but to legitimise and securitise a continued Israeli occupation under a new, internationalised management system. This perception ensures that the ISF would be viewed not as a neutral arbiter but as an occupying force, severely undermining its potential for success and making it a lightning rod for continued resistance.