Europe’s Existential Moment, Navigating the Trifecta of War, American Retreat, and Far-Right Resurgence
The annual Munich Security Conference has long been a stage for transatlantic affirmations—a ritualistic display of unity between Europe and the United States. This year, the script was different. The speeches from European leaders carried a tone not of affirmation, but of anxiety, even defiance. Germany’s Chancellor Friedrich Merz declared that the international rules-based order “no longer exists.” French President Emmanuel Macron called for greater European “military autonomy,” arguing that the continent must become a stronger pillar within NATO.
Across the Atlantic, the message was mixed. U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio promised a path of cooperation, advocating a stronger alliance rooted in shared history and Christian cultural linkages. But his emphasis on culture rather than strategy, on shared identity rather than shared interests, echoed the talking points of the American far-right. It was a reminder that the Trump administration, now in its second term, wants Europe to join its culture wars even as it signals reduced commitment to European security.
Europe, in short, faces an existential moment. It is grappling with a trifecta of challenges that threaten the post-war order on which its prosperity and security have been built: a protracted war on its eastern flank, the retreat of its American security guarantor, and the rise of far-right movements within its own borders that challenge the very idea of an inclusive European Union.
The War: Four Years and No End in Sight
The largest land conflict since the end of the Second World War has been raging on Europe’s eastern flank for four years. Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, launched in 2022, has evolved into a war of attrition, with tens of thousands dead, cities reduced to rubble, and the global order shaken to its foundations.
Europe’s principal response has been to arm Ukraine and punish Russia through sanctions. The EU has provided billions in military and economic aid, coordinated weapons supplies, and imposed successive rounds of sanctions designed to cripple the Russian economy. But these measures have not produced decisive results on the battlefield. The front lines have barely moved in months. Both sides appear capable of sustaining the fight for years to come.
The war has exposed Europe’s military weaknesses. Decades of underinvestment in defence, enabled by the American security umbrella, have left European armies with depleted stocks, aging equipment, and limited capabilities. The continent has struggled to produce enough ammunition to keep Ukrainian forces supplied, let alone to build a credible deterrent against future Russian aggression.
More fundamentally, the war has shattered the illusion that peace in Europe is permanent. The post-Cold War assumption that history had ended, that liberal democracy and market economics would spread without resistance, has been brutally overturned. Europe must now confront the reality of a revisionist power on its borders, willing to use force to redraw maps and challenge the principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity.
The American Retreat: From Guarantor to Question Mark
Europe’s reliance on the United States for its security dates to the Second World War and deepened during the Cold War. The NATO alliance, built on the principle of collective defence, has been the cornerstone of European security for seven decades. American troops have been stationed in Germany, Italy, and other countries as a visible guarantee of the U.S. commitment.
That guarantee is now in doubt. The Trump administration, now in its second term, has signaled a fundamental reassessment of transatlantic ties. President Trump’s musings about taking control of Greenland, a territory of NATO member Denmark, may have been dismissed by some as rhetorical excess, but they underscore a deeper point: the administration does not view alliance commitments through the traditional lens of shared strategic interests.
Secretary Rubio’s speech at Munich attempted to strike a conciliatory tone, but its framing was revealing. He advocated a stronger alliance rooted in “shared history and Christian cultural linkages” rather than shared strategic interests. This is a significant shift. It suggests that the administration sees the transatlantic relationship not as a partnership of equal sovereign states pursuing common goals, but as a cultural and civilizational project—one that comes with expectations about domestic policies, cultural values, and political alignments.
For Europe, this creates a dilemma. If the American security guarantee can no longer be relied upon, Europe must build its own defence capabilities. Macron’s call for “military autonomy” is not new—he has made similar arguments for years—but it now carries greater urgency. The question is whether Europe can overcome its internal divisions and invest the necessary resources to become a credible military power in its own right.
The Far-Right Resurgence: Challenge from Within
Even as Europe faces external threats, it is grappling with internal ones. Far-right movements are resurgent across the continent, challenging the liberal democratic consensus that has defined the European project. In France, Marine Le Pen’s National Rally consistently polls as a leading political force. In Germany, the Alternative for Germany (AfD) has gained ground in eastern states. In Italy, Giorgia Meloni’s Brothers of Italy leads the government. In Sweden, the Denmark, the Netherlands, and elsewhere, far-right parties are shaping political agendas.
These movements share common themes: hostility to immigration, skepticism of the EU, opposition to climate policies, and a cultural nationalism that clashes with the EU’s inclusive self-image. They also share a sympathy, in varying degrees, with the Russian narrative about the war in Ukraine and with the American far-right’s critique of “woke” liberalism.
The rise of the far-right complicates Europe’s ability to respond to external challenges. It undermines domestic consensus, making it harder to sustain support for Ukraine or to invest in defence. It also creates openings for external actors—Russia, but also the Trump administration—to exploit divisions within European societies.
The Search for Strategic Autonomy
In the face of these challenges, the concept of “strategic autonomy” has moved from the margins to the mainstream of European debate. The idea, long championed by France, is that Europe must reduce its reliance on the United States and develop the capacity to act independently in defence of its interests.
Strategic autonomy has multiple dimensions. Militarily, it means investing in European defence industries, developing joint capabilities, and creating the institutional mechanisms for rapid decision-making. Economically, it means reducing dependence on other powers for critical goods—energy, semiconductors, rare earths, pharmaceuticals. Technologically, it means building European champions in key sectors and setting standards that reflect European values.
But strategic autonomy also has a political dimension. It means Europe developing its own analysis of global challenges, its own strategy for engaging with the world, and its own voice in international forums. It means not simply following the American lead, but thinking for itself.
Engaging the Wider World
If Europe is to build strategic autonomy, it must also look beyond the West. The international order that the U.S. and Europe built after 1945 is under strain, but it cannot be restored by the West alone. Europe must engage with the rising powers of Asia, with the Global South, and with countries that have traditionally been on the margins of its foreign policy.
This means deepening ties with India, a democratic partner with shared concerns about China’s rise. It means engaging with the Gulf states on energy and investment. It means rebuilding relationships in Latin America and Africa, where China has made significant inroads. It means taking seriously the grievances of the Global South about the unfairness of the international economic system, and working to address them.
At the same time, Europe must find a way to end the war in Ukraine and establish a workable new normal with Russia. This is the most immediate and pressing challenge. A frozen conflict on its borders will drain European resources, destabilize the region, and provide a perpetual opening for Russian interference. However difficult, a negotiated settlement that secures Ukraine’s sovereignty while addressing Russia’s security concerns must be pursued.
Conclusion: Reimagining Europe’s Role
The speeches at Munich marked a turning point. For decades, Europe could rely on the United States to guarantee its security, on the liberal international order to provide a framework for cooperation, and on domestic consensus to sustain its political project. All three are now in question.
Europe’s response will determine not only its own future, but the shape of the emerging world order. If it retreats into itself, consumed by internal divisions and unable to act, it will be squeezed between a resurgent Russia, a dominant America, and a rising China. If it rises to the challenge, building genuine strategic autonomy while engaging with the wider world, it could become a pole of stability and cooperation in a turbulent century.
The choice, as Macron and Merz made clear in Munich, is Europe’s to make.
Q&A: Unpacking Europe’s Existential Challenges
Q1: What did German Chancellor Friedrich Merz mean when he said the international rules-based order “no longer exists”?
A: Merz was referring to the erosion of the post-1945 international system built on agreed rules, multilateral institutions, and shared norms. This order, championed by the U.S. and its allies, assumed that disputes would be resolved through diplomacy, that borders would not be changed by force, and that international law would be respected. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine shattered that assumption. But Merz was also pointing to broader trends: the weakening of institutions like the WTO, the rise of unilateralism, and the willingness of major powers to use economic coercion. In his view, the framework that provided predictability and stability for decades is no longer functioning.
Q2: Why is Europe’s reliance on the U.S. for security now considered unsustainable?
A: European reliance on the U.S. was built on the assumption that American commitment to European security was permanent and unconditional. That assumption is now in doubt. The Trump administration has signaled a more transactional approach to alliances, demanding that European members of NATO spend more on defence and questioning the value of the alliance itself. President Trump’s remarks about Greenland, while seemingly rhetorical, underscore a willingness to challenge alliance norms. More fundamentally, the U.S. is increasingly focused on China as its primary strategic competitor, and may see Europe as less central to its interests. Europe cannot base its security on a guarantee that may not be there when needed.
Q3: What is “strategic autonomy,” and why is it important for Europe?
A: Strategic autonomy is the ability of Europe to act independently in defence of its interests, without relying on the United States. It has military, economic, technological, and political dimensions. Militarily, it means investing in European defence capabilities and industries. Economically, it means reducing dependence on other powers for critical goods. Technologically, it means developing European champions and standards. Politically, it means Europe developing its own analysis and strategy for engaging with the world. Strategic autonomy is important because it gives Europe options. It allows Europe to act when the U.S. is unwilling or unable, and to shape its own destiny rather than being shaped by others.
Q4: How does the rise of far-right movements in Europe complicate its response to external challenges?
A: Far-right movements complicate Europe’s response in several ways. First, they undermine domestic consensus, making it harder to sustain support for Ukraine or to invest in defence. Second, they often sympathize with Russian narratives about the war and with the American far-right’s critique of liberalism, creating openings for external actors to exploit divisions. Third, they challenge the EU’s inclusive self-image and its project of integration, weakening the cohesion that Europe needs to act collectively. In short, far-right movements erode the political foundations on which a robust European response to external challenges must be built.
Q5: What does “engaging with the wider world” mean for Europe, and why is it necessary?
A: Engaging with the wider world means Europe looking beyond the transatlantic relationship and building ties with countries in Asia, Africa, Latin America, and the Middle East. This is necessary for several reasons. First, the international order cannot be restored by the West alone; it requires the participation of rising powers like India, Brazil, and Indonesia. Second, Europe needs partners to address global challenges like climate change, pandemics, and economic instability. Third, Europe’s economic future depends on access to growing markets in the Global South. Fourth, engagement with the wider world helps Europe understand and address the grievances of countries that feel marginalized by the current international system. It is both a strategic necessity and a moral imperative.
