The Dhaka Reset, BNP’s Landslide, the Jamaat’s Shadow, and India’s Delicate Opportunity in a New Bangladesh

The Dhaka Reset, BNP’s Landslide, the Jamaat’s Shadow, and India’s Delicate Opportunity in a New Bangladesh

Eighteen months after Sheikh Hasina’s dramatic ouster and subsequent exile to India, Bangladesh has a new, popularly elected government. The Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP), led by Tarique Rahman, has secured a sweeping victory in elections that also saw voters endorse constitutional reforms in a simultaneous referendum. The mandate is decisive, the transfer of power appears orderly, and for the first time since August 2024, Bangladesh has a government with a clear democratic mandate.

But the path to this moment has been treacherous. The 18-month interim regime of Muhammad Yunus was marked by rising extremism, a weakening economy, and a sharp deterioration in ties with India. The Jamaat-e-Islami, which by all accounts emerged as one of the biggest beneficiaries of the 2024 Gen-Z uprising, has finished as a distant second—a outcome that will mitigate domestic and regional anxieties about the rise of radical forces. The Awami League, the party that led Bangladesh to independence and governed for 15 years under Hasina, contested but was reduced to a marginal presence, its participation shadowed by the ban that had been imposed on it under the Yunus regime.

For India, the election results present a complex and delicate challenge. Prime Minister Narendra Modi has extended “warm congratulations” to Rahman, signalling New Delhi’s desire for a fresh start. The BNP leader, for his part, has struck a conciliatory tone towards India, speaking of the importance of stable ties during External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar’s visit to Dhaka for the funeral of Rahman’s mother, former Prime Minister Khaleda Zia. The building blocks for a reset are thus in place.

But the building blocks are not the whole structure. Beneath the surface of electoral outcomes lie deeper currents that will shape the future of India-Bangladesh relations: the unresolved question of Sheikh Hasina’s presence in India, the rise of the Jamaat as a significant opposition force, the protection of Bangladesh’s Hindu minority, the challenge of reconciliation with Awami League supporters, and the need to insulate core areas of cooperation from political volatility. The opportunity is real, but so are the risks.

Part I: The Verdict—A BNP Landslide with Constitutional Endorsement

The election results are unambiguous. The BNP, led by Tarique Rahman, has secured a sweeping victory, giving it the parliamentary strength to govern without coalition partners. The simultaneous referendum on constitutional reforms has also passed, giving the new government a mandate to reshape Bangladesh’s foundational document.

The composition of the opposition is equally significant. The Jamaat-e-Islami-led alliance has emerged as the principal opposition, but with insufficient seats to block government legislation or dictate terms. This outcome will mitigate anxieties—both within Bangladesh and in neighbouring countries—about the rise of radical forces. The Jamaat’s historical association with the Pakistani occupation army during the 1971 Liberation War, its Islamist ideology, and its role in the 2024 uprising had raised fears that it might emerge as a dominant force. Those fears have not been realised.

The Awami League’s marginal presence is a humbling outcome for a party that has shaped Bangladesh’s history. But its participation in the election, even under the shadow of the Yunus regime’s ban, means that it remains a legal political entity. Its supporters, though demoralised, have not been entirely disenfranchised.

Part II: The Yunus Legacy—Extremism, Economy, and Eroded Ties

To understand the scale of the BNP’s challenge, one must first understand the damage wrought by the 18 months of Yunus regime rule. The interim government, headed by Nobel laureate Muhammad Yunus, came to power under extraordinary circumstances in August 2024. It promised stability, reform, and a return to democratic norms. Instead, by most accounts, it delivered a deteriorating situation on multiple fronts.

Rising extremism was perhaps the most alarming trend. The spokesperson of India’s Ministry of External Affairs, Randhir Jaiswal, noted in December 2025 that more than 2,900 incidents of violence against minorities had been documented by independent sources during Yunus’s tenure. This figure, if accurate, represents a systematic failure to protect the most vulnerable sections of Bangladeshi society. The Hindu minority, in particular, bore the brunt of this violence, with attacks on temples, businesses, and homes driving fear and, in some cases, flight.

The economy weakened under Yunus’s watch. The garment industry, the backbone of Bangladesh’s exports, faced disruptions. Unemployment rose. Prices of essential commodities spiked. The macroeconomic stability that had been the hallmark of the Hasina years was eroded.

Ties with India deteriorated sharply. The Yunus regime’s foreign policy was, by any measure, a disaster for bilateral relations. Indian investments stalled. Border tensions rose. The rhetoric from Dhaka became less friendly, more adversarial. The relationship that had been carefully built over 15 years lay in tatters.

Part III: The BNP’s Agenda—Containing Extremism, Protecting Minorities

The new government’s most urgent task is to reverse the trends of the Yunus era. Tarique Rahman has pledged religious freedom and communal harmony. He has spoken of building a nation that is safe and inclusive for all citizens, irrespective of faith. These are the right words. The true test will lie in enforcement.

Containing extremism requires a multi-pronged strategy:

• Intelligence and policing: Strengthening the capacity of law enforcement to detect and disrupt extremist networks before they can act.

• Prosecution: Ensuring that those who commit violence are swiftly brought to justice, with no impunity for perpetrators regardless of their political affiliations.

• Counter-radicalisation: Addressing the ideological roots of extremism through education, community engagement, and deradicalisation programmes.

• International cooperation: Working with neighbours, including India, to address cross-border dimensions of the threat.

Protecting minorities requires more than words. It requires:

• Visible presence of security forces in vulnerable areas, especially during festivals and times of tension.

• Fast-track courts for cases of violence against minorities, ensuring swift justice.

• Reconstruction assistance for damaged homes, temples, and businesses.

• Political inclusion of minority representatives in governance structures.

• Social messaging from the highest levels that attacks on minorities will not be tolerated.

The 2,900 incidents documented during the Yunus era are a stain on Bangladesh’s record. The BNP government must show that it is different.

Part IV: The Reconciliation Challenge—Awami League and the Winner-Takes-All Trap

The BNP’s sweeping victory brings with it a temptation: to treat the Awami League as a defeated enemy, to marginalise its supporters, to settle scores after years in opposition. This would be a mistake.

Sheikh Hasina’s ouster was driven in part by her highhandedness, her autocratic tendencies, her unwillingness to tolerate dissent. The Awami League’s long tenure in power had created deep resentments. But replacing one winner-takes-all system with another will not strengthen Bangladeshi democracy. It will simply rotate which group is excluded.

Tarique Rahman should recognise the merits of generosity. This means:

• Protecting Awami League members from retaliatory violence. The widespread attacks on AL supporters after Hasina’s departure must not be repeated or condoned.

• Engaging with Awami League leaders on matters of national importance, even while governing without them.

• Creating space for the Awami League to rebuild as a legitimate opposition party, rather than driving it underground or into exile.

• Forging a consensus on the terms under which the Awami League can return to the political fold as a normal participant in democratic politics.

This is not altruism; it is enlightened self-interest. A democracy with a weak, embittered, and excluded opposition is an unstable democracy. The Awami League, with its deep roots in Bangladeshi society, will not disappear. It will either be a loyal opposition or a source of perpetual instability. The BNP’s choice will shape which path it takes.

Part V: The India Factor—Opportunity and Obstacles

For India, the change of government in Dhaka presents both an opportunity and a set of formidable obstacles.

The opportunity is to reset a relationship that has been badly damaged. Prime Minister Modi’s early congratulatory message to Rahman sets the right tone. Rahman’s conciliatory remarks during Jaishankar’s visit for Khaleda Zia’s funeral are encouraging. The building blocks for a fresh start are in place.

The obstacles are equally real:

The path forward requires India to:

• Broaden engagement beyond the BNP government to include opposition figures, civil society, business leaders, and youth. Relationships that depend on a single party are fragile.

• Deliver on projects that demonstrate India’s reliability as a partner. Infrastructure, connectivity, energy, and trade—these tangible benefits matter more than diplomatic rhetoric.

• Address the Hasina issue with sensitivity and discretion, seeking a solution that protects India’s interests while acknowledging Bangladesh’s sensitivities.

• Maintain security cooperation as a non-negotiable pillar, but avoid a purely securitised lens that reduces the relationship to threats.

Part VI: The Long View—Beyond the BNP, Beyond the Awami League

The BNP’s return to power after nearly two decades is a historic moment. But it is also a reminder that political fortunes in Bangladesh are cyclical. The Awami League will rise again. The Jamaat will adapt. New forces will emerge.

India’s relationship with Bangladesh must be built to withstand these cycles. This means:

• Institutionalising cooperation in areas where interests converge, regardless of which party governs.

• Investing in people-to-people ties that create constituencies for friendship on both sides of the border.

• Avoiding the trap of partisanship—being seen as the patron of one party and the adversary of another.

• Taking the long view, recognising that today’s opposition is tomorrow’s government, and that relationships built on mutual interest outlast those built on personal chemistry.

Conclusion: A Moment to Seize

The BNP’s sweeping victory, the constitutional referendum’s passage, and the Jamaat’s containment create a moment of opportunity for Bangladesh and for its relationship with India. The Yunus interregnum was a disaster on multiple fronts. The new government has a mandate to reverse that damage.

For India, the path forward requires a delicate balance: engaging warmly with the new government while avoiding the appearance of partisanship; protecting core security interests while broadening the relationship beyond security; addressing the Hasina issue with discretion while focusing on the future.

The opportunity is real. So are the risks. The next few months will determine whether the Dhaka reset leads to a sustained, productive partnership—or whether it becomes another chapter in the long, difficult history of India-Bangladesh relations.

Q&A: Bangladesh’s Election and India’s Delicate Opportunity

Q1: What was the outcome of Bangladesh’s election, and why is it significant for regional stability?

A1: The election produced a decisive outcome with multiple layers of significance:

Overall significance: The “architecture of Dhaka’s politics, long defined by the Awami League-BNP duopoly, is intact”—though the ban on the AL during the Yunus regime “cast a shadow over the polls.” The result brings much-needed stability and a clear mandate.

Q2: What was the Yunus regime’s record, and what challenges does it leave for the BNP?

A2: The 18-month Yunus interim regime left a deeply problematic legacy:

The bottom line: The Yunus regime “effectively rolled back” the stability that was the hallmark of the Hasina years. The BNP inherits a country in distress.

Q3: What is the “reconciliation challenge” facing the BNP, and why does it matter for Bangladesh’s democracy?

A3: The reconciliation challenge refers to how the BNP engages with the Awami League and its supporters:

The writer’s advice: Rahman “should realise that a winner-takes-all approach will harm democracy in Bangladesh. Its new leader would do well to see the merits of generosity and forge a consensus on the terms under which the AL can return to the political fold.”

Q4: What are the main obstacles to a smooth India-Bangladesh reset under the BNP government?

A4: Several obstacles complicate the path:

The path forward: India must broaden engagement beyond government, deliver on projects, address Hasina issue with discretion, maintain security cooperation, and avoid purely securitised lens.

Q5: What signals have India and the BNP sent about their desire to reset relations?

A5: Both sides have signalled willingness for a fresh start:

The opportunity: The change of guard in Dhaka is “an opportunity for New Delhi to go beyond its longstanding ties with the AL.” Modi’s early message “could set the tone for a forward-looking and mutually beneficial partnership.”

The caution: The building blocks for reset are in place, but “the true test will lie in enforcement.” Words must translate into action on extremism, minority protection, and reconciliation.