Why Trumpian Hegemony Is in Trouble, The Iran War Exposes the Limits of Coercive Unilateralism
As the Counterterror Chief Resigns, Allies Balk, and Domestic Support Frays, the Post-WW2 Consensus on American Dominance Thins Both Globally and at Home
Trump’s second term starkly illustrates a rapidly intensifying imbalance between consent and force in America’s hegemonic strategy. Historically, the United States favoured waging a patient struggle for hearts and minds through soft power—building alliances, nurturing institutions, and cultivating the belief that American leadership served the common good. Trump’s escalating military campaigns, however, exemplify coercion without restraint.
But how far can Trump push such a coercive strategy, and what restraints, if any, remain on a president who seems to have dismantled the guardrails of American liberal democracy? The Iran war is proving to be a stress test not just for the region but for the very foundations of US global leadership.
Trump’s actions signal not just geopolitical adventurism but a profoundly risky reconfiguration of US hegemony—one that may further alienate allies, erode domestic consent, and ignite counter-hegemonic forces globally. Given Trump’s ego-driven persona, we should be prepared for wars to continue.
The Resignation That Matters
Trump’s director of the National Counterterrorism Center, Joe Kent, resigned yesterday, saying he could not back the Iran war because the country posed no imminent threat to the United States. This is not a minor defection. Kent is a counterterrorism professional, someone whose entire career has been dedicated to protecting America from genuine threats. His judgment that Iran does not constitute an imminent threat carries weight.
Trump, so far, has ignored this development. But ignoring it does not make it disappear. The resignation is part of a pattern in his second term, where he has ordered strikes in Somalia, Gaza (bolstering Israeli operations), Venezuela, and the Caribbean. He has also threatened to secure Greenland. Each action extends the reach of American military power, each is justified in the language of necessity, and each adds to the cumulative sense of a president unbound.
The Imminent Threat Argument
Trump’s illegal Iran offensive began with precision strikes on nuclear facilities, escalating to attacks on missile sites and naval assets. While disputed by Trump, strikes also included an Iranian girls’ primary school, killing 165 children. Claiming to neutralise an unproven “imminent threat,” Trump has refused to rule out ground troops or regime change.
The “imminent threat” argument has a long and troubled history in American foreign policy. It was used to justify the Iraq War, based on intelligence about weapons of mass destruction that turned out not to exist. It was used to justify drone strikes that killed civilians far from any battlefield. It is a flexible concept, capable of stretching to cover almost any action a president wishes to take.
In this case, the evidence for imminence is thin. Iran had not attacked the United States. It had not threatened imminent attack. The justification rests on assertions rather than proof, on fear rather than facts.
The Shift from Consent to Coercion
This represents a shift from post-World War II US hegemony methods, built on consensual alliances via institutions like NATO and the UN, to a coercive unilateralism. The America First doctrine seeks to manufacture domestic consent for these manoeuvres by portraying them as defensive necessities against “radical regimes.”
Yet this is US hegemony in crisis: the liberal international order, once sustained by elite networks of foundations, think tanks, and organic intellectuals, is fracturing under Trump’s assault. The institutions that legitimated American power—the alliances, the treaties, the multilateral frameworks—are being systematically undermined. In their place, Trump offers transactional relationships based on power rather than principle.
The problem is that hegemony requires legitimacy to be sustainable. Power alone, unadorned by the claim to serve common interests, generates resistance. The more Trump relies on coercion, the more he alienates those whose cooperation he needs.
The Domestic Fractures
Restraints are mounting, driven by fissures within Trump’s own coalition. Even his MAGA base and its ideologues, wary of endless wars, are rejecting this military interventionism. Polls show Trump’s core supporters, who cheered America First as a pledge against Bush-era entanglements, now denounce the betrayals in Gaza, Venezuela, Greenland, and especially Iran.
Influential voices like Tucker Carlson and Vance surrogates have publicly criticised escalations as draining resources from domestic priorities. The populist right, which came to power promising to end wars, now finds itself supporting a president who seems to be starting them. The contradiction is not lost on them.
This portends challenges in the midterms, where many Republican incumbents face primary threats from anti-interventionist challengers, and voter turnout dips amid disillusionment. This could possibly hand Democrats major Congressional gains later this year.
Trump’s coalition—corporate elites, populist nationalists, and military-industrial interests—will likely still challenge the neoliberal consensus by using coercion where consent falters. But the coalition is fracturing. The populists and the interventionists are on a collision course.
The International Backlash
Internationally, the credibility gap is wider, and allies are less willing to fall in line. Witness Trump’s flip-flops on allies, as well as on stated adversaries. After denouncing Starmer for rejecting military support for the war on Iran, he has requested allies, as well as China, to send warships to the Strait of Hormuz to protect shipping, as oil prices spike and Trump’s approval ratings suffer.
Allies who were attacked for not supporting the war are now asked to help manage its consequences. The inconsistency is glaring. The transactional approach—you’re either with us or against us—leaves no room for the kind of nuanced cooperation that actually sustains alliances over time.
The BRICS+ grouping, the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, and other alternative institutions represent attempts to build a world not dependent on American goodwill. They may not succeed, but their existence reflects a widespread recognition that the old order is dying and something new must take its place.
The Great Power Dimension
How far can Trump take these wars? Hegemony endures through a careful balance of force and persuasion. Trump’s campaigns, however, could expand into full-scale regional conflagrations, drawing in Qatar and Saudi Arabia. In fact, Trump’s war strategy could extend far longer than rationally necessary, as he leverages the post-9/11 Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF) to bypass Congress, stretching executive power to authoritarian lengths.
The AUMF, passed in the immediate aftermath of 9/11, was intended to authorise force against those responsible for the attacks. It has since been stretched to justify military action in multiple countries against groups that had nothing to do with 9/11. Its use in Iran represents yet another expansion, yet another precedent that future presidents could invoke.
The great powers are watching. China is deepening its economic engagement with Iran, investing in alternative energy routes, and building military capabilities that complicate American freedom of action in the Pacific. Russia has provided diplomatic cover and military technology. The axis of resistance to American unilateralism is growing.
The End of Hegemony?
Ultimately, Trump’s wars will extend as far as fractured constituents allow. However, with MAGA defections, midterm perils, mass protests, and the spectre of great-power backlash constraining escalation, Trump’s hegemony may crumble.
Even if Trump can mobilise a large part of his MAGA base through portrayals of Iran as an existential antagonist, elite cohesion is thinner than during earlier interventions. The structural machinery for consensus still exists, but its capacity is diminished. Fragmented institutions, polarised publics, and global scepticism limit how far any administration can go.
It may simply be too late to recreate a US-led fully manufactured consensus of the old kind. The post-World War II order was built on a unique set of circumstances—American economic dominance, the Soviet threat, the exhaustion of Europe and Asia. Those circumstances no longer exist. Trying to recreate the consensus without the conditions that produced it is like trying to run software on hardware it wasn’t designed for.
Conclusion: The Limits of Coercion
The Iran war is revealing the limits of coercive unilateralism. Power alone, unaccompanied by legitimacy, generates resistance. The resignation of the counterterror chief, the fractures in Trump’s coalition, the reluctance of allies, the emergence of counter-hegemonic forces—all point in the same direction.
Trump may continue to wage war. He may escalate further. He may ignore the constraints that have bound previous presidents. But each escalation adds to the cumulative pressure, each action generates new resistance, each overreach brings the day of reckoning closer.
Hegemony requires balance—between force and consent, between interest and legitimacy, between power and principle. Trump’s strategy has lost that balance. And without it, even the most powerful nation on earth may find its reach exceeding its grasp.
Q&A: Unpacking the Crisis of Trumpian Hegemony
Q1: Why is the resignation of counterterror chief Joe Kent significant?
A: Joe Kent’s resignation as director of the National Counterterrorism Center is significant because he is a career professional whose judgment on threats carries weight. He stated he could not support the Iran war because Iran posed no imminent threat to the United States. This defection from within Trump’s own administration undermines the official justification for the war and signals that even those tasked with protecting America are not convinced of the necessity of military action.
Q2: How has US hegemony shifted from consent to coercion under Trump?
A: Historically, US hegemony operated through consensual alliances built via institutions like NATO and the UN, cultivating the belief that American leadership served the common good. Trump’s approach represents a shift to coercive unilateralism—acting without allies, bypassing international institutions, and relying on military force rather than persuasion. The America First doctrine seeks to manufacture domestic consent by portraying actions as defensive necessities, but this approach alienates allies and erodes the legitimacy that made American power sustainable.
Q3: What domestic fractures are emerging within Trump’s coalition?
A: Even Trump’s MAGA base, which cheered America First as a pledge against endless wars, is showing signs of disillusionment. Polls show core supporters denouncing military escalations in Gaza, Venezuela, Greenland, and Iran. Influential voices like Tucker Carlson have criticised the wars as draining resources from domestic priorities. This portends challenges in midterm elections, with anti-interventionist primary threats to Republican incumbents and potential voter turnout dips that could hand Democrats Congressional gains.
Q4: How are allies and adversaries responding to Trump’s strategy?
A: Allies are increasingly reluctant to fall in line. After denouncing UK leader Starmer for refusing military support, Trump then requested allies and China to send warships to protect shipping in the Strait of Hormuz—highlighting the inconsistency of his transactional approach. Adversaries are building counter-hegemonic forces: China deepens economic ties with Iran, Russia provides diplomatic cover, and groupings like BRICS+ offer alternatives to US-dominated institutions.
Q5: What are the limits of Trump’s coercive strategy?
A: Hegemony requires balance between force and consent. Trump’s reliance on coercion without legitimacy generates mounting resistance—from defections within his administration, fractures in his coalition, reluctant allies, and emerging counter-hegemonic forces. The post-9/11 AUMF is being stretched to justify actions far beyond its original intent, setting dangerous precedents. Fragmented institutions, polarised publics, and global scepticism limit how far any administration can go. It may be too late to recreate the manufactured consensus of the old kind.
