Why the War in Iran Threatens India’s Food Security, The Fragile Geopolitics of Fertiliser
Fertilisers are, quite literally, the food for our crops. They supply the essential nutrients—nitrogen (N), phosphorus (P), potassium (K), and sulphur (S)—that plants need to yield the grains, fruits, and vegetables that sustain a nation of 1.4 billion people. India has achieved remarkable self-sufficiency in the production of most food and non-food crops, a feat that is the bedrock of its economic stability and social fabric. But this self-sufficiency in food is built on a foundation of profound and often overlooked dependence: dependence on imported fertilisers. And as the US-Israel war on Iran escalates, threatening to close the Strait of Hormuz and disrupt supply chains across West Asia, that foundation is being stress-tested. The current conflict is a stark reminder of how vulnerable India’s agriculture, and by extension its food security, is to the whims of geopolitics.
The numbers tell a story of strategic vulnerability. In the current financial year, 2025-26, India is expected to import nearly 10 million tonnes (mt) of urea and 6.5 mt of di-ammonium phosphate (DAP). This is on top of domestic production of 30 mt and 3.5 mt, respectively. The picture for potash is even starker: the country’s entire projected consumption of 3 mt of muriate of potash (MOP) will be imported. In complex fertilisers, which contain various combinations of N, P, K, and S, domestic production is estimated at 12.5 mt, with imports adding another 4 mt. This is not a marginal dependence; it is a structural reality of India’s agricultural economy.
The geography of this import dependence makes the current conflict particularly menacing. As detailed in the accompanying analysis by Harish Damodaran, the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries—Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Bahrain—accounted for a staggering 75% of India’s urea imports in 2024-25. In DAP, Saudi Arabia is the single largest source. While the GCC states are not major suppliers of MOP, other West Asian nations like Jordan and Israel, as well as Iran’s northern neighbour Turkmenistan, are significant players. The current war, therefore, directly threatens the supply lines for the three most critical fertilisers.
This dependence extends beyond finished fertilisers to the very raw materials and feedstocks required to manufacture them domestically. India’s urea plants run on natural gas, which serves as both a feedstock and a source of energy. The fertiliser sector alone accounts for nearly 29% of India’s total natural gas consumption. And just over half of that natural gas is imported, primarily as liquefied natural gas (LNG). In 2024-25, India imported 27 mt of LNG. Of this, a massive 11.2 mt came from Qatar alone, with another 3.5 mt from the UAE and 1.8 mt from Oman. In the first nine months of the current fiscal year (April-December 2025), Qatar’s share remained dominant at 9 mt out of 19 mt total. All of this LNG, like the fertilisers themselves, is shipped through the Strait of Hormuz, the narrow waterway that Iran has now effectively blocked.
The situation is equally precarious for the production of complex fertilisers and DAP. India has virtually no mineable reserves of rock phosphate (for phosphorus), potash (for potassium), or elemental sulphur. These must all be imported. In 2024-25, India imported 2.5 mt of ammonia, a key intermediate. Almost 1 mt of that came from Oman, 0.9 mt from Saudi Arabia, and 0.2 mt from Qatar. Phosphoric acid, another crucial intermediate, is primarily sourced from Jordan, Senegal, Morocco, and China. While not all of these countries are directly involved in the current conflict, any major disruption to global shipping and insurance markets will affect all supply chains. Sulphur, essential for manufacturing DAP and other fertilisers, is imported largely from Oman, the UAE, Qatar, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia—all GCC nations whose exports must transit the Strait.
There is, however, a silver lining for the immediate present. India’s fertiliser stocks are, for the moment, in a relatively comfortable position. As of February-end, urea stocks stood at 5.5 mt, higher than the 4.9 mt recorded on the same date in 2025. DAP stocks were at 2.5 mt, nearly double the 1.3 mt of the previous year, and complex fertiliser stocks were also significantly higher at 5.4 mt versus 3.2 mt. This is a marked improvement from the precarious situation at the start of the current rabi (winter-spring) season, when urea stocks had fallen to a dangerously low 3.7 mt. This stock build-up has been achieved through aggressive, large-scale imports over the past few months, including from less traditional suppliers such as Indonesia, Malaysia, Egypt, Finland, Vietnam, and Algeria for urea, and Australia for DAP.
The timing also offers a degree of breathing room. The next major planting season, kharif (monsoon), will only kick off from mid-June. Farmers are currently harvesting wheat, mustard, and other rabi crops. As G. Ravi Prasad, a fertiliser industry veteran, notes, “The prepositioning of stocks for the upcoming kharif can be appropriately planned.” This means that even if the war causes immediate disruptions, the government has a window of a few months to adjust procurement strategies and secure alternative sources.
But this comfort is contingent on one critical factor: time. If the war stretches beyond March, the situation could become dire. Many domestic urea plants are already operating at only about 60% of their capacity due to inadequate gas availability. Some have even gone in for annual routine maintenance shutdowns ahead of the peak marketing season, a normal practice that could become a liability if supply chains snap. The real challenge, as a CEO of a leading domestic fertiliser company points out, will be if LNG supplies from Qatar Energy and Abu Dhabi National Oil Company dry up. These companies, along with Saudi Aramco, are also major exporters of sulphur. Their LNG and sulphur, as well as ammonia from Qatar Energy and Saudi Arabia’s Maaden and SABIC, are all shipped through the Strait of Hormuz.
The closure of the Strait will most severely affect the flow of these critical inputs: LNG, ammonia, and sulphur. Finished fertilisers, while also impacted, can potentially be rerouted through longer, more expensive alternatives, such as the Black Sea-Turkish Straits-Mediterranean-Suez Canal-Red Sea-Indian Ocean route, or even the much longer voyage around the Cape of Good Hope. The official suggested that India would have to look for more LNG from the US, Australia, Angola, and Cameroon, and for ammonia from Indonesia, Malaysia, and China. This is not impossible, but it will take time, cost more, and require intense diplomatic and commercial effort.
In the worst-case scenario of worsening disruptions, the government may be forced to make difficult choices. Out of India’s total natural gas consumption of 58,802 million metric standard cubic meters (mmscm) during April-January 2025-26, the fertiliser sector was the single largest consumer at 16,812 mmscm, followed by city gas distribution (13,699 mmscm) and power (6,898 mmscm). If supplies are severely constrained, the government may choose to prioritise allocations to the fertiliser sector to ensure food security, and to the city gas distribution sector to ensure uninterrupted supply of clean cooking fuel (PNG) and transport fuel (CNG) for consumers. The power sector, which can theoretically switch to coal, may be asked to bear the brunt of the cuts.
This crisis, whatever its eventual outcome, is a powerful lesson in the interconnectedness of geopolitics and food security. India’s green revolution was built on the back of high-yielding seeds and chemical fertilisers. That model has delivered food security, but it has also created a deep structural dependence on imports that are vulnerable to the whims of distant conflicts. The current war is a stress test of that model. The immediate challenge is to navigate the next few months with smart procurement and deft diplomacy. The long-term challenge is to reduce this dependence, through greater efficiency in fertiliser use, promotion of alternative nutrients like nano-urea and organic sources, and diversification of import sources. For now, however, all eyes are on the Strait of Hormuz, and the fragile supply lines that connect the farms of Punjab and Uttar Pradesh to the gas fields of Qatar and the mines of Jordan.
Questions and Answers
Q1: What is the scale of India’s dependence on imported fertilisers?
A1: India’s dependence is substantial and structural. In 2025-26, it is expected to import nearly 10 million tonnes (mt) of urea and 6.5 mt of DAP, alongside its entire consumption of 3 mt of muriate of potash (MOP) . For complex fertilisers, imports are projected at 4 mt. This dependence extends to raw materials like natural gas, ammonia, and sulphur.
Q2: How does the current war in West Asia threaten these fertiliser supply lines?
A2: The threat is direct and severe because a massive proportion of India’s imports come from the region. GCC countries account for roughly 75% of India’s urea imports. Saudi Arabia is the top DAP supplier. Key inputs like LNG (from Qatar) and ammonia (from Oman, Saudi Arabia) are shipped through the Strait of Hormuz, which Iran has blocked. A prolonged closure would halt these critical flows.
Q3: What is the current status of India’s fertiliser stocks, and does it provide any comfort?
A3: Currently, stocks are in a relatively comfortable position. As of February-end, urea stocks at 5.5 mt are above last year’s levels. DAP and complex fertiliser stocks are also significantly higher. This provides a buffer. Furthermore, the next major planting season (kharif) is still three months away (mid-June), giving the government a window to secure alternative supplies.
Q4: What are the potential alternative sources of supply if West Asian imports are cut off?
A4: India has already begun diversifying. For urea, it has bought from Indonesia, Malaysia, Egypt, Finland, and Vietnam. For DAP, Australia has emerged as a supplier. For LNG, the US, Australia, Angola, and Cameroon are potential alternatives. For ammonia, Indonesia, Malaysia, and China are options. However, these alternatives may involve longer shipping routes and higher costs.
Q5: What difficult choices might the government face if the war leads to severe natural gas shortages?
A5: If natural gas supplies are severely constrained, the government may have to prioritise allocations. The fertiliser sector, crucial for food security, and the city gas distribution sector, essential for clean cooking and transport fuel (PNG/CNG), would likely be protected. The power sector, which can potentially switch to coal, might be asked to bear the brunt of any cuts in gas supply.
