The Return of the Zia Legacy, How the BNP’s Deep History Shapes Bangladesh’s Tumultuous Present
On February 12, 2026, the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) secured a historic victory in the country’s general election, winning a commanding two-thirds majority in the Jatiya Sangsad. For a party that spent nearly two decades in the political wilderness, crushed under the weight of Awami League dominance, this is an extraordinary resurrection. Tarique Rahman, the son of former president Ziaur Rahman and former prime minister Khaleda Zia, now stands poised to become the next prime minister.
But to understand the BNP’s return to power is to understand the deep, contested history from which it emerged. As Kallol Bhattacherjee’s detailed account reveals, the party’s origins lie not in the independence movement of 1971 alone, but in the turbulent, violent, and ideologically charged years that followed. The BNP’s foundational mythology is built around the figure of Ziaur Rahman—a military officer who declared independence on his own, who seized power in the chaos after Mujib’s assassination, and who forged a new political ideology of “Bangladeshi nationalism” as a counter to the “Bengali nationalism” of the Awami League.
Today, as the BNP prepares to steer a nation restless with economic anxiety and geopolitical uncertainty, the ghosts of that founding era are once again walking the corridors of power. The party’s return is not just a change of government; it is a reassertion of a rival origin story for the nation itself.
The Two Declarations: Competing Foundational Myths
Bangladesh’s Liberation War of 1971 is the crucible of its national identity. But within that crucible, there are competing narratives. The dominant story, associated with the Awami League, centres on Sheikh Mujibur Rahman. His historic speech of March 7, 1971, is often described as a de facto declaration of independence. When the Pakistani military launched Operation Searchlight on March 25, unleashing a genocidal crackdown, Mujib was arrested and flown to Pakistan. From exile, other leaders like Tajuddin Ahmed and Syed Nazrul Islam formed a government and mobilized the Mukti Bahini guerrilla forces.
But there is another story. On March 27, 1971, a voice crackled over the radio from Chittagong. “This is Major Zia speaking,” it began. Minutes earlier, Major Ziaur Rahman, a decorated officer in the Pakistani Army who had fought in the 1965 war, had rebelled against his commanders. He arrested and killed his commanding officer, Lt. Col. Abdur Rashid Janjua, and other non-Bengali officers. He then drove to the Kalurghata radio transmitter and announced the independence of Bangladesh.
For Zia and his supporters, this was the real declaration of independence—a moment of martial courage, not political negotiation. While Mujib’s speech inspired the masses, Zia’s action on the ground gave the liberation struggle a military spearhead. He formed his own guerrilla unit, the Z-Force, which fought alongside the Mukti Bahini in key sectors, basing out of Tura in Meghalaya and Tripura with Indian support.
These two origin stories—one political, one military—have coexisted uneasily ever since. For the Awami League, Mujib is the “Father of the Nation.” For the BNP, Zia is the military hero who gave the liberation struggle its teeth. The contest between these narratives is not just historical; it is the foundation of Bangladesh’s partisan divide.
The Cauldron of the 1970s: Assassination, Chaos, and the Rise of Zia
The liberation of Bangladesh in December 1971 did not bring peace. It brought a new kind of warfare—an internal power struggle that would consume the nation’s founding generation.
Sheikh Mujibur Rahman returned from Pakistani prison to a hero’s welcome and became the prime minister. But his government struggled. The war had devastated the economy. A catastrophic famine in 1974 killed hundreds of thousands. Political unrest grew. In January 1975, Mujib, increasingly authoritarian, launched a single-party system called BAKSAL (Bangladesh Krishak Sramik Awami League), banning all opposition parties and concentrating power in his own hands.
It was a fatal move. On August 15, 1975, a group of disgruntled army officers assassinated Mujib and most of his family in his Dhaka home. Only his daughters, Sheikh Hasina and Sheikh Rehana, survived, as they were abroad.
A new government, led by Khondokar Mostaq Ahmad, a former associate of Mujib who had turned against him, took power. It consisted of former Awami League and BAKSAL leaders. Mostaq announced that political activities would resume and elections would be held.
But a powerful faction within the military, wary of a return to civilian rule that might restore Awami League dominance, decided to act. On November 3, 1975, they stormed Dhaka Central Jail and killed four of the nation’s most respected leaders—Tajuddin Ahmed, Syed Nazrul Islam, Mansur Ali, and A.H.M. Qamruzzaman—all of whom had formed the first government of Bangladesh in exile in 1971.
Four days later, a “military mutiny” brought Ziaur Rahman to the forefront. On paper, Zia was made Deputy Martial Law Administrator. But in the vacuum created by the jail killings and the discrediting of the political class, actual control slipped into his hands.
Zia was not initially a politician. In a broadcast on November 11, 1975, he said: “I am not a politician. I am a soldier. I have no relation with politics and our government is totally nonpartisan and apolitical.” But the logic of power is inexorable. On April 21, 1977, he declared himself President. A subsequent national referendum gave him 98.8% of the vote, a figure that testified more to the absence of democratic processes than to genuine popular support.
The Birth of the BNP: Forging a New Nationalism
As President, Zia needed a political vehicle. He experimented briefly with a “Nationalist Front,” but soon recognized the need for a proper political party. According to veteran author Mohiuddin Ahmed, it was Zia himself who came up with the name: Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP).
On September 1, 1978, at a press conference in Dhaka’s Roman Restaurant premises, Zia formally announced the launch of the party. Its ideology was built around a crucial distinction: “Bangladeshi nationalism” as opposed to “Bengali nationalism.”
The distinction was deliberate and profound. “Bengali nationalism,” associated with the Awami League, was linguistic and cultural. It emphasized the Bengali identity shared by both West Bengal in India and Bangladesh, and it had a natural affinity with secularism and a degree of Indian orientation. “Bangladeshi nationalism,” by contrast, was territorial. As Humayun Kabir, a foreign policy adviser to current BNP chairman Tarique Rahman, explained: “Bangladeshi nationalism is territorially defined. It means nationalism of the citizens who live on the land of Bangladesh.”
This formulation allowed Zia to do several things. It distinguished his party from the Awami League. It appealed to conservative and Islamist elements who were uncomfortable with the secularism of Bengali nationalism. And it provided a basis for a more independent foreign policy, less oriented toward India.
Zia also sought to legitimize his rule through a 19-point agenda, announced on May 22, 1977, which expressed faith in “Almighty Allah” and promised justice for all citizens regardless of religion, caste, or other differences. It was a carefully crafted blend of military discipline, conservative values, and developmental ambition.
The Assassination and the Interregnum
Zia’s rule was cut short on May 30, 1981, when he was assassinated in the Chittagong Circuit House by a group of army officers. The conspiracy remains murky, but its effect was clear: the BNP’s political journey was paused.
Gen. Hussain Muhammad Ershad seized power in a bloodless coup in 1982 and ruled for nearly a decade. During this interregnum, Zia’s widow, Khaleda Zia, took charge of the BNP in 1984. She emerged as a formidable opposition leader, agitating alongside the Awami League’s Sheikh Hasina for the restoration of parliamentary democracy.
The alliance of convenience between the BNP and Awami League against Ershad did not survive the dictator’s fall. In 1991, Khaleda Zia led the BNP to victory in a parliamentary election and became prime minister. The bitter rivalry that would define Bangladeshi politics for the next three decades had begun.
Tarique Rahman, Khaleda and Zia’s son, entered the political stage after the BNP returned to power in 2001. He was seen as his mother’s political heir, but his path was complicated by corruption allegations and a long, self-imposed exile in London during the years of Awami League dominance.
The 2026 Victory: A Restoration and a Test
The BNP’s 2026 victory is a historic restoration. After nearly two decades in the political wilderness, the party has returned with a mandate that rivals its greatest triumphs. Tarique Rahman is credited with leading this comeback, navigating the party through the treacherous aftermath of the 2024 student uprising that ousted Sheikh Hasina.
But the party that returns is not the same party that left. The Bangladesh of 2026 is different from the Bangladesh of 2006. The economy has grown, but inequality has widened. The youth who powered the 2024 uprising are restless for jobs and opportunity. The geopolitical landscape, with China and India vying for influence, is more complex.
The BNP’s foundational ideology of “Bangladeshi nationalism” will be tested in this new context. Can it deliver economic revival? Can it manage the relationship with India, strained by the ouster of Hasina and the BNP’s call for her extradition? Can it navigate the competing pressures of China’s Belt and Road Initiative and the United States’ Indo-Pacific strategy?
Conclusion: The Ghosts of 1971
As Tarique Rahman prepares to take office, the ghosts of 1971 and 1975 hover in the background. The BNP’s origin story is one of military courage, political assassination, and ideological invention. It is a story of a man—Ziaur Rahman—who declared independence, seized power in chaos, and forged a party that would outlive him.
For the Awami League, the BNP has always been an illegitimate offspring of military rule. For the BNP, it is the true inheritor of the liberation spirit, standing against the authoritarian tendencies of its rival.
The 2026 election has given the BNP a chance to govern, and to write the next chapter of its history. Whether it can transcend the bitter partisan divisions of the past and deliver for the restless nation it now leads is the great question of the hour. The return of the old guard is complete. The test of governance has just begun.
Q&A: Unpacking the BNP’s History and Return
Q1: What is the difference between “Bengali nationalism” and “Bangladeshi nationalism”?
A: This is the core ideological distinction between the Awami League and the BNP. “Bengali nationalism,” championed by the Awami League, is based on linguistic and cultural identity. It emphasizes the shared Bengali heritage of people in both Bangladesh and the Indian state of West Bengal. It is traditionally associated with secularism and a closer relationship with India. “Bangladeshi nationalism,” forged by Ziaur Rahman for the BNP, is territorially defined. It focuses on citizenship of the land of Bangladesh, regardless of ethnicity or language. This formulation allowed the BNP to appeal to conservative and Islamist elements who were uncomfortable with the secularism of Bengali nationalism, and to pursue a more independent foreign policy less oriented toward India.
Q2: Why are there two competing narratives of the 1971 Liberation War?
A: The competing narratives reflect the different roles played by political and military leaders. The Awami League’s narrative centres on Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, whose March 7 speech inspired the nation and who was arrested before the war began. The government-in-exile, led by Tajuddin Ahmed, provided political direction. The BNP’s narrative centres on Ziaur Rahman, a military officer who rebelled against his Pakistani commanders and declared independence over the radio from Chittagong. He then formed the Z-Force guerrilla unit and fought actively in the war. Both narratives are true in their own way, but they have been weaponized in the partisan rivalry that has defined Bangladeshi politics since independence.
Q3: What was the significance of the 1975 jail killings?
A: The November 3, 1975, jail killings were a pivotal moment in Bangladesh’s post-independence history. Four of the nation’s most respected leaders—Tajuddin Ahmed, Syed Nazrul Islam, Mansur Ali, and A.H.M. Qamruzzaman—who had formed the first government of Bangladesh in exile in 1971, were murdered in Dhaka Central Jail by a faction of the military. The killings eliminated a generation of political leadership that could have provided an alternative to both military rule and the eventual return of the Awami League. They created a vacuum that allowed Ziaur Rahman to emerge as the dominant figure, and they deepened the culture of political violence that has plagued Bangladesh ever since.
Q4: How did Khaleda Zia shape the BNP?
A: After Ziaur Rahman’s assassination in 1981, his widow Khaleda Zia took charge of the BNP in 1984. During the military rule of H.M. Ershad, she led the party in opposition, initially in alliance with the Awami League against the dictator. After Ershad’s fall, she led the BNP to victory in the 1991 elections and became prime minister. Her tenure cemented the BNP as a major political force and established the pattern of bitter, personal rivalry with Sheikh Hasina that defined Bangladeshi politics for three decades. She also positioned her son, Tarique Rahman, as her political heir.
Q5: What challenges does the BNP face upon its return to power in 2026?
A: The BNP faces several monumental challenges. Domestically, it must address the economic anxieties—inflation, unemployment, lack of opportunity—that powered the 2024 student uprising. It must govern in a way that does not replicate the authoritarian tendencies of its predecessor, and it must navigate the expectations of its coalition partners, including the Islamist Jamaat-e-Islami. Internationally, it must manage a fraught relationship with India, strained by the ouster of Sheikh Hasina and the BNP’s call for her extradition, while also balancing the growing influence of China. The party’s foundational ideology of “Bangladeshi nationalism” will be tested against these complex realities.
