The Return of the Iran Nuclear File, Trump’s Second Act and the Geopolitical Stakes
In late 2013, the White House in Washington DC—then under President Barack Obama—embarked on a multi-national, complicated, and ambitious journey to negotiate with Iran to curtail its nuclear programme. The United States, along with some of its allies, particularly Israel, was at a level convinced that Tehran had set out to develop a nuclear weapons programme. The negotiations, which involved a consortium of United Nations Security Council Members along with Germany, collectively known as the P5+1, managed to reach an agreement in 2015 called the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). The aim was to install guardrails around the Shia power’s nuclear activities, which its then President Hassan Rouhani and the Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei maintained was only for civil use.
The JCPOA was never a perfect agreement, but it was an agreement. It placed limits on Iran’s nuclear programme in exchange for sanctions relief. It was the product of years of intense diplomacy and represented the best hope for preventing a nuclear-armed Iran through peaceful means.
The Trump Years: Tearing Up the Deal
In 2018, as the first presidency of Donald Trump began, the U.S. exited the agreement leaving not just Iran but also its allies in Europe in the lurch. Russia and China, technically allies for Iran, but not wanting a nuclearised West Asia, were also left stumped. Mr. Trump had long advocated that the JCPOA was farcical and negotiated in a way which did not secure American interests.
The withdrawal was a strategic shock. It undermined the credibility of American commitments, emboldened hardliners in Iran who had always opposed the deal, and removed the very guardrails that had been so painstakingly constructed. Iran, which had been complying with the agreement, began to gradually roll back its commitments. The path toward potential nuclear weapons capability, which had been blocked, was reopened.
Fast forward to 2025. Now, in Mr. Trump’s second run as President, the U.S., with Israel, bombed Iran’s nuclear and air defence sites followed by a narrative that the country’s capacities to pursue such weapons lay in tatters. The strikes were significant, but they did not eliminate Iran’s nuclear knowledge or its determination.
The Diplomatic Reversal
However, a few months following the attacks, Mr. Trump is now chasing a deal through diplomacy, in a very similar manner as Mr. Obama did and succeeded, albeit not a perfect one. Israel’s Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, who in a speech at the United Nations in 2012 had shown a drawing depicting the various stages at which Iran’s nuclear programme had progressed, kept stopping Tehran as a non-negotiable security aim. With Mr. Obama, and even President Joe Biden later, Mr. Netanyahu had limited success. But with Mr. Trump, it was an opportunity as the Israeli leader managed to market his state’s celebrated intelligence apparatus’s assessment that Iran was racing towards nuclear weapons. While the U.S.’s assessments differed, Mr. Netanyahu’s whisperings in Mr. Trump’s ear won the battle.
Now, in 2026, even as the U.S. moves notable military capacity in the region while simultaneously holding talks with Iran, hosted by long-time mediator Oman, Mr. Trump seemingly wants his own JCPOA. The language from the White House today resembles that of the pre-Obama era. “… I insisted that negotiations with Iran continue to see whether or not a deal can be consummated,” he said. “If it can, I let the Prime Minister know that will be a preference. If it cannot, we will just have to see what the outcome will be,” Mr. Trump said while meeting Mr. Netanyahu, who, once again, had to rush to the White House as U.S. interlocutors met their Iranian counterparts in Muscat.
The Regional Context: Arab Powers and the Fear of Escalation
Arab powers of the Gulf, who over the past year or two have committed hundreds of billions of dollars of investment towards Mr. Trump, despite their own troubles with Tehran, do not want to see military escalation. And it is not just them. Others across the world would rather see talks succeed than fail, avoiding pushing the region into another conflict which could run for years should it spread.
The Gulf states have spent decades building their economies, attracting investment, and creating modern societies. A war with Iran would put all of that at risk. Their investments in Trump are not just about business; they are about insurance—a way of ensuring that American power remains committed to their security.
Iran has made no bones that it retains the kinetic capacity to strike back—a claim that is increasingly being taken seriously by analysts and officials alike. Further threats from Tehran that any strikes this time will be met by retaliation targeting U.S. military facilities in the region, largely situated in the Gulf states, have led to anxieties peaking. The stress is not coming from Iran’s intentions, but more from an inability to predict or influence Mr. Trump’s thinking.
The Stakes for India
The Iran file coming back as a point of geopolitical friction, at a moment when the world identifies more as a disordered than an ordered one, poses renewed challenges for many. India, for example, was a supporter of the erstwhile JCPOA process. In fact, New Delhi had highlighted to its peers in Tehran the perks of such an agreement, such as ease of sanctions and a return of oil trade. Iran was at a point one of the top two oil suppliers for India, only to lose out as U.S. pressure peaked. JCPOA was seen as the way out.
But even as focus usually comes down to oil, or the Chabahar Port, a long-standing Indian connectivity investment, Tehran remains an important political player—for its fractious relationship with Pakistan, its practicality with the Taliban in Afghanistan, and its posturing in Central Asia vis-à-vis Turkish and Pakistani influences. Iran offers much for India than just its West Asia policies.
Chabahar is India’s gateway to Afghanistan and Central Asia, bypassing Pakistan. It is a strategic asset of immense value. But its viability depends on Iran not being under crushing sanctions. A nuclear deal that brings Iran back into the international fold would be a boon for Chabahar and for India’s broader connectivity ambitions.
Iran’s Internal Dynamics
Finally, Iran also stands at a crossroads. Internal protests have been consistent, gnawing into the state’s political stability. The ‘moderates’, once powerful, have had to align with their conservative peers to build a nationalist narrative following the U.S. bombings. Domestic power plays, much like before, will heavily impact external outcomes.
The Iranian regime is under pressure from multiple directions: economic sanctions, popular discontent, and now military strikes. Its response to these pressures will shape not only its nuclear policy but its entire posture toward the region and the world.
Conclusion: Diplomacy or Conflict?
Any success of these talks will be a better option moving forward than the alternatives being presented by the largest American military build-up in the region since 2003. The choice is stark: a negotiated agreement that places limits on Iran’s programme and brings it back into the international community, or a conflict that could destabilise the entire region for years to come.
Trump wants his own JCPOA. Whether he can achieve it depends on factors beyond his control: Iran’s internal politics, the influence of Israel and the Gulf states, and the unpredictable dynamics of a region that has known too much war. The stakes could not be higher—for Iran, for the region, and for the world.
Q&A: Unpacking the Iran Nuclear File
Q1: What was the JCPOA and why did Trump withdraw from it in 2018?
The JCPOA was the 2015 nuclear agreement between Iran and the P5+1 (UN Security Council members plus Germany). It placed limits on Iran’s nuclear programme in exchange for sanctions relief. Trump withdrew in 2018, arguing the deal was flawed and did not secure American interests. The withdrawal undermined U.S. credibility, emboldened Iranian hardliners, and removed the guardrails on Iran’s nuclear programme.
Q2: What is Trump’s current position on Iran nuclear negotiations?
In 2026, despite having bombed Iran’s nuclear sites in 2025, Trump is now pursuing a diplomatic deal—his own version of the JCPOA. He has stated that negotiations should continue to see if a deal can be reached, expressing preference for diplomacy over conflict. However, he has also maintained military pressure, with significant U.S. naval assets deployed in the region.
Q3: What role do Gulf Arab states play in this dynamic?
Gulf Arab states, despite their own tensions with Iran, do not want military escalation. They have invested heavily in their economies and fear that war would destroy their achievements. Their hundreds of billions in investments toward Trump are partly aimed at ensuring U.S. commitment to their security while avoiding conflict. They prefer a negotiated outcome.
Q4: Why is the Iran nuclear issue important for India?
Several reasons: Iran was once one of India’s top oil suppliers; the Chabahar Port—India’s strategic connectivity project to Afghanistan and Central Asia—depends on Iran not being under crushing sanctions; Iran is a key political player with influence in Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Central Asia. A nuclear deal would ease sanctions, benefit Chabahar, and reduce regional tensions.
Q5: What are the internal challenges facing Iran?
Iran faces consistent internal protests gnawing at political stability. Moderates have had to align with conservatives to build a nationalist narrative following U.S. bombings. Economic sanctions, popular discontent, and military pressure have created multiple stresses. Domestic power plays will heavily influence Iran’s willingness to negotiate and any potential deal’s durability.
