The Quad in the Age of Interregnum, Resilience and Uncertainty in a Shifting World

The year 2025 was a year of profound global recalibration, marked most significantly by the return of Donald Trump to the White House. This political earthquake sent disruptive tremors through strategic theatres worldwide, but perhaps nowhere were the fault lines more visible—and the consequent balancing act more delicate—than in the Indo-Pacific, the epicenter of 21st-century great power competition. At the heart of this geopolitical drama stands the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad), the grouping of India, Australia, Japan, and the United States. As the authors Harsh V. Pant and Sayanang Haldar observe, 2025 became a “year of interregnum” for the Quad—a period of suspended animation and strategic hesitation, challenging its hard-won momentum but also unexpectedly revealing its underlying resilience.

The Quad’s Core Mandate: A Rules-Based Order in a Contested Sea

The Quad’s foundational purpose, solidified since its 2017 revival, is to serve as a force for a “free, open, inclusive, and rules-based Indo-Pacific.” This carefully crafted phraseology is a direct, though often unspoken, counterweight to China’s increasingly assertive behavior in the region, characterized by militarization of disputed territories, coercive economic diplomacy, and a challenge to established international law, particularly the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). The Quad represents a unique model of cooperation: not a formal military alliance like NATO, but a flexible, multifaceted partnership of like-minded maritime democracies. Its strength lies in its ability to coordinate across domains—maritime security, infrastructure development, critical and emerging technology, climate resilience, and health security—presenting a holistic, positive alternative vision for regional order, in contrast to Beijing’s more transactional and hierarchical model.

The Trump Doctrine and the Shadow of “America First”

The advent of the Trump 2.0 administration cast an immediate and significant shadow over the grouping. While Trump was paradoxically a key architect of the Quad’s 2017 revival, his governing philosophy of “America First” has always been inherently skeptical of multilateral commitments perceived as entangling or costly. Early 2025 was thus fraught with anxiety: would Washington continue to invest political capital in a minilateral forum aimed at providing “global public goods,” or would it retreat into a more unilateralist, transaction-driven posture?

The initial signals were cautiously positive. The fact that U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio chose to host his Quad counterparts in Washington in January 2025 as his first major diplomatic engagement sent a powerful message of continuity. A second Foreign Minister-level meeting in July reinforced this. These actions signaled that the Trump administration recognized the Quad’s utility, likely viewing it through a pragmatic lens: as a cost-effective means to share the burden of balancing China, to secure U.S. interests in the region, and to leverage the capabilities of key partners like India and Japan. However, this transactional appreciation lacked the strategic warmth and declaratory commitment of the Biden era, creating an atmosphere of uncertainty.

The Summit Gap: Symbolism and Substance

The most conspicuous indicator of the interregnum was the failure to convene a leaders-level summit in 2025, breaking a streak of six annual summits held from 2021 to 2024. The summit, scheduled to be hosted by India, was a casualty of the complex diplomatic choreography required amid political transitions. The delay was not trivial. For a forum with no permanent secretariat or treaty-based structure, the annual leaders’ summit is its institutional anchor and lifeblood. It is where strategic convergence is forged at the highest level, new initiatives are launched with fanfare, and the political will of the group is publicly demonstrated to allies and adversaries alike.

The absence of this top-tier engagement in 2025 fueled speculation about the Quad’s cohesion and future relevance. It was compounded by the fact that new Japanese Prime Minister James Takachi had not attended any Quad engagement since assuming office in October, suggesting internal prioritization challenges. The summit gap created a symbolic vacuum, allowing Beijing to portray the Quad as an ad-hoc, faltering initiative.

Operational Resilience: The Proof is in the Action

Yet, beneath the surface of this summit-level hiatus, the Quad’s operational machinery demonstrated remarkable resilience. As Pant and Haldar highlight, key initiatives continued to move forward, proving that the partnership had developed a bureaucratic and institutional momentum of its own that transcended political cycles in individual capitals.

Quad-at-Sea: Ship Observer Mission: This initiative, operationalized for the first time in June 2025, is a prime example of practical, low-profile cooperation. It focuses on Coast Guard-level collaboration, enhancing maritime domain awareness, and promoting best practices in areas like illegal fishing and humanitarian response. Such functional cooperation builds trust and interoperability without the overt military posturing that can escalate tensions.
Ports of the Future Partnership: Launched at the 2024 summit, this initiative held its inaugural meeting in Mumbai in October 2025. It aims to promote sustainable, resilient, and transparent port infrastructure across the Indo-Pacific, directly offering an alternative to China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). By focusing on quality infrastructure, debt sustainability, and adherence to environmental standards, it embodies the Quad’s positive agenda.
Malabar Naval Exercises: While not an official Quad initiative (to maintain a degree of diplomatic deniability), the annual Malabar exercise, involving all four navies, has become its most potent military manifestation. The 2025 iteration in Guam was a powerful demonstration of advanced maritime interoperability, signaling to Beijing the collective capacity of these democracies to operate together in complex naval warfare scenarios.

This continuity of working-level collaboration reveals a critical truth: the strategic rationale for the Quad remains compelling for all four members, irrespective of political leadership. India sees it as a platform to manage China’s rise while preserving its strategic autonomy. Australia views it as central to its security and economic stability in the region. Japan considers it indispensable for a networked response to Chinese coercion. And for the U.S., even under Trump, it remains a force-multiplier. This shared, enduring interest acted as a stabilizing ballast during the political turbulence of 2025.

The Path Forward: Beyond the Interregnum

The Quad now stands at a critical juncture as it looks toward 2026. The “diplomatic efforts” mentioned by U.S. Ambassador to India Sergio Cor to schedule an early 2026 leaders’ summit are paramount. Reconvening at the highest level is essential to dispel doubts, reaffirm commitments, and inject new strategic direction.

The future trajectory will depend on several factors:

Managing Internal Divergences: The Quad is not a monolith. Differences remain, particularly regarding the war in Ukraine and the extent of overtly “anti-China” rhetoric. India’s historical non-alignment and ties with Russia require careful navigation. Sustaining the Quad requires focusing on the positive, cooperative agenda while managing these divergences with mature diplomacy.
Delivering Concrete Outcomes: The group must accelerate the delivery of tangible results from its initiatives—visible infrastructure projects, effective disaster response, accessible technology collaborations. Success must be measured in benefits delivered to regional partners in Southeast Asia and the Pacific Islands, expanding the Quad’s appeal beyond its core membership.
Institutionalizing Cooperation: To survive future political transitions, the Quad may need to gradually build a lean but effective support structure—perhaps a small permanent coordinating office or a rotating secretariat. This would provide continuity and bureaucratic memory.
Navigating the U.S. Political Landscape: Ultimately, the commitment of the United States, the group’s most powerful member, will be decisive. The Quad must prove its worth to Washington not just as a talking shop, but as an effective instrument for advancing concrete U.S. interests in the Indo-Pacific with minimal direct cost.

Conclusion: A Force for Good in a Turbulent Time

The year 2025 proved to be a stress test for the Quad. It revealed that the grouping is not immune to the disruptive currents of global politics, particularly the mercurial nature of American foreign policy. The absence of a leaders’ summit was a significant setback. However, the year also demonstrated the Quad’s surprising resilience. The continuity of its functional and military cooperation showed that the strategic imperatives that bind these four nations are deeper and more durable than the political preferences of any single leader.

As Pant and Haldar conclude, it is “too early to write the group off.” The Quad emerged from its year of interregnum not broken, but battle-tested. It remains the most coherent democratic grouping dedicated to shaping the Indo-Pacific’s future. Its challenge for 2026 and beyond is to convert its operational resilience into renewed political momentum, proving that it can be more than just an intermittent dialogue—that it can be a sustained, effective, and indispensable “force for good” in an increasingly contested and uncertain world. The interregnum is over; the moment for decisive action has arrived.

Q&A on the Quad’s 2025 Interregnum and Future

Q1: What exactly is meant by the Quad’s “year of interregnum” in 2025?

A1: The term “interregnum” refers to a period when normal political continuity is suspended or interrupted. For the Quad in 2025, this meant a year marked by significant strategic hesitation and a break in momentum, primarily caused by the return of Donald Trump to the U.S. presidency. The most glaring symbol of this interregnum was the failure to hold an annual leaders-level summit—a critical event for setting the group’s agenda and demonstrating high-level unity—for the first time since the summit series began in 2021. This created a sense of uncertainty and paused the forward diplomatic thrust of the grouping, even as its lower-level work continued.

Q2: Why did the Trump administration continue engaging with the Quad despite its “America First” policy?

A2: The Trump administration’s engagement is best understood through a lens of pragmatic transactionalism rather than ideological commitment to multilateralism. While skeptical of open-ended alliances, the administration likely sees the Quad as a highly efficient, low-cost tool to advance core U.S. interests:

Burden-Sharing: It leverages the military, economic, and diplomatic resources of India, Japan, and Australia to help balance China, reducing the sole burden on the U.S.
Operational Value: Initiatives like maritime coordination and military exercises (Malabar) enhance U.S. operational reach and interoperability with key partners.
Positive Agenda: Projects like the “Ports of the Future” offer a viable alternative to Chinese influence (BRI), promoting U.S. standards and countering Beijing’s narrative without requiring massive direct U.S. investment.
In short, the Quad aligns with an “America First” approach by getting allies and partners to do more for shared objectives, a classic Trump foreign policy preference.

Q3: How did the Quad demonstrate resilience during this challenging year?

A3: Resilience was shown through the uninterrupted continuation of substantive, working-level cooperation across multiple pillars:

Diplomatic: Two Foreign Minister-level meetings were held, maintaining high-level dialogue.
Functional: New initiatives like the Quad-at-Sea: Ship Observer Mission (launched June 2025) and the Ports of the Future Partnership (first meeting in Mumbai, Oct 2025) moved forward, focusing on practical, non-military cooperation.
Military: The Malabar naval exercises, involving all four navies, proceeded as scheduled in Guam, signaling undiminished commitment to maritime security interoperability.
This proved that the Quad had developed a degree of institutional and bureaucratic momentum independent of the political calendar, driven by enduring shared strategic interests.

Q4: What is the strategic importance of the leaders-level summit, and why was its absence so significant?

A4: For an informal, non-treaty-based grouping like the Quad, the leaders-level summit is its supreme political engine. Its importance is multifaceted:

Symbolic Reaffirmation: It is a powerful, visible signal of the highest-level commitment from all four nations, deterring adversaries and reassuring partners.
Strategic Direction-Setting: It is where major new initiatives are conceived and announced, setting the agenda for the year ahead.
Trust and Bonhomie: Face-to-face meetings between leaders build personal rapport and help manage bilateral divergences (e.g., India’s stance on Russia), which is crucial for a consensus-based group.
Institutional Anchor: In the absence of a permanent secretariat, the annual summit cycle provides the essential rhythm and structure for the partnership.
Its absence in 2025 created a leadership vacuum, slowed decision-making on new endeavors, and fueled narratives of the Quad’s decline.

Q5: What are the key challenges and opportunities for the Quad as it looks beyond 2026?

A5:
Challenges:

Sustaining U.S. Commitment: Ensuring consistent, high-level U.S. engagement beyond transactional calculations.
Managing Internal Differences: Navigating differing national perspectives on Ukraine, Russia, and the precise tone to adopt toward China.
Delivering for the Region: Translating initiatives into tangible benefits for Southeast Asian and Pacific Island nations to build broader legitimacy and counter accusations of being an exclusive “Asian NATO.”
Institutionalization: Developing just enough structure to ensure continuity without becoming a bloated bureaucracy that stifles flexibility.

Opportunities:

Crisis Response: Positioning itself as a first responder for regional humanitarian disasters and health crises, building on its vaccine diplomacy model.
Technology Cooperation: Deepening collaboration on critical and emerging tech (AI, quantum, semiconductors, undersea cables) to build secure, democratic supply chains.
Infrastructure Alternative: Successfully implementing the “Ports of the Future” and similar projects as transparent, high-quality alternatives to state-led models.
Expanding Partnerships: Developing “Quad-plus” frameworks to work with European partners (like the EU or UK) and key regional states (Indonesia, Vietnam, Philippines) on specific issues, broadening its coalition without formal expansion.

The Quad in the Age of Interregnum, Resilience and Uncertainty in a Shifting World