The Nomination Conundrum, Democratic Accountability in UT Assemblies

The Nomination Conundrum, Democratic Accountability in UT Assemblies

Introduction

The recent affidavit filed by the Union Home Ministry before the Jammu & Kashmir and Ladakh High Court, asserting that the Lieutenant Governor (LG) of J&K can nominate members to the Legislative Assembly without the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers, has reignited a critical debate. This issue touches upon:

• Federalism vs. Central Control in Union Territories (UTs)

• The Legitimacy of Nominated MLAs in democratic setups

• Judicial Precedents on UT governance

• Potential Manipulation of Assembly Dynamics

This article examines:

1. Constitutional and Legal Provisions for nominations

2. Comparative Analysis of J&K, Puducherry, and Delhi

3. Judicial Interpretations (including the 2023 “Triple Chain of Command” doctrine)

4. 5 Key Reforms Needed

5. 5 Q&A on UT Nominations

By the end, we’ll assess whether nominated members strengthen representation or undermine democracy.

Legal Framework: Who Controls Nominations?

1. Constitutional Provisions

• Article 239A (Puducherry) & J&K Reorganisation Act, 2019: Allow Parliament to create legislatures for UTs.

• Nominated Members:

  • Puducherry: Up to 3 members (Centre’s discretion).

  • J&K: Up to 5 members (2 women, 2 Kashmiri migrants, 1 PoK displaced person).

  • Delhi: No nominations (70 elected seats only).

2. Key Differences

Judicial Precedents: Democracy vs. Central Overreach

1. Lakshminarayanan v. Union of India (2008)

• Madras HC Ruling: Centre can nominate Puducherry MLAs without consulting UT ministers.

• Supreme Court: Later set aside recommendations for reform, leaving ambiguity.

2. Govt of NCT Delhi v. Union of India (2023)

• “Triple Chain of Command” Doctrine:

  1. President (for UTs)

  2. LG (as Centre’s representative)

  3. Elected Govt (for day-to-day administration)

• Implication: Reinforces Centre’s supremacy in UT governance.

Why Nominated MLAs Are Controversial

1. Subverting Electoral Mandates

• J&K Example: 5 nominated MLAs could tilt a hung assembly (e.g., converting a 26-seat majority into a minority).

• Puducherry (2021): Congress govt fell after 3 BJP-backed nominees joined opposition.

2. Lack of Democratic Accountability

• Nominated members owe allegiance to nominators (Centre/LG), not voters.

• No recall mechanism if they act against public interest.

3. J&K’s Unique Case

• Pre-2019: Had more autonomy than other states.

• Post-2019: UT status + nominated members = Perceived democratic backsliding.

5 Reforms for Democratic Integrity

1. Clarify Nomination Procedures

• Parliamentary Amendment: Define if LG/Centre must consult UT ministers.

2. Restrict Nominated Members’ Voting Rights

• Model: Like Rajya Sabha nominees, bar them from confidence/no-confidence motions.

3. Transparency in Selection

• Public Criteria: E.g., Kashmiri migrant nominees must prove residency.

4. Restore J&K’s Statehood

• Eliminate Nominations: Only elected reps should legislate.

5. Judicial Review

• Constitutional Bench: Re-examine if nominations violate basic structure doctrine.

5 Key Q&A on UT Nominations

Q1: Why does J&K have nominated MLAs but not Delhi?

A: Historical reasons. J&K’s Reorganisation Act (2019) added nominations for “underrepresented groups”, while Delhi’s Act (1991) doesn’t permit them.

Q2: Can nominated MLAs topple governments?

A: Yes. In Puducherry (2021), 3 nominees helped defeat the Congress govt.

Q3: Does the President/LG need ministers’ advice for nominations?

A: No clear law. Courts have ruled both ways (Puducherry: Centre decides; J&K: LG’s affidavit claims unilateral power).

Q4: Are Anglo-Indian nominations relevant here?

A: No. That provision (Article 331) was abolished in 2020. UT nominations are governed by separate Acts.

Q5: What’s the “triple chain of command”?

A: SC’s 2023 framework prioritizing:

1. President > 2. LG > 3. Elected Govt — reinforcing Centre’s control over UTs.

Conclusion: Nominations vs. Democracy

Nominated members—whether in J&K or Puducherry—risk becoming tools for political engineering. While they may represent marginalized groups, their undemocratic selection and voting powers undermine federalism.

The Way Forward:
Limit nominations to symbolic roles (no voting on govt formation).
Restore J&K’s statehood to end exceptionalism.
Judicial clarity on the LG’s role.

As former IAS officer Rangarajan B argues, “Political differences shouldn’t rupture popular mandates.” If India’s UTs are to be truly democratic, nominations must either be reformed or abolished.

Author

Rangarajan B
Former IAS Officer & Author of “Courseware on Polity Simplified”