The Looming Shadow of Midnight, The End of START and the Uncharted Perils of a New Nuclear Age

The Looming Shadow of Midnight, The End of START and the Uncharted Perils of a New Nuclear Age

On February 4, with a whisper rather than a bang, the final pillar of the post-Cold War nuclear arms control architecture crumbled. The expiration of the New START (Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty) between the United States and Russia marks a watershed moment in global security, one that the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists grimly quantified by moving its symbolic Doomsday Clock to 85 seconds to midnight—the closest to catastrophe it has ever been. This is not merely the lapse of a diplomatic agreement; it is the active suspension of the primary mechanism that has, for over half a century, provided a fragile but critical measure of predictability, transparency, and restraint between the world’s two largest nuclear powers. With other treaties like the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty and the Open Skies Treaty already defunct, the international community now faces a stark reality: there are no longer any legally binding limits on the size and sophistication of the American and Russian nuclear arsenals. The world has entered an era of unchecked nuclear competition, and the consequences, as analyst Saptarshi Basak outlines, are dire and multidimensional, threatening to destabilize the global order and accelerate the very proliferation these weapons were meant to deter.

The Unraveling of a Fragile Consensus

The path to this precipice was neither sudden nor accidental. The New START treaty, signed in 2010 and extended in 2021, was the last survivor of a once-robust arms control regime. Its demise is a symptom of the profound collapse in US-Russia relations, poisoned by the annexation of Crimea in 2014 and rendered toxic by the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022. Russia’s formal suspension of participation in the treaty in 2023 was a death knell, turning its verification mechanisms—including on-site inspections and data exchanges—into a dead letter. While Vladimir Putin later proposed a one-year extension, the proposal was laden with conditions linked to the Ukraine war that were non-starters for Washington. The complete absence of diplomatic engagement since then underscores a chilling new normal: strategic rivalry has completely eclipsed the shared interest in mutual survival that once underpinned arms control.

This breakdown is catastrophic because arms control treaties were never merely about limiting numbers of warheads. They served three vital functions:

1. Strategic Stability: By capping arsenals and banning certain destabilizing weapon categories (like ground-launched intermediate-range missiles under the INF Treaty), they reduced incentives for a first-strike and created a predictable balance of terror.

2. Transparency and Trust: Verification protocols like inspections allowed each side to peer into the other’s arsenal, replacing worst-case assumptions with hard data. This reduced misperception and miscalculation during crises.

3. A Framework for Diplomacy: The treaties provided a continuous channel of communication between military establishments, even when political relations were frozen. This channel is now severed.

The Triad of Consequences: Why a Post-START World is Infinitely More Dangerous

Basak’s analysis correctly identifies three interconnected and escalating dangers that define this new era.

1. The Inevitable Security Dilemma and the Resumption of an Arms Race:
In international relations, a security dilemma occurs when one state’s efforts to increase its own security (like building more weapons) are perceived as a threat by a rival, provoking a reactive buildup that leaves both sides less secure. With the guardrails of New START removed, this dynamic is set to go into overdrive. The US has already signaled its direction. In October of last year, the Trump administration announced the resumption of nuclear weapons testing, a practice dormant since 1992. While framed as necessary for modernization, such a move is a political signal that shatters a decades-long norm. Russia, paranoid about perceived Western encirclement and technological inferiority in conventional forces, will almost certainly respond in kind, developing and deploying new delivery systems, expanding its warhead stockpile beyond treaty limits, and possibly resuming its own tests.

This is not a hypothetical Cold War relic. Modern technology adds terrifying new dimensions. The race will now encompass:

• Hypersonic Glide Vehicles: Maneuverable weapons that can evade current missile defense systems.

• Nuclear-Armed Sea Drones: Like Russia’s reported “Poseidon,” designed to create radioactive tsunamis.

• Tactical (Battlefield) Nuclear Weapons: Smaller, more “usable” warheads that lower the threshold for nuclear use.

• AI and Cyber Vulnerabilities: The integration of artificial intelligence in command systems and the cyber-hardening (or vulnerability) of nuclear infrastructure.

An unchecked technological arms race increases the risk of accidental launch, lowers the threshold for use, and consumes colossal resources that could address existential threats like climate change or pandemics.

2. The Intensification of the Stability-Instability Paradox:
This sophisticated concept, articulated by Glenn Snyder, posits that while mutual assured destruction (MAD) may prevent an all-out nuclear war between superpowers, it paradoxically increases the likelihood of conventional and proxy conflicts at lower levels. States believe they can engage in limited warfare—supplying proxies, conducting cyber-attacks, seizing territory—secure in the knowledge that the nuclear umbrella prevents total escalation. We see this playing out vividly in Ukraine, where direct NATO-Russia conflict is avoided, but a devastating proxy war rages.

Without arms control, this paradox becomes exponentially more dangerous. Transparency is lost. If the US deploys a new missile system, is it defensive or part of a first-strike capability? Is Russia’s expansion of tactical nukes a defensive measure or preparation for a limited nuclear war in Europe? In the absence of data exchanges and inspections, each side will assume the worst. This ambiguity makes the “nuclear threshold”—the ill-defined line where a conflict triggers a nuclear response—impossible to discern. Miscalculation becomes far more likely. A regional skirmish could escalate uncontrollably because neither side can accurately gauge the other’s red lines or arsenal status.

3. The Cascading Effect of Proliferation:
The superpower arms control regime was the cornerstone of the global non-proliferation order. The 1968 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) was a bargain: non-nuclear states promised not to pursue weapons, and nuclear states promised to work toward disarmament. When the two largest nuclear powers openly abandon disarmament and race to expand their arsenals, that bargain is revealed as a sham. It provides a powerful rationale for other states to seek their own nuclear deterrents, citing an increasingly insecure and lawless international environment.

The immediate focal point is Iran. Its nuclear program, the subject of fraught negotiations, exists in the shadow of a perceived US security guarantee to Israel (a nuclear state) and Saudi Arabia’s explicit warnings that it will match Iranian capabilities. If Iran were to weaponize, a nuclear cascade in West Asia is almost certain, with Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Egypt likely to follow. A region already riddled with interstate rivalries, non-state actors, and instability would become a multi-directional nuclear standoff, a scenario of almost unimaginable risk.

Furthermore, China’s ongoing and opaque nuclear expansion—possibly aiming for parity with the US and Russia—is no longer happening in a regulated environment. It becomes part of an untrammeled triangular arms race, with each player reacting to the others’ moves in a dark room.

The Ghost of The Day After: A Lost Language of Restraint

The column’s reference to Ronald Reagan is poignant. The conservative Cold Warrior was deeply affected by the film The Day After, which depicted the horrific aftermath of a nuclear exchange on American soil. That visceral understanding of the stakes drove him toward unprecedented cooperation with Mikhail Gorbachev. Today, that shared sense of apocalyptic consequence seems absent. In Moscow and Washington, nuclear weapons are increasingly discussed not as instruments of universal doom to be marginalized, but as usable tools of statecraft and deterrence. The language of restraint has been replaced by the rhetoric of modernization and strength.

Diplomacy is not entirely dead. The fact that “both states will be talking about nuclear weapons again,” as Basak notes, provides a sliver of hope. Even discussions on risk reduction, crisis communication hotlines, or agreements to avoid certain dangerous behaviors (like deploying nuclear weapons in space) would be valuable. But the foundation for a new comprehensive treaty is absent, buried under the rubble of Ukraine and deep mutual hostility.

The Global Imperative and India’s Precarious Position

For the world, and for middle powers like India, this new nuclear age presents acute challenges. India has maintained a credible minimum deterrent posture, focused on China and Pakistan. A US-Russia arms race, coupled with Chinese expansion, creates a more complex and threatening strategic environment. It increases pressure on India’s own arsenal and could destabilize the delicate balance in South Asia. Moreover, the collapse of the global non-proliferation norm undermines India’s longstanding critique of the discriminatory NPT regime, even as it faces the practical dangers of a more proliferated world.

The international community must urgently:

• Decouple Crisis Management from Arms Control: Push for separate dialogues on risk reduction and crisis communication, even if treaty negotiations are impossible.

• Reinforce Norms: Universally condemn any resumption of nuclear testing and work to uphold the de facto global test ban.

• Engage Other Nuclear Powers: Bring China, and potentially the P5 (permanent UN Security Council members), into multilateral discussions on strategic stability, however preliminary.

Conclusion: The Clock Ticks Louder

The expiration of New START is not just another failed treaty. It is the crossing of a Rubicon into an era of unconstrained nuclear competition. The Doomsday Clock’s ominous tick toward midnight is a metaphor the world can no longer afford to ignore. The security dilemma, the stability-instability paradox, and the proliferation cascade are not abstract theories; they are the operating manuals for a new, more perilous chapter in human history. The lesson of The Day After was that there are no winners in a nuclear war. The lesson of the post-START world may be that without the brave, grinding work of arms control, the unthinkable becomes ever more probable. The task for statesmen now is not to win an arms race, but to remember how to end one—before the clock strikes midnight.

Q&A Section

Q1: What was the New START treaty, and why is its expiration on February 4 so significant?
A1: The New START (Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty) was the last remaining nuclear arms control agreement between the United States and Russia. Signed in 2010 and extended in 2021, it limited each country to 1,550 deployed strategic nuclear warheads and 700 deployed missiles and bombers, and included rigorous verification measures like on-site inspections and data exchanges. Its expiration is catastrophic because it removes all legally binding limits on the world’s two largest nuclear arsenals. With earlier treaties like the INF Treaty already defunct, there are now no rules governing U.S.-Russian nuclear stockpiles, heralding a new era of unchecked potential expansion and competition.

Q2: What is the “security dilemma,” and how does it relate to the post-START environment?
A2: The security dilemma is a core concept in international relations where one state’s actions to increase its own security (e.g., building more weapons) are perceived as a threat by a rival state, which then takes similar actions, leading to an arms race that ultimately leaves both sides less secure. With New START gone, this dynamic is unleashed. If the U.S. resumes nuclear testing or deploys new missiles, Russia will see it as an offensive threat and respond in kind, and vice-versa. The absence of agreed limits creates powerful incentives for both sides to build more and better weapons, triggering a classic action-reaction spiral that fuels a dangerous arms race.

Q3: What is the “stability-instability paradox,” and how does the loss of arms control intensify it?
A3: Coined by scholar Glenn Snyder, the stability-instability paradox states that while mutual nuclear deterrence reduces the risk of all-out war between nuclear-armed states (due to fear of annihilation), it actually increases the likelihood of lower-intensity conventional conflicts and proxy wars. States believe they can engage in limited warfare without triggering a nuclear response. Arms control treaties mitigated this by providing transparency—each side knew the other’s capabilities and limits. Without New START’s inspections and data exchanges, transparency vanishes. The “nuclear threshold” becomes blurred, and miscalculation becomes more likely. A proxy conflict (like in Ukraine) could escalate more dangerously because neither side can accurately assess the other’s intentions or red lines.

Q4: How does the collapse of U.S.-Russia arms control encourage nuclear proliferation in other regions, specifically West Asia?
A4: The global non-proliferation regime is built on a bargain: non-nuclear states forgo weapons in exchange for nuclear states’ commitment to disarm. When the U.S. and Russia—the custodians of the largest arsenals—abandon arms control and potentially expand their stockpiles, they shatter that bargain. This sends a message that security ultimately depends on possessing nuclear weapons. In West Asia, this directly incentivizes Iran to pursue a weapon as an ultimate deterrent. If Iran succeeds, neighboring rivals like Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Egypt would feel compelled to follow suit to maintain their security, leading to a dangerous multipolar nuclear standoff in an already volatile region.

Q5: What was the symbolic significance of Ronald Reagan watching “The Day After,” and what contrast does it highlight with today’s leaders?
A5: The film The Day After graphically depicted the horrific aftermath of a nuclear war on American society. For President Ronald Reagan, a staunch anti-communist, watching it provided a visceral, human understanding of the apocalyptic consequences of nuclear conflict. This experience is credited with hardening his resolve to engage in serious arms control negotiations with Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev, leading to landmark treaties like the INF. The contrast with today’s leaders—Trump and Putin—is stark. Currently, nuclear weapons are often discussed in transactional, geopolitical terms (“modernization,” “deterrence strength”), with little public emphasis on their civilization-ending potential. The reference highlights a deficit of that visceral, human fear of consequences, which once served as a powerful driver for dialogue and restraint, even between bitter enemies.