The Institutional Crucible, Can India’s Democratic Edifice Withstand the Test of Perceived Partisanship?

The Institutional Crucible, Can India’s Democratic Edifice Withstand the Test of Perceived Partisanship?

The health of a democracy is not measured merely by the regularity of its elections, but by the credibility of its institutions that operate between them. In India, a nation of immense democratic vitality, a profound and urgent question has moved from political rhetoric to central constitutional concern: Can investigative agencies be both powerful instruments against corruption and bastions of impartiality? As articulated in a recent critique, if the answer is uncertain, the need for structural reform is immediate and non-negotiable. The debate transcends individual cases and personalities; it strikes at the core of democratic trust—the belief in a level playing field and equal treatment under the law.

The Anatomy of an Asymmetry: Data and Perception

Since 2014, a stark statistical narrative has emerged, one that forms the backbone of the current crisis of confidence. Analyses consistently indicate that a vast majority—roughly 95%—of cases registered by premier investigative agencies like the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) and the Enforcement Directorate (ED) have targeted opposition politicians, not those aligned with the ruling dispensation. This numerical imbalance is compounded by an exponential increase in operational scale. For instance, ED raids, which numbered around a hundred in the decade up to 2014, have skyrocketed to several thousand in the decade since.

The government’s defence is straightforward: this reflects a vigorous, zero-tolerance drive against corruption, a cleansing of a system long plagued by graft. However, as the critique logically posits, this defence invites a counter-question: Is corruption so overwhelmingly the monopoly of the opposition? The prima facie evidence complicates the narrative. In the current Union Council of Ministers, a significant proportion—approximately 40% or 29 out of 72 ministers—have self-declared criminal cases against them in their sworn affidavits to the Election Commission. These range from serious charges like murder and attempt to murder to kidnapping and cheating. The public is left to wonder: have these cases been pursued with the same zeal, resources, and expeditiousness as those against the opposition? The perceived discrepancy fuels scepticism.

The “Washing Machine” Phenomenon and the Erosion of Credibility

Perhaps the most damning perception damaging institutional credibility is the colloquial metaphor of the ruling party as the nation’s biggest “washing machine.” This describes a recurrent pattern: politicians facing serious, multiple corruption charges—often first highlighted by the ruling party itself while they were in the opposition—see those charges mysteriously fade upon crossing the aisle. Case files are closed, investigations lose momentum, or the relentless “heat” from agencies cools to an “indiscernible simmer.”

This phenomenon does more than spare individuals; it actively incentivizes political defection and undermines the very premise of the anti-corruption drive. It creates a perverse equation where legal vulnerability can be “cured” by political alignment, transforming law enforcement from a neutral arbiter into a lever of political consolidation. When the outcome of an investigation appears predicated not on evidence but on political affiliation, the process loses all legitimacy. It reinforces the public impression that one is targeted not for criminality, but for being on the “wrong” side of the political divide.

The Political Vacuum Myth and the “Process as Punishment”

A common retort is that institutions like the CBI and ED are merely doing their job, operating in a supposed “political vacuum.” This is a legal fiction. As the critique notes, their actions, especially against prominent politicians in the fevered periods preceding elections, have profound “real political consequences.” Raids, arrests, and prolonged investigations cast a shadow over campaigns, dominate media cycles, and can decisively shape voter perception. The timing of such actions, often clustered around election seasons, intensifies suspicions of strategic deployment.

For those caught in this machinery, the judicial system, while the foundational hope, offers a grim and delayed refuge. The process itself becomes the punishment. Laws governing agencies like the ED, such as the Prevention of Money Laundering Act (PMLA), are notoriously draconian, making bail exceptionally difficult to secure. Combined with a judicial system groaning under backlogs, this means an individual can spend years in legal limbo—their reputation tarnished, political career stalled, and personal life upended—even if ultimately acquitted. This reality grants immense power to the agencies and the executive that controls them, power that can be wielded to incapacitate political opponents through protracted legal warfare, irrespective of the final verdict.

The Core Crisis: Erosion of Trust in Democratic Competition

The issue, therefore, is not about defending any individual politician or party against allegations. Corruption is a malignant reality in Indian politics, and a robust, fearless investigative apparatus is indispensable. The core crisis is one of trust and perception. When scrutiny appears overwhelmingly lopsided, it nourishes a “perception of asymmetry” that is toxic to democracy.

This erosion of trust has a cascading effect:

1. Legitimacy Deficit: Successful convictions, even if merited, are viewed by a section of the populace not as justice, but as political vendetta. This robs anti-corruption victories of their moral and exemplary force.

2. Compromised Electoral Field: Democracy thrives on fair competition. If one side campaigns under the cloud of incessant investigations while the other operates seemingly immune, the level playing field—a bedrock principle—is fundamentally compromised. This isn’t about guaranteeing outcomes but about ensuring equitable rules of engagement.

3. Institutional Degradation: The long-term casualty is the institution itself. The CBI and ED, once feared by the corrupt, now risk being perceived merely as extensions of the political executive. This diminishes their stature, demoralizes honest officers, and makes future, genuinely independent action more difficult.

4. Democratic Polarization: It deepens the “us vs. them” binary, where every legal action is seen through a partisan lens. Supporters of the ruling party dismiss all allegations as a defence of corruption, while the opposition sees a conspiracy to crush dissent. This polarization chokes reasoned debate and weakens the collective faith in shared institutions.

The Path to Redemption: An Agenda for Structural Reform

Acknowledging this crisis is the first step. The solution lies not in weakening agencies but in fortifying their independence and insulating them from political influence. The critique rightly calls for “urgent structural reforms.” This agenda must be comprehensive:

• Independent Appointments: The process for selecting the heads of the CBI, ED, and other key agencies must be taken out of the exclusive purview of the executive. A bipartisan committee, perhaps involving the Prime Minister, the Leader of the Opposition, the Chief Justice of India, and an eminent jurist, should recommend candidates based on integrity and expertise. This model, inspired by the selection process for the Chief Election Commissioner, is crucial.

• Fixed Tenures with Ironclad Security: Directors must be granted fixed, secure tenures that cannot be curtailed arbitrarily. This is vital for operational autonomy and to allow long-term investigations to proceed without fear of interference.

• Judicial Oversight and Transparent Protocols: There must be stronger, real-time judicial oversight of major investigations involving politicians, especially close to elections. Clear, legislated protocols should mandate how such cases are handled in the six months preceding a vote, ensuring they are not used as electoral tools. Transparency in decision-making—such as publishing reasons for closing cases or dropping charges against politicians who switch sides—is essential.

• Revisiting Draconian Laws: Laws like the PMLA need parliamentary review to rebalance the scales between investigative power and individual liberty. Provisions regarding bail, the definition of “proceeds of crime,” and the standards of evidence must be examined to prevent their misuse as instruments of harassment.

• A National Prosecution Service: Creating an independent prosecutorial service, separate from the investigative agencies and the government, would ensure that cases proceed to court based on legal merit alone, not political instruction.

The Judiciary as the Sentinel

In this reform project, the judiciary has a pivotal role as the ultimate “sentinel.” It must move beyond adjudicating individual cases to laying down broad, principles-based guidelines that govern the conduct of investigative agencies in politically sensitive matters. The Supreme Court’s interventions in the past, such as establishing the “Vineet Narain guidelines” for the CBI, have been landmark. A new, more robust set of guidelines is needed for the current context. The courts must also expedite hearings in cases where political actors allege partisan targeting, to separate genuine corruption from political weaponization swiftly.

Conclusion: A Choice of Futures

India stands at an institutional crossroads. One path leads to a deepening cynicism where “might is right” and state power is seamlessly fused with partisan interest, eroding the democratic ethos from within. The other path demands courageous reform to resurrect the sanctity of its investigative and law-enforcement bodies. It requires the political will, across party lines, to subordinate short-term tactical advantage to the long-term health of the republic.

The question “Can our institutions be both powerful and impartial?” must be answered with a resounding “Yes”—but that affirmation must be backed by concrete, institutional architecture that makes impartiality inevitable. The goal is a system where the corrupt, irrespective of their party badge, fear the law, and where every citizen, irrespective of their political belief, trusts that the system will treat them equally. This is not a partisan agenda; it is the urgent, non-negotiable foundation for preserving India’s democratic future.

Q&A

1. What is the core argument against the current operation of agencies like the CBI and ED, as per the critique?
The core argument is not that these agencies should not investigate corruption, but that their actions exhibit a severe and politically damaging asymmetry. With roughly 95% of cases targeting the opposition and a dramatic surge in actions post-2014, coupled with the “washing machine” effect (where charges diminish upon joining the ruling party), a perception has taken root that these agencies are being used as tools for political targeting rather than impartial law enforcement. This erodes public trust in institutional neutrality and compromises the level playing field essential for a healthy democracy.

2. How does the “washing machine” phenomenon undermine the anti-corruption drive and institutional credibility?
The “washing machine” phenomenon refers to the perception that politicians facing serious corruption charges see those charges weaken or disappear after they defect to the ruling party. This undermines credibility in two key ways: First, it suggests that investigative outcomes are contingent on political loyalty, not evidence, making the entire process seem partisan. Second, it incentivizes corruption-accused politicians to switch sides for legal protection, thereby using the anti-corruption apparatus as a mechanism for political engineering rather than cleansing, which makes a mockery of the stated goal of fighting graft.

3. Why is the timing of investigations and raids around elections particularly problematic?
Investigative actions immediately preceding elections are problematic because they have undeniable political consequences, regardless of legal intent. Raids and arrests dominate news cycles, shape voter perceptions, and can cripple an opposition party’s campaign by placing its leaders under a cloud of suspicion. This creates an uneven battlefield where one side campaigns under the constant shadow of state action. It allows the ruling party to weaponize the narrative of corruption at a crucially sensitive time, leveraging state institutions for electoral advantage.

4. What are some key structural reforms proposed to restore institutional impartiality?
Key proposed reforms include:

• Independent Appointments: Establishing a bipartisan committee (including the PM, Leader of Opposition, CJI) to select agency heads.

• Secure Tenures: Guaranteeing fixed, non-removable tenures for directors to ensure operational autonomy.

• Enhanced Judicial Oversight: Instituting stronger, real-time judicial monitoring of politically sensitive cases, especially near elections.

• Transparent Protocols: Legislating clear rules for handling cases against politicians during election periods and mandating transparency when cases are closed or charges dropped.

• Legal Reform: Reviewing and amending draconian laws (like the PMLA) to prevent their misuse as tools of harassment by rebalancing investigative power with civil liberties.

5. What is the judiciary’s role in addressing this crisis, according to the analysis?
The judiciary is envisioned as the critical “sentinel” or guardian. Its role extends beyond judging individual cases to establishing overarching principles and guidelines that govern the conduct of investigative agencies in politically sensitive matters. The Supreme Court can mandate reforms through judicial orders (as it has done in the past with the CBI) and must prioritize the swift adjudication of cases where partisan targeting is alleged. By doing so, it can act as a check on executive overreach, uphold the rule of law, and help rebuild the crumbling wall between law enforcement and political manipulation.