The Imperative of Self Reliance, Why Strategic Autonomy is India’s Unavoidable Compass in an Age of Rupture

The Imperative of Self Reliance, Why Strategic Autonomy is India’s Unavoidable Compass in an Age of Rupture

The grand tableau of India’s Republic Day parade is never merely a military display; it is a profound semiotic exercise in foreign policy. The choice of chief guest is a carefully decoded signal of national priorities. In 2026, the dual presence of European Council President Antonio Costa and EU Commission President Ursula von der Leyen spoke volumes. It signaled a deliberate, sophisticated hedging strategy—a calibrated reach beyond the familiar orbit of the United States towards a “near peer” in financial resources and technology. This move, culminating in landmark trade and security pacts with the European Union, was not an act of diplomatic whimsy. It was a strategic recalibration forced by a world that, as analyst Manoj Joshi observes, is experiencing not a smooth transition, but a “rupture.” In this emergent landscape of sharpening great-power competition, eroding alliances, and profound uncertainty, the ancient wisdom of India’s foreign policy—strategic autonomy—has re-emerged not as a nostalgic slogan from the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) era, but as an urgent, pragmatic, and non-negotiable necessity for survival and ascendancy.

The End of Certainty: A World in Rupture, Not Transition

The post-Cold War “unipolar moment” and the subsequent decades of US-led globalization fostered an illusion of linear progress and predictable partnerships. For India, the post-2008 strategic rapprochement with the United States created a “comfort zone,” as Joshi terms it. A dense web of defense agreements (like the foundational COMCASA and BECA), technology partnerships, and Quad cooperation developed at a “measured and relatively frictionless pace.” This engendered a sense of trust, which in international relations is often a function of temporarily converging interests—specifically, a shared concern about an ascendant China.

However, the foundational sands of this order are shifting. The warnings at Davos by leaders like Canadian PM Mark Carney about a “rupture” point to several simultaneous fractures:

1. The Re-Nationalization of American Foreign Policy: A growing bipartisan consensus in Washington prioritizes domestic industrial revival (the Inflation Reduction Act, CHIPS Act) and views alliances through a fiercely transactional lens. Support for allies is becoming more conditional, and confrontation with China is increasingly framed as “managed competition.” For India, this implies a sobering reality: America’s willingness to actively underwrite India’s security or aggressively undermine China on India’s behalf may be far more constrained than previously assumed.

2. The Crisis of Reliability in Alliances: The war in Ukraine, combined with volatile US domestic politics, has sown deep doubts in Europe about American staying power. This has propelled even stalwart NATO allies like France to champion “strategic autonomy.” If America’s oldest allies feel compelled to hedge, the lesson for New Delhi is unequivocal: excessive reliance on any single partner is a growing strategic vulnerability.

3. The Rise of Transactional Realpolitik: The global order is regressing towards a Hobbesian arena where raw leverage, not shared values or long-term partnerships, is the primary currency. “Friendshoring” and “de-risking” are the new mantras, reflecting a world dividing into competing economic and technological blocs.

This pervasive uncertainty is not a passing storm but a new climate. In such an environment, a nation’ foreign policy cannot be built on the assumed permanence of another’s benevolence or priorities.

India’s Latent Leverage and the Autonomy Deficit

India is uniquely positioned yet paradoxically vulnerable. It possesses immense latent leverage: a vast market, critical geography astride the Indian Ocean, and an indispensable role as the principal regional counterbalance to China. Yet, as Joshi critically notes, this latent power has “not always been translated into bargaining power.” In some instances, it has visibly diminished.

The examples are telling. Under sustained US pressure, India has significantly “voluntarily” curtailed its deeply discounted oil imports from Russia, impacting its fiscal health and energy security. Similarly, its strategic investment in the Chabahar port in Iran—a vital gateway to Central Asia and a project of profound national interest—has been repeatedly reconsidered and stalled due to Washington’s maximum pressure campaign against Tehran. These episodes reveal an autonomy deficit. They demonstrate that when core Indian interests (affordable energy, continental connectivity) clash with US priorities, New Delhi’s ability to assert its sovereign choices has been compromised by the very dependencies nurtured in the “comfort zone.”

The danger, as Joshi warns, is “mistaking comfort for trust.” The dense network of Indo-US ties created comfort, but trust—the assurance that a partner will support your core interests even when they diverge from its own—is now being tested and found wanting. Interests are diverging on Russia, on Iran, and on the precise contours of confronting China. In a transactional world, India’s challenge is to convert its latent leverage into tangible, exercised power.

The Core of Strategic Autonomy: Capabilities, Not Isolation

Strategic autonomy is often misunderstood as isolationism or a return to the dogmatic non-alignment of the past. This is a profound misreading. As Joshi clarifies, “Autonomy has never meant isolation. Rather, it has meant the ability to engage widely without being constrained by the preferences of any single power.” Its core objective is the preservation of sovereignty through the building of independent capacities.

India’s own history offers a masterclass. The Indian Space Research Organisation (ISRO) began in the 1960s with modest resources. It selectively acquired foreign technologies and licenses—from France, the US, and the Soviet Union—but with a “hard-nosed focus” on adaptation, indigenization, and building a domestic ecosystem of scientists and engineers. The result is today’s strategic independence in space launch, remote sensing, and navigation (NavIC). No external partner can hold India’s space ambitions hostage because the foundational capabilities are homegrown.

This model must now be replicated across the critical domains of 21st-century power:

1. Technological Autonomy: This is the new frontier of sovereignty. It demands domestic capacity in semiconductors (the brain of all modern systems), artificial intelligence (for defense and governance), secure cyber infrastructure, and advanced aerospace (drones, surveillance). Partnerships (like the iCET with the US) are essential, but they must be conduits for technology transfer and co-development, not permanent dependency.

2. Economic and Supply-Chain Resilience: Autonomy requires “de-risking” India’s own economy. This means building resilient supply chains for critical minerals, pharmaceuticals, and electronics. It involves asserting digital sovereignty through platforms like UPI and the Digital Personal Data Protection Act, ensuring that Indian data and payment architectures are governed by Indian law, not subject to extraterritorial control.

3. Defense Industrial Self-Reliance: The ambitious Atmanirbharta (self-reliance) drive in defense is the most direct expression of strategic autonomy. Moving from being the world’s largest arms importer to a designer, developer, and manufacturer of cutting-edge platforms (fighters, submarines, missiles) is non-negotiable for a nation with two contested nuclear-armed borders.

The European Gambit: Autonomy in Action

The Republic Day invitation to EU leaders and the subsequent agreements are a textbook exercise in operationalizing strategic autonomy. By deepening ties with Europe, India achieves multiple objectives:

• Diversification: It reduces over-dependence on the US for technology, investment, and diplomatic support.

• Leverage Enhancement: It creates a competitive dynamic. American companies and policymakers must now consider that if they are too restrictive or transactional, India has a credible, advanced alternative in Europe.

• Capacity Building: EU collaboration in green tech, digital governance, and scientific research directly feeds into India’s domestic capability goals.

This is not about replacing the US with the EU. It is about building a multi-vector, pluralistic web of partnerships where India engages with the US, the EU, Russia (where pragmatism dictates), Japan, ASEAN, and others, always from a position where it has alternatives and can walk away from unfavorable terms.

The Domestic Foundation: Stability as a Springboard, Not a Sedative

Joshi rightly notes that India is an “island of stability” in a turbulent world, with a strong political mandate and significant reforms. However, this domestic stability must be the springboard for autonomy, not a sedative that breeds complacency. The persistent challenges of weak employment growth, insufficient capital investment, and skilled talent migration (“brain drain”) directly undermine the capacity-building project. Strategic autonomy is impossible without a vibrant, innovative, and self-sustaining economic and educational ecosystem at home.

Conclusion: Autonomy as the Prerequisite for Greatness

In the final analysis, strategic autonomy is not a foreign policy choice; it is the prerequisite for India’s aspiration to be a leading power. In an era of rupture, where middle powers risk being “mere objects of great-power bargaining,” autonomy is the shield that protects sovereignty and the sword that carves out strategic space.

It is a recognition that in the 21st century, power flows from intrinsic capabilities—technological, economic, and institutional. Partnerships are vital accelerants, but they cannot be the engine. The Republic Day spectacle with EU leaders was a powerful symbol. But the real work lies in the laboratories, factories, and silicon fabs where India’s independent future is being forged. As the world fractures, India’s task is clear: to engage all, be constrained by none, and build the foundational strength that ensures its destiny is written in New Delhi, not dictated from Washington, Brussels, or Beijing. In this uncertain age, strategic autonomy is not a luxury of the strong; it is the indispensable compass for a nation determined to navigate its own course to greatness.

Q&A: Unpacking India’s Strategic Autonomy in a Fractured World

Q1: The article argues that the world is experiencing a “rupture, not a transition.” What are the key signs of this rupture, and how do they specifically challenge India’s previous foreign policy “comfort zone” with the US?
A1: The signs of rupture include: (1) The Re-Nationalization of US Policy: America’s inward turn, exemplified by the IRA and CHIPS Act, signals a priority on domestic revival over global leadership, making its alliance commitments more transactional and conditional. (2) The Crisis of Alliance Reliability: European calls for “strategic autonomy” reflect deep doubts about US staying power, demonstrating that even core alliances are no longer immutable. (3) The Ascendancy of Transactional Realpolitik: Global relations are increasingly based on immediate leverage and bloc formation (“friendshoring”), not shared values or long-term trust.
This ruptures India’s “comfort zone” by undermining its core assumptions: that the US would be a permanently reliable partner in countering China, that strategic convergence would override disagreements on other issues (like Russia/Iran), and that the partnership was evolving into a deep, institutionalized trust. The rupture reveals these as contingent on fleeting interest alignment, forcing India to confront hard questions about dependency and leverage it had previously postponed.

Q2: Manoj Joshi states that India has an “autonomy deficit,” citing the examples of Russian oil and Chabahar port. How did these episodes reveal this deficit, and what does it say about the difference between “latent leverage” and actual “bargaining power”?
A2: These episodes revealed the deficit by showing India’s inability to fully exercise its sovereign choices in the face of pressure from a dominant partner.

• Russian Oil: Despite the immense economic and energy security benefits of discounted Russian crude, sustained US pressure led India to significantly reduce imports. Its “latent leverage” (huge market) did not translate into the “bargaining power” to secure an exemption or withstand the pressure.

• Chabahar Port: A project of vital strategic interest for connectivity to Afghanistan and Central Asia, and a declared Indian foreign policy priority, has been repeatedly stalled because Washington’s maximalist policy towards Iran takes precedence. India’s “latent leverage” of being a key regional balancer did not give it the “bargaining power” to protect this core investment.
  The difference is stark. Latent leverage is passive potential (size, location, role). Bargaining power is the active ability to use that potential to shape outcomes and resist coercion. The deficit exists because India, within the “comfort zone,” did not build sufficient alternative options (e.g., other energy suppliers, other connectivity routes) or domestic resilience to credibly push back, making its latent leverage unexercisable.

Q3: The article clarifies that strategic autonomy is not isolationism but the “ability to engage widely without being constrained.” Using the example of the 2026 Republic Day EU outreach, explain how this engagement actually strengthens autonomy.
A3: The EU outreach is a classic autonomy-enhancing move. By proactively deepening trade and defense ties with the European Union—a “near peer” to the US—India achieves several goals that reduce constraint:

• Creates Alternatives: It develops a credible alternative source for advanced technology, investment, and diplomatic support. If the US imposes restrictive conditions on tech transfer or takes a stance contrary to Indian interests, New Delhi now has a powerful counterweight to engage with.

• Generates Competitive Leverage: The EU partnership makes Indian markets and geopolitical cooperation a contested prize. This competition incentivizes both the US and the EU to offer better terms (more tech access, fewer political conditions) to secure India’s alignment, thereby increasing India’s bargaining power with both.

• Diversifies Dependency: It moves from a model of concentrated reliance on one partner to a distributed, multi-vector network of partnerships. This pluralism ensures that no single partner can become a choke point or wield disproportionate influence, preserving India’s freedom of maneuver. Engagement, in this strategic form, is a tool to build options and avoid constraint.

Q4: What are the key domestic capacity-building areas identified as critical for 21st-century strategic autonomy, and why is a strong domestic foundation non-negotiable for this foreign policy doctrine?
A4: The critical domestic capacities are:

1. Technological: Semiconductors (for all advanced electronics and defense), AI (for economic and military edge), secure cyber infrastructure, and indigenous space/surveillance assets (like NavIC).

2. Economic: Resilient supply chains for critical goods, digital sovereignty (in payments/data), and a vibrant capital investment and R&D ecosystem to fuel innovation.
   A strong domestic foundation is non-negotiable because strategic autonomy is ultimately a function of intrinsic strength. You cannot be autonomous if you are permanently dependent on others for your defense equipment (compromising security choices), critical technology (compromising economic choices), or energy and resources (compromising foreign policy choices). Partnerships can supplement, but cannot substitute for, a nation’s own capacity to design, produce, and sustain the pillars of its power. Without this foundation, autonomy is just a rhetorical posture; with it, autonomy becomes an operational reality.

Q5: The piece warns against “mistaking comfort for trust” in international relations. In the context of the Indo-US relationship, what specific diverging interests illustrate that “trust” based on convergence may be fraying?
A5: The convergence that built the “comfort zone” was primarily about managing China’s rise. The fraying “trust” is evident in the divergence of interests on other critical issues:

• Relations with Russia: The US demands global isolation of Russia; India views Russia as a historic, reliable defense partner and a strategic counterbalance, necessitating continued engagement. The US pressure on oil and arms purchases creates direct friction.

• Policy towards Iran: The US seeks to cripple Iran economically and diplomatically; India sees Iran as a crucial partner for Central Asian connectivity (Chabahar) and energy security. US sanctions directly threaten Indian projects.

• The Nature of “Containing” China: The US increasingly frames competition with China in ideological, systemic terms, seeking to build a broad coalition for confrontation. India’s approach is more pragmatic and localized, focused on managing the border dispute and regional balance, not on a global ideological crusade that could limit its own economic and diplomatic flexibility.
  These divergences show that the deep “trust” assumed in the comfort zone was situational. As interests shift, the partnership becomes more transactional, revealing that the alignment was never as comprehensive as it seemed. True trust would accommodate these divergences; its absence forces a recalculation towards autonomy.