The Houbara and the General, Pakistan’s Perilous Game of Migration, Military Adventurism, and the Unlearned Lessons of History
In the winter months, a remarkable migratory bird makes its way to the plains of Pakistan. The Houbara Bustard, a large, stately creature, travels thousands of kilometres from its breeding grounds in Central Asia to escape the bitter cold. Its arrival is anticipated not only by naturalists but by a very different set of predators: Arab royalty, who hunt the bird for sport and for its meat, which is reputed to be an aphrodisiac. The hunt is an annual ritual, and for a nearly bankrupt Pakistan, it brings precious foreign exchange and, sometimes, infrastructure investment.
The accompanying analysis by Gaurav Arya uses the Houbara as a metaphor for Pakistan itself. Like the migratory bird, Pakistan’s military establishment repeatedly migrates between patrons—the United States, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, China—seeking short-term gain, trading strategic services for cash and political validation. And like the Houbara, Pakistan is hunted; its assets are extracted, its sovereignty compromised, its people left to bear the costs of decisions made by generals in search of validation.
The occasion for this reflection is the recent visit of UAE President Mohammed bin Zayed Al Nahyan (MBZ) to Islamabad. The visit was presented by Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif and Army Chief Asim Munir as a diplomatic triumph, promising investments, an IT revolution, and massive energy deals that would finally end Pakistan’s days of misfortune. The reality was more prosaic. After a few hours of meetings, MBZ departed for Rahim Yar Khan, where the annual Houbara hunt awaited. The symbolism was lost on no one.
At the same time, reports emerged that Pakistan had offered to provide troops as part of an International Stabilisation Force in Gaza, a role that would involve forcibly disarming Hamas. US Secretary of State Marco Rubio thanked Pakistan for the offer. The proposal is fraught with peril. Pakistan has no diplomatic relations with Israel; its passport explicitly states that it is valid for all countries except Israel. Antisemitism is deeply embedded in the state’s ideology, reinforced by religious texts and decades of propaganda. For a Pakistani general to send troops to Gaza to disarm Hamas would be, in Arya’s memorable phrase, “like throwing a burning match to petrol.”
The MBZ Visit: Houbara Diplomacy
The MBZ visit was a masterclass in the manipulation of appearances. Islamabad was locked down. Flags of the UAE and Pakistan fluttered over the city. The media was fed stories of imminent investments, of an IT revolution, of energy deals that would transform Pakistan’s fortunes. The visit was presented as a strategic breakthrough, a testament to the personal relationships between the UAE leadership and Pakistan’s civilian and military rulers.
The reality was that MBZ sat for a couple of hours with Munir and Sharif and then left for the hunting grounds. The message was unmistakable: Pakistan is a convenient stopover, a place to transact business and then depart for more important pursuits. The UAE’s interests are pragmatic and transactional. It seeks to maintain influence in a nuclear-armed state, to secure access to Pakistani manpower and military expertise, and to protect its investments. It has no interest in solving Pakistan’s fundamental problems.
The pattern is familiar. Arab states have long used Pakistan as a source of military labour—soldiers, technicians, and advisors who serve in their armed forces and protect their regimes. In return, they provide financial support, investment, and diplomatic cover. But the relationship is unequal, and the costs to Pakistan are rarely counted.
The Gaza Gambit: A Bridge Too Far
The proposal to send Pakistani troops to Gaza to disarm Hamas is of a different order of magnitude. It would require Pakistan to take sides in a conflict that is deeply polarising within the Muslim world and within Pakistan itself. It would require Pakistani soldiers to engage in combat against fellow Muslims, to participate in what many would see as an American-Israeli project to suppress Palestinian resistance.
The consequences would be catastrophic. The hatred of Israel and Jews is not merely a matter of state policy in Pakistan; it is embedded in the religious and cultural fabric. The Sahih al-Bukhari, one of the most authoritative collections of hadith, contains graphic passages about the enmity between Muslims and Jews, including the famous prophecy that stones and trees will call out to Muslims to kill Jews hiding behind them. For a Pakistani general to send troops to disarm Hamas would be seen as a betrayal of faith, an act of apostasy.
Arya invokes the historical precedent of Zia ul Haq, who as a brigadier in 1970 led Pakistani troops in Jordan to crush the Palestinian fighters—an operation that killed thousands and broke the spine of the Palestinian movement. Zia’s reward was advancement; he went on to become Army Chief and then President. But the operation also sowed seeds of resentment that would later bear fruit in the form of anti-American and anti-regime sentiment within the Pakistani military itself.
The more immediate precedent is the Lal Masjid operation of 2007, when General Pervez Musharraf ordered the Special Services Group to storm a mosque in Islamabad that had been defying the writ of the state. The bloodshed that followed led to multiple assassination attempts on Musharraf, some involving soldiers from his own army. If storming a mosque could provoke such a reaction, what would happen if Pakistani soldiers were sent to kill Palestinians?
Arya notes that at a recent gathering of military personnel, Asim Munir’s security team placed a bulletproof glass between the Army Chief and his audience. The detail is telling. Munir knows the risks. He knows that his own soldiers might turn against him. He knows that the history of Pakistan’s military is littered with leaders who were brought down by their own men.
The Historical Pattern: Trading Blood for Cash
Pakistan’s military has a long history of trading strategic services for cash and political validation. In the 1980s, General Zia ul Haq took money from the CIA to launch the “Afghan Jihad,” funnelling weapons and fighters into Afghanistan to fight the Soviet Union. The consequences were catastrophic: Pakistan was flooded with extremism, heroin, and Kalashnikovs. The jihadis it nurtured would later turn against the state.
After 9/11, General Pervez Musharraf again took money from the Americans to join the “War on Terror.” Pakistan became the most favoured supply route for US forces in Afghanistan. In return, it received billions in aid. But the costs were staggering: over 100,000 Pakistani deaths, according to official estimates, and over USD 150 billion in losses due to damaged infrastructure and economic disruption.
Any other country would have learned its lesson. But Pakistan is not any other country. The military’s institutional interests, its ideological commitments, and its search for validation have repeatedly led it down the same path. Each time, it promises that this time will be different. Each time, the outcome is the same.
The India Factor: Waiting and Watching
For India, the implications are clear. Pakistan’s internal instability, its susceptibility to extremist currents, and its military’s propensity for adventurism are perennial sources of concern. The proposal to send troops to Gaza, if implemented, would further radicalise Pakistani society and increase the risk of violence spilling across the border.
But there is also an opportunity. As Pakistan becomes more entangled in regional conflicts, more dependent on external patrons, and more internally divided, its capacity to threaten India diminishes. The four-day skirmish in May 2025 was quickly contained, and India’s military superiority was evident. The strategic balance is shifting.
Arya’s advice to New Delhi is simple: wait and watch. History will repeat itself. Pakistan will again migrate, like the Houbara, and the hunters will again be waiting. India’s role is not to intervene but to be prepared, to strengthen its own capabilities, and to ensure that when the inevitable crisis comes, it is well-positioned to protect its interests.
Conclusion: The Unlearned Lesson
The Houbara is a magnificent bird, but it is also a vulnerable one. Its migration is dictated by instinct, not choice. It travels the same routes, stops at the same places, and falls prey to the same hunters, generation after generation.
Pakistan’s military establishment is similarly trapped in a cycle of behaviour that it cannot break. It seeks patrons, trades services, and reaps short-term rewards while ignoring long-term costs. It repeats the same mistakes, expecting different results. The definition of insanity, it is said, is doing the same thing over and over again and expecting a different outcome.
The question is whether Asim Munir will be the general who breaks the cycle or the one who confirms it. The bulletproof glass between him and his soldiers suggests that he knows the risks. Whether he can act on that knowledge, whether he can resist the temptations of foreign validation and short-term gain, remains to be seen.
History is watching. And as always, it will repeat itself unless someone has the courage to change it.
Q&A Section
Q1: What is the significance of the Houbara Bustard metaphor in understanding Pakistan’s strategic behaviour?
A1: The Houbara Bustard is a migratory bird that travels to Pakistan each winter, where it is hunted by Arab royalty for sport and for its meat, which is reputed to be an aphrodisiac. The hunt brings precious foreign exchange and sometimes infrastructure investment to Pakistan. The metaphor captures Pakistan’s cyclical pattern of migration between patrons—the US, Saudi Arabia, UAE, China—seeking short-term gain by trading strategic services for cash and political validation. Like the Houbara, Pakistan is hunted; its assets are extracted, its sovereignty compromised, and its people bear the costs of decisions made by generals in search of validation. The metaphor also suggests a tragic inevitability: the Houbara follows the same migration routes and falls prey to the same hunters generation after generation. Pakistan’s military establishment is similarly trapped in a cycle of behaviour it cannot break.
Q2: What were the realities behind the UAE President’s visit to Islamabad, and how does it illustrate the transactional nature of Pakistan-Gulf relations?
A2: The UAE President Mohammed bin Zayed Al Nahyan’s visit was presented by Pakistani leaders as a diplomatic triumph promising investments, an IT revolution, and massive energy deals. The reality was more prosaic: after a few hours of meetings, MBZ departed for Rahim Yar Khan to participate in the annual Houbara hunt. The visit illustrates the transactional and unequal nature of Pakistan-Gulf relations. Arab states seek to maintain influence in a nuclear-armed state, secure access to Pakistani manpower and military expertise, and protect their investments. In return, they provide financial support, investment, and diplomatic cover. But the relationship is fundamentally asymmetrical; Pakistan provides strategic services and receives short-term benefits while its long-term structural problems remain unaddressed. The visit was a masterclass in the manipulation of appearances, with Islamabad locked down and flags flying, but the substance was minimal.
Q3: What are the risks of Pakistan sending troops to Gaza to disarm Hamas, and why would this be particularly perilous for Army Chief Asim Munir?
A3: The proposal to send Pakistani troops to Gaza to disarm Hamas is extraordinarily perilous for several reasons. First, ideological contradiction: Pakistan has no diplomatic relations with Israel, its passport explicitly excludes Israel, and antisemitism is deeply embedded in state ideology, reinforced by religious texts. Disarming Hamas would be seen as a betrayal of faith. Second, historical precedent: When General Zia ul Haq led troops to crush Palestinians in Jordan in 1970, it advanced his career but sowed resentment. When General Musharraf stormed Lal Masjid in 2007, it led to multiple assassination attempts, some involving his own soldiers. Third, internal security risk: Pakistani soldiers might turn against their own command. Arya notes that Asim Munir’s security team now places bulletproof glass between him and military audiences—a telling sign of perceived threats. The hatred of Israel is religiously sanctioned, and any move perceived as befriending Jews or killing Palestinians could be cataclysmic for Munir’s survival.
Q4: What historical patterns does Pakistan’s military establishment repeat, and why does it fail to learn from past mistakes?
A4: Pakistan’s military has repeatedly traded strategic services for cash and political validation, with catastrophic consequences. In the 1980s, General Zia ul Haq took CIA money to launch the “Afghan Jihad,” funnelling weapons into Afghanistan. The result was Pakistan flooded with extremism, heroin, and Kalashnikovs. After 9/11, General Musharraf took US money to join the “War on Terror,” becoming the main supply route for US forces in Afghanistan. Pakistan estimates over 100,000 deaths and USD 150 billion in losses. Any other country would have learned its lesson. But Pakistan’s military is trapped by institutional interests, ideological commitments, and the search for validation. Each time, it promises that this time will be different; each time, the outcome is the same. The definition of insanity is doing the same thing repeatedly and expecting different results. Pakistan’s military establishment seems incapable of breaking this cycle.
Q5: What does the analysis suggest as India’s appropriate strategic posture toward Pakistan?
A5: The analysis suggests that India should adopt a posture of patient vigilance: wait and watch, strengthen its own capabilities, and be prepared for the inevitable crisis. The four-day skirmish in May 2025 demonstrated India’s military superiority and Pakistan’s diminished capacity to threaten India. As Pakistan becomes more entangled in regional conflicts, more dependent on external patrons, and more internally divided, its capacity to threaten India diminishes further. The historical pattern suggests that Pakistan will again migrate, like the Houbara, and the hunters will again be waiting. India’s role is not to intervene but to be prepared, to ensure that when the crisis comes, it can protect its interests. The analysis implicitly rejects any notion of proactive destabilisation or intervention, recognising that Pakistan’s internal dynamics will produce sufficient challenges without external assistance. New Delhi should focus on building its own strengths while monitoring the situation across the border.
