The Hollowing of Parliament, A Symptom of India’s Institutional Crisis

The Hollowing of Parliament, A Symptom of India’s Institutional Crisis

A recent, intense parliamentary deadlock—sparked by the expulsion or “gagging” of the Leader of the Opposition (LoP) from the chamber—has been treated by much of the political class and media as a procedural skirmish, a clash of inflated egos, or simply another episode of noisy democratic friction. However, as the incisive analysis by Suhas Palshikar argues, to view it merely as a political spat is to profoundly misunderstand its significance. This event is not an anomaly but a stark and revealing symptom of a deeper, more systemic malaise: the deliberate and accelerating hollowing out of India’s democratic institutions, with Parliament as its central and most symbolic casualty. The standoff is a microcosm of a larger, more dangerous struggle between the substance of parliamentary democracy and its ceremonial performance, where the former is being systematically evacuated to make way for a form of majoritarian, mission-driven governance that views institutional checks as impediments.

The Unplayed Scenario: A Glimpse of Lost Democratic Confidence

Palshikar begins with a powerful thought experiment. The deadlock could have unfolded in a manner that would have strengthened, not weakened, democratic norms. Imagine an alternate reality: as the LoP rises to speak, amidst predictable heckling from the treasury benches, the Prime Minister himself intervenes. He could assert that a confident government has no fear of scrutiny, and that the LoP, as the elected voice of a significant portion of the populace, must be heard. Such a gesture would have been a masterclass in democratic magnanimity and statecraft. It would have projected supreme confidence, robbed the Opposition of a potent victimhood narrative, and, most importantly, reaffirmed the sanctity of the parliamentary floor as a sacred space for unfettered debate, even—especially—for harsh criticism. The ruling party would have emerged looking strong and democratic; the institution would have been elevated.

That this path was not chosen, and instead a path of confrontation, expulsion, and subsequent personal-political attacks was taken, is profoundly revealing. It points not merely to a failure of political tact but to a fundamental ideological and operational shift in how the ruling establishment views democratic institutions. The refusal to allow space for adversarial questioning is rooted in a perception where the Opposition is not seen as a legitimate, constitutionally mandated counterweight—a “government-in-waiting”—but as an existential adversary to a larger, divinely-ordained national mission. In this worldview, parliamentary accountability is not a virtue but an inconvenient procedural hurdle, a “nicety” that pales before the “moral significance” of the mission. The House, therefore, must be managed, controlled, and choreographed, not genuinely engaged with; its disruptive potential for genuine scrutiny must be neutralized, not negotiated.

The Erosion of Parliament’s Core Purpose: From Real-Time Answerability to Ritualistic Acclamation

The parliamentary system, at its heart, was designed for continuous, real-time accountability. The executive is meant to be on trial every single day the House is in session, forced to explain, defend, and modify its actions under the relentless glare of elected representatives. This daily dialectic—the cut and thrust of debate, the uncomfortable questioning, the demand for documents—is the lifeblood of a healthy democracy. It ensures that power is constantly questioned, assumptions are challenged, and public interest, rather than executive convenience, remains paramount. As Palshikar notes, the executive is made answerable “here and now; not just after five years.”

What we are witnessing is the systematic replacement of this culture of answerability with a culture of acclamation and administrative decree. Parliament is increasingly being used as a stage to broadcast pre-decided narratives, launch political campaigns, and pass legislation with minimal substantive debate. The “essence of the system”—the right to question, delay, dissent, and hold the government to account—is treated as “dispensable.” This is evidenced in multiple ways: key legislative changes are pushed through with disruptive haste or as Money Bills to bypass the Rajya Sabha; parliamentary committees are sidelined, their reports ignored, or their composition manipulated; sessions are truncated or rendered dysfunctional, minimizing opportunities for scrutiny; and the space for the Opposition is physically and procedurally squeezed. The House is becoming a venue for ratification, not deliberation; a sounding board for the executive, not its scrutineer.

The Twin Engines of Institutional Hollowing: Elite Instrumentalism and Ideological Override

This hollowing is not occurring in a vacuum, nor is it driven solely by contemporary politics. Palshikar correctly identifies that it is propelled by two powerful, historically rooted, and mutually reinforcing forces:

1. A Pre-existing Culture of Elite Instrumentalism: Since Independence, India has suffered from a paradoxical relationship with its institutions. While a remarkable constitutional and institutional framework was erected, a culture of truly internalizing their spirit was often lacking. Across the spectrum—among civil servants, judges, industrialists, and politicians—there has been a deeply ingrained tendency towards formalism over substance. Institutions were often seen as structures to be navigated, bent, or bypassed for personal, partisan, bureaucratic, or commercial convenience. The independent spirit of institutions was frequently undermined by patronage, corruption, complacency, and a lack of courage. This created a fertile, permissive ground where institutional decay could take root. The “flimsy and instrumental approach” is a pre-condition.

2. An Ideology of Majoritarian Missionism: The current political moment supercharges this pre-existing weakness with a potent new ideology. It is characterized by a deep-seated belief that the ruling party embodies the national will and civilizational destiny in a unique, almost metaphysical sense. Its electoral victories are interpreted not just as political success but as a popular mandate for a fundamental reawakening. In this framework, institutional checks and balances—particularly those that empower the opposition (like parliamentary debate), ensure neutrality (like an independent Election Commission), or enforce accountability (like investigative agencies or a vigilant judiciary)—are viewed not as democratic safeguards but as “colonially inspired” procedural hurdles, remnants of a liberal past that must be overcome to achieve the nation’s true potential. Opposition is not legitimate dissent; it is recalcitrance, or worse, “conspiring against the nation.” This belief system provides a righteous, moral justification for overriding institutional norms in the name of a “higher purpose.” Procedure is sacrificed at the altar of the mission.

The convergence of these two tendencies—the old, cynical habit of bending rules meeting a new, zealous ideology that considers some rules ideologically obsolete—has created a perfect storm for institutional erosion. The instrumentalist finds a moral crusade to join, and the crusader finds ready tools in a system already amenable to manipulation.

The Metastasis of Hollowing: A Pattern Across the Institutional Landscape

The decay is not confined to Parliament alone. Palshikar outlines how it has become a metastatic pattern visible across the institutional landscape, demonstrating that the parliamentary crisis is merely the most visible tip of a vast and unsettling iceberg:

• The Executive’s Extended Arm: Investigative agencies like the Enforcement Directorate (ED) and the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) are widely perceived not as independent arbiters of law but as instruments of political targeting and coercion. Their actions often appear synchronized with the political calendar, used to engineer defections, silence critics, and create a chilling atmosphere of fear, undermining the rule of law.

• The Judiciary’s Ambiguous Role: While the higher judiciary continues to deliver important judgments, it faces growing critique for perceived abdication on crucial questions involving civil liberties, electoral integrity, and executive overreach. Delays in hearing politically sensitive cases, a perceived reluctance to confront the executive on matters of constitutional morality, and the acceptance of sealed covers erode its image as a fearless bulwark of rights.

• Constitutional Bodies Undermined: Governors in opposition-ruled states frequently act as partisan agents of the centre, creating unending discord and undermining federal harmony. The Election Commission, once a globally revered institution, now faces profound questions about its autonomy, evident in its handling of electoral schedules, model code violations, and allegations of voter harassment, damaging the very foundation of free and fair elections.

• The Blurring of Constitutional and Sacred Authority: Perhaps the most profound symbolic shift is the deliberate, systematic conflation of state and religious authority. When senior armed forces personnel attend overtly religious-political ceremonies in official uniform, when judges participate in rituals alongside the executive head, and when the Prime Minister’s public persona is meticulously crafted to merge that of a head of government with that of a religious-cultural head, it represents a profound deinstitutionalization. It signals that the neutral, secular, procedural authority of the state is being subsumed into a majoritarian, culturally-specific identity project. The institution of the state itself is being reshaped, moving from a neutral arena for all citizens to an embodiment of a particular belief system.

The Long-Term Consequences: From Meaningless to Malevolent

The short-term fallout of the parliamentary deadlock will likely follow a depressingly familiar script: partisan blame-gaming, fleeting media outrage, and eventual resumption of a hollowed-out normalcy. Pundits will preach false equivalence, engaging in “balanced” commentary that blames “both sides” and equates the procedural aggression of a dominant executive with the desperate protests of a marginalized opposition.

But Palshikar’s warning about the long-term consequences is where the true danger lies. As institutions are hollowed out—stripped of their core purpose, their independence, and their public trust—they do not simply vanish. Instead, they risk becoming actively harmful to the citizens they were designed to protect. A Parliament that does not debate ceases to represent the people’s diversity and becomes a rubber stamp. A judiciary seen as compliant fails to protect the weak from the powerful. Investigative agencies that act as political weapons destroy the very concept of equality before the law. When institutions lose their soul, their remaining shells—their legal powers, their police force, their official stamp—can be repurposed. They become tools for the very oppression they were designed to prevent, lending a veneer of legality to authoritarianism.

This hollowing, as Palshikar concludes, clears the pathway for replacement. Once public faith is destroyed and institutions are seen as meaningless or malevolent, the ideological project can argue that the old “Western” liberal system is broken and inefficient. It can then propose a new, streamlined system—perhaps with a powerfully centralized executive, a supine legislature, a committed judiciary, and pliant constitutional bodies—designed not for balance, deliberation, and rights protection, but for the “efficient” realization of its ideological and majoritarian goals. The hollowed-out shells of the old institutions (the Parliament building, the courtrooms) might remain for symbolic show, but the living, breathing, adversarial democracy they were meant to house would be extinct.

Conclusion: The Battle for the Soul of Institutions

The current crisis in Parliament, therefore, is far more than a dispute over a speech. It is a clarion call and a battleground. It is a fight for the soul of Indian democracy. The question it forces the nation to confront is whether India will remain a parliamentary democracy, where power is contested, dispersed, and answerable in a vibrant, often chaotic arena of equals, or whether it will morph into a plebiscitary democracy, where periodic popular acclaim, mediated through a controlled public sphere and a dominated narrative, replaces daily accountability, and institutions are reduced to theatrical props in a pageant of unchallenged power.

Defending Parliament is not about defending politicians. It is about defending the only mechanism that, in theory, forces the mighty to answer to the powerless in real-time. It is about preserving the space where alternative visions for the country can be articulated without fear. The choice is between a living, breathing, arguing House that gives meaning to democracy, and a hollowed-out monument that merely echoes the commands of those already in power. The silence in that hollowed chamber, Palshikar warns, would be the silence of democracy itself. The time to recognize the symptom and address the disease is now, before the hollowing is complete and the pathway to replacement becomes an irresistible sweep.

Q&A: Understanding the Institutional Hollowing of Indian Democracy

Q1: The article argues that the recent parliamentary deadlock is a “symptom” and not the core problem. What exactly is the core problem it symptomatic of?

A1: The core problem is the systematic hollowing out of democratic institutions, a process where the formal structures of democracy are preserved while their substantive, democratic functions are eroded. Parliament is the prime example. Its core function—real-time executive accountability through rigorous debate and scrutiny—is being replaced by its use as a stage for acclamation and one-way communication. The deadlock over the LoP’s speech is a flashpoint that reveals this deeper erosion: the executive’s growing intolerance for unfettered, adversarial questioning within the House, which is the very raison d’être of a parliamentary system. It symbolizes a shift from seeing Parliament as a sovereign arena of accountability to viewing it as a managed venue for political messaging.

Q2: What are the “two tendencies” whose “coexistence” is driving this institutional decline, as per the analysis?

A2:

• Tendency 1 (Historical/Cultural): A Pre-existing Culture of Elite Instrumentalism: Since Independence, Indian elites across sectors (politicians, bureaucrats, judges) have often exhibited a formalistic, rather than a principled, commitment to institutions. There’s a deep-seated history of bending rules, using patronage, and bypassing procedures for personal, partisan, or bureaucratic gain. This created a weak institutional culture where the form of institutions was respected more than their independent spirit, making them vulnerable to manipulation.

• Tendency 2 (Contemporary/Ideological): The Rise of Majoritarian Missionism: The current ruling ideology views its mandate as a civilizational mission of national reawakening. From this vantage point, institutional checks (a vocal Opposition, neutral agencies, an assertive judiciary) are perceived not as democratic necessities but as procedural obstacles or “colonial baggage” that slow down the fulfillment of this higher, moral purpose. This ideology believes the “mission” overrides “institutional niceties.”

The convergence is potent: the old habit of cutting corners finds a new, morally charged justification, accelerating institutional decay from both cynicism and conviction.

Q3: How is this “hollowing” manifesting in institutions beyond Parliament? Provide specific examples cited.

A3: The hollowing is a widespread pattern:

• Investigative Agencies (ED/CBI): Perceived as weapons of political harassment and coercion, losing credibility as independent arbiters and becoming tools to target opposition and critics.

• The Judiciary: Critiqued for perceived abdication—delays in hearing crucial cases, reluctance to confront the executive on civil liberties, and acceptance of opaque “sealed cover” procedures—eroding its role as a fearless guardian of rights.

• Constitutional Bodies: Governors act as partisan agents in opposition states. The Election Commission’s actions regarding electoral schedules and violations raise serious questions about its neutrality, harming the foundation of free elections.

• Blurring of State and Religion: Armed forces officers in uniform at partisan religious events, judges participating in executive-linked rituals. This deinstitutionalizes the state, merging secular, constitutional authority with majoritarian religious-political symbolism.

Q4: The article warns that hollowed-out institutions can become “harmful.” How can a meaningless institution become actively dangerous?

A4: An institution stripped of its core democratic purpose doesn’t just become inert; its empty shell can be repurposed as a weapon against the very citizens it was meant to serve. For example:

• A hollowed-out Parliament can be used to pass draconian laws without scrutiny, directly harming minority and individual rights.

• A hollowed-out investigative agency can be used to imprison activists, journalists, and opposition figures on trumped-up charges, destroying political freedom and dissent.

• A hollowed-out Election Commission can tilt the electoral playing field through biased actions, fundamentally harming the right to a free and fair vote.
  Thus, the institution’s remaining powers—to legislate, investigate, prosecute, or regulate—are detached from democratic accountability and are instead wielded to legitimize and execute actions that undermine democracy itself.

Q5: What is the ultimate endgame or danger of this process, as suggested in the conclusion?

A5: The ultimate danger is the legitimation and establishment of an alternative, authoritarian system. Once institutions are rendered meaningless and public trust is destroyed, the final step becomes politically and socially easier. The ruling ideology can argue that the old liberal-democratic system is inefficient and alien. It can then propose a new, majoritarian, centralized system—with a dominant executive, a compliant legislature, a “committed” judiciary, and instrumentalized agencies—designed explicitly for ideological delivery, not pluralistic governance. The hollowed-out shells of the old institutions might remain for nostalgic or symbolic legitimacy, but the living essence of liberal democracy would be replaced. The parliamentary deadlock is thus a small battle in a much larger war over the fundamental nature of the Indian state.