The Coercive Legacy, Decoding Bangladesh’s Post-Authoritarian Violence Crisis
Bangladesh stands at a perilous crossroads, gripped by a pervasive and seemingly intractable wave of public violence. Gunshots, knife attacks, street brawls, and mob assaults have become grimly familiar punctuation marks in daily life, fostering a deep-seated public frustration. This simmering discontent has been directed squarely at the interim government, which is widely branded as weak, incompetent, and indifferent for its apparent inability to stem the tide of lawlessness. However, this visceral demand for “law and order” masks a more profound and challenging question: a restoration to what, exactly? As the article provocatively argues, to diagnose and treat Bangladesh’s current affliction of “chaotic” violence, one must first understand its genesis in the “suppressed” violence of the preceding era. The crisis is not a simple failure of policing; it is the toxic societal aftermath of a long period of klepto-fascist rule, where state-sponsored coercion systematically dismantled institutional integrity and reprogrammed social behavior. The solution, therefore, lies not in a tougher police force replicating past suppression, but in the arduous, long-term task of institutional repair and the rebuilding of a civic contract.
The Illusion of Order: Violence as an Instrument of Rule
To comprehend the present chaos, one must first deconstruct the recent past. For over fifteen years under Sheikh Hasina’s Awami League, Bangladesh experienced what the article terms a “klepto-fascist” phase of governance. In this model, the state did not seek to eliminate violence; it sought to monopolize and weaponize it as a central instrument of political control. Coercion replaced genuine political competition. Opposition parties, most notably the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP), were systematically crippled through mass arrests, trumped-up charges, and the legal disqualification of their leadership. The space for dissent shriveled as journalists faced intimidation, abduction, and prosecution under draconian digital security laws. Critical voices were not debated; they were criminalized.
This political suffocation was enforced through a shadow architecture of violence. State agencies like the Rapid Action Battalion (RAB)—notorious for extrajudicial “crossfire” killings—acted as the blunt instruments of fear. Alongside them operated a sprawling network of party-aligned actors: student wings like the Bangladesh Chhatra League and local party cadres. These groups functioned as informal enforcers, using knives, rods, and machetes not in random acts of thuggery, but as tools for precise political and economic dominance. They silenced local opponents, controlled university campuses, and monopolized public tenders and neighborhood extortion rackets.
The result was a perverse form of “order.” Crime statistics in certain categories may have appeared manageable, but this was an illusion crafted by fear. Victims of political or party-linked violence were too terrified to report incidents to a police force that was often complicit. Streets appeared calm because the cost of public protest or dissent was unthinkably high. This was not peace; it was suppressed violence. The state had not resolved conflicts; it had buried them under a blanket of fear, delegating brutality to loyalists who were, in turn, protected from justice. The rule of law was not failing; it had been deliberately suspended for a specific political project.
The Great Unraveling: When Fear Collapses Faster Than Institutions
The current crisis represents the violent decompression of this suppressed system. The article’s central thesis is powerful: what Bangladesh is witnessing is the “leakage” of state-monopolized violence back into the general society. The interim government, lacking the same entrenched network and perhaps the will to employ identical methods of terror, cannot maintain the same iron grip. The fear that once enforced a brittle quiet has begun to dissipate.
However, the institutions meant to manage societal conflict—an independent judiciary, a non-partisan police force, credible electoral commissions, and robust civic forums—were systematically eroded and politicized over the previous decade and a half. They were not rebuilt in tandem with the collapse of fear. This has created a dangerous vacuum.
Into this vacuum pours a torrent of long-pent-up grievances. The violence today is described as “decentralized and retaliatory.” It is the anger of those who were humiliated, whose properties were seized, whose family members were disappeared, and whose voices were silenced, now feeling emboldened to seek redress or revenge. It is also the violence of former enforcers, whose impunity is now uncertain and who may resort to aggression to retain their dwindling control. This is a classic post-authoritarian syndrome: the coercive apparatus recedes, but the social muscle memory of violence—the learned behavior that aggression trumps law—persists. Society has been “reprogrammed,” taught that legal channels are irrelevant and that survival depends on force or alignment with power. When that central power shifts or weakens, society does not magically revert to civic norms; it experiences the violent withdrawal symptoms of the coercive drug.
The Futility of “Tougher Policing” in an Institutional Vacuum
The public and political clamor for a swift crackdown is understandable but misguided. Demanding that the interim government simply “get tougher” is to call for a return to the methods that created the crisis in the first place. A police force operating without renewed institutional legitimacy and professional ethics would merely be applying fresh suppression atop old wounds. It would target symptoms—the street clashes and mob attacks—while ignoring the disease: the complete collapse of trust in state institutions as fair arbiters.
A security-centric approach risks several catastrophic outcomes:
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Recreating Selective Impunity: A crackdown could easily devolve into targeting the former regime’s opponents under the guise of restoring order, merely flipping the script of political violence rather than ending it.
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Further Eroding Legitimacy: If policing is seen as another form of partisan coercion, it will deepen public alienation and fuel further resistance and retaliation.
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Ignoring the Root Cause: It addresses the manifestation of leaked violence without plugging the leak itself: the gutted institutions of justice and accountability.
The Path of Institutional Repair: A Daunting but Necessary Blueprint
The solution, as the article implies, is profoundly difficult and unglamorous. It requires moving beyond the cyclical “order-through-fear” model to build a sustainable “order-through-justice” model. This institutional repair must be comprehensive:
1. Restoring the Judiciary and Rule of Law: This is the cornerstone. It requires ensuring judicial appointments are based on merit and integrity, insulating courts from political interference, and expediting the massive backlog of cases—particularly those related to political violence, corruption, and human rights abuses from the previous era. Symbolic but credible trials for past extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances, even if few, are essential to signal that impunity is over.
2. Reforming the Security Apparatus: The police and investigative agencies require a root-and-branch overhaul. This means depoliticizing postings and promotions, implementing rigorous human rights and community policing training, and holding officers accountable for abuses. Units with records of violations, like the RAB, need fundamental restructuring or disbanding. The goal must be to transform them from instruments of party power into servants of public safety and legal procedure.
3. Rebuilding Political and Civic Space: A return to genuine political competition is vital. This involves allowing all parties to operate freely, ensuring free and fair elections under a neutral administration, and repealing or reforming laws used to criminalize dissent (like the Digital Security Act). Independent media and civil society organizations must be protected as critical watchdogs and forums for dialogue, not treated as enemies of the state.
4. Addressing the Grassroots Ecosystem of Violence: The network of party enforcers will not vanish overnight. A dual strategy is needed: strict legal action against ongoing criminality, coupled with programs for demobilization and reintegration. Simultaneously, local governance institutions (union parishads, municipal bodies) must be strengthened to resolve disputes and deliver services, reducing communities’ dependence on partisan strongmen.
5. Fostering a National Dialogue on Justice and Reconciliation: Bangladesh needs a candid, society-wide conversation about the trauma of the past fifteen years. While a formal truth commission may be politically fraught, civil society-led dialogues, memorialization projects, and educational reforms can begin the process of acknowledging suffering and breaking the cycle of retaliatory grievance.
The International Community’s Role
The international community, particularly democratic nations and multilateral bodies, must shift its focus. Rather than applying sporadic pressure during elections, sustained engagement should prioritize and support these institutional rebuilding efforts. Aid and partnerships should be explicitly tied to progress in judicial independence, security sector reform, and human rights. This is more valuable than vacillating between engaging with and sanctioning regimes based on geopolitical convenience.
Conclusion: Beyond the Crossroads
Bangladesh’s current violence is not an anomaly; it is a legacy. It is the bitter harvest of a system that taught its people that law is a lie, that justice is for sale, and that power flows from the barrel of a gun or the swing of a machete. The interim government faces an almost impossible task: managing the chaotic outbursts of this legacy while laying the foundations for a different future.
The easy path—a new round of suppression—leads back to the same bleak destination. The hard path—the meticulous, patient, and often frustrating work of institutional repair—offers the only genuine exit. It requires leaders with a vision that extends beyond the next election or news cycle, and a citizenry that, despite its weariness, can channel its frustration into a demand for lasting justice rather than temporary calm. The question for Bangladesh is not whether it can restore an old, illusory order, but whether it can summon the collective will to build a new, legitimate one. The stakes are nothing less than the nation’s future as a stable, democratic, and just society.
Q&A: Bangladesh’s Crisis of Violence and Institutional Legitimacy
Q1: How does the article distinguish between the violence of the previous Hasina era and the violence seen today under the interim government?
A1: The article draws a crucial distinction between “suppressed violence” and “chaotic, retaliatory violence.” Under Hasina’s “klepto-fascist” rule, violence was a state-monopolized instrument of political control. It was deployed selectively by state agencies and party cadres to crush dissent, control resources, and instill fear, creating an illusion of order through coercion. Today’s violence is decentralized and diffused. It represents the “leakage” of that state-sponsored violence back into society—a surge of retaliatory attacks, long-suppressed grievances, and social aggression unleashed as the climate of fear diminishes, but before legitimate institutions can be rebuilt to manage conflict.
Q2: Why does the article argue that simply demanding “tougher policing” is a flawed solution?
A2: Demanding a crackdown is flawed because it treats the symptom (public violence) while ignoring the disease (the collapse of institutional legitimacy). A “tougher” police force operating within the same eroded, politicized framework would likely reproduce the past model of selective impunity and partisan coercion, merely targeting different groups. This would not restore genuine law and order; it would deepen public mistrust, perpetuate cycles of retaliation, and fail to address the root cause: that citizens have been taught for years that legal institutions are not fair arbiters but tools of the powerful.
Q3: What is meant by the claim that “klepto-fascism reprogrammes social behaviour”?
A3: This refers to the profound sociological impact of long-term authoritarian rule. When a system consistently demonstrates that laws do not apply to the powerful, that justice is absent, and that survival and success depend on allegiance to power or the use of force, it rewires societal norms. Citizens internalize that aggression and connections trump legality and civic dialogue. When such a regime ends, this learned behavior does not instantly disappear. The “muscle memory” for violence remains, leading to the chaotic, self-help justice and retaliatory attacks seen during the transition period, as people act on these ingrained beliefs in the absence of a trusted, neutral state.
Q4: What are the key components of the “institutional repair” needed in Bangladesh?
A4: Institutional repair is a multi-pronged, long-term process:
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Judicial Restoration: Guaranteeing the independence, merit-based appointments, and capacity of the judiciary to fairly adjudicate cases, especially those involving past and present political violence.
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Security Sector Reform: Depoliticizing and professionally retraining police and intelligence agencies, holding them accountable to law, not political masters.
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Political Space Reformation: Ensuring free operation of all political parties, credible neutral election administration, and the repeal of laws used to criminalize dissent.
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Grassroots Dispute Resolution: Strengthening local governance to provide non-partisan channels for resolving conflicts and delivering services, undermining the power of party enforcers.
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Societal Reconciliation: Encouraging dialogue to acknowledge past trauma and break cycles of grievance.
Q5: What role can the international community play in supporting a sustainable solution?
A5: The international community must move beyond a focus solely on electoral moments. Sustainable support should be tied to concrete progress in institution-building. This includes:
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Providing technical and financial assistance for judicial reform, police training, and civil service strengthening.
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Applying consistent diplomatic pressure and conditioning trade/aid relationships on verifiable improvements in human rights and the rule of law.
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Protecting and empowering Bangladeshi civil society organizations and independent media as essential partners in accountability and dialogue.
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Avoiding short-term engagements that prioritize stability over justice, thereby inadvertently endorsing a return to suppression. The goal should be to bolster the actors and processes working toward legitimate, durable institutions.
