The Chain That Pulls Shorter, Bangladesh’s New Assertiveness, India’s Calculated Outreach, and the Uncomfortable Geometry of Neighbourly Relations
Bangladesh has voted. The Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP), led by Tarique Rahman, has secured a two-thirds majority in a historic election that marks a fundamental shift in the country’s view of itself. The question on everyone’s mind is what this means for Dhaka-Delhi relations. And as Shahab Enam Khan, a Bangladeshi analyst, argues in the accompanying essay, the answer is not a Bollywood-style “grand family reunion” on the model of Kabhi Khushi Kabhi Gham. Post-July 2024 Bangladesh comes with a new script: transactional relations.
The era of diplomatic cheerleading over shared history is over. It is not that the history is forgotten; it is that a new generation, shaped by the July uprising, has come of age with a different sensibility. This generation does not seek a patron. It has found its voice—loud, assertive, and uninterested in being anyone’s junior partner. The parliament that the new government inherits was birthed by a youth demographic, a people’s uprising, and a new political reality. It is a people’s government, not a political party sitting in another country’s guest room.
The far-right’s surprising electoral showing confirms that Bangladesh’s old duopoly has cracked. The Awami League and the BNP have dominated politics for decades, but the electorate now has options, and whoever governs must reckon with a citizenry that knows it has choices. This is a new political landscape, and it demands a new approach from all parties, including India.
The accompanying essay is frank about the failures on both sides. Several of Delhi’s politicians have spent 18 months turning Bangladesh into a punching bag for domestic consumption. That was noted and deeply felt. Those scars will not heal anytime soon. The Yunus interim government did itself no favours either; its inability to address India’s perceived security concerns gave Delhi plenty of ammunition. Diplomatic incompetence is not a defence strategy; it is an invitation to be outmanoeuvred.
But here is the irony that Khan highlights: those very anti-Bangladesh, anti-Yunus, and pro-Awami League campaigns achieved what no Bangladeshi politician managed in 50 years. They united the entire nation. A country that had been deeply divided found common cause in resistance to external criticism.
The Transactional Turn: What It Means for Foreign Policy
The shift to transactional relations does not mean hostility; it means a cold-eyed calculation of interests. Bangladesh under the BNP will calculate its foreign policy on the basis of realities, not sentiments. It will engage with India where interests align, and it will resist where they do not. It will expect reciprocity, not goodwill monologues delivered over biryani at diplomatic receptions.
This is not a rejection of India; it is a maturation of the relationship. Bangladesh is no longer a supplicant seeking favours. It is a confident nation with options. Beijing remains the economic guarantor regardless of government. Washington, Ankara, and Islamabad will offer defence diversification solutions—a genuine necessity given the erosion of multilateral security guarantees. Myanmar, with a non-state armed group across the border and 1.2 million Rohingya refugees, will dictate defence priorities in unprecedented ways.
India must adjust to this new reality. It would be wise not to view Bangladesh as any country’s national security concern, nor as submissive to another state’s wishlist. Bangladesh will make its own choices, and India must respect those choices while protecting its own interests.
The Domestic Poison: How Indian Rhetoric Backfired
Khan’s critique of Indian political rhetoric is sharp and specific. Several of Delhi’s politicians spent 18 months turning Bangladesh into a punching bag for domestic consumption. The campaigns were noted and deeply felt. The scars will not heal anytime soon.
This is not merely a matter of diplomatic niceties; it has real consequences. Every inch of diplomatic space that India vacates through such rhetoric will be filled by others. China, Pakistan, Turkey, and other actors are waiting to deepen their engagement with Bangladesh. India’s loss is their gain.
The irony is that the very campaigns designed to criticise Bangladesh achieved the opposite of their intended effect. They united a divided nation against external criticism. They gave Bangladeshis of all political persuasions a common cause. They made the task of any future government seeking friendly relations with India more difficult, not less.
The Extremism Challenge: A Shared Nightmare
Khan is clear that extremism is Dhaka’s nightmare too. The BNP will have to take India’s security concerns seriously, not because India demands it, but because a stable, peaceful Bangladesh is in its own interest. The persecution of minorities does not go unnoticed across borders, and it only bolsters radical narratives on both sides.
The challenge for both governments is to address these concerns without playing into the hands of extremists. This requires cooperation, not confrontation; intelligence sharing, not public posturing; quiet diplomacy, not inflammatory rhetoric. It requires recognising that the fight against extremism is a shared struggle, not a zero-sum game.
The Hasina Question: A Convenient Chip
The trial of former Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina remains a political reality that will serve as a convenient bargaining chip for whoever needs it. The BNP cannot ignore the demands of its base for accountability; India cannot ignore its obligations to a former ally who was granted asylum. This is the most delicate issue on the bilateral agenda, and there is no easy solution.
Khan’s framing of Hasina as a “chip” is not cynical; it is realistic. In transactional relations, every issue becomes a bargaining chip. The question is whether both sides can negotiate in good faith, recognising that the relationship is too important to be held hostage to any single issue.
Conclusion: Waiting for Someone to Say Something Sensible
Khan’s concluding reference to the famous line from Sholay—itna sannata kyun hai bhai?—captures the current moment perfectly. There is a silence, a waiting, a sense that both nations are finally pausing to consider what comes next. The bar, at this moment, is not high. The relationship does not need grand gestures or emotional reunions. It needs pragmatism, reciprocity, and a willingness to recognise each other’s legitimate concerns.
The BNP will show commitment to improving relations, but this will only come with reciprocity, not goodwill monologues. India must meet Bangladesh halfway, acknowledging the new reality and adjusting its approach accordingly. The alternative is a continued downward spiral, with each side blaming the other and neither willing to take the first step.
The chain that pulls shorter is a metaphor for the inescapable geography that binds India and Bangladesh. No matter how far they try to storm off in opposite directions, the chain will pull them back. The question is whether they will be pulled back into a constructive engagement or a destructive confrontation. The choice is theirs.
Q&A Section
Q1: What does the essay mean by describing future India-Bangladesh relations as “transactional,” and why is this a shift from the past?
A1: “Transactional” means that relations will be based on cold-eyed calculation of interests rather than historical sentiment or ideological alignment. In the past, the relationship was often framed in terms of shared history, particularly the 1971 liberation war, and India’s support for the Awami League. Bangladesh was often seen, and sometimes saw itself, as needing a patron. The July 2024 uprising and the BNP’s victory have changed this. Bangladesh now sees itself as having options—with China, the US, Turkey, Pakistan, and others—and will engage with India where interests align and resist where they do not. It expects reciprocity, not goodwill gestures. This is a shift from a relationship based on nostalgia and perceived dependency to one based on pragmatism and mutual interest.
Q2: How did Indian political rhetoric against Bangladesh backfire, according to the essay?
A2: Several Indian politicians spent 18 months using Bangladesh as a “punching bag for domestic consumption,” engaging in anti-Bangladesh, anti-Yunus, and pro-Awami League campaigns. This rhetoric was noted and deeply felt in Bangladesh. The irony, as the essay notes, is that these campaigns achieved what no Bangladeshi politician had managed in 50 years: they united the entire nation against external criticism. A country that had been deeply divided found common cause in resistance. This makes the task of any future government seeking friendly relations with India more difficult, as the scars from this period will not heal quickly. It also vacated diplomatic space that other countries—China, Pakistan, Turkey—are eager to fill.
Q3: What responsibilities does the essay assign to both India and Bangladesh for repairing the relationship?
A3: The essay assigns responsibilities to both sides. India must stop using Bangladesh as a domestic political punching bag, recognise the new reality of a more assertive Bangladesh, and engage on the basis of reciprocity rather than expecting gratitude or submission. It must also address its genuine security concerns—particularly regarding extremism and the Northeast—through cooperation rather than confrontation. Bangladesh, for its part, must recognise India’s legitimate security concerns and take them seriously. Extremism is Dhaka’s nightmare too, and addressing it is in its own interest. The BNP must also manage the delicate issue of Sheikh Hasina’s trial in a way that does not poison the relationship. Both sides must recognise that the relationship is too important to be sacrificed on the altar of domestic politics.
Q4: What role do other countries—China, the US, Turkey, Pakistan—play in Bangladesh’s new foreign policy calculus?
A4: These countries offer Bangladesh options and alternatives, reducing its dependence on any single partner. Beijing remains the economic guarantor regardless of government. Washington, Ankara, and Islamabad offer defence diversification solutions—a genuine necessity given the erosion of multilateral security guarantees. Bangladesh will calculate its relations with all of these actors based on its own interests. This is not a rejection of India; it is a maturation of Bangladesh’s foreign policy. India must adjust to this reality and compete for influence by offering a compelling vision of partnership, not by demanding loyalty. The essay suggests that every inch of diplomatic space India vacates through clumsy rhetoric will be filled by others.
Q5: What is the significance of the essay’s concluding reference to the Sholay line, “itna sannata kyun hai bhai?”
A5: The famous line from the Bollywood film Sholay—”Why is there such silence, brother?”—captures the current moment of suspended animation in India-Bangladesh relations. There is a sense of waiting, of both nations pausing to see what comes next. The silence is not empty; it is filled with uncertainty, caution, and the possibility of either renewed engagement or continued drift. The essay suggests that the bar at this moment is not high. The relationship does not need grand gestures or emotional reunions. It needs pragmatism, reciprocity, and a willingness to recognise each other’s legitimate concerns. The silence will be broken when someone says something sensible. The question is whether that will happen.
