Tehran Reenters the Global Geopolitical Spotlight, Nuclear Diplomacy, Regional Anxieties, and India’s Strategic Calculus
As Trump Pursues His Own JCPOA, the Middle East Holds Its Breath
In late 2013, the White House under President Barack Obama embarked on a multi-national, complicated, and ambitious journey to negotiate with Iran to curtail its nuclear programme. The United States, along with its allies—particularly Israel—was convinced that Tehran had set out to develop nuclear weapons. The negotiations, involving a consortium of United Nations Security Council members along with Germany (collectively known as the P5+1), managed to reach an agreement in 2015 called the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). The aim was to install guardrails around the Shia power’s nuclear activities, which its then-President Hassan Rouhani and Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei maintained were only for civil use.
That agreement, imperfect but functional, represented one of the most significant diplomatic achievements of the early twenty-first century. It did not solve all problems. It did not address Iran’s ballistic missile programme, its support for proxies across the region, or its domestic human rights abuses. But it did what it was designed to do: it placed strict limits on Iran’s nuclear enrichment, installed rigorous inspection regimes, and extended the time Tehran would need to produce a weapon, should it choose to do so, from months to years.
Then came 2018. Donald Trump, in his first presidency, withdrew the United States from the JCPOA, calling it “farci cal” and negotiated in a way that did not secure American interests. The decision left not just Iran but also its European allies in the lurch. Russia and China, technically allies of Iran but not wanting a nuclear-armed West Asia, were also left stumped. The agreement that had taken years to negotiate was torn up, and with it, the architecture of restraint.
Now, in 2026, Tehran is once again at the centre of global geopolitical attention. The United States, under Trump’s second presidency, has bombed Iran’s nuclear and air defence sites, following a narrative that the country’s capacity to pursue such weapons lies in tatters. Yet, paradoxically, Trump is now chasing a deal through diplomacy—in a very similar manner to Obama—even as he builds up American military capacity in the region and hosts Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu at the White House. The situation is fraught with contradiction, anxiety, and the ever-present risk of escalation.
The Long Arc of Nuclear Diplomacy
To understand the current moment, one must trace the long arc of nuclear diplomacy with Iran. The suspicion that Tehran sought nuclear weapons dates back decades, to clandestine facilities revealed in the early 2000s. For years, the international community tried various approaches: sanctions, isolation, covert action, and ultimately, negotiation.
The JCPOA represented the triumph of the negotiation track. Iran agreed to limit its enrichment to 3.67 per cent, well below weapons grade; to reduce its centrifuges by two-thirds; to redesign its heavy water reactor so it could not produce plutonium; and to accept the most rigorous inspection regime ever negotiated. In return, sanctions were lifted, and Iran rejoined the global economy.
For a brief period, it worked. Iran complied. The IAEA verified. Oil flowed. Trade resumed. Then Trump withdrew, reimposed sanctions, and the carefully constructed edifice began to crumble. Iran gradually exceeded the limits, enriching to higher levels and installing more advanced centrifuges. The breakout time—the time needed to produce enough fissile material for a weapon—shortened from years to months.
Now, after the bombings of 2025, Iran’s nuclear infrastructure is damaged. But knowledge cannot be bombed. The scientists remain. The intent, whatever it may be, remains. And the regime, facing internal protests and external pressure, has every incentive to preserve its nuclear option as a strategic hedge.
The Trump-Netanyahu Dynamic
Benjamin Netanyahu, Israel’s long-serving Prime Minister, has made preventing a nuclear Iran the central mission of his political life. In a famous 2012 speech at the United Nations, he held up a drawing depicting the various stages of Iran’s nuclear programme, using a red line to mark the point beyond which Israel would not tolerate progress. With Obama, and later with Biden, Netanyahu had limited success in shaping U.S. policy to his preferred maximalist position.
With Trump, it was different. The Israeli leader managed to market his state’s celebrated intelligence apparatus’ assessment that Iran was racing towards nuclear weapons. While U.S. assessments often differed, Netanyahu’s whisperings in Trump’s ear won the battle. The withdrawal from the JCPOA, the maximum pressure campaign, the bombings of 2025—all bore the imprint of Israeli influence.
Yet even Netanyahu cannot fully control the trajectory. In 2026, Trump is pursuing talks with Iran even as he meets with Netanyahu at the White House. “I insisted that negotiations with Iran continue to see whether or not a deal can be consummated,” Trump said. “If it can, I let the Prime Minister know that will be a preference. If it cannot, we will just have to see what the outcome will be.”
The language is classic Trump: transactional, ambiguous, leaving all options on the table. But it signals a shift. The president who tore up the JCPOA now wants his own version of it. The question is whether Iran, having been burned once, will trust any agreement with the United States. And whether Israel, having tasted the fruits of maximal pressure, will accept any deal that leaves Iranian nuclear infrastructure intact.
The Arab Dilemma
The Arab powers of the Gulf find themselves in an excruciating position. Over the past year or two, they have committed hundreds of billions of dollars of investment towards Trump and his circle, betting on his return to power and his willingness to protect their interests. Yet despite their own troubles with Tehran—the rivalry that has defined Gulf politics for decades—they do not want to see military escalation.
The reasons are practical. War would disrupt oil shipments, scare away investment, and potentially spiral into a broader conflict that could consume the region. Iran has made no bones about its capacity to strike back—a claim that analysts and officials are increasingly taking seriously. Further threats from Tehran that any strikes this time will be met by retaliation targeting U.S. military facilities in the region, largely situated in Gulf states, have led to anxieties peaking.
The stress is not coming from Iran’s intentions alone. It is coming from an inability to predict or influence Trump’s thinking. The president who ordered the bombing of Iran’s nuclear sites could just as easily order more bombing—or cut a deal that leaves his Gulf allies exposed. The Gulf states, for all their wealth and investment, are passengers on a roller coaster whose driver they cannot reach.
Others across the world would rather see talks succeed than fail. A diplomatic resolution would avoid pushing the region into another conflict that could run for years should it spread. The costs of war—in human life, in economic disruption, in regional stability—are incalculable. The benefits of a deal, even an imperfect one, are tangible.
The Stakes for India
For India, the return of the Iran file as a point of geopolitical friction poses renewed challenges. New Delhi was a supporter of the original JCPOA process. In fact, Indian officials had highlighted to their Iranian peers the perks of such an agreement: ease of sanctions, return of oil trade, and integration into the global economy.
Iran was at one point among the top two oil suppliers for India, only to lose that position as U.S. pressure peaked under the maximum pressure campaign. The JCPOA was seen as the way out—a mechanism to restore the flow of oil and normalise economic relations. Now, with the agreement in tatters and talks uncertain, India’s energy security hangs in the balance.
But the relationship with Iran is about more than oil. The Chabahar Port, a long-standing Indian connectivity investment, represents a strategic foothold in the region—a gateway to Afghanistan and Central Asia that bypasses Pakistan. Iran’s fractious relationship with Pakistan, its practical engagement with the Taliban in Afghanistan, and its posturing in Central Asia vis-à-vis Turkish and Pakistani interests all affect Indian calculations.
Tehran remains an important political player for India across multiple dimensions. Its position on the Gulf, its influence in Afghanistan, its connections to Central Asia—all of these matter for a country that seeks to expand its strategic footprint. A stable, engaged Iran is in India’s interest. A turbulent, isolated Iran is not.
Iran’s Internal Crossroads
Finally, Iran itself stands at a crossroads. Internal protests have been consistent, gnawing into the state’s political stability. The economic hardship caused by sanctions, the repression of dissent, the gap between the ruling elite and the suffering population—all have fuelled discontent that periodically erupts into the streets.
The ‘moderates’, once powerful under Rouhani, have had to align with their conservative peers to build a nationalist narrative following the U.S. bombings. External pressure has a way of consolidating internal support, at least temporarily. But the underlying grievances remain, and they will resurface.
Domestic power plays, much like before, will heavily impact external outcomes. The Supreme Leader, aging and with succession questions looming, must navigate between hardliners who see nuclear capability as non-negotiable and pragmatists who see relief from sanctions as essential for survival. The Revolutionary Guards, with their economic empire and ideological commitment, exert enormous influence. The elected president, whatever his faction, must balance these forces while managing the daily crises of governance.
Any success of the current talks will be a better option moving forward than the alternatives being presented by the largest American military build-up in the region since 2003. War would devastate Iran, but it would also destabilise the region, disrupt global energy supplies, and create consequences that no one can fully predict.
Conclusion: The Path Forward
The situation in early 2026 is one of profound uncertainty. The United States has demonstrated its willingness to use force, having bombed Iranian nuclear sites. It has also signalled its openness to diplomacy, with talks ongoing in Oman. Iran has shown its capacity to withstand pressure and its desire for relief from sanctions. The region watches, anxious and powerless to influence the outcome.
For India, the stakes are high but the leverage is limited. New Delhi must navigate between its strategic partnership with the United States and its historical ties with Iran. It must protect its energy security, its connectivity investments, and its regional interests while avoiding entanglement in a conflict it cannot control.
The lesson of the past decade is that agreements, however imperfect, are preferable to the alternatives. The JCPOA was not perfect, but it worked. Its destruction led not to a better deal but to escalation, conflict, and now a fragile attempt to rebuild what was lost.
Whether Trump can succeed where Obama did—whether he can negotiate a deal with a country he has bombed, with partners who do not trust him, and with an Israel that prefers military action—remains to be seen. The world watches, hopes, and prepares for outcomes that no one can predict.
Q&A: Unpacking the Iran Nuclear Crisis
Q1: What was the JCPOA, and why did the United States withdraw from it?
A: The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) was a 2015 agreement between Iran and the P5+1 (the five permanent UN Security Council members plus Germany). It placed strict limits on Iran’s nuclear enrichment, required redesign of its heavy water reactor, and installed rigorous inspections in exchange for sanctions relief. In 2018, during his first presidency, Donald Trump withdrew the United States from the agreement, calling it “farcical” and arguing it did not secure American interests. The withdrawal left Iran, European allies, and even Russia and China frustrated, and led to Tehran gradually exceeding the agreement’s limits.
Q2: What is the current status of U.S.-Iran nuclear talks in 2026?
A: In 2026, following U.S. bombings of Iranian nuclear and air defence sites in 2025, the Trump administration is simultaneously building up military capacity in the region while pursuing diplomatic talks with Iran, hosted by long-time mediator Oman. Trump has stated that he wants to see “whether or not a deal can be consummated,” suggesting he seeks his own version of the JCPOA. However, Iran’s trust has been severely damaged by the U.S. withdrawal from the original agreement and subsequent military action, making negotiations extremely challenging.
Q3: What role has Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu played in shaping U.S. policy toward Iran?
A: Netanyahu has made preventing a nuclear Iran the central mission of his political career, famously using a diagram at the 2012 UN General Assembly to illustrate Iran’s nuclear progress. With Obama and Biden, he had limited success in pushing for maximalist positions. However, with Trump, he found a more receptive audience, marketing Israeli intelligence assessments that Iran was racing toward nuclear weapons. His influence contributed to the U.S. withdrawal from the JCPOA, the maximum pressure campaign, and the 2025 bombings. Yet even Netanyahu cannot fully control the outcome, as Trump now pursues diplomacy.
Q4: What are the concerns of Arab Gulf states regarding the current crisis?
A: Gulf Arab states find themselves in a difficult position. Despite committing hundreds of billions of dollars in investment toward Trump and sharing his concerns about Iran, they do not want military escalation. War would disrupt oil shipments, scare away investment, and potentially spiral into broader conflict. Iran has threatened to retaliate against U.S. military facilities in the Gulf if attacked, raising anxieties. The stress is compounded by an inability to predict or influence Trump’s thinking—they are passengers on a roller coaster whose driver they cannot reach.
Q5: Why does the Iran nuclear issue matter for India?
A: India has multiple stakes in the Iran nuclear issue. First, energy security: Iran was once among India’s top two oil suppliers, and sanctions disrupted that flow. Second, connectivity: the Chabahar Port represents a strategic Indian investment providing access to Afghanistan and Central Asia bypassing Pakistan. Third, regional politics: Iran’s relationship with Pakistan, its engagement with the Taliban, and its posture in Central Asia all affect Indian interests. Fourth, broader stability: a conflict in the region would have cascading consequences for India’s trade, energy supplies, and diaspora. New Delhi supported the original JCPOA and now watches the uncertain talks with deep concern.
