Seen but Not Secured, Why Budget 2026 Missed the Chance to Protect India’s Gig Workers
Six years ago, India witnessed a historic moment in its labour law architecture. The Code on Social Security, 2020, formally recognised gig and platform workers as a distinct category of workers, departing from the traditional binary framework of employer and employee to extend social protection. This was a landmark step, a recognition that the nature of work was changing, and that the law needed to change with it. India took a further step in late November 2025 by implementing this Code. After years of waiting, this long-awaited reform was expected to reshape the country’s labour market, providing social security and protection to the millions of workers who power the platform economy.
Now, nearly six years after its enactment and months after the labour codes became operational, expectations were high that Budget 2026 would articulate the fiscal operationalisation of these provisions. This was the moment to move from recognition to reality, to put money behind the promise. Contrary to these expectations, the Budget made no dedicated allocation for gig workers. No timeline was provided for activating the Social Security Fund mandated by the Code. No clarity was offered on the government’s co-financing commitments. The workers who were recognised in law remained, in practice, unseen and unsecured.
The disconnect between the legal recognition of gig workers and the fiscal silence of the Budget is a troubling pattern. Interestingly, the Economic Survey, released just days before the Budget, offered a far more candid assessment of the reality of gig work. It noted that a substantial proportion of gig workers earn below Rs 15,000 per month. They face high income volatility, their earnings fluctuating wildly from week to week. They remain outside the ambit of health insurance, maternity benefits, and old-age security—the basic building blocks of a dignified life. Moreover, the Survey highlighted algorithmic control as a profound source of insecurity. The opaque, platform-determined work allocation and the inscrutable wage-setting mechanisms effectively limit workers’ bargaining power, leaving them with no recourse against decisions that determine their livelihood.
The Economic Survey went further. It recommended concrete measures: minimum earnings standards to provide a basic floor, portable social security benefits that a worker could carry from platform to platform, and mechanisms to address income instability. These were not radical proposals; they were pragmatic, evidence-based solutions to the problems the Survey itself had documented. Yet, Budget 2026 failed to incorporate these analytical insights. There was no dedicated allocation, no consideration of budgetary instruments, no policy timelines. The analytical work was done; the policy prescription was written. The Budget simply ignored it.
This disconnect between the Code on Social Security and Budget 2026 signals a broader pattern in India’s labour reform strategy: legal modernisation without commensurate fiscal commitment. While the legal framework has been expanded to accommodate a workforce of over 500 million, budgetary policy remains grounded in traditional labour definitions, favouring formal employment over informal welfare arrangements. The law has moved forward; the money has not.
As a result, gig workers continue to occupy a complex and ambiguous position. They are neither part of formal employment structures that grant access to contributory social insurance—they have no employer to contribute on their behalf—nor are they sufficiently recognised within informal welfare frameworks to qualify for traditional social assistance schemes designed for the rural poor. They fall through the cracks, invisible to a system designed for a different era.
This is a major concern not only from an equity perspective—these workers deserve dignity and security—but also for its macroeconomic implications. Gig workers are no longer a marginal labour market phenomenon. They have become a structural component of urban service delivery and consumption growth. They now contribute measurably to GDP while absorbing a growing share of the urban workforce. An economy increasingly reliant on insecure labour cannot sustain aggregate consumption demand or long-term productivity growth. Workers who are unsure of their income next week do not make long-term investments in their futures, do not take out mortgages, do not buy cars. They cannot be the engine of sustained consumption growth. This is especially concerning given that a significant portion of gig work involves feminised labour, women who are already facing structural barriers to economic security.
Nowhere is this policy gap more visible than in India’s rapidly expanding platform-based economy. In particular, the emergence of ultra-fast or “quick delivery” models—often promising customers deliveries within 10-15 minutes—has further intensified the vulnerabilities faced by gig and platform workers. Food and grocery delivery platforms increasingly rely on dense delivery networks and strict time-bound performance metrics to maintain a competitive advantage. In this hyper-competitive model, delivery partners operate under algorithmic management systems that reward speed and penalise delays. The algorithm does not care about traffic, or weather, or the physical exhaustion of the worker. It only cares about the clock.
This often pushes workers towards unsafe driving practices and irregular work schedules in order to secure higher ratings and wages. The absence of formal job contracts, employment security, health insurance, accident coverage, and income stability further magnifies these vulnerabilities. When a delivery partner is injured in a road accident, there is no workers’ compensation, no medical leave, no safety net. The operational risks and market uncertainties are effectively transferred onto the workers themselves. The platform assumes no responsibility for the human cost of its business model.
As the “quick delivery” economy expands across Indian cities, it institutionalises a labour regime marked by precarity, informality, rising occupational hazards, and minimal regulatory oversight. This condition stands in stark contrast to the broader objectives of employment security and job stabilisation highlighted in the Budget’s own rural employment discourse. The same government that promises guaranteed wage employment for rural households is silent on the security of urban gig workers.
The Budget adopted a growth-centric framing, remaining cautious while aligning with India’s macroeconomic priorities. It emphasised rural employment and livelihoods through the Viksit Bharat-Guarantee for Rozgar and Ajeevika Mission, a new scheme aiming to provide 125 days of guaranteed wage employment per rural household. This positions itself as the government’s primary instrument for rural labour security and income stabilisation. At the same time, allocations for MGNREGA have been scaled back to adjust pending liabilities and support a transition phase. While the government maintains that MGNREGA will continue alongside the new scheme for now, concerns remain that a shift towards cost-sharing frameworks with states may dilute its rights-based employment-guarantee approach.
The contrast is stark. In rural India, the state recognises its responsibility to provide a guaranteed safety net. In urban India, for the millions of workers who power the digital economy, there is no equivalent commitment. Budget 2026 missed an opportunity to integrate protection for gig and platform workers with existing policy missions on women’s employment, urban livelihoods, skilling, and financial inclusion. It could have linked the recognition of the Code to the existing infrastructure of these missions. It did not.
If the Code on Social Security is to be more than symbolic, future Budgets must move decisively from recognition to operationalisation. The question is not whether the State can afford to extend social security to gig workers; it is whether the economy can afford not to. An economy that relies on precarious labour to deliver its most basic services is an economy building its future on sand. Budget 2027 must translate institutional and legal recognition into concrete fiscal and institutional commitments: a well-structured, inclusive social security fund; co-financing arrangements between different levels of government; flexible benefits frameworks that recognise the fluid nature of gig work; and a minimum earning safety net. Only then can India’s gig-driven economic growth remain compatible with job security, income stability, and sustainable demand in a transforming urban economy. Only then will the workers who keep the city moving be seen and, at last, secured.
Questions and Answers
Q1: What was the landmark legal recognition given to gig workers under the Code on Social Security, 2020?
A1: The Code on Social Security, 2020, formally recognised gig and platform workers as a distinct category of workers, departing from the traditional binary framework of employer and employee. This was a historic step aimed at extending social protection to the millions of workers in India’s platform economy.
Q2: What did the Economic Survey reveal about the condition of gig workers, and what recommendations did it make?
A2: The Economic Survey found that a substantial proportion of gig workers earn below Rs 15,000 per month, face high income volatility, and remain outside health insurance and old-age security. It also highlighted algorithmic control as a source of insecurity. It recommended minimum earnings standards, portable social security benefits, and mechanisms to address income instability.
Q3: What is the “disconnect” between the Code on Social Security and Budget 2026?
A3: The disconnect is that while the Code legally recognised gig workers and mandated a Social Security Fund, Budget 2026 made no dedicated allocation for gig workers, provided no timeline for activating the Fund, and offered no clarity on government co-financing commitments. The legal framework has been modernised, but the fiscal commitment has not followed.
Q4: How does the “quick delivery” model intensify the vulnerabilities of gig workers?
A4: The “quick delivery” model relies on algorithmic management that rewards speed and penalises delays. This pushes workers towards unsafe driving practices and irregular work schedules. The absence of formal contracts, health insurance, or accident coverage means that operational risks and market uncertainties are transferred entirely onto the workers themselves.
Q5: What is the article’s central argument about what Budget 2027 must do to fulfil the promise of the Code on Social Security?
A5: Budget 2027 must move from “recognition to operationalisation” by establishing:
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A well-structured, inclusive social security fund.
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Co-financing arrangements between different levels of government.
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Flexible benefits frameworks suited to gig work.
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A minimum earning safety net.
The article argues that the question is not whether the state can afford to extend social security to gig workers, but whether the economy can afford not to.
