Regime Change Requires Ground Troops, Why Air Power Alone Cannot Decisively Win Wars
Former Air Chief Marshal Birender Singh Dhanoa on the Limits of Air Campaigns, Iran’s “Nuisance Value,” and What India Has Learned from Balakot and Operation Sindoor
Amid the US-Israeli war on Iran, the former Chief of the Air Staff, Air Chief Marshal Birender Singh Dhanoa (Retired), offers a sobering assessment of what air power can and cannot achieve. While air battles have always been the opening gambit in modern conflicts, he argues that they can achieve decisive success only when coupled with a ground campaign. The liberation of Bangladesh and the 2003 Iraq War stand as the best examples of how regime change was carried out by ground forces operating in an environment of air superiority.
Using air power alone, Dhanoa notes, can at best aim for a change in behaviour. The bombing of Yugoslavia during the Kosovo War ended with the Kumanovo Agreement, not with the overthrow of the regime. In the Russia-Ukraine War, the Russian Air Force has not been able to achieve air superiority, and consequently, its ground forces have not been very successful.
The Propaganda Value of Iranian Claims
In the past week, Iran has claimed to have hit a US F-35 jet and targeted the joint US-UK base on Diego Garcia island, about 4,000 km away. How significant are these claims? Dhanoa is dismissive: “There’s a saying that one swallow does not make a summer. If, in thousands of sorties, you get one hit and that too the aircraft hasn’t fallen, you can see how low the loss rate is.”
The numbers tell the story. The US and Israel have flown between 5,700 and 7,600 sorties and have had only one reported hit. The loss rate is approximately 0.0166 per cent, assuming an average of 6,000 sorties. By contrast, during the 1971 India-Pakistan war, the loss rate was 0.85 per cent, as per Air Marshal Vikram Singh’s book. That means losing about one aircraft per 100 sorties across all aircraft types.
What Iran is achieving, Dhanoa suggests, is primarily of propaganda value. “They can claim for propaganda value that, though the Americans and Israelis are claiming that their defences have been destroyed, they have still managed to hit one stealth aircraft. What Iran is demonstrating is its nuisance value. They are not achieving anything significant in military terms.”
The Nuisance Value of Asymmetric Warfare
Iran has been able to cause damage with drones that cost about $20,000 each, while the cost of the systems used to counter them is much higher. This asymmetry is central to Iran’s strategy. “You see the cost-to-benefit ratio of dealing with the nuisance value,” Dhanoa explains. “Israel and the Gulf countries are using expensive missiles to counter Iran’s drones that are much cheaper to make.”
This is not a new phenomenon. All these countries had moved away from air defence guns, but the drone threat has forced a reconsideration. Dhanoa notes that in Operation Sindoor, despite many drones coming from Pakistan, there was hardly any damage caused to Indian Air Force infrastructure because India had its air defence guns. He adds that the Close-in Weapons System (CIWS), which can shoot down Shahed drones more effectively than older L-70 guns, has likely been inducted by now. The cost of a round from such systems is a fraction of the drone’s cost.
But the asymmetry is not only about cost. “A drone cannot penetrate a blast-pen and take out an aircraft, but it can hit a tank at an oil refinery, triggering a fire that will be portrayed as a major hit. Iran is fighting this perception battle.”
Iran’s Strategic Depth
How long can Iran sustain this conflict, given its economy has been under sanctions for so long? Dhanoa points to Iran’s strategic preparation. “In an autocratic society like Iran, you can divert a lot of resources into defence, even if your economic condition is not so good. They have been preparing for many years. They have seen what the US has been able to do in Yugoslavia and Iraq. Iraq tried to fight the US conventionally and lost badly. They have prepared and dug deep.”
Geography is on Iran’s side. More than 40 per cent of Iran is mountainous, allowing them to dig extensive tunnel networks. “At best, the enemy can destroy the mouth of the tunnel, so you can clear that debris and come out again. If the enemy is very good at intelligence, it can destroy the ventilation shafts, and life becomes very tough inside.” With years of build-up, Iran has kept reserves of missiles and drones that it can deploy from the surface. “With this, the Iranian tunnels and fire, they retain their nuisance value.”
The Civilian Impact
While the military significance of Iranian attacks may be limited, the impact on civilians is profound. Dhanoa notes that the Strait of Hormuz remains a critical vulnerability. “The US could have a chance to defend itself and go through the Strait of Hormuz, definitely during the day. But the tankers are all civilian and have to be insured by Lloyd’s Shipping and other insurers who have either stopped insuring or severely hiked their costs, which in turn are hiking shipping rates. So, the tanker owners will decide to wait. The nuisance value of the Iranian missiles and drones has affected the civilians the most.”
This is a crucial observation. The conflict is not being fought only between military forces. It is disrupting global trade, raising the cost of living, and creating uncertainty that ripples through economies worldwide. The civilian population, in Iran, in India, and across the globe, bears the cost.
US Objectives and Off-Ramps
What does the US hope to achieve? Dhanoa outlines a spectrum of possible objectives. “From my perspective, the desired end state would have been that the Iranian nuclear capability should be obliterated; the missile and drone capabilities should be obliterated; and a change of regime, since there were large-scale protests in Iran at the beginning of this year.”
But there is a lower bar. “The US-Israeli alliance would at least be expecting a change of behaviour, that Iranians stop supporting Hezbollah and Hamas, and stop calling for death to Israel.”
On nuclear capability, the US and Israel would have been able to set Iran back quite a bit. Missile and drone capabilities have been made ineffective, though Dhanoa notes it is not zero; the pinprick capability will always remain. Regime change, however, is another matter. “Regime change will need boots on the ground.”
This is the critical point. President Donald Trump can walk away tomorrow if a change in behaviour is the objective, not a change of regime. “If that is the case, he can have a peace accord tomorrow.”
Lessons for India
What are the learnings for India from recent conflicts, where the battle has mostly been in the air? Dhanoa is clear: “The air battle has always been the opening gambit in these conflicts. But it can achieve a lot only if it’s coupled with a ground campaign. The liberation of Bangladesh and the Iraq War of 2003 are the best examples of how a change of regime was carried out by ground forces operating in an environment of air superiority.”
Using air power alone can at best aim for a change in behaviour. The bombing of Yugoslavia during the Kosovo War ended with an agreement, not with regime change. In the Russia-Ukraine War, the Russian Air Force has not been able to achieve air superiority, and hence their ground forces have not been very successful.
Both Balakot and Operation Sindoor were mainly air campaigns aiming at behavioural change. The objective was to tell the sponsors of terrorism in Pakistan that “we can get you wherever you are and terrorist attacks in India will come to you at a cost.” Operation Sindoor demonstrated the Indian Air Force’s capability to hit Pakistani targets through the length and breadth of Pakistan, with their Air Force not being able to respond in kind.
The Limits of Air Power
The current conflict in West Asia reinforces a fundamental military reality: air power can punish, deter, and degrade, but it cannot, by itself, achieve regime change or secure lasting political outcomes. For that, boots on the ground are required.
This is not a new insight. It was true in World War II, where strategic bombing did not break German or Japanese morale, and victory required ground invasion. It was true in Vietnam, where the most intense bombing campaign in history did not prevent the fall of Saigon. It was true in Iraq, where the 2003 invasion toppled Saddam Hussein only after ground forces rolled into Baghdad.
Yet each generation of military planners seems to need to relearn this lesson. The allure of air power is powerful: it is visible, dramatic, and seemingly bloodless—for the attacker. It promises quick victories without the messy business of ground warfare. But the promise is rarely fulfilled.
The Way Forward
As the conflict in West Asia continues, the question is not whether air power will decide the outcome. It will not. The question is whether the US and Israel are prepared to commit ground forces to achieve their objectives. If they are not, then the best they can hope for is a change in Iranian behaviour—and even that is uncertain.
For India, the lessons are clear. Air power is an essential tool of national security. It provides deterrence, precision strike capability, and the ability to send clear signals to adversaries. But it cannot substitute for the hard work of ground forces when regime change or territorial objectives are at stake.
The Indian Air Force has demonstrated its capabilities in Balakot and Operation Sindoor. But these were limited campaigns aimed at behavioural change, not regime change. For larger objectives, India must continue to invest in its ground forces, maintain its edge in air power, and ensure that the two work in concert.
The air battle has always been the opening gambit. It will continue to be so. But the opening gambit is not the whole game. The whole game requires boots on the ground.
Q&A: Unpacking the Air Power and Iran Conflict
Q1: What does former Air Chief Marshal Dhanoa say about Iran’s claim of hitting a US F-35 jet?
A: Dhanoa dismisses the significance of the claim, noting that the US and Israel have flown between 5,700 and 7,600 sorties with only one reported hit—a loss rate of approximately 0.0166%. By contrast, the loss rate in the 1971 India-Pakistan war was 0.85%. He argues that Iran is achieving only propaganda value, demonstrating “nuisance value” rather than anything significant in military terms.
Q2: Why does Dhanoa argue that air power alone cannot achieve regime change?
A: Dhanoa states that air power can achieve a lot only when coupled with a ground campaign. He cites the liberation of Bangladesh and the 2003 Iraq War as examples where regime change was carried out by ground forces operating in an environment of air superiority. Air power alone, he notes, can at best aim for a change in behaviour—as seen in the Kosovo War, which ended with an agreement, not regime change.
Q3: What is Iran’s “nuisance value,” and how does it affect the conflict?
A: Iran is using inexpensive drones (costing about $20,000 each) to force Israel and Gulf countries to use expensive missiles to counter them, creating an unfavourable cost-to-benefit ratio for the defenders. While these drones cannot destroy hardened military assets, they can hit vulnerable targets like oil refinery tanks, creating fires that can be portrayed as major hits. Dhanoa notes this is a “perception battle.”
Q4: How long can Iran sustain the conflict given its economic situation?
A: Dhanoa points to Iran’s strategic preparation over many years. As an autocratic society, Iran can divert significant resources to defence despite economic challenges. The country’s mountainous terrain (over 40% of Iran) allows extensive tunnel networks that can survive air strikes. Even if tunnel mouths are destroyed, they can be cleared and reopened. Iran has also kept reserves of missiles and drones to deploy from the surface, allowing it to retain “nuisance value.”
Q5: What lessons does Dhanoa draw for India from recent conflicts?
A: Dhanoa notes that both Balakot and Operation Sindoor were air campaigns aimed at behavioural change—telling Pakistan that terrorist attacks on India will come at a cost. He emphasises that air power has always been the opening gambit, but decisive outcomes require ground forces operating under air superiority. The Russian Air Force’s failure to achieve air superiority in Ukraine, he notes, has hindered their ground forces’ success. India must ensure its air power and ground forces work in concert.
