Pakistan’s Arms Bazaar, How Rawalpindi is Forging a New Strategic Identity in the Gulf and Beyond
In the shadowy world of global arms dealing, where geopolitics, finance, and conflict intersect, a significant shift is underway. While India’s attention has been focused on its own strategic partnerships and domestic challenges, its western neighbor has been quietly but aggressively carving out a new role for itself. Pakistan, long perceived as an economy reliant on handouts and a nation grappling with its own internal security dilemmas, is emerging as a significant arms supplier to conflict zones in the Arab world. A series of recent deals, culminating in a historic $4.6 billion agreement to supply fighter jets and trainer aircraft to Libyan National Army (LNA) commander Khalifa Haftar, signals a bold new strategy by the Pakistani military establishment, particularly the powerful GHQ in Rawalpindi. This is not merely about commerce; it is about forging a new strategic identity, leveraging military-to-military ties, Islamic solidarity, and aggressive salesmanship to become a net security provider to the Gulf and beyond. For India, this development should be a wake-up call, a reminder that its neighbor is actively working to tilt regional geopolitics in its favor, even as its economy lags far behind.
The meeting in Rawalpindi on February 2 was itself a piece of political theater. Pakistan’s Chief of Defence Forces, General Asim Munir, met with Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar, the 82-year-old warlord who controls eastern Libya. It was believed to be the first meeting between two self-styled Field Marshals, a symbolic coming-together of military strongmen. The substance of the meeting, however, was far more significant: the finalization of a deal to supply Pakistani arms worth $4.6 billion to Haftar’s Benghazi-based Libyan National Army. This is the largest arms export deal in Pakistan’s history. Haftar, recognizing its importance, sent his Prime Minister two days ahead and brought along his son and putative heir, Saddam, underscoring the dynastic and personal nature of the transaction.
The deal reportedly comprises 16 fully loaded JF-17 fighter jets and 12 Super Mushak trainer aircraft, to be delivered over the next 30 months. The JF-17 is a particularly significant piece of hardware. It is a multi-role combat aircraft built in Pakistan with extensive Chinese assistance, powered by a Russian engine and capable of carrying some Turkish missiles. It is a symbol of Pakistan’s attempt to create an indigenous, or at least assembled, defence industry. For Haftar, whose LNA currently lacks any meaningful air power, this deal is a potential game-changer. It could provide him with the aerial capability to finally tip the balance in the sputtering, inconclusive civil war against the Tripoli-based, internationally recognized Government of National Unity (GNU). Reports suggest the deal is being funded by the United Arab Emirates (UAE), a long-time supporter of Haftar, adding another layer of complexity to the transaction.
This Libyan deal is not an isolated incident. It is part of a concerted, multi-pronged strategy by Pakistan to become a major player in the global arms bazaar, particularly in markets where it can leverage its Islamic identity and its deep military ties with Gulf monarchies. Pakistan is simultaneously negotiating a massive deal with the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF), which is engaged in a bloody civil war against the Rapid Support Forces (RSF). The proposed deal, worth an initial $1.5 billion, involves 10 Karakorum-8 light attack aircraft, more than 200 drones, and advanced air defence systems. There are strong hints that this could eventually expand to include JF-17s, raising the total value to $4 billion. Saudi Arabia, a key player in the Sudanese conflict and a nation with deep financial ties to Pakistan, is rumored to be considering financing this transfer through the waiver of loans owed to it by Islamabad.
Pakistan’s sales pitch is sophisticated and multi-layered. It leverages several recent developments to turbocharge its defence exports. General Munir has cultivated a “bromance” with former U.S. President Donald Trump, who welcomed him to the White House. Pakistan has signed a Strategic Mutual Defence Agreement with Saudi Arabia. The UAE’s President has visited Islamabad. Pakistan also claims its weaponry, particularly the JF-17, has been “combat-proven” in its conflicts with India, including the claimed successes in the May 2025 skirmishes. This narrative of battlefield effectiveness is a powerful marketing tool. Cumulatively, if all of Pakistan’s claimed and potential deals are added up—including previous sales to Azerbaijan, Myanmar, and Nigeria—the total could reach an eye-popping $13 billion.
However, despite the fanfare and the impressive numbers, this ambitious arms export drive faces significant headwinds and constraining factors that could dampen the optimism in Rawalpindi. The first and most critical constraint is industrial capacity. Pakistan lacks a deep, indigenous industrial base. Its defence production is largely an assembly operation, reliant on a global supply chain of components from China, Russia, and Türkiye. Its capacity to produce the JF-17, for example, is limited to about 25 units per year, and this output must be split between fulfilling domestic requirements for the Pakistani Air Force and meeting export orders. Any surge in demand would quickly outstrip supply.
The second major constraint is financing. Many of these transactions are made to cash-strapped clients dependent on third-party financing from Gulf states like Saudi Arabia and the UAE. This creates a dependency and a potential “pinch point.” If the geopolitical interests of the financiers shift, or if their own financial circumstances change, the deals could collapse. This leads to the third and perhaps most treacherous factor: the complex legal and geopolitical landscape into which Pakistan is wading. Both Libya and Sudan are currently under United Nations arms embargoes. While these embargoes are often porous and selectively enforced, they create a legal and reputational risk. Furthermore, the two mega-deals are buffeted by the intense and often opaque rivalry between Saudi Arabia and the UAE. Both nations have competing interests in Libya and Sudan, and Pakistan is being forced to perform an awkward balancing act, trying to satisfy both patrons simultaneously without alienating either. The situation is further complicated by the possibility that Haftar, supported by the UAE, could supply Pakistani arms to the UAE-backed RSF in Sudan, potentially putting Pakistani weapons in the hands of both belligerents in that conflict.
There is also the risk that the hype surrounding the “combat-proven” success of Pakistani weapons may eventually wear off, revealing shoddy, incompetent products and resulting in a reversal of fortune. And finally, General Munir’s much-touted relationship with Donald Trump may prove to be a mixed blessing. While Trump may bless the transactional activities of his “favourite Field Marshal,” he may take a dim view of Munir acting as a conduit for Chinese military hardware into a region that Washington considers its own sphere of influence. The U.S. has historically found it convenient to subcontract Gulf security to Pakistan, but this current episode feels different. The Gulf monarchies are now using the same subcontractors to arm their respective regional proxies, further fragmenting an already volatile region.
For Pakistan itself, the motivations are clear and compelling. This is not the old model of putting “boots on the ground” to fight Arab wars. This is a leaner, more profitable approach. Rawalpindi gets hard cash, earns valuable political capital and “brownie points” from the cash-rich Gulf monarchies, and expands its strategic outreach to regional hotspots. It positions Pakistan as a hub of a military-industrial complex, a role that washes away, at least in the eyes of its new clients, the taint of terrorism, dodgy financial practices, and drug running that has long dogged its international reputation. It earns it plaudits from both Beijing and Washington, a neat trick in a polarized world.
This growing role for Pakistan should be a matter of deep concern for New Delhi. India has a much stronger economic engagement with the Gulf than Pakistan does. Indian expatriates send home billions of dollars in remittances, and India is a major trading partner. However, Pakistan is now forging a regional security and defence role that India has conspicuously failed to build. This is a force multiplier for Islamabad. It enables Pakistan to reclaim a sense of strategic parity with India in a critical region, despite the vast disparity in economic size. It emboldens the GHQ in Rawalpindi, potentially reviving its willingness to sponsor terrorism in India, secure in the knowledge that it has powerful new friends and a fresh narrative of military success to peddle.
The contrast between the two nations’ defence export strategies is stark. India’s defence exports have grown rapidly and respectably, reaching $2.8 billion in 2024-25. But Pakistan has shown that an asymptotic surge is achievable with a more passionate, single-minded, and strategically focused approach. While India, as a more responsible and self-respecting nation that adheres to international law, cannot and should not replicate Pakistan’s willingness to flout UN embargoes and arm warlords, it can certainly learn from its neighbor’s aggressive marketing and strategic integration.
India must prioritize defence exports not just for their financial value, but for their immense political spin-offs. It should focus particularly on its friends in the neighbourhood and the Global South. As the world’s third-largest crude importer, India has enormous leverage. It can and should use its buying power to persuade its oil suppliers to redress the massive trade imbalance by procuring Indian weapon systems. It can link its sizable aid programs and credit lines with other nations to lubricate arms deals. Most importantly, it needs to create a dedicated, nimble, and empowered defence export promotion organization, one that cuts through bureaucratic red tape and can aggressively market Indian products at international exhibitions, leveraging expertise from the private sector, IT, and artificial intelligence. Pakistan’s recent salesmanship is a wake-up call. It demonstrates that in the high-stakes game of geopolitics, defence exports are not just about hardware; they are about building influence, forging alliances, and shaping the strategic landscape. India, with its vastly superior industrial and economic base, has every advantage. The question is whether it has the strategic will and organizational agility to compete.
Questions and Answers
Q1: What was the significance of the meeting between General Asim Munir and Khalifa Haftar in Rawalpindi?
A1: The meeting was significant for two reasons. Symbolically, it was believed to be the first meeting between two self-styled “Field Marshals.” Substantively, it resulted in the finalization of a historic $4.6 billion arms deal—Pakistan’s largest ever—to supply JF-17 fighter jets and trainer aircraft to Haftar’s Libyan National Army, potentially shifting the balance in Libya’s civil war.
Q2: Besides Libya, what other major arms deal is Pakistan pursuing, and who are the key financiers involved?
A2: Pakistan is negotiating a deal worth up to $4 billion with the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF). This includes attack aircraft, drones, and air defence systems. The deals are often financed by Gulf states; the Libya deal is reportedly funded by the UAE, and the Sudan deal is expected to be financed by Saudi Arabia through loan waivers.
Q3: What are the major constraints that could hinder Pakistan’s ambitious defence export drive?
A3: Several factors could slow Pakistan’s momentum:
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Limited Industrial Capacity: Pakistan largely assembles, rather than manufactures, weapons and can only produce about 25 JF-17s per year.
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Financing Dependency: Deals rely on third-party funding from Gulf states, creating vulnerability.
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Legal and Geopolitical Issues: Both Libya and Sudan are under UN arms embargoes, and the deals are complicated by the rivalry between Saudi Arabia and the UAE.
Q4: Why should India be concerned about Pakistan’s growing role as a defence supplier to the Gulf?
A4: Pakistan’s new role as a “net security provider” to the Gulf is a strategic force multiplier. It allows Pakistan to gain influence and reclaim a sense of parity with India in a critical region, despite its much smaller economy. This could embolden the Pakistani military establishment and complicate India’s own strategic and economic interests in the Gulf, which are currently based primarily on trade and expatriate remittances.
Q5: What steps does the article suggest India should take to counter this trend and boost its own defence exports?
A5: The article suggests India should:
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Leverage its economic power: As the world’s third-largest crude importer, India should persuade oil suppliers to buy Indian weapons to redress trade imbalances.
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Link aid to exports: Utilize its aid programs and credit lines with other nations to facilitate arms deals.
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Create a dedicated export promotion body: Establish a nimble, autonomous organization to aggressively market Indian defence products, cutting through bureaucratic delays and leveraging expertise from the private sector and IT.
