India’s Strategic Autonomy on Trial, Navigating Between Great Powers

At a time when there is a perceived sense of slight about Washington’s assertions that New Delhi has committed to reducing Russian oil imports in a lopsided trade deal, External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar affirmed that India’s decisions on energy purchases will be made after considering “availability, cost and risks.” Strategic autonomy is a non-negotiable condition for the availability of strategic options in the interaction of states, and for India to conduct its international diplomatic negotiations, it needs to blend high-mindedness with toughness.

Jaishankar is surely aware that the size of the economy, position in trade and technological networks, savings, wealth, and finance are the main sources of economic power, and their impact on strategic autonomy is considerable. In a world where power is increasingly measured in economic terms, India’s ability to maintain independent foreign policy depends on its economic strength.

The Perception of Capitulation

Part of the impression accounting for the sense of India’s capitulation to the US must be due to the Leader of the Opposition, Rahul Gandhi’s allegation in the Lok Sabha that the NDA government had compromised India’s energy security, data, and the future of its farmers by signing the Indo-US interim trade agreement. Going by Trump badmouthing India for the last couple of months and his disparaging tone, India’s stony silence and refusal to counter Trump further firmed up a perception of India’s tame gesture.

Whether this perception reflects reality or is merely a product of domestic political posturing is a separate question. But perceptions matter in international relations. When a nation is seen as weak, it invites pressure. When it is seen as strong, it commands respect.

Russian President Vladimir Putin told Washington last year not to try to strong-arm India and China with tariffs and sanctions, saying, “You cannot talk to India or China in that way.” Addressing the media after attending the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation Summit, Putin accused the Trump administration of using economic pressure as a tool to undermine two of Asia’s biggest powers.

We would have loved our PM saying to Trump that when it comes to the energy security of a nation, India, like the US, must brook no nonsense. But diplomacy is not about what we would love; it is about what works. Sometimes silence is a strategy.

The Oil Question

Trump announced that a trade deal had been reached with India, claiming that New Delhi would stop buying Russian oil as part of the agreement. No comment from India has been forthcoming, and Russia said it has received no word from New Delhi about halting oil purchases.

“We respect bilateral US-Indian relations,” Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov said, “But we attach no less importance to the development of an advanced strategic partnership between Russia and India.”

Analysts are, however, wary that India will stop buying Russian oil completely due to the economic ramifications. Russian oil has been a lifeline for India, providing discounted crude that has helped manage the current account deficit and inflation. To give that up without a viable alternative would be economically damaging.

As both the US and Russia consider India to be their natural ally, it would be unfortunate if India acts on American diktats. The question is whether the trade deal actually requires such action, or whether Trump’s claims are exaggerated. The deliberate obfuscation from New Delhi suggests the latter.

The Nuclear Precedent

Whether the core goals of Indian exceptionalism and prickly sovereignty of its global vision had been sustained was on trial during the US-India negotiation on the 2008 nuclear agreement and in some features of US-India defence sales. But this time, it is a bit hazy.

The 2008 nuclear deal was a landmark agreement that ended India’s nuclear isolation and opened the door for civil nuclear cooperation. It was achieved through intense negotiation and demonstrated that India could work with the US while maintaining its strategic autonomy. The deal was not a capitulation; it was a carefully calibrated arrangement that served Indian interests.

This time, the contours are less clear. The trade deal has been announced, but its details remain opaque. The claims about Russian oil are contested. The sense of what India has actually conceded is murky.

The Iran Complication

India’s vote against the resolution adopted by the United Nations Human Rights Council condemning Iran for its ‘violent’ crackdown on peaceful protests and extending investigative mandates to probe the alleged violations must be read in the light of the US flexing its muscles in subverting India’s interests both in the cases of its relation to Russia and Iran.

India’s decision was driven by multiple factors: the need to not antagonise its Muslim population, its expediency to maintain its interests in the Chabahar port, and a slew of other considerations. The US revoked the long-standing sanctions waiver for Chabahar in September 2025, which exposed Indian operators to potential penalties.

The US is trying to drag India into a test of friendship that overlooks the nuances of an established relationship. India has historically maintained ties with Iran despite US pressure because Chabahar is strategically important—it provides access to Afghanistan and Central Asia without going through Pakistan.

Compartmentalising Relationships

India’s thriving bilateral relationships with Iran, Israel, and Saudi Arabia—each having adversarial relations with the other—are essentially independent and non-parallel. India’s dealings with countries locked in outstanding disputes have been the hallmark of its foreign policy behaviour since independence.

For instance, since the establishment of full diplomatic relations with Tel Aviv in 1992, India has sought to compartmentalise its ties with Israel and Iran, driven by an intent to pursue bilateral relations consistent with its interests and requirements, regardless of their conflicts.

To make strategic autonomy work, India has, in the past, been able to muster a sophisticated and complex set of bilateral and multilateral relations. This is not easy. It requires constant calibration, careful messaging, and the ability to withstand pressure from all sides.

The Russian-China-India Triangle

It bears recall that since the late 1990s, there has been frequent speculation about the formation of a bilateral alliance consisting of Russia, China, and India, which, by the imperative of strategic autonomy, was a no-brainer mainly because the relationship of each of them with the US is more important than their relationship with each other.

This is the fundamental reality that shapes Indian foreign policy. India’s relationship with the US is critical for technology, investment, and balancing China. Its relationship with Russia is critical for defence supplies and energy. Its relationship with China is critical for trade and regional stability, despite the tensions.

Navigating these relationships requires a delicate touch. Too close to the US, and Russia and Iran are alienated. Too close to Russia, and the US applies pressure. The goal is to maintain balanced relationships with all while being dependent on none.

Conclusion: Wearing Several Hats

The American flair for unilateralism and interference in the internal affairs of other countries stands not only in violation of international law but also in the diktats of strategic autonomy. If the past is any guide, technology denial, sanctions, and arm-twisting continued to haunt India as far as the US is concerned, while Russia, on the other hand, had been consistently hospitable to Indian requirements.

Energy and defence had been the bane of Indo-Russian ties even before the Ukraine war. The cold logic of 21st-century global politics is to wear several hats. India cannot afford to put all its strategic eggs in one basket. It must maintain relationships across the geopolitical spectrum.

Strategic autonomy is not about rejecting partnerships; it is about ensuring that no partnership becomes a dependency. It is about having options. It is about being able to say no when necessary and yes when beneficial. The current trial of India’s strategic autonomy will test whether these principles can be maintained in the face of intense pressure.

Q&A: Unpacking India’s Strategic Autonomy

Q1: What is strategic autonomy in the context of Indian foreign policy?

Strategic autonomy is the ability of a state to make independent decisions in its foreign policy based on its national interests, without being dictated by other powers. It is the intellectual descendant of non-alignment, adapted to a multipolar world. It requires India to maintain balanced relationships with all major powers while being dependent on none, and to have the economic and military strength to back up its independent stance.

Q2: What is the controversy surrounding the US trade deal and Russian oil?

President Trump announced that India had agreed to stop buying Russian oil as part of the trade deal. India has not confirmed this, and Russia says it has received no word from New Delhi. Analysts doubt India will completely halt Russian oil purchases due to economic ramifications—Russian crude has been a lifeline, providing discounted oil that helps manage the current account deficit and inflation. The deliberate obfuscation from New Delhi suggests Trump’s claims may be exaggerated.

Q3: How has India historically managed relationships with adversarial countries?

India has maintained thriving bilateral relationships with Iran, Israel, and Saudi Arabia—each having adversarial relations with the other—by compartmentalising its ties. Since establishing full diplomatic relations with Israel in 1992, India has pursued bilateral relations consistent with its interests regardless of other countries’ conflicts. This sophisticated approach allows India to maintain multiple, non-parallel relationships simultaneously, a hallmark of its foreign policy since independence.

Q4: Why is the Chabahar port important to India, and how has US policy affected it?

Chabahar port in Iran provides India strategic access to Afghanistan and Central Asia without going through Pakistan. It is crucial for trade, connectivity, and countering Chinese influence in the region. The US revoked the long-standing sanctions waiver for Chabahar in September 2025, exposing Indian operators to potential penalties. This creates tension between India’s strategic interests and US pressure, testing India’s ability to maintain independent relationships.

Q5: What is the cold logic of 21st-century global politics according to the article?

The cold logic is that nations must wear several hats—maintain multiple, sometimes competing relationships simultaneously. India’s relationship with the US is critical for technology and balancing China; with Russia for defence and energy; with China for trade and regional stability. The goal is not to choose sides but to maintain balanced relationships with all while being dependent on none. Strategic autonomy requires constant calibration and the ability to withstand pressure from multiple directions.

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