India and Israel, The Evolution of a Strategic Partnership and the Dilemmas of National Interest
Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s recent visit to Israel on February 25-26, 2026, generated the predictable spectrum of reactions. Ruling party members celebrated the warm reception and the deepening of ties, while opposition voices lamented what they saw as India’s abandonment of the Palestinian cause. But beyond the political brouhaha lies a more significant story: the visit was the latest milestone in a decades-long, paradigmatic shift in India’s foreign policy, a journey from principled opposition to pragmatic partnership that reflects New Delhi’s evolving understanding of its national interest in a complex and dangerous world.
To appreciate the scale of this shift, one must look back to 1948. India was among the countries that opposed the creation of Israel through UN and Western intervention. For decades, under the leadership of Jawaharlal Nehru and his successors, India’s policy towards the Palestine-Israel conflict was consistently framed by the basic tenets of its post-independence foreign policy: anti-imperialism, anti-racism, support for national liberation movements, opposition to military occupation, and a commitment to resolving disputes through mediation and negotiation. India was one of the most forceful non-Arab critics of Israel’s policies towards Palestinians, a stance that aligned it with the broader Non-Aligned Movement and the Arab world.
This Nehruvian consensus held for over four decades. But the compulsions of realpolitik began to chip away at it long before the Bharatiya Janata Party came to power. The Indo-Pakistani wars of 1971 and 1999 saw Israel emerge as a key, if quiet, supplier of armaments, ammunition, and intelligence. When full diplomatic relations were finally established in 1992, it was under a Congress government, signaling that the old certainties were already fraying. The Cold War was over, and India’s economic crisis had forced a fundamental reorientation of its foreign and economic policy. Pragmatism was beginning to eclipse ideology.
Under the BJP, this pragmatic drift became a deliberate and openly articulated strategy. The shift has been steady and unmistakable. Prime Minister Modi’s recent visit was in perfect sync with this changing trajectory, and it bore testimony to India’s assertion of a new kind of strategic autonomy—one that prioritizes national interest over and above any ethical or normative considerations that might have guided policy in the past.
The warmth of the reception was notable. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu personally escorted Modi to every engagement, from his landing to his departure. The chemistry between the two leaders, both powerful nationalist figures facing domestic and international headwinds, was palpable. Modi became the first Indian leader to address Israel’s Knesset, where he delivered a message of deep friendship. He noted, with symbolic resonance, that he was born on the same day India formally recognized Israel in 1950. He expressed condolences for every life lost in the October 7, 2023, Hamas terrorist attack, and called for sustained global action against terrorism.
What Modi did not mention, and what was not lost on observers, was Israel’s relentless bombing of the civilian population in Gaza and the ongoing allegations of genocide being examined by international courts. The irony was stark: a visit celebrating a deepening strategic partnership took place while Israel faced growing international isolation over the high civilian casualties in Gaza and Prime Minister Netanyahu’s contentious West Bank settlement plans, which have been condemned by dozens of countries, including traditional allies like Germany, France, and the UK.
The tangible outcomes of the visit were substantial. The two leaders agreed to upgrade ties to a “Special Strategic Partnership” and signed more than 15 Memorandums of Understanding covering critical technologies, artificial intelligence, cybersecurity, quantum computing, agriculture, culture, and education. They also agreed to facilitate the employment of 50,000 Indian workers in Israel over the next five years. India is expected to acquire Israel’s AI-driven air defence systems, including the Iron Dome and Iron Beam, to complement its existing S-400 systems. Trade has grown from a mere $200 million in 1992 to $6.5 billion in 2024, making India Israel’s second-largest trading partner in Asia after China.
The partnership now operates within a broader strategic framework. Both countries are members of the I2U2 group, also known as the Middle Eastern Quad, which also includes the United Arab Emirates and the United States. Formed in 2021, this grouping is a testament to the new, economics-driven multilateralism of the 21st century, focused on joint investments in space, health, and food security, and explicitly setting aside the old ideological and religious divisions that once defined alignments in the region.
The ideological underpinnings of this shift are also significant. V.D. Savarkar, the ideological guru of the BJP, had long cited Israel as an example of how a small nation could survive and thrive through military preparedness, technological innovation, and national unity. For Hindu majoritarian thinkers, Israel offers a model of a state that actively champions the identity of the majority community. Critics argue that this ideological affinity, this vision of India as a Hindu homeland echoing Israel’s self-image as a Jewish state, is a driving force behind the deepening ties. Both countries frame “Islamic terrorism” as a key existential threat, a label that critics say is used to justify wider anti-Muslim policies at home and abroad.
This deepening relationship now confronts its most serious test. The US and Israel have embarked on a full-scale war with Iran, a conflict that has the potential to engulf the entire region and directly threaten India’s energy security and the safety of its millions of citizens working in the Gulf. India must once again perform a delicate balancing act, a tightrope walk between its image as a Vishvaguru (world leader) committed to a rules-based international order and opposed to aggression, and its role as a hard-nosed pursuer of its own national interest, which now includes a “Special Strategic Partnership” with one of the belligerents.
The tricky question that now confronts Indian policymakers is not whether the partnership with Israel is valuable. It clearly is. The question is where, in this new and dangerous conflict, India’s true national interest lies. Can it maintain its strategic autonomy while being so closely aligned with one side? Can it continue to balance its relationships with Israel, Iran, and the Arab world? The answers to these questions will define the next chapter of India’s engagement with the most volatile region on earth. The visit to Israel was a celebration of how far the relationship has come. The war with Iran will reveal its true strategic depth and its ultimate cost.
Questions and Answers
Q1: What was India’s traditional foreign policy stance towards Israel for decades after 1948?
A1: India opposed the creation of Israel in 1948 and was a forceful non-Arab critic of Israeli policies towards Palestinians. This stance, rooted in Nehruvian principles of anti-imperialism, anti-racism, and support for national liberation movements, held for over four decades.
Q2: When did India’s policy towards Israel begin to shift, and what were the early drivers of this change?
A2: The shift began before the BJP came to power. Israel supplied India with armaments, ammunition, and intelligence during the 1971 and 1999 wars with Pakistan. Full diplomatic relations were established in 1992 under a Congress government, signaling that pragmatic considerations of national security and realpolitik were starting to outweigh older ideological positions.
Q3: What were the key outcomes of Prime Minister Modi’s February 2026 visit to Israel?
A3: The visit resulted in an upgrade of ties to a “Special Strategic Partnership” and over 15 MoUs in critical areas like AI, cybersecurity, quantum computing, and agriculture. It also included an agreement to facilitate employment for 50,000 Indian workers in Israel and progressed discussions on acquiring Israeli air defence systems (Iron Dome, Iron Beam).
Q4: What criticism did the visit attract, and what significant omission was noted in PM Modi’s address to the Knesset?
A4: Critics noted the irony of celebrating a strategic partnership while Israel faced growing international isolation over civilian casualties in Gaza and Prime Minister Netanyahu’s West Bank settlement plans. PM Modi expressed condolences for Israeli lives lost in the October 7 Hamas attack but did not mention Israel’s military actions in Gaza or the allegations of genocide being examined in international courts.
Q5: What “tricky question” does the escalating US-Israel war with Iran pose for India?
A5: The war forces India to balance its image as a Vishvaguru committed to a rules-based order against its “hardcore national interest,” which now includes a “Special Strategic Partnership” with Israel. The question is whether India can maintain its strategic autonomy while being so closely aligned with one side in a conflict that threatens its energy security and its millions of citizens in the Gulf.
